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ANTI-IMPERIALISM DURING THE PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN WAR:
PROTESTING 'CRIMINAL AGGRESSION' AND 'BENEVOLENT ASSIMILATION'

BY

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DISSERTATION

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ABSTRACT

At the conclusion of the Spanish-American War of 1898, the United States purchased the Philippines from Spain in the Treaty of Paris. For over a decade beginning in early 1899, the United States waged a brutal war to suppress Filipinos seeking an end to colonial rule. My dissertation investigates the anti-imperialist movement in the United States that protested the use of extreme violence against Filipinas/os, including the "water cure" (precursor to "waterboarding") and "reconcentration" camps, during the Philippine-American War. The project focuses on two related issues: (1) the chronological development of anti-imperialisms in the United States with regard to structural issues of race, class, and gender, and (2) the effects of anti-imperialist activism on the formation of U.S. imperialist policies. I explain the anti-imperialist movement's relationship to the formation of what I call a "racial state of exception," a historically adaptable pattern of legal inclusions and exclusions of violence that continues to inform U.S. policies. The analysis draws empirically on archival collections of the leaders of the Anti-Imperialist League (the organization at the vanguard of the anti-imperialist movement), government documents at the National Archives and Record Administration, and socialist, labor, progressive, and Black newspapers. This is the first study to show the importance of Black, white, and Filipina women's involvement in the anti-imperialist movement during the war. Through the use of an intersectionality framework and feminist research methods, the dissertation uncovers the women's essential but heretofore overlooked contributions to the anti-imperialist movement. Additionally, I demonstrate that anti-imperialists' strategy of framing contradictions between democracy and imperialist violence as "criminal aggression," as opposed to the government's claim of "benevolent
assimilation," contributed to conditions that elicited an official senate investigation on
affairs in the Philippines. The investigation gave rise to explicit debates over rules of war,
race, and indiscriminate use of violence by a "civilized" nation. It was through these
debates that the "racial state of exception" evolved from a set of unacknowledged
practices in the Philippines to explicitly rationalized legal strategies. After the senate
investigations, anti-imperialists changed their strategy to continue focusing on violence in
the Philippines and informing the U.S. public. Facing public indifference, anti-
imperialists adjusted their schemas concerning "civilization" and moved their activism to
different types of "rights" organizations.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I settled on the anti-imperialist movement during the Philippine-American War as the topic for my dissertation in the context of the U.S. invading Iraq and Afghanistan after 9-11-01. These wars in Central Asia and the corresponding opposition movement have been personal since I had a younger brother who signed up for the Illinois National Guard in his senior year of high school to help pay for college. I unequivocally opposed the invasions while my brother was sent to both Iraq and Afghanistan. He has since returned safely, just weeks after my final defense. The history of the Philippine-American War and the anti-imperialist movement allowed me to research themes of race, gender, class, violence, imperialism, and resistance with the added element of historical distance. I remained critically reflexive of my relationship to the politics of the present as I studied and analyzed the politics of the past. But, the families directly affected by the complications of war, families in the U.S., in Afghanistan, and in Iraq, were frequently in my thoughts.

During the process of writing this dissertation, I have become indebted for aid in making this a better project. Various archivists and librarians gave support and guidance in helping me locate key documents, especially Karen Hogenboom at University of Illinois. My research was also supported with grants and fellowships from the University of Illinois including the Center on Democracy in a Multiracial Society, the Graduate College Dissertation Travel Grant, the Graduate College Dissertation Completion Fellowship, the Women and Gender Studies Feminist Scholarship Award, and the
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I thank my dissertation committee for their enthusiasm and guidance. Dave Roediger's vast historical knowledge and his ability to ask the right questions to work out a problem got me through more than one block. Julian Go's suggestions and challenges pushed me to further think through my position, which made the project more thoroughly researched. Anna-Maria Marshall's support came when needed most. Incorporating her suggestions made my arguments more nuanced and better structured. Winifred Poster's suggestions made the project more precise from the outset. Moon-Kie Jung incisively suggested what reading would get me through a conceptual problem and allowed me the freedom and space to explore my questions. His careful listening, critical questions and suggestions, and generosity provided steady support as the dissertation evolved. It has been a privilege to work with a chair with such integrity and intelligence.

Throughout my life family members have supported me even if they may not have always understood me. Each of my parents contributed to the development of this dissertation in key ways. My mom demonstrated the importance of being true to one's self and fostered my independence and respect for the experiences of others from a young age. My dad demonstrated the value of community and civic responsibility and fostered my curiosity to explore the unfamiliar. My grandmothers, Jean Murphy and Carolyn Staub, have been constants and champions throughout my life. My Aunt Kathy (my godmother) and Uncle Tom were friendly faces after heady days in the archives, insisting I stay at their home while I researched at the University of Michigan. I also appreciate the
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Friendships have enriched my graduate experience as well. Whether it was as a writing partner, a debater, a cultural critic, a karaoke accomplice, or a master chef, Lisa Asplen, Satomi Yamamoto, Laura Jennings, Adrian Cruz, Kazuyo Kubo, Judith Vendrzyk, and Jennifer Ortman are in many fond memories. Carolyn Hronis, Heather Downs, Kareem Muhammad, and Anne McCloskey have been those things as well as steadfast friends and sounding boards for far more than work.

My siblings have always been a source of inspiration and motivation. Being their older sister has informed much of my identity. They kept me, perhaps ironically, out of trouble and on a path. Finally, Tim McHenry's confidence in this project and in my ability to do it has sustained me. He enables me to remember to have fun, go to work fresh, and, not least, take care of myself in the process. This is for Tim, Sean, Daniel, Patrick, and Anna – my friends and my teachers.
For my family
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION: ANTI-IMPERIALISM AND THE MAKING OF EMPIRE'S EXCEPTIONS

I speak not of forcible annexation, for that cannot be thought of
That, by our code of morals would be criminal aggression.

---Message of President McKinley to Congress, April 11, 1898

The impulse for the anti-imperialist movement was crystallized when President McKinley declared sovereignty over the Philippines with his "benevolent assimilation proclamation," which opened up a "Pandora's Box" (Blount 1912) of events in the Philippines. Events unfolded in an incongruous order. First, McKinley wrote a proclamation outlining U.S. intentions in the Philippines at the suggestion of Admiral Dewey in mid December 1898 (Elliott 1916). The proclamation, which was later dubbed the "benevolent assimilation proclamation," declaring U.S. sovereignty over the Philippines was publicized for Filipinos beginning on January 1, 1899 (Blount 1912). Finally, on February 5, 1899, the day after fighting broke out between Filipino and U.S. forces, the Senate ratified the Treaty of Paris by only one vote. Ratification of the treaty retroactively approved the President's prior declaration of U.S. sovereignty over the Philippines, paying Spain the price of 20 million dollars for the Philippines.

The Anti-Imperialist League (AIL) was the organization at the vanguard of the anti-imperialist movement at home. Secretary of the Boston arm of the AIL, Erving Winslow, (1908) stated, "This flagrant outrage" against the democratic process outlined in the U.S. Constitution was "the subject of some of the [Anti-Imperialist] League's most

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1 Quoted in "Republic or Empire with Glimpses of 'Criminal Aggression" by Edwin Burritt Smith, 1900, Liberty Tracts, Vol. 9, Chicago: American Anti-Imperialist League. Box 1, Anti-Imperialist League papers, Swarthmore Peace Collection, Swarthmore College.
notable publications" (p. 8). However, it was Filipino resistance to U.S. colonial rule in the Philippines that buttressed their conviction of the rightness of anti-imperialism (Schirmer 1972).

This dissertation examines a pivotal moment in the development of the United States as a global power—the colonization of the Philippines in 1899. Embarking on a path of overseas colonialism provoked furious debate and unlikely alliances in the U.S. metropole. Therefore, I concentrate on the anti-imperialist movement in the U.S. that opposed the colonization of the Philippines. While previous studies of the anti-imperialist movement have focused on the elitist and provincial nature of anti-imperialist ideology as well as their racist motivations (Lasch 1958, 1972; Welch 1972), they have not analyzed anti-imperialists' concerted efforts to thwart the indiscriminate use of racialized violence against Filipinos. Given the U.S.'s emphasis on "benevolent assimilation" policies in the Philippines, perhaps it is not surprising that the racialized violence of this period has gone unquestioned—it has either been taken for granted by critics or had its importance diminished by apologists. Nevertheless, during the Philippine-American War, the U.S. employed the so-called "water cure" (a precursor to "water boarding") and "reconcentration" camps to force Filipinos into submission, which has left a historical legacy worthy of further investigation.

The purpose of my research is to explain how a racialized "state of exception" (Agamben 2005), that legally legitimated violence by excluding racialized groups from democratic practice while including them in the control of a sovereign state, came into being. Racialized "states of exception" legitimate and reproduce special cases of exclusion from democratic practice based on race. For those excluded from the polity,
such as racialized groups at the turn of the twentieth century, the "exception" followed racialized rule. Examining the development of a racialized "state of exception," I investigate the opposition movement that exposed the U.S. military's claims to "exceptionally" violent practices. Using archival sources, this project addresses three questions: 1) how did the organized opposition attempt to undermine imperialist violence, 2) how did differences in social position offer multiple points of contention with and interpretations of imperialist violence, and 3) what effects did these activities have on (de)limiting the state of exception known as "benevolent assimilation" policies.

Through the case of the anti-imperialist movement, I explore a particular moment in the history of U.S. Empire that affected the racialization and gendered character of the U.S. democratic processes and contentious politics thereafter. Analysis of the history of imperialist and anti-imperialist struggle at beginning of the 20th century shows how anti-imperialist opposition both succeeded and failed, ultimately changing political culture in the U.S.

The failures of anti-imperialists are many. They failed to stop the U.S. from taking the Philippines as a colony when they were unable to block the Treaty of Paris in February 1899. They failed to unify a strong campaign for William Jennings Bryan, as the anti-imperialist candidate, in the Presidential election of 1900. They failed to have all of their witnesses to "atrocities" in the Philippines heard at the Senate Investigation on Affairs in the Philippines (SIAP) in 1902. They failed to get high-ranking officials in the U.S. military court-martialed or terminated, such as Secretary of War Elihu Root or General Leonard Wood. They failed to obtain a government "for the people and by the

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2 I use quotes around benevolent assimilation here to denote the contested nature of the term as it was used and reformulated in this historical context and since.
people” in the Philippines. And, they failed to prevent the U.S. from formally becoming an empire with metropole and colony. However, Daniel Schirmer (1972) states, "For a number of reasons, any study of the United States and imperialism that fails to take anti-imperialism into account is incomplete. At the very least, in the aftermath of the failure of the Mugwump anti-imperialists to reverse the decisions of 1898, the emergence of new forms of anti-imperialism helps to explain why the enthusiasm for empire was so short-lived" (p. 200).³ Despite their losses, anti-imperialists were persistent.

Anti-imperialist persistence is what this dissertation explores. Determining whether anti-imperialists had any successes in their persistence is largely an issue of how we define success. Do we look only at specifically stated goals or also general philosophies? Do we consider unintended consequences? For brevity and a certain brand of atheoretical empiricism that overvalues parsimony (Steinmetz 2005b), it is often expedient to stay with the explicitly stated goals of a movement as a guide to assigning successes and failures. I choose a theoretically informed definition of success that looks at anti-imperialists' democratic philosophy as well as the unintended consequences of their activism. In the interest of the utility of a success/failure analysis, however, I investigate short-term and long-term goals. This allows me to address a more fundamental question of whether anti-imperialist opposition incited social transformation.

Therefore, I address how, at the pinnacle of the “Age of Empire” (Hobsbawm 1987), the movement against formal imperialism opposed its own government’s imperialist policies, how the movement sought legitimacy, as well as what strategies were used to carry out an anti-imperialist agenda. Out of an emerging array of imperialist practices, the

³ Mugwumps were political independents who used their votes to influence particular issues (Beisner 1968).
movement targeted particular issues. Tracing anti-imperialist issues, a pattern of the interconnections between race, gender, class, culture, and state formation takes shape. There are paradoxes of violence and democracy having to do with racialized differences (Mann 2004), however the cultural context making conditions possible for this historical formation of racialized violence belies the usual story of a state's legitimate use of violence.

Before getting into the more substantive issues, I will briefly discuss terminology. I explain the anti-imperialist movement's relationship to the formation of what I call a "racial state of exception," a historically adaptable pattern of legal inclusions and exclusions of violence that continues to inform U.S. policies. The question of imperialism and violence—in the form of the U.S. implementation of the "water cure" and "reconcentration" camps—became central for U.S. Americans opposed to the U.S. extending its imperial power. Therefore, this project focuses on the chronological development of anti-imperialisms in the U.S. with regard to structural issues of race, class, and gender, and the effects of anti-imperialists' agency on the formation of U.S. imperialist policies. It is in this historical context that a new "racial state of exception" emerged.

I argue it has significant continuing effects for state practices today. I make this argument by employing Sewell's (2005) theorization of historical events. Sewell (2005) notes that "events are shaped by particular conditions" (p. 246) and are characterized by semantic ambiguity, symbolic meaning of material culture, and, borrowing from Marshall

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Sahlins, reliant on the "structure of the conjuncture" based on historical contingencies. In this way, the Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation/Treaty of Paris debate was the first key historical event for anti-imperialists in the Philippine-American War that gave rise to a series of events structurally transforming the U.S. nation-state.

"Civilization" discourse provided the semantic ambiguity for benevolent assimilation policies. In this way, it encompassed meanings for justice and inalienable rights promised in the Declaration of Independence as well as the race hierarchy, which was based on white supremacy inherent in social Darwinism and evolutionary progress. "Civilization" discourse linked white nationalism and the language of something sacred, progressive, and transcendent.

However, the benevolent assimilation proclamation had a curious space-time dimension that is characteristic of imperialism—it was a presidential decree carried out and modified by a military official, General Elwell Otis, in the Philippines to soften the blow to Filipinas/os and curtail potential uprisings (Welsh 1900). The version received by Filipinas/os read as follows:

Finally, it should be the earnest wish and paramount aim of the military administration to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring them in every possible way that full measure of individual rights and liberties which is the heritage of free peoples, and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of BENEVOLENT ASSIMILATION substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule. In the fulfillment of this high mission, supporting the temperate administration of affairs for the greatest

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5 See appendix for full document.
good of the governed, there must be sedulously maintained the strong arm of authority, to repress disturbance and to overcome all obstacles to the bestowal of the blessings of good and stable government upon the people of the Philippine Islands under the free flag of the United States (Blount 1912: 149-150).

This proclamation had radicalizing effects both in the Philippines and the U.S.

In Boston, Faneuil Hall had been the center of abolitionist activity. The building, therefore, carried symbolic meanings for campaigns for liberty. This symbolism was invoked by a speaker at the first meeting of anti-imperialists in response to the benevolent assimilation proclamation. Practices carried out by abolitionists were again enacted, such as petitions to be heard by Congress, public meetings, and general agitation. In this case, the "despotism" of imperialism was taking place thousands of miles away across an ocean, not just south of the Mason-Dixon line. Nevertheless, anti-imperialists made the argument that despotism in the Philippines degraded democracy at home. Physical distance from the colony played a significant part in the hurdles for anti-imperialists at home.

The meetings at Faneuil Hall sparked a collective outrage against U.S. imperialism in the Philippines. The country was divided over what to do with the Philippines. In the benevolent assimilation proclamation the president declared U.S. sovereignty over the Philippines, despite their movement for independence from colonial rule, and despite the fact that this was beyond Presidential power. Rather, Congress held this power. Because the Treaty of Paris was heatedly debated in the senate, there was no reason for President McKinley to believe the Treaty of Paris would easily pass. And once it finally passed, it was by a margin of one vote. But, it passed, legalizing the treaty and making the terms
set out in the benevolent assimilation proclamation more than a unilateral presidential decree.

Sewell (2005) states, "Events are sequences of ruptures that effect transformations of structure. If structures are multiple and overlapping, it follows that any transformation of structure has the potential of touching off dislocations and rearticulations of overlapping or contiguous structures" (p. 255). A foreign policy precedent of isolationism from European powers set by the founding fathers was ruptured beyond even the expansionist Monroe Doctrine in taking the Philippines. It was in reference to this precedent that McKinley had made the statement that taking land forcibly "by our code of morals would be criminal aggression." In response to this precedent, the benevolent assimilation proclamation set off a sequence of ruptures from democratic tradition by building on the existing structure of racial hierarchy. In this sense, it had a "cascading character" (Sewell 2005) for racialized events that followed and compelled anti-imperialist opposition.

The key aspect of the events during the Philippine-American War and after is that there was no agreed upon resolution between pro-imperialists and anti-imperialists. Rather, promises for Filipino independence were deferred (Kramer 2006). Sewell (2005) states, "the resolution of structural dislocation--whether by restoring the ruptured articulation or by forging new ones--results in powerful emotional release that consolidates the rearticulation" (p. 249). However, there was no emotional release with an accompanying consolidation or wholesale rearticulation. Rather, a racialized state of exception was implemented in which democracy was to exist as the rule, with violent practices occurring outside established and accepted rules in only "exceptional" instances.
and on particular subjects in keeping with standards of "civilization." This is one legacy
of U.S. imperialism in the Philippines.

I draw on Said's (1993) definition of imperialism from *Culture and Imperialism*. He
states, "[...] 'imperialism' means the practice, the theory, and the *attitudes of a
dominating metropolitan center* [...]" (Said 1993: 9, my emphasis) that has lingering
effects in the general cultural, political, ideological, and economic spheres even though
formal colonialism has ended. Said's definition takes into account culture, materiality,
relational practices as well as structures of feeling and the physicality of empire, all of
which played a significant part in the development of anti-imperialism and the racialized
state of exception.

It is not unique for empires to claim uniqueness. Go (2007) shows in his article "The
Provinciality of American Empire: 'Liberal Exceptionalism' and U.S. Colonial Rule,
1898-1912" that arguing for exceptionalism turns out to be an "unexceptional" part of
empire, as European empires also argued their uniqueness in their ability to "civilize" the
"savage." However, in comparison to other empires in 1899, it is worth noting the lack of
other mass anti-imperialist movements in the metropoles. For example, why was there no
mass movement against the Boer War, or the Boxer Rebellion? If there is any plausible
claim to an "exceptional" U.S. empire, it would have to rely on the fact that there was an
organized mass anti-imperialist movement in the metropole from various corners of
society (not just Leftists as one might expect), rather than the claim to U.S. empire's
"benevolence." The structural feeling of racial and nationalist superiority (which I
develop in chapter three) upon which imperialism develops was surely also present in
Great Britain, which would explain the currency of the shared "the white man's burden."
Rather, what was not present in Europe, but was present in the U.S. and the Philippines, was a significant commitment by citizens to a democratic government. The uniqueness of this case makes it methodologically compelling as a comparatively deviant one.

**Socio-historical Methods**

I use a socio-historical application of Michael Burawoy's (1998) "extended case method [which] applies reflexive science to ethnography in order to extract the general from the unique, [and] to move from the 'micro' to the 'macro,' [...]" (p. 5). Applying this method with archival documents, I chronologically follow the activities of the anti-imperialist movement. As is common with marginalized actors in socio-historical research, the evidence of Black and white women's, and all working-class anti-imperialisms is uneven, buried in the asides of personal correspondence and tempered in their publications (Jung 2003). However, as Taylor (1999) states, "the goal of feminist research is to make women's experiences visible, render them important, and use them to correct distortions from previous empirical research and theoretical assumptions that fail to recognize the centrality of gender to social life" (p. 11). Social history has a parallel goal for working-class histories and people of color. This orientation led me to research whether women, working classes, Blacks, and Filipinas/os were significantly in the anti-imperialist movement in the metropole. I draw on all available primary documents to describe the activities in which they were involved and the implications of their activism on the relations of anti-imperialists and anti-imperialist effects on imperialist structures.

Therefore, I base this study on individual- and organizational-level data collected from archival and secondary sources. Individual-level data includes articles and poems by
anti-imperialists published in newspapers that other anti-imperialists read as well as personal letters in individual archival collections. Organizational-level data includes ledger books for the Boston AIL that anti-imperialists wrote and circulated, record books of the organization that included officer reports, member votes, and official policy, as well as correspondence of AIL officers acting in an official capacity to raise awareness on violence in the Philippines. I collected these documents mainly from the personal papers of AIL officers, although some works were available as independent publications, such as Liberty Poems (1900) and Our Islands and Their Peoples (Bryan 1899). I examined the archives of The Woman's Journal and various labor, socialist, and Black newspapers, such as American Freeman, Journal of the Knights of Labor, National Labor Tribune, Social Democratic Herald, The Colored American, and the Workers' Call, as well as edited volumes of primary documents in Foner's (1984) Anti-Imperialist Reader and (Foner 1993) Racism, Dissent, and Asian Americans from 1850 to the Present, between 1898-1910 for evidence of working-class, Black, Filipina/o and women's anti-imperialist activity in particular and gendered anti-imperialist politics in general that may not have appeared in the collections of AIL leaders.\footnote{See the appendix for a list of abbreviations of archives and primary documents.}

I analyze these documents for evidence of observable conflict between anti-imperialists and imperialists in public activities and personal letters. This led me to analyze anti-imperialists' agenda-setting practices, such as how anti-imperialisms were framed and what possibilities for organizing were on and off the table. Finally, I analyzed these documents for cultural patterns of domination stitched into the fabric of anti-imperialist activism.
I look at the anti-imperialist and imperialist "schemas," or cultural meanings (Sewell 1992), practices and "performances" (Jung 2009) as well as material resources, not for their historical accuracy, as to what best represents any ontological truths about U.S. imperialism in the Philippines, such as how many Filipinos were actually killed in the war—still a contested issue. Rather, I analyze the schemas, practices, performances, and material resources, for the "doxic" (or taken-for-granted) limits of debate (Bourdieu 1993), and how they contributed to the reproduction or changes in existing social structures.

This dissertation contributes to what Adams, Clemens, and Orloff (2005) call the "third wave of historical sociology," which theoretically incorporates and empirically demonstrates the utility of race, gender, and class for understanding structural changes and reproductions as outcomes of struggles between opposition movements and state actors. Specifically, I add to the record evidence of women's anti-imperialism and their contributions to the anti-imperialist movement, which previous studies have overlooked and underestimated (Murphy2009).
This study also contributes to the developing area of the Sociology of Empire. Showing the struggle over colonial development in the metropole, rather than the struggle over colonial management in the colony, enables me to explore the enduring importance of schemas and practices of race and gender in the development and limitations of imperialism. More crucially, this dissertation elaborates on the processual development of empire's exceptions that yielded practices that produced and legalized racialized inequalities. Specifically, I analyze the role of violence as a focus of anti-imperialist opposition, which was central to anti-imperialist attempts to expose U.S. subterfuge, but more effectively negotiated limits to imperialist legitimacy.

In a project of imperialist racial reformation, the U.S. was reimagined and remade in conflicts over whether and how to colonize the Philippines. This was an ongoing process of U.S. Pacific expansion in taking Hawai'i, Guam, and Samoa. According to Omi and Winant (1994) “Racial movements arise, and race becomes a political issue, when state institutions are thought to structure and enforce a racially unjust social order” (p. 78). Following this definition, the anti-imperialist movement was a racial movement. This imperialist project informed the remaking of a racial state at a point when Pacific politics

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7 Still, social histories such as Schirmer (1972) make important contributions to understanding the implications of the U.S. war in the Philippines that are worth reminding today's reader. For example, he noted, “Modern foreign policy is associated with the rise of the large-scale corporation, industrial and financial, as the dominant economic force in the country, exerting a most powerful influence upon the government of the United States. The Spanish-American War and the war to subdue Aguinaldo and the Philippine insurgents were the first foreign wars conducted as a consequence of this influence, the first wars of modern corporate America” (p. 3). Schirmer wrote these words during the Vietnam War, but the relevance continues in the era of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the rise of companies like Blackwater, Dynacorp, and Halliburton, for example.
threatened to unravel the work of previous racial formations of the United States. Filipinos fighting for independence against the U.S. propped open the door for anti-imperialists at home to enter the struggle. Using cultural schemas that corresponded with their subject positions and through practices of struggle, anti-imperialists exposed themselves to other anti-imperialist standpoints of empire's citizens as well as those of revolutionary Filipinos, empire's subjects.

I aim to expose the "changing same" (Bonilla-Silva 2006) characteristic of racialized imperialist violence by describing the process through which it happened during the Philippine-American War in order to theorize how racialized states of exception might be disrupted. In the process, I also aim to challenge the complacency of modern racial ideology based on the legacies of a white supremacist system that continues to deny the human rights of nonwhites. In the George W. Bush era, racialized others continued to receive state sanctioned confinement and torture, rationalized through garbled, unclear laws. Clearly, this is an all too pertinent past that is in the midst of no clear resolutions even with the Obama administration.

Pro-imperialists argued the U.S. would bring "civilization," protection, and implement "benevolent assimilation" to the "little brown brothers" (Wolff 1961) in the Philippines. They argued the anti-imperialists were weak and scared, feminizing them as the "aunties" (Hoganson 1998). Anti-imperialists argued taking the Philippines as a colony was poor business, racist, and anti-democratic. Anti-imperialists argued pro-
imperialists were, therefore, poorly guided, greedy, and racist. What neither group questioned was the value of democracy or "civilization."  

**Chapter Summary**

In Chapter Two, "Exceptional Culture, Exceptional Violence: U.S. Imperialist Fields and Benevolent Assimilation," I give an analytical description of the historical context in which the Spanish-American War, the Philippine-American War, and the anti-imperialist movement began. I lay out the "interimperial" and "intraimperial" fields (Go 2003) of U.S. imperialism, following the transnational path of imperialist violence rendered on racialized bodies, those "exceptionally" included through their exclusions. Tracing imperialist violence through these fields, I look at the cultural conditions that made this violence and its corresponding opposition possible. The interimperial field of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century Pacific included Spain, Great Britain, Japan, and the United States, consisting not only of competition over land and trade claims but also of exchanges of imperialist technologies, centrally including violence. The United States was also involved in an intraimperial field of metropole and colony, in which imperialist violence was a key factor. In taking the Philippines as a colony, the United States developed a structure of exceptionalism dubbed as "benevolent assimilation," which was to differentiate its empire from that of other empires. That the U.S. required an exceptionalist discourse to legitimate its imperialist endeavors was a result of its

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8 In the background of these debates was China. The phantom of Chinese competition and the yearning to permeate Chinese markets has informed the development of U.S. transnational relations as much as or more than any Anglo-Saxon rapprochement over the last 125 years.
historical narrative that claimed democratic traditions as fundamental to its existence as a
nation-state. Along with this statist narrative was an accompanying cultural narrative of
an evangelical process of "civilization" and progress that white U.S. Americans would
bring to racialized groups.

At the turn of the twentieth century, the United States was on an imperialist track,
taking territory beyond the North American continent starting with Hawai'i in 1898.
These actions made some U.S. Americans un-easy because they believed imperialist
acquisitions went against American democratic traditions; it made others un-easy because
of racist inclinations for creating a white state. Therefore, when the Spanish-American
War ended in April 1898, many were uneasy about the possibility of the U.S. taking
Spain's islands as U.S. territory, especially the Philippines. When it became clear that the
U.S. was in fact going to take the Philippines from Spain, anti-imperialists mobilized.

In Chapter Three, "Anti-Imperialists and Structures of Feeling," I analyze the anti-
imperialist movement in terms of structures of feeling. Through an intersectionality
framework, which accounts for anti-imperialists' subject positions at the intersection of
their race, class, and gender, I "[track] down the causes and character of structural
transformations in political events [that] may require us to be particularly sensitive to the
emotional tone of action" (Sewell 2005: 250). In the "gilded age" of excess (a phrase
coined by the anti-imperialist Mark Twain), political emotion was structured by an
expansive "spirit of capitalism" (Weber 1958). The accompanying ethic was the
evangelical and missionary impulses in Christianity, "the calling" of manifest destiny,
rather than the corresponding Protestant ethic of conserving and saving. Physically
located in the place of metropole, empire's dubious citizens (anti-imperialist U.S. citizens
who were opposed to being citizens of a U.S. empire), have been under analyzed and under theorized as a category in studies of empire. These were not colonial administrators, although some were politicians. Mainly, they were active citizens engaged in protest through the established outlets available. Anti-imperialists were cautious and calculating. Looking at the cultural schemas informing anti-imperialist subjectivities, this chapter uncovers racialized structures of feeling that set the limits of political emotion. This chapter's main contribution lies in an empirical analysis of empire's dubious citizens and how subjectivity informed by structures of feeling led to a raised consciousness and mobilization.

Throughout the course of anti-imperialist struggle, changes in racial and gendered structures superseded structural changes in economic class. This may have been a function of anti-imperialists failing to mobilize workers, or a function of an imperialist capitalism continuing rather unimpeded. In any case, race, class, and gender changes do not necessarily occur at the same time nor in equal measure, and trying to account for change beyond what resulted from anti-imperialist opposition would not only distort the focus of this project, but also take away from what anti-imperialists did achieve. Nevertheless, this dissertation is foremost a socio-historical analysis of struggle.

In Chapter Four, "Anti-imperialists and Civilization as Civil Religion," I begin to outline these struggles in terms of how anti-imperialists assessed and entered the fight. Chapter Four looks at how the leadership of the anti-imperialist movement organized their opposition to imperialism by rooting their strategy in a broader millenialist schema of "civilization," which combined social Darwinism with Christian ideas of progress. "Civil religion" refers to discourse and practice treating democratic tradition and practices
as sacred and transcendent. Anti-imperialists invoked the discourse and practice of civil religion as a resource. At every turn, anti-imperialists were in conflict over distinctions of civilization: with each other, with imperialists, and with public indifference. Drawing these distinctions was not merely a parsing of words or a refinement of ideas; they held material consequences for the legal development of U.S. democracy, the U.S. treatment of Filipinos, and the distinctions of U.S. sovereignty over the Philippines. This choice of strategy also created constraints for the anti-imperialist movement. Rooting their arguments and strategy in the civil religion elicited a tension between visions of the United States's past with visions for its future. Tensions over democratic traditions were at the heart of pro-imperialist and anti-imperialist debates and the purpose for invoking democracy as a civil religion.

Anti-imperialists invoked civil religion as a doxic order that held certain democratic beliefs, symbols, and traditions as sacred, but was, again, disrupted and tainted, starting with the benevolent assimilation proclamation. Personal feelings of indignation and betrayal led to a collective outrage that mobilized the anti-imperialist movement. Harnessing the outrage proved to be a significant challenge for anti-imperialist leaders. Many initial supporters fell away after the defeat of anti-imperialist Presidential Candidate William Jennings Bryan in 1900. The anti-imperialists who stayed active in the movement formed a transnational advocacy network with prominent Filipinos and traveled to the Philippines to discern conditions for themselves. Still rooting their work in the morality of democracy and "civilization," they focused their strategies on opposing imperialist violence.
Chapter Five, "Exposing Criminal Aggression: Benevolent Assimilation as Exceptionalist Policy," follows the anti-imperialist activists that focused on strategies of opposing imperialist violence. From outrage over the transgressions against democratic traditions to moral transgressions involving imperialist violence, these anti-imperialists vested themselves in stopping racialized violence in the colonies. Chapter five accounts the acts of violence as anti-imperialists uncovered them and used them as a symbolic resource for change. In tracing anti-imperialists' opposition to violence, this analysis is materialist in both its physical and visceral accounts (Knowles 2003). I look at the interpersonal level of interactions that enabled transformations to social structures, such as race and gender bracketed in a capitalist society, while also looking at how these interacting structures proved to be constraints contributing to reproduction.

Chapter Six, "Monitoring Benevolent Assimilation," therefore, shows the aftermath of the SIAP. It follows anti-imperialist investigators who utilized their social position and networks to discover more reliable information on affairs in the Philippines. They did this as a self-conscious strategy to shed light on the duplicitous reports given to the public at home by both the McKinley and Roosevelt administrations. In the course of attempts to educate the public, anti-imperialists changed the strategy of the movement to focus on the rights of Filipinos and the contradictions between violence and the guarantees of individual rights as stated in the benevolent assimilation proclamation.
CHAPTER 2: EXCEPTIONAL CULTURE, EXCEPTIONAL VIOLENCE: U.S. IMPERIALIST FIELDS AND BENEVOLENT ASSIMILATION

Having worked on bringing lynching to the white U.S. public's attention through careful research and relentless reporting, but with only marginal success, Ida B. Wells devised a new strategy. She convinced the British of the lynching problem. In turn, they persuaded the white U.S. American public that lynching was a problem for any "civilized" nation.

On Wells's strategy, Gail Bederman (1995) writes, "In March 1894, Ida B. Wells sailed to England in order to agitate against the rise of racial violence in the United States. She left a country where lynching was rarely mentioned in the white Northern press, and where she herself was unknown to most whites. Three months later, she returned to the United States a celebrity, vilified as a 'slanderous and nasty-minded mulatress' by some papers but lauded by others. Above all, she returned to a country where lynching was widely discussed as a stain on American civilization" (p. 45). Wells' strategy was more effective than continuing her efforts in the U.S. through her own voice. She realized she needed allies with "legitimacy" to obtain the white public's attention on lynching.

Wells utilized "intraimperial" and "interimperial" fields, and she used them to implement her strategy of resistance. Go (2003) distinguishes between intraimperial and interimperial fields of individual empires characterized by "competition, contest, and exchange" (p. 16). Anglo-Saxonism was common among U.S. American "elites"9 and was characterized by a mutual identification as well as a "competition, contest, and  

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9 I put "elites" in quotes here to signify the socially constructed nature of the idea. Because this hierarchy is how they understood social groupings of at the time, I refer to elites without quotes in the rest of the text.
exchange" with the "Anglo-Saxons"\(^{10}\) of Great Britain. Anglo-Saxonism was a belief in the racial superiority of descendants from Great Britain and was enough for some U.S. elites to support Britain's imperialist activities (Kramer 2002). Indeed, Anglo-American rapprochement went as far as a debate over the advantageousness of an Anglo-American Treaty in Congress (Kramer 2002).\(^{11}\) At this time, there was support from New England elites for the Anglo-American Treaty between the U.S. and Great Britain, including leading support from anti-imperialists, such as Andrew Carnegie who flew a flag above his mansion in Scotland that combined Old Glory and the Union Jack (Kramer 2006), and pro-imperialists.

Wells utilized the white U.S. elite's rapprochement with the British. Whether with a treaty to crystallize this rapprochement or not, showing and convincing the British of America's barbaric violence could legitimate lynching as a political problem worthy of addressing in a way she could not directly, by virtue of her social position as a disfranchised Black woman. She turned the hegemonic, cultural discourse of "civilization" used against Blacks by whites against the white United States in Britain (Bederman 1995).

Through her strategic resistance, Wells traversed and utilized the central problem of this chapter, "exceptionalist" culture and violence across imperialist fields of power relations. Although her anti-imperialism was generally an implicit one, her analysis highlighted the relationship between violence against disfranchised Black citizens, the

\(^{10}\) I quote the term here to note that it was self-referential and used by many descendants of English lineage to refer to a "blood" and cultural kinship with people in Great Britain. Throughout the dissertation, I also use the term to describe the way they applied it, not as a confirmation or reification of the way they imagined this relationship.

\(^{11}\) Lake Mohonk Papers. Swarthmore Peace Collection, Swarthmore College. These papers also provide ample evidence of the debates that demonstrate Anglo-Saxonism.
gendered and racialized orders, the state, and imperialist culture. Her work informed the knowledge of those who considered themselves to be explicitly "anti-imperialist" and who later linked the problem of lynching in the metropole with a problem of brutality in the new American colony of the Philippines.

In this chapter, I start with a discussion of the definitions of imperialism, imperialist culture, civilizing projects, and imperialist violence. Studies of empire invoke these concepts, but rarely define them. Therefore, the meaning they are intended to convey is too often unclear or imprecise.\textsuperscript{12} Defining imperialist violence and invoking the roles of imperialist culture and what came to be seen as cultural projects in the service of imperialism, which I call "civilization projects," require delineation. I first discuss these terms before moving on to an analysis of the U.S.'s interimperial field at the turn of the twentieth century. In this analysis, I outline the U.S.'s relations with other empires showing how these relations affected the development of the already existing imperialist culture, imperialist violence, and civilizing projects. Next, I discuss the intraimperial field of metropole and colony and how imperialist culture, imperialist violence, and cultural imperialism developed in the relations of interimperial and intraimperial fields. Finally, I address the cultural logic of "exceptionalist" violence that developed across these fields in response to colonial resistance and crystallized in the policy of "benevolent assimilation."

\textsuperscript{12} The legal imprecision of imperialism has served to both protect and target potential "threats" of state security, however defined.
Exceptional Culture

'We're a gr-reat people,' said Mr. Hennessy, earnestly. 'We ar-re,' said Mr. Dooley. 'We ar-re that. An' th' best iv it is, we know we ar-re.'

--- Mr. Dooley: in Peace and War, (1899)
Finley Peter Dunne.

Discussing the anti-imperialist movement requires definitions of empire, imperialism, and colonialism, capacious and nebulous terms, to be distinguished as well as imperialist violence defined. Given contemporary international U.S. policies, these terms have been increasingly invoked with much analytical slippage and overlap (Steinmetz 2005a). In questioning formations of empire Steinmetz (2005a) defines imperialism "as a nonterritorial form of empire in contradistinction to colonialism as a territorial one" (p. 340). The question of territory is key in formations of empire as well as the question of historicity. Crucially, the question of controlling space without the annexation or sovereignty over territory, distinguishes "nonterritorial empire" (p. 342). Therefore, to speak of American empire or imperialism without reference to historical period could refer to all of Steinmetz's definitions of empire as the U.S. has taken part in various form of empire over different periods of time and in different locations. The U.S. involvement in the Philippines constituted colonialism (Go 2003; Steinmetz 2005a). This is requisite for descriptive purposes of U.S.-Philippine relations in comparison to U.S.-Indian relations (e.g. expansionist nation-state), U.S.-Mexican relations (e.g. expansionist nation-state), U.S.-Chinese relations (e.g. non territorial political ordering of space, and
control of movement and bodies), or U.S.-Black relations (e.g. nonterritorial political
ordering of space, and control of movement and bodies), in the metropole.\footnote{In her introduction to \textit{Haunted By Empire: Geographies of Intimacy in North American History}, Ann Laura Stoler (2006) also notes the need for studies of empire and U.S. imperialism to focus on the flexibility of imperialist practices that involve the control and management of the movement of bodies.}

Racialized groups have shared experiences of the U.S. politics revolving around exclusionary practices such as disfranchisement, spatial ordering, and the control of group movement and confinement. These experiences have been a subject of previous critical race theories such as "internal colonialism" (Allen 2005; Almaguer 1989; Blauner 1972; Gordon 2006; Gutierrez 2004; Singh 2004). Steinmetz (2005) notably leaves out the theory of "internal colonialism" in his comparative-historical overview of empire. In the case of the U.S., settler colonialism provided the historical basis for the founding of the U.S. and its after effects for the "racial formation" of particular racialized groups (Omi and Winant 1994). Go (2003) distinguishes between the settler colonialism and the "administrative colonialism" that unfolded in the Philippines outlining the different experience of "incorporated" territories in the Western frontier and the "unincorporated territory" of the Philippine archipelago.

While Go (2003) and Steinmetz (2005) focus on styles of government and governance, both explicitly leave open the possibility for culture to share an important role. My aim in analyzing U.S. "exceptions" is a project of cultural sociology rather than one of the sociology of culture. Imperialist culture and civilizing projects are imperfectly overlapping structures made of schemas, practices, and resources that take place in particular spaces and times (Sewell 1999). Imperialist culture is less organized, more diffuse, and only a "thinly" coherent system of structures of practice (e.g., social}
Darwinism) (Sewell 1999). Imperialist culture is an antecedent to the formation of civilizing projects. Civilizing projects, in contrast, are more densely organized, coherent, and firmly nested with "state/culture" (e.g., colonial education) (Steinmetz 1999). Therefore, civilizing projects have greater access to state resources and have greater state dependency.

Amy Kaplan's (2002) *The Anarchy of Empire* and Ann Laura Stoler's (2006) edited volume *Haunted By Empire* both specifically take culture into account with formations of U.S. empire. The former compares the treatment of racialized groups with regard to culture and imperialism, focusing on the disorganization and chaos generated by imperialism, rather than just the organization and categorizations generated by imperialism. The latter focuses on the intimacies between the colonizer and the colonized, often despite sustained efforts of social and spatial distance. Yet these works do not address how cultural structures of meaning and practice affects the formation of opposition movements against empire by citizens within the empire. Even theories on U.S. "internal colonialism" omit questions of culture and colonizers' opposition, as well as the problem of gender (Gordon 2006). My dissertation begins research in this direction questioning relationships between imperialist culture, race, gender, and "contentious politics" (Tarrow 1998) within the metropole.
Starting with the habitual, dehistoricized use of "the white man's burden" as common parlance for imperialism (Murphy 2009), the cultural aspects of imperialist modes of thought and "structures of feeling" (Williams 1977)\(^{14}\) deserve historicized attention—the subtitle of Kipling's "The White Man's Burden" was "The United States and the Philippine Islands." The fact that "the white man's burden" is so often referenced as shorthand for imperialism, yet the history of the Philippine-American War is so commonly unknown evidences a contemporary imperialist schema still impressing a politics of memory—or rather a politics of forgetting and ignoring. In the discussions of U.S. and European empires that frequently cite "the white man's burden," it is the cultural schemas of civilization and social Darwinism that interacted in the inter-imperial field between U.S. involvement in the Philippines and Great Britain's empire that they are referencing.\(^{15}\) That the phrase has had such resonance for proponents and critics of U.S. Empire speaks to the cultural modes of pro-imperialism and anti-imperialism as they have developed over time—specifically since the Philippine-American War. This resonance is evidence of the "deeply" racialized and gendered imperialist U.S. relations (Jung 2009).

While culture and imperialism are formative in relation to each other (Kaplan 2002; Said 1993), a clear distinction between imperialist culture and civilizing projects has not previously been made. This lack of distinction has hindered empirical

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\(^{14}\) In her introduction to *Haunted By Empire*, Stoler references "structures of feeling." Here, I am specifically citing Williams (1977) discussion of "structures of feeling" in *Marxism and Literature* and employing his meaning with this phrase. I elaborate the implications of "structures of feeling" in chapter three.

investigations into imperialist modes of thinking and feeling for not only the colonized but also the colonizer, or citizens of the empire. Noting the different structural relationship with the state is theoretically and methodologically key for getting at these cultural differences of imperialism and imperialist practice. Edward Said (1993) stated in his preface to *Culture and Imperialism*, "One of imperialism's achievements was to bring the world closer together, and although in the process the separation between Europeans and natives was an insidious and fundamentally unjust one, most of us should now regard the historical experience of empire as a common one. The task then is to describe it as pertaining to Indians and Britishers, Algerians and French, Westerners and Africans, Asians, Latin Americans, and Australians despite the horrors, the bloodshed and the vengeful bitterness" (p. xxii). Rather than "despite" the common experience of imperialist violence, I argue it is time to center violence in the analysis of imperialism, culturally, politically, and economically, questioning its normativity. The language of colonizers/colonized holds many shades of degree within the dichotomy. Therefore, when I use these terms I am using them as an indicator of social position within empire. Here, speaking of colonizers needs to be understood as a social position of citizens of the imperialist state, rather than speaking simply of colonial managers in the colony.

Structures of feeling under imperialist systems inform the reactions to politically legitimated violence. After all, without recourse to violence, what would empire be? Imperialism is embedded in the everyday U.S. citizen's experience. Politics as emotions
and the politics of emotions are central to the experience of our social position with regard to the imperialist system and process, including in intimate relations.\(^\text{16}\)

As shown in the case of Ida B. Wells' strategies of resistance, there is utility in addressing imperialism in terms of "intraimperial" and "interimperial" fields that limiting imperialism to nonterritorial empire versus colonialism precludes. In the case of anti-imperialists, their critiques of imperialism linked colonialism with internal colonialism, and not metaphorically. Pinning down "imperialist" practices that could be specifically problematized and subverted was indeed a problem for anti-imperialist leaders, prompting them to focus on what they knew – the constitution, the law, and public opinion.

I define modern imperialism as a political system of unequal economic and cultural relations carried out and enforced through state structures with powers of legitimating violence in various fields of power relations. U.S. imperialist culture as a set of practices and schemas, as well as other modern European imperialist cultures, fosters normative violence that advances a "deeply" racialized statist power (Jung 2009). This means that the racialization of the state is embedded so as to go unquestioned; racialization is structurally implemented through racial schemas, performances, and practices (Jung 2009) having to do with the imperialist system. Deep racialization dialectically fosters the imperialist schemas normalizing violence with imperialist practices institutionalizing violence. Gayendra Pandey (2006) describes it as follows,

\(^{16}\) While Stoler's project of looking at the intimacies between colonizer and colonized is indeed productive as a site that illustrates imperialist relations of reproduction and resistance, it is not exhaustive of the intimate experiences of empire, resistance, or contentious politics. Opposition to empire has contingent emotions related to time, physical space, specific imperialist formation, and social position.
The colony, [Achille Mbembe] writes, following Fanon, is 'a place where an experience of violence and upheaval is lived, where violence is built into structures and institutions. It is implemented by persons of flesh and bone, such as the soldier, the...administrator, the police officer, and the native chief. It is sustained by an imaginary--that is, an interrelated set of signs that present themselves, in every instance, as an indisputable and undisputed meaning. The violence insinuates itself into the economy, domestic life, language, consciousness. It...pursues the colonized even in sleep and dream.' What one has here, he suggests, is the 'spirit of violence'. This spirit 'makes the violence omnipresent; it is presence--presence not deferred (except occasionally) but spatialized, visible, immediate, sometimes ritualized, sometimes dramatic, very often caricatural' (p. 11, my emphasis).

This defines the colony in relationship to the experience of violence rather than territory, further implicating imperialism in fields of bodily relation rather than only specific territories. Violence is central to the experience of imperialism and defines imperialist culture. Civilizing projects are self-conscious imperialist practice implementing the symbols, rituals, and practices that glorify the colonizer's civilization and denigrate that of the native.

Imperialist culture provided the necessary antecedents to imperialist violence and civilizing projects, which further instituted imperialist legitimacy. For example, the 1899 edited two volume set of Our Islands and Their People as Seen with Camera and Pencil shows how imperialist culture and cultural imperialism begin to overlap through the didactic descriptions and centralization of "knowledge" through photographs and pictures.
of the people and geography of Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, Hawai'i, and the Philippines by an artist commissioned for the project. The introduction is written by Major-General Joseph Wheeler and gives an introduction to the colonial possessions for the hearth of every American home (Bryan 1899). Major-General Wheeler closes his introduction with,

In all the great events that have occurred and in every crisis that has arisen in the history of our country, the American people have proven themselves equal to the occasion. The indomitable courage and endurance which have never failed will strengthen us to grapple with the mighty possibilities of the future. The spirit of liberty and the love of justice and fair dealing constitute the dominant characteristic of the race. It was this spirit that led us into the war with Spain—the war for humanity—and the same spirit will guide us in our dealings with the tribes and peoples whose liberty has come to them as one of the results of the late contest.

Be it ours to lift them from the low estate of unwilling subjects to the high plane of independent citizenship, to extend to them the knowledge of our beneficent institutions, and to help them onward and upward to the realization of the loftiest ideals of perfection in human government and the universal happiness of mankind (p. 7).

Wheeler's full-page portrait in his military regalia, juxtaposed to the next page of the publisher's preface to the two-volume set touting the following information as the most accurate and first available on "our islands and their peoples" exemplifies the relationship between the diffuse imperialist culture at home and the beginnings of more dense civilizing projects focused on the empire abroad, starting with the generation of "official"
knowledge of these people and the islands. Steinmetz (2007) also shows that how ethnographers represented peoples informed how colonial administrators governed them, which is another example of the relationship between particular imperialist cultural practice and the civilizing projects that followed.

On the relationship between imperialist violence, imperialist culture, and civilizing projects, Pandey (2006) continues,

There can be little doubt, it seems to me, that examples of collective violence—and indeed most cases of individual violence—constitute a complex social fact [...] with important religious, economic, political, and moral implications. Hence, the antecedents, the enabling conditions, the cycle of violence that a violent act initiates or continues, the forms that it takes, the wide sections of society that it involves, the consequences that it has both near and far—all these must form part of the study of violence...There is one other step that we must take if we are to appreciate violence as a social fact: we must recognize violence not only in its most spectacular, explosive, visible moment, but also in its more disguised forms—in our day-to-day behavior, the way we construct and respond to neighbors as well as strangers, in the books and magazines we read, the films we see, and the conversations and silences in which we participate (p. 8, my emphasis).

Civilizing projects impose systems of meaning and practice on the colonized. However, even the visibility or spectacular violence, as seen by some, is ignored and taken for granted by others such as those of the hegemonic imperialist culture. This contributes to the "symbolic violence" of legitimating the racialized inferiority of the colonized group that enables the justifications for physical violence (Jung 2004). Indeed, the extraordinary
violence the U.S. used in the Philippines is consistently noted in histories of the U.S.-
Philippine relations (Kramer 2006; Miller 1982; San Juan 2000). Nevertheless, the
history of the U.S.-Philippine War has been so successfully erased from the mainstream
historical-narrative of the U.S. that the silence on that violence and subsequent violence
against racialized others has contributed to a systematic pattern of silence and omission in
official histories of U.S. imperialist involvements. The exception to this is when citizen-
activists have publicized widely and successfully shamed U.S. actions (e.g., as in Mai-
Lai).

Therefore, imperialism is a system of relations fundamentally based on enabling
conditions that allow recourse to violent political practices for expansive control.
Legitimacy is contingent on political and cultural structures. In a democratic society, a
hegemonic logic is negotiated that allows for conditions that justify political violence.
This logic is the "exception" that simultaneously normalizes democracy and allows
"exceptions" for certain uses of violence. But empirical analysis of violence shows the
racialized, gendered, stratified nature of violence in the U.S. democracy. These
democratic "exceptions" consistently fall on the backs of racialized subjects. Here, those
groups included in the control of the U.S. and excluded from full participation are
disproportionately represented. Through imperialist violence and "states of exception"
(Agamben 1998; Agamben 2005), which refers to periods of particular exceptions that
legitimate violence such as benevolent assimilation, racialized groups in both the
metropole and colony were specifically excluded from the body politic of the United
States by disfranchisement and citizenship exclusion, yet included within the parameters
of its control through recourse to violence and confinement. This is the paradox upon
which imperialist—and anti-democratic—relations are based. Analyzing schemas through
discursive connections as well as performative practices between the “states of
exception” in the metropole and the colony that allowed and supported racialized
violence is the first obligatory step to understanding the extension of imperialism and its
corresponding violence (Jung 2009).

But what specific purpose do these exceptionalist logics serve? Why do "states of
exception" enable conditions for legitimate violence? And, more specifically, what part
did the discourse of "benevolent assimilation" play as a cultural component of the U.S.
"state/culture" (Steinmetz 1999). Clearly, capitalist greed and competition was at the
center of imperialist relations in the interimperial field. But U.S. proponents of
imperialism justified imperialist activities as different from other empires to critics, who
called out the greed and violence inherent in imperialist systems, by maintaining the
ideology of U.S. exceptionalism through comparisons of relations in the interimperial
field (Go 2007). For instance, the U.S. was to benevolently "civilize" the "savage"
Filipinos and provide "tutelage" in the ways of democracy—not simply exploit their
resources and labor as in the case with European empires (Go 2007).\footnote{17}

The words of Wm. Hayes Ward, a speaker at the Lake Mohonk Conference (the
pinnacle of connected progressive do-gooder activists) on International Arbitration in
1900--where white elites concerned about the reform of less "civilized" groups met
annually to discuss programs of uplift held at the Mohonk Mountain House of Alfred
Smiley-- synthesized the white elite's view of evangelical Christianity and United States's
imperialism:

\footnotetext[17]{I thank Jeffrey Alexander for noting this point in conversation, and Moon-Kie Jung for
reiterating it for me in another conversation.}
The new century is evidently planning, in church and state, for great things; and church and state agree practically in the purposes for which they are working. And those purposes, largely in their motives, and certainly in their effects, are altruistic. What does the church want? The evangelization of the world and its own unification is to be the means by which the evangelization of the world is to be achieved. What is the purpose of the state? It has the object of giving a high and uniform civilization to the whole world. And whatever may be the jealousies which exist between France and England and Germany and Russia in the work which they have to do, yet as we look upon what these last few years have done for Africa, for instance, we cannot help seeing that it has brought, or is bringing, the end of intestine feuds, the end of the battles and raids which made the slave trade possible; that it is bringing civilization and a better condition of things to that great continent. The states of the earth are determined on two things: one of them is the extension of civilization over the whole earth, and the other is the giving of free government, a government of the people and for the people, to the nations of the earth.\(^\text{18}\)

While the conference was devoted to the development of arbitration, rather than war, that was only arbitration between Anglo-Saxons and other nation-states with empires. This quote shows how imperialist culture provided a "doxic," or taken for granted, schema of race, a deep racialization of the interimperial field that promoted the competition between European empires for civilizing racialized groups. The deeply racialized schema of imperialist culture becomes evident in the performative actions of the interimperial fields.

as referenced by even the "liberal do-gooders" advancing the belief of a unified mission of church and state in civilizing racialized "others" outside of the field of shared imperialist relations. Referencing the jealousies between France, England, Germany, and Russia alluded to the competition of the interimperial field of each state's brand of "civilization."

Hayes used a millenialist schema that suggested the inevitability of evolutionary progress in civilization. Millenialism combined social Darwinism with religious beliefs. This combination purported the inevitability of evolutionary progress, much like manifest destiny, and justified the "survival of the fittest" through "civilization." Through missionary work of the church and imperialist expansion of the state, civilization would go forward. And the colonized groups, symbolized by Africa—indeed African tribal feuds are implicitly culpable for the slave trade here—should thank the "civilizers" and their "free" governments.

**U.S. Enters the Interimperial Field**

Empire was the marker of peak "civilization" and power, the marker of robustness of a given society, according to Western states subscribing to social Darwinism. While some empires were weakening at the turn of the twentieth century, the United States began strengthening its empire with strategic territorial acquisitions beyond the North American continent to include Hawai'i, Puerto Rico, Cuba, Guam, Samoa, and the Philippines.

Other states with long-standing empires were also active in the Pacific. States of highest interest for the U.S. were Great Britain, Spain, China, and Japan. In the western hemisphere, the most pertinent state was Spain. Through the Monroe Doctrine the U.S.
claimed preferred trade agreements with countries in the western hemisphere. Spain, holding the colonies of Puerto Rico and Cuba so close in proximity to U.S. territory, presented the greatest threat to U.S. trade interests. Therefore, events coincided with U.S. interests when Cuba started a revolutionary movement against Spain.

Reports from Cuba described Spain's indiscriminate use of violence, especially the tactics of General Weyler who was nicknamed the "butcher," against the Cuban revolutionaries that included the "reconcentrado" policy. The "reconcentrado" policy amounted to burning homes and fields, destroying villages, and reconcentrating the surviving population into monitored camps. These reports outraged the American public. As quoted in Kramer (2006) President McKinley viewed reconcentration as "cruel." "[He] observed in his first message to Congress, while rationalized 'as a necessary measure of war and as a means of cutting off supplies from the insurgents,' [reconcentration] was immoral, requiring the U.S. government to issue a 'firm and earnest protest.' 'It was not civilized warfare,' he stated. 'It was extermination'” (quoted in Kramer 2006: 153). Therefore, when the U.S. government sent the USS Maine just outside Havana to purportedly survey the situation, it had wide ranging support from the U.S. public. Once the warship was damaged through an explosion, the U.S. had all the reason it needed to officially go to war with Spain in 1898, aiding the Cubans.

The Spanish-American War lasted only a few months, beginning and ending in Manila Bay, Philippines. This war was relatively short and successful, overthrowing the Spanish colonialists and freeing the Cubans. It came to be known as America's "splendid little war" in which Admiral Dewey and Theodore Roosevelt became national heroes. However, the Cubans were not alone in their quest for independence.
Beginning in 1896, Filipino revolutionaries had been staging their own war for independence from Spain. Their leader, Emilio Aguinaldo, coordinated with the U.S. forces to defeat Spanish troops in the Philippines. He did this with the understanding that the U.S. would be offering the Philippines independence, not trading one colonial occupation for another. Therefore, in December 1898, when the Treaty of Paris was signed by Spain and the United States, in which the United States purchased the Philippines for 20 million dollars, Aguinaldo claimed U.S. officers had betrayed him. The apparent duplicity on the part of the U.S. generals in their dealings with Aguinaldo was another source of anti-imperialist agitation. Once it became clear to Aguinaldo and the revolutionary junta in Hong Kong that the U.S. was not going to even grant protectorate status to the Philippines as it had agreed to do in Cuba, but rather keep the Philippines as a U.S. colony, Filipino military forces gathered around U.S. occupied Manila. In the months before the U.S. Congress actually ratified the treaty, there was heated public debate over the relationship between the U.S. and the Philippines. This debate initially revolved around democracy in the U.S. and how imperialism would possibly corrupt the nation-state.  

After a period of tensions building between U.S. and Filipino military forces, fighting finally broke out, and February 4, 1899 the Philippine-American War began.

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19 In these debates, democracy was treated as "sacred" and imperialist policies were seen as a corruption to the purity of the nation. For more on this, see Alexander and Smith's (1993) article "The Discourse of American Civil Society: A New Proposal For Cultural Studies" in *Theory and Society.*

20 In the history books and even the U.S. National Archives and Record Administration, the Philippine-American War has been subsumed under the Spanish-American War or labeled as the Philippine Insurrection. The history of the Philippine-American War is largely unknown, despite its historical echoes with the Vietnam War with Iraq.
Once fighting began between the U.S. and Filipino forces, support for war in the U.S., which was already called into question in the debate over the treaty, began to split. Some, who had supported the war against Spain, and others, who were already wary of the U.S. involvement, protested against fighting Filipinos. Under the broad labels of "imperialists" and "anti-imperialists" fell various ideologies in support of and against the U.S. taking the Philippines as a colony. Imperialists were forced to repeatedly justify the course in the Philippines to a vocal and influential opposition at home, in addition to configuring their own purpose and agenda in the Philippines against an organized and armed resistance that was on familiar terrain.

Nevertheless, pro-imperialists argued the U.S. taking and keeping the Philippines was a necessity, constitutional or not, in order to be competitive in trade with Asia in general and China in particular (Go 2003; Kramer 2006; Miller 1982; Rosenberg 1982; Schirmer 1972). They believed having the Philippines would allow the U.S. to use Manila as a coaling station and point of entry for trade with China (Miller 1982; Rosenberg 1982). Part and parcel of the interimeperial field also known as “the white man’s burden,” was not only the civilizing projects, but also squelching indigenous militant groups that Europeans and the U.S. wanted under control. Violent tactics used by other imperial powers made certain names, such as Great Britain's Lord Kitchener of the Boer War and Spain's General Weyler in Cuba, familiar to Americans who had been previously outraged at the violence committed against Cubans by their Spanish colonizers.

General Weyler made famous the tactics of torture, starvation, and reconcentration camps. This point is illustrated by the phrases describing violence
committed by the U.S. as "Weyler-like tactics" (Kramer 2006: 170) or "Weylerian procedures" (Kramer 2006: 293). Lord Kitchener also employed the tactics of concentration camps in South Africa. The reputations of these men became synonymous with organized brutality in the view of the U.S. public. When describing U.S. activities, anti-imperialists called attention to imperialist violence by using Weyler and Kitchener's names and reputations symbolically.\(^{21}\)

When Boer settlers, descendants of Dutch settler-colonizers, took up arms against the British settler-colonizers in South Africa, the U.S. military was already involved in armed conflict in the Philippines. U.S. critics often referred to British policies against the Boers as "extermination," with residual meaning that carried with it the Indian Wars in the West and Midwest. The *Herald* reported on November 19, 1899 that Lord Kitchener's plans in South Africa, "harsh though it appears to be, appeals to officials of the war department, and during the coming campaign...no mercy is to be extended to those in active rebellion or who give aid and comfort to the insurgents" (as quoted in Schirmer 1972: 225). On November 20, 1899 the *Globe* reported Kitchener's plan to use reconcentration "appealed to officials in the War Department, who explained that 'unless the Filipinos are forced to leave the country districts and settle in the towns where they can be kept under the eye of the military authorities, there will be no hope of suppressing the guerrilla warfare'" (as quoted in Schirmer 1972: 225-226). A private letter to Captain Mahan from G.S. Clarke further illustrates the Anglo-Saxon imperialist rapprochement. In the letter Clarke tells Mahan:

...I venture to think that in our empire there is a close parallel to the conditions in the Philippines, and that we solved the problem, as it is certain to my mind, that you can now solve it. If you will look up to the past of the native states of the Malay Peninsula, you will find conditions closely approximating to those of the Philippines. Fighting was incessant; trade and development were at a standstill. There is no corner of the world in which the development has been so swift and so perfectly successful. These native states are now prosperous and contented. Their trade has increased by leaps and bounds. This is an advantage to us and to the rest of the world. Piracy, the joy of the Malay population, has disappeared. Civilization is making rapid way.  

Although McKinley asserted the U. S. intended to take the Philippines through a policy of “benevolent assimilation,” which would circumvent the people of the Philippines from the harsh treatment experienced by Boers or Cubans, the U.S. did not limit its use of violence. After similar reconcentration policies were implemented in the Philippines, the United States declared martial law, no longer distinguishing between “insurgents” or “insurrectos” and the Philippine people in general (Schirmer 1972). It was Luke E. Wright, Governor General of the colonial Philippines, who in 1905 declared martial law in certain provinces allowing the exemption from the writ of habeas corpus (Dy Yap 1972). Therefore, anyone captured or taken into custody for aiding insurgents lost any rights to habeas corpus from the United States or any rights as prisoners of war under General Rule 100, regulations for combat conduct from the Civil War (Kramer 2006).

22 Letter to Mahan from Clarke (no date). American Anti-Imperialist League Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
The brutality the British used against the Boers in South Africa was synonymous with the name of Lord Kitchener. Many liberal U.S. elites who actively subscribed to Anglo-Saxonism felt disappointed in Britain's use of imperialist violence. The feeling of disappointment was structured by the rapprochement with Britain. These citizens believed Anglo-Saxons, as the heralds of civilization, should have been morally above the use of savage violence.

The left image, "Before" the text reads,

John (kneeling): Sammy dear, my only friend, my only true friend!—When you got that angry about the Venezuela-affair, I at once gave way;--Sammy, when you had that Spanish affair on your hands, I kept the other boys quiet—Sammy, you are my dearest friend, Sammy, I have a veneration for you, Sam, my blood is thicker than water, now keep the other chaps off my hand whilst I just give a licking to that nasty nigger of a Boer-boy—Do promise me, Sammy and be a nice and true chum!—Sam: Allright, allright[sic], don't get so nervous and so excited. —Go ahead, and I'll have a look round.

Right Image "After" reads,

Sam(intervening): Now look here, that will just do. Seven to one, that's no fair play any longer. I thought you were going to fight it out on equal terms—But now you have even called in your younger brothers!—Stop it, I say—This Boer-boy has fought his battle splendidly. He shan't be kicked to death—When I was in trouble with you I was that glad to get foreign assistance. So stop it now, I say!—

John: Allright, Sammy-dear, allright. You know I didn't mean mischief [sic]. Only wanted to give him a lesson in civilisation, you know--

This cartoon exemplifies the Anglo-American rapprochement and disappointment as well as the U.S.-Boer rapprochement. John Bull's appeals to Uncle Sam illuminate the rapprochement through the employment of the interimperial field's project of "civilization," while Uncle Sam's defense of the Boers illuminates the rapprochement over two white settler-colony societies attempting to throw out the white British empire.
The schema of the white man's burden was complicated in this case, forcing the U.S. to take both sides and ultimately showing a disappointment with Britain's violent unrestraint against white settler-colonizers.

Image 2. *The Forbidden Book*. These images demonstrate both Anglo-Saxonism and the inter-imperial field of empire.

There was also anti-British sentiment, rather than a self-identified disappointment, among U.S. working classes tending toward anti-imperialism. U.S. citizens in the working classes felt more of a rapprochement for the Boers as settler-colonizers trying to overthrow the British. This harkened back to what they associated with the American
experience. Workers of Irish descent, not surprisingly, were especially anti-British with regard to the affairs of the Boer War.23

But Kipling's poem, "The White Man's Burden," spoke to a significant element of U.S. society associating race, gender, empire, and civilization as a moral duty that could also open up economic opportunities, even if it required considerable violence to get there. The well-known writer and anti-imperialist sympathizer, Caroline Pemberton wrote to Anti-Imperialist League leader Herbert Welsh in 1899 referring to a new story she had written, *Stephanie the Black*, which she believed tied the issues of race prejudice at home and the war in the Philippines. She wrote, "Most intimately connected is I believe this problem with our shameful conduct in the Philippines. If the people of those islands were white, we could sympathize with their struggle for independence as we sympathize with the Boers. When shall we outgrow this hideous arrogance that is in our blood toward all whom the sun has browned? The liberty of the Anglo-saxon[sic] is for himself alone."24 Pemberton notes the sympathy Uncle Sam felt for the Boer boy in image 1, suggesting that if the Filipinos were of European descent, like the Boers, U.S. Americans would feel much differently about the Philippine-American War. This is one example of a structural feeling of race. Although in her letter she says this book will be about "Stephanie," it was actually published in 1899 as *Stephen the Black*. Her choice of changing the subject's gender suggests an additional awareness of inadequate sympathies for racialized women.

Although a substantial number of Filipinos were Catholic, after three centuries of Spanish rule, protestant missionaries were anxious to Christianize the "savage" Filipinos.

24 Letter from Caroline Pemberton to Herbert Welsh, November 15, 1899. Herbert Welsh Papers, Hatcher Graduate Library, Special Collections Library.
"American Protestants who accepted Darwinism, but could not bear to jettison the belief that they were part of a cosmic plan to perfect the world, found in 'civilization' a way to reconcile the seemingly contradictory implications of Darwinism and Protestant millenialism. Discourses of civilization gave millenialism a Darwinistic mechanism. Instead of God working in history to perfect the world, believers in civilization described evolution working in history to perfect the world" (Bederman 1995: 26). Indeed, McKinley reported to have prayed on the Philippine issue which led him to take the Philippines and bring them civilization (Kramer 2006).

After McKinley's assassination in 1900, Theodore Roosevelt, recent national hero of San Juan Hill, succeeded him as his vice president. Not one to shy away from expressing his opinions, Roosevelt held counsel with Kipling. As quoted in Dyer (1980), "[Roosevelt] informed Rudyard Kipling that 'in dealing with the Philippines I have first [to deal with] the jack-fools who seriously think that any group of pirates and head-hunters needs nothing but independence in order that it may be turned forthwith into a dark-hued New England town meeting'" (pp. 140-141). Roosevelt saw the anti-imperialists as naive and out of date with how governance should be employed on colonial subjects.

However, the empires were not the only ones exchanging tactics for fighting insurgent uprisings. Filipinos were also taking note of the successful tactics the Boers used against the British and employed them against the U.S. military (Kramer 2006). Furthermore, knowing the racial history of the U.S., Filipinos were on guard as to how this could come into play against them as subjects of the U.S. and even used this information to garner support and sympathy from "colored" troops in the Philippines
(Jacobson 2000; Reyes 1971). Not only attempting communication with soldiers in the Philippines, the revolutionary leadership in Hong Kong also made contacts with prominent anti-imperialists in the U.S. exchanging information and visiting the U.S. to educate the public about the situation in the Philippines from the perspective of the revolutionaries (De Ocampo 1977; Zwick 1998). Through these activities, anti-imperialists in the metropole earned the dubious label of traitors.

**Pacific Politics and "Asiatic" Power**

When the Boxer Rebellion broke out in 1900, with Chinese nationalists fighting Western Christian missionaries in China, it was no coincidence that the U.S. was allied with Great Britain against the Chinese to put down the fighting and secure access to Chinese markets.\(^\text{25}\) Much like the earlier protestant missionaries in Hawai'i\(^\text{26}\) going first to evangelize, all the while paving the way for American trade (Jung 2006), missionaries in China played a similar role (Miller 1982; Rosenberg 1982). The U.S. had benefited from Great Britain's colonial ventures in Chinese ports that resulted in preferential treaties, as its "junior partner" (Miller 1982: 4). Its Open Door policy with China amounted to nonterritorial imperialism (Kramer 2006; Ninkovich 2001; Schirmer 1972). The view of China as potentially offering a vast outlet for trade was central to many American imperialists' support for colonizing the Philippines.

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\(^{25}\) Troops stationed in the Philippines were conveniently rerouted to Hong Kong to help put down the fighting (Kramer 2006). See pp. 349-350.

\(^{26}\) Justifications for the U.S. taking Hawai'i as a colony and later as a territory also cited proximity to China and China's purportedly infinite possibilities for trade given the size of its population (Miller 1982).
Within China and Japan, however, there were increasing numbers of protests over U.S. and European trade agreements (Kramer 2006). The Boxer Rebellion was a significant event for protestant missionaries and capitalists hoping to further penetrate the Chinese interior. That the Chinese would take up arms against them was a disturbing prospect for conducting effective business. The Japanese defeat of Russia in 1905 further crystallized the increasing power of Japan in the Pacific. More unsettling for the U.S. was its disruption of the tenets of "the white man's burden" with an Asian empire defeating a white empire. Indeed, the idea of a "race war" (Kramer 2006) with Japan threatening to take over the Philippines from the Americans and securing Asia as its domain, a fear correlating to the actual practices of the U.S. through the Monroe Doctrine, was part of the background in which the development of policies in the inter-imperial field in the Pacific occurred at the beginning of the 20th century.

The Intraimperial Field of the U.S.

The racialized antecedents to international events in the Philippines included settler colonialism, slavery, the Monroe Doctrine, the Open Door Policy in China, and annexing Hawai'i as a territory, paving the path for intervention in the Philippines with white public support. Referencing schemas of "civilization," such as social Darwinism and abstract notions of progress, imperialist culture in the metropole developed the "benevolent assimilation" schema regarding the Philippines that justified and explained the involvement. Missionaries, educators, and World's Fairs did the bidding of the government's civilizing projects using the banner of "civilization" in implementing imperialist governance and management.
By the time of the Philippine-American War, the Indian Wars of the 1880's were over but the project of “civilizing” the Indians and containing them on reservations was still a priority for missionaries and educators. Meanwhile, white lynch mobs increasingly terrorized Black Americans (Wells 1997). The U.S. empire proved adept at learning and implementing the violent techniques of the British and Spanish empires in conquering racialized populations. However, the U.S. military also had the experience in the metropole warring with Indians and forcing their relocation onto reservations to draw from. Slotkin (1992) states,

The parallel between the logic of massacre in the Philippines and the lynching of Blacks in the South and Midwest was a fact of contemporary life and rhetoric. If 'Indian' was the racial epithet for Filipinos preferred by the high command, the second most popular--and the one preferred by the rank and file--was 'nigger.' The former emphasized the danger the Filipino presented as an armed enemy capable of 'exterminating' the American army as Sitting Bull had exterminated Custer's men (p. 114).

Additionally, the Chinese Exclusion Acts had been expanded to exclude Japanese immigrants, inciting a dispute with Japan that resulted in a Gentleman's Agreement allowing Japanese students (Kramer 2006). Such was the racial state as developed in the metropole, a reimagined nation-state of white control and racialized Asian "others" included through exceptional exclusions (Murphy 2005).

Cultural schemas like social Darwinism played into the savage/civilization discourse and justified "benevolent assimilation" along with the corresponding violence. These schemas legitimated practices taken against "primitive" peoples for imperialist and
many anti-imperialists (Bannister 1979). Imperialist cultural practices gave rise to hegemonic structures of thinking and feeling about imperialism and gave purchase to imperialist practices for colonizers. For example, President Roosevelt noted, "It is our duty toward the people living in barbarism to see that they are freed from their chains, and we can free them only by destroying barbarism itself. The missionary, the merchant, and the soldier may each have to play a part in this destruction and the consequent uplifting of the people" (as quoted in Bederman 1995: 189). Force and control through colonial management tactics and the withholding of rights in the colony were key to imperialist culture through structures of thinking and feeling of colonizers, and vested citizens of empire. The state is not something separate from society, but rather is part of the culture in which it is situated (Bourdieu 1999).

At the turn of the twentieth century, social Darwinism carried with it racial ideas of science. Social Darwinism, more than anything, represented schemas to explain, justify, and embody imperialist culture. Arendt (1968) states, "Darwinism was met with such overwhelming success because it provided, on the basis of inheritance, the ideological weapons for race as well as class rule and could be used for, as well as against, race discrimination. Politically speaking, Darwinism as such was neutral, and it has led indeed, to all kinds of pacifism and cosmopolitanism as well as to the sharpest forms of imperialistic ideologies" (p. 58). In contradistinction to the imperialist schema of social Darwinism, civilizing projects gave rise to acts that forcibly imposed language, values, beliefs, religion and simultaneously devalued the native civilization. Civilizing projects created official knowledge framed through social Darwinism. Colonial educators, missionaries, merchants and soldiers often were roles played by the same individual over
time, just as the materials of warfare changed functions overtime. For example, the warship *USS Thomas* used to carry soldiers to the Philippines, was the first ship to bring teachers to the Philippines from the U.S. These teachers became known as "thomasites" (Kramer 2006). Thus, civilizing projects performed the state's imperialist policies through missionaries, systems of colonial education, and the 1904 World's Fair with colonized peoples on display (Kramer 2006; Rydell 1984).

Civilizing projects not only created "official knowledge" of the Philippines and Filipinos, it also created "colonial experts" mostly men of the academy in the Philippines who also held posts in the colonial government (Kramer 2006). Photographs of Filipinos as racialized subhuman subjects (Wexler 2000), depending on the role of the photographer (i.e. individuals at the World's Fair or anthropologists employed by the government generating official "knowledges" of Filipinos) could contribute either to imperialist culture, cultural imperialism or both as in *Our Islands and Their Peoples* (1899).

Imperialist culture set the enabling conditions for evangelical tactics of missionaries and "do-gooder" activities of organizations such as the Women's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) (Tyrrell 1992) as well as expansive capitalist trade. As an example, WCTU's evangelical tactics for temperance and ridding violence, while xenophobic and racist ideologies informed their work, does not seem to me to be cultural imperialism. Though clearly hegemonic and influenced by the age of empire in which it originated, the work of WCTU went around the state creating transnational networks that lobbied the

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27 Dean Worcester and various anthropologists made careers out of their colonial "expertise." Anti-imperialists also sent educated professionals to the Philippines to gather knowledge about what was happening from a point of view not as sympathetic to imperialism and the U.S. government's policies.
state, rather than international networks through the state. Because of the state's power to legitimate and institutionalize, it is the relationship between state and imperialist culture that yields the civilizing projects of education eradicating native languages, religious knowledges, and ways of organizing social life. This makes the crucial distinction between imperialist culture and civilizing projects. As imperialist culture and civilizing projects reinforce each other, there are not always clear lines of distinction. But imperialist culture is an antecedent for cultural imperialism. Thus, when interests coincided, missionaries were supported by the state. Nevertheless, if civilizing projects form in the process of empire, they carry institutionalized practices that "civilize" subjects and justify the violence of the battlefield.

Paradoxically extending "civilization" and "savagery" with regard to violence, imperialist culture in the intraimperial field allowed racialized practices to go unquestioned and ignored while insisting on assimilation. Therefore, while benevolent assimilation took aim in the Philippines, lynching went on in the metropole.28

U.S. imperialist cultural practices contributed heavily to assimilation. Missionaries, educators, and the settlement movement played a significant role in perpetuating assimilation. In the Philippines, this cultural logic, which Paul Kramer (2006) calls an "inclusionary racial formation," touted the capacities of the Filipinos for their capabilities for future governance and simultaneously "lamented" their present shortcomings for self-governance (Kramer 2006: 192, my emphasis).

However, those subscribing to benevolent assimilation overestimated the one-way direction of assimilating culture (Magubane 2004). Many pro-imperialists and racial

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28 This is to say nothing of the missionary education in the South and the Philippines.
purists explicitly feared the assimilation of Filipino ways into U.S. culture. For these imperialists, any inclusions could lead to concessions and accommodationist inclusions of the assimilating group, Filipinos (Kramer 2006). Even containment within the control of the state could lead to incremental changes in the imperialist culture, as the history of slavery had shown.

*Lynching in the Metropole*

Anti-imperialists were not only aware of the violent techniques used in the Philippines by the military, they were also aware of the violent techniques used in the metropole against Blacks that were implicitly accepted by the state and whites, through willful ignorance and refusal to punish white mob violence, most notorious in the form of lynching. Therefore, making connections with torture in the Philippines and lynching in the metropole was not questioned as two different cases, one legitimate, and the other not. Vron Ware (1992) states of the period covering the Philippine-American War, "By the turn of the century, from 1899-1903, only 27 of the total 543 recorded lynchings were of whites" (p. 171). The racial component of lynching was undeniable. The violence in the metropole and the colony were both considered "race prejudice," "savage," and "immoral" by Northern anti-imperialists.

For many anti-imperialists, seeing themselves in the abolitionist legacy played into their understanding of an underlying racial connection with the violence. They saw white Southerners as culpable for the racist imperialism in the Philippines, although many Southern whites were anti-imperialist because they wanted to prevent the U.S. from including any more nonwhite groups within the nation (Kramer 2006). For example, the
widow of Jefferson Davis, former president of the Confederacy, wrote "The White Man's Problem: Why We Do Not Want the Philippines." In this article, she categorizes herself as both an "anti-imperialist," disagreeing with the government, and an "anti-expansionist," seeing no benefit to adding the Philippines to the U.S. She stated, "For my own part, however, I cannot see why we should add several millions of negroes to our population when we already have eight millions of negroes in the United States. The problem of how best to govern these and promote their welfare we have not yet solved."29 Racist policies of the South were utilized to extend imperialism, just as Southern states used Northern imperialist policies to justify increased disfranchisement of Black men in the South (Woodward 1951). In the same issue of The Arena as the article by Mrs. Davis, as she signed herself, Caroline Pemberton contributed the article, "The Barbarism of Civilization," wherein she scorns lynching and raises the issue that despite the obvious evidence of "race-mixing,"

It was decided that it was criminal for a white man to marry a colored woman having more than one-eighth of negro blood. This was voted for by all except two or three colored men in the convention. A negro named Smalls then arose and offered a resolution to the effect that it should be declared criminal and punishable for white men to live in an unmarried state with colored women. This was voted down by the same majority that had voted for the other resolution!

she goes on,

One seldom hears of colored men uniting themselves openly with white women of even the poorest class in the South. To do so would be a conspiracy against 'the

honor of white womanhood,' the discovery of which means death to the negro.

Yet such cases occur. But no punishment is visited on the white man that seeks a similar union with a negro woman.30

One infamous lynching occurred in Wilmington, North Carolina in November of 1898, just as the debate over the Philippines was heating up. There, an established middle-class Black population ran candidates for office. In response, white members of the community burned the building that held the Black newspaper office and killed dozens of Black community members. This drove elected Black officials and white allies out of the community (Schirmer 1972). The violence spread to South Carolina when the small number of enfranchised Blacks tried to vote. "Before nightfall ten blacks were killed; five lay dead all day long by the roadside, four others were lynched in adjoining woods" (Schirmer 1972: 101).

Newspapers in the North came out against the Southern violence. The Boston Advertiser noted, "The white man's government of the North Carolina pattern is precisely the government which so-called expansionists hope to put in operation...in the Philippines" (as quoted in Schirmer 1972: 101). The Memphis Commercial Appeal, a Southern paper, also noted, "How are we going to govern the Philippines, Hawaii, and other new possessions? Peaceably if we can; or like the white men are doing in the Carolinas, if we must, but govern them we will" (as quoted in Schirmer 1972: 101-102).

Lynching continued with increased virulence into 1899. Emilio Aguinaldo followed U.S. newspapers, staying up-to-date on characterizations of the war and racial issues (Silbey 2007). He was well aware of the lynching problem and exploited it to the

advantage of his cause. Learning of the especially incendiary lynching of Sam Hose, Aguinaldo had fliers posted to attract and recruit Black U.S. soldiers. Hose was lynched on April 23 by a white mob in Newnan, Georgia, where they burned him at the stake. Although Hose consistently denied it, he was accused of raping the wife of his employer. While this was common in stories of lynching, the Hose lynching went further, "'small pieces of bone went for 25 cents and a bit of liver crisply cooked for 10.' When the news of the lynching spread to nearby Atlanta the railroad put on special excursion trains to take nearly 4,000 whites to the affair. Arriving too late for the burning, they returned home with souvenirs" (Schirmer 1972: 146).

Given the racial hostility in the U.S. against Blacks it might seem surprising that there were two Black volunteer regiments serving in the Philippines, much to the chagrin of many of their white counterparts.

Instances of black desertion to join the Filipino insurgents numbered only about a dozen, yet these received considerable attention among white officials and in the press. White deserters, reported *New York Herald* journalist Stephen Bonsal, were most often merely 'lazy and idle,' whereas black deserters far more likely to leave U.S. ranks for ideological reasons, or even to jump sides. The most notorious of these cases was David Fagen of the Twenty-fourth Infantry who deserted in November 1899, evidently after coming across a placard from Aguinaldo addressed 'To the Colored American Soldier.' 'It is without honor that you are spilling your costly blood,' such broadsides proclaimed. 'You must consider your situation and your history, and take charge that the blood ...of Sam Hose proclaims vengeance' (Jacobson 2000: 252).
Fagen not only deserted the U.S. military, but also joined the Filipinos and led his own regiment. His regiment was later captured by the U.S. military, and he was beheaded (Jacobson 2000). Like Wells utilizing the interimperial field, Aguinaldo successfully exploited intraimperial racialized politics to gain sympathy and allies for his cause.

*Violence in the Colony*

Debates over the military use of the "water cure" and reconcentration merged the metropole and colony within a binary schema of benevolent civilization and barbaric violence. Anti-imperialist debates against imperialism had focused on democratic traditions and contradictions with the constitution. As the violence became more noted, anti-imperialists began focusing their arguments against the violence invoking established law. Meanwhile, imperialist racial explanations for the violence also became justifications for violence. Chapters 5 and 6 expand in detail on violence in the colony with regard to the Philippine-American War and anti-imperialism.

*Exceptional Violence*

Exceptional U.S. culture brought with it "states of exception" (Agamben 2000). These "states of exception" glorified the benevolence of the U.S., while justifying the exceptional use of violence against those it hoped to civilize. On the exceptional logic of violence, Giorgio Agamben (2000) states,

> Historians debate whether the first appearance of camps ought to be identified with the campos de concentraciones [or reconcentrados] that were created in 1896 by the Spaniards in Cuba in order to repress the insurrection of that colony's
population, or rather with the concentration camps into which the English herded the Boers at the beginning of the twentieth century. What matters here is that in both cases one is dealing with the extension to an entire civilian population of a state of exception linked to a colonial war. The camps, in other words, were not born out of ordinary law, and even less were they the product—as one might have believed—of a transformation and a development of prison law; rather, they were born out of the state of exception and martial law (p. 38).

In Agamben's discussion here the use of the camp as a technology of violence is born out of imperialist relations. He concludes the "camp as nomos," or the camp as an ordered logic of practice. Although he is probably not aiming to make an exhaustive list, I think the fact Agamben does not include the U.S.-Philippine reconcentrations or the U.S. use of Indian reservations as camps suggests that the U.S. has successfully represented and organized around its own exceptionalism in its historical narrative. This exceptionalism is told in the official histories of the Philippines's benevolent assimilation, erasing the perpetuation of extraordinary violence from the U.S. historical narrative. This exceptionalism also justifies racialized violence by making U.S. imperialist policy self-sacrificing and virtuous, deepening the racialization through a taken-for-granted need to "civilize" the "savage."

Given the racial state of the U.S., the use of violent measures was justifiable through the schema of "the white man's burden." Violence, government officials argued, was a necessary means for controlling savage people, incapable of self-government. Violence was a necessary means to support the experiment in the Philippines that would eventually lead to Filipino democratic self-government, after a period of tutelage by the
American colonial government. How long this tutelage would take, however, was conveniently left in question allowing the U.S. to maintain control indefinitely, or at least until the U.S. deemed the Filipinos ready for self-government (Kramer 2006).

Some U.S. colonial officials, like William H. Taft, took McKinley's line of benevolent assimilation seriously. The U.S. would not just take from its colony, it would also educate. For many skeptics, the policy of benevolent assimilation satisfied the question of the morality of involvement in the Philippines. Thus, the exceptionalist schema of "benevolent assimilation" provided a release to pressure the discourse of "civilization" also put on U.S. officials when the contradictions of using violence came about in debates. The schema of "benevolent assimilation" resulted from specific values of democracy that enabled Americans to believe themselves and their government to be different (Go 2007). Employing a schema of "benevolent assimilation" avoided undermining the value of the state's "civilization." The U.S. could still claim the moral high ground while implementing and extending its empire through "exceptions" that garbled the laws anti-imperialists worked to have enforced.31

Historians have debunked claims to U.S. exceptionalism over the last two decades (Go 2007; Stoler 2006). Nevertheless, the events of the Philippine-American War are the embodiment of the historical-narrative of U.S. exceptionalism. On the politics of memory and the Philippine-American War, Matthew Frye Jacobson (2000) states,

The stakes are quite high for Americans' national self-conception. In expurgating the period of U.S. expansionism that bridges the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Americans adopt a broken narrative that casts Manifest Destiny and

continental expansionism falsely adrift from 'modern' U.S. history, and obscures the extent to which the modern state was built, and modern nationalism generated, in close relation to the imperialist project. The effect is to mystify U.S. involvement in global affairs by hiding the very moment when global power was so lustily seized. If there is no turn-of-the-century expansionism, then Manifest Destiny becomes an irrelevance of dim antiquity, and both the Wilsonian internationalism and the Cold War interventionism of the twentieth century can be imagined as developing upon an entirely different epistemological footing (pp. 263-264).

For anti-imperialists and pro-imperialists, the debates on imperialist violence mattered because of the hegemonic schemas of democracy. Opposing violence appealed to anti-imperialists across social positions because violence was considered morally wrong between civilized groups. Therefore, violence had to be legitimated by taking racialized exceptions because it was not justifiable in and of itself. Exceptionalism and the racialization of subjects attempted to put them outside of the hegemonic order of the "sacred." Thus, exceptional culture and the exceptional violence worked in tandem moving forward the U.S. imperialist project at home and abroad as the Philippine-American War unfolded.32

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CHAPTER 3: ANTI-IMPERIALISTS AND STRUCTURES OF FEELING

Any form or degree of domination has a like tendency. It fosters the degrading sense of superiority, contempt, arrogance, aloofness, the domineering spirit, all of which canker the superior man's nature. It prevents the growth of brotherliness—the highest idea of civilization; of equality—the basis of democratic evolution; of the American spirit—the essence of the American spirit being equal opportunity of development for all.

—Morrison Swift (1899), *Anti-Imperialism*

The AIL organized against the Philippine-American War specifically in opposition to the United States’ acquisition of the Philippines, as a colony or otherwise. Individual rank and file anti-imperialists opposed the acquisition of the Philippines for complex and competing nationalist, racialized, and gendered reasons. Beyond their contradictory reasons, all anti-imperialists expressed outrage over the United States’ imperialist advances. Previous studies of the anti-imperialists have argued that anti-imperialists were racist or provincial (Lasch 1958; 1973). However, this does not uncover the various racisms at play and how those competing racisms affected their activism (Go 2004), including those organizing opportunities that were imagined as within their limits of possibility (Jung 2006). Therefore, I take into account the important differences in the AIL such as in their political, racial, gendered, and nationalist beliefs rather than treated in any singular, over-generalized way. By including and scrutinizing the anti-imperialist views of Black women and men as well as white women alongside the previously studied views of white men, the relevance of social position with understanding imperialism and expressing these views emotionally can now be addressed. Both the Atkinson affair of 1899 and the various views on the Boer War highlight the tenuous alliance held together by the AIL.
Studying emotions as a category of social analysis, rather than psychological analysis, is a growing trend for both history and sociology (Barbalet 2002; Collins 2004; Denzin 1984; Hochschild 1983; Reddy 2001; Stearns 1988; Stearns 1998; Thoits 1989; Williams 2001). However, as Sewell (2005) notes, "Most social scientists avoid emotion like the plague. They seem to fear that if they take emotion seriously as an object of study, they will be tainted by the irrationality, volatility, subjectivity, and ineffability that we associate with the term—that their own lucidity and scientific objectivity will be brought into question. But if, as I would maintain, high-pitched emotional excitement is a constitutive ingredient of many transformative actions, then we cannot afford to maintain this protective scientific distance" (p. 248). Anti-imperialists displayed "emotional excitement" over the Philippines. One specific example of this is when they displayed a "moral shock" over the benevolent assimilation proclamation and the Atkinson Affair. On the other hand, some citizens expressed a marked indifference to the events in the Philippines, which is demonstrated by a comparative interest in the Boer War. Therefore, I use evidence of emotional excitement and indifference as information to probe.

Emotions have been addressed implicitly in the literature on class, race, and gender—though more often self-consciously addressed with respect to women's experiences, (e.g. Hochschild's (1983) The Managed Heart). More recently, historical scholarship has taken up the issue of emotion as related to class (Barrett 2002) or ethnicity and race (Diner 1998; Janiewski 1998). Sociological studies of social

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33 Indeed, this reaction by social scientists would be lacking in reflexivity regarding how their emotions inform their research, and following, how feelings are structured by ideas of scientific research.
movements have also made significant contributions to the study of the role of emotion in recent years (Berezin 2002; Jasper 1998; Goodwin 2001). For my purposes, it is more important to stress emotion is relational and temporal and that there are underlying social conditions that structure feeling.

I agree when Collins (2004) states,

The sociology of emotions thus bears upon the central questions of sociology. What holds a society together--the 'glue' of solidarity--and what mobilizes conflict--the energy of mobilized groups--are emotions; so is what operates to uphold stratification--hierarchical feelings, whether dominant, subservient, or resentful. If we can explain the conditions that cause people to feel these kinds of emotions, we will have a major part of a core sociological theory. There is, of course, a structural part of such a theory, and a cognitive part; but the emotional part gives us something essential for a realistic theory--its dynamics (p. 103, my emphasis).

But, I also suggest thinking of emotions as structured and structuring (not unlike Bourdieu's notion of "habitus") is not only realistic but essential for understanding key moments of transformation (Sewell 2005).

"Structures of feeling" as Raymond Williams (1977) conceived of them are historical and contingent on the capitalist epoch in which they exist. He states,

34 The interdisciplinary study of emotion has elaborated and deepened understandings of their biological and social characteristics (Denzin 1984; Thoits 1989; Williams 2001). I am solely interested in the social characteristics here.

35 Randall Collins' (2004) book, Interaction Ritual Chains, offers a theory that attempts to transcend the micro/macro divide through quantifying micro interactions. I think this misrepresents the nature of micro interactions and the way macro questions should be answered, although I do sympathize with his dissatisfaction on micro/macro divisions.
the term [structures of feeling] is difficult, but 'feeling' is chosen to emphasize a
distinction from more formal concepts of 'world-view' or 'ideology' [...] It is that
we are concerned with meanings and values as they are actively lived and felt [...] We are talking about characteristic elements of impulse, restraint, and tone;
specifically affective elements of consciousness and relationships: not feeling
against thought, but thought as felt and feeling as thought: practical consciousness
of a present kind, in a living and interrelating continuity. We are then defining
these elements as a 'structure': as a set, with specific internal relations, at once
interlocking and in tension (p. 132).

For example, "civilization" structured feelings by giving limits to habitual impulses,
restraints, and tone. "Civilization" schemas structured feelings of racial superiority that
expressed the particular societal tone of "civilization." However white supremacy
translated, whether through a responsibility to "uplift," through the entitled right to
dominate people of color in whatever way served an interest, or to continue the progress
of the U.S. and serve as an effective model, provided the tension. Non-white anti-
imperialists did not escape the structures of feeling regarding white supremacy. It was
something they had to confront in terms of anti-imperialism, which they did.

Explaining conditions that incite mobilizing emotions does not need to be done at
the expense of cognition or even rationality, as many scholars have noted. For instance,
in his discussion on emotions involved in protest, James Jasper (1998) states, "To the
extent that emotions depend on cognitions, they more clearly allow learning and
adaptation to one's environment, i.e., rationality" (p. 400). Starting with an intersectional
analysis of actors' protest, the relationship between emotion and cognition is shown to be
not only inextricable but also mutually formative. Again drawing on Jasper's (1998) work, I outline how the emotions that mobilize actors to protest are path dependent according to social position and develop over or against historically contingent structures of feeling.

Historian William Reddy (2001) has done much methodologically to make the historical relevance of emotions and feeling accessible. Reddy states, "If emotions operate like overlearned cognitive habits, as many psychologists would now agree, then they must be shaped, to a significant degree, by the environment in which the individual lives" (p. 34). Anti-imperialists' social position and their time provided the parameters of feelings structured against racial hierarchy (such as the impulses, restraints, and tone). He (2001) uses "emotional regimes" rather than structures of feeling. However, the meaning seems compatible in that "emotional regimes" require a cultural "domain of effort" and are given to cultural strategies and goals for emotional mastery. With this in mind, Reddy (2001) suggests, "Emotional regimes would be essential elements of all stable political regimes" (p. 55), such as those at the turn of the twentieth century in the form of civilization, racial hierarchy, and white superiority.

Anti-imperialists formulated their reactions to imperialist policies with a firm belief in the traditions and promises of U.S. democracy. For them, democracy exemplified the highest form of civilization, and whites were the authors of the enlightened order. For pro-imperialists and anti-imperialists, the democratic narrative of the U.S. was treated as sacred. Because both groups subscribed to the idea of democratic practice as the ultimate in civilization, it laid the foundation for anti-imperialists to invoke contradictions with it as a point of opposition to imperialism. Answering the calls

The most relevant aspect of the emotional excitement that mobilized anti-imperialists to protest was their outrage. Social influence on collective emotion is not merely a repressive or productive form of social control (Sommers 1988). Sparked emotion, especially of the collective character, can also incite counter-hegemonic political action (e.g. see Passionate Politics (2001) edited by Jeff Goodwin, James Jasper, and Francesca Polletta and Chapter 8 of William Sewell's (2005) Logics of History). This was the case for anti-imperialists. However, the relationship between social position and the emotional excitement driving opposition movements is ignored both in social movements literature and political sociology.

Bourdieu’s (1993) theories of habitus and doxa are the most helpful for a sociological analysis of social position and corresponding anti-imperialisms. Habitus is defined as dispositions—indicating an incorporation of emotion—structured according to social position (i.e. race, class, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, cohort, religion, nationality, etc.) and structuring according to agents’ choices in responses. As such, it plays a significant role in the reproduction of social structures, which has been the focus of Bourdieu’s application of the theory (for example, see Masculine Domination (1998) and Distinction (1984)).

In addition to social reproduction, Bourdieu theorized the possibility within habitus for social transformation. However, actual analysis of this possibility has yet to be adequately undertaken (Alexander 1995). Nevertheless, Bourdieu’s understanding
that we are the products of our social and personal histories just as much as we are the
responses that we choose is fundamental to his theory. Furthermore, the responses we
choose, within real structural limits, are sometimes less limited than what we can
conceptualize without reflexive (Bourdieu 1993) social experiences that are themselves
transformative. A critical posture toward social structures, or in Bourdieu’s (1992)
terms an awareness of “symbolic violence,” allows for alternative thinking and planning
than would reproduce the social structure, as is evident in the work of many Black anti-
imperialists.

However, Jeffrey Alexander (1995) gets at the Achilles heel of Bourdieu’s theory
of habitus noting, “Bourdieu displays the [...] inability to conceptualize a distance, or
critical space, between mental structures and the social conditions from which they
emerge” (pp. 141-142). Alexander (1995) goes on to state, “In habitus theory, domination
is not an ‘empirical’ fact: it results from systematic theoretical inattention to the
conditions of autonomy. Actors are ‘dominated agents’ in principle, that is, on good
theoretical grounds” (p. 147). While I share Alexander’s view regarding the general
inattention to conditions that promote “critical space,” his critique that Bourdieu’s project
does not theorize autonomy is exactly what Bourdieu was trying to avoid, the false binary
of autonomy versus determinacy. In fact, I would argue this is what Bourdieu was trying
to theorize against, if unsuccessfully exemplified in over-determined analyses.

36 Studying these transformative experiences, like W.E.B. Du Bois’ theory of the “double
consciousness” could lead to better theories of transformation. N.K. Denzin’s project of
autoethnography also interrogates personal experience as transformative through critical,
reflexive, and empathic analysis. While this is one productive point of departure, more
needs done on collective experience as transformative (e.g. Douglas McAdam’s (1988)
Bourdieu’s concept of “symbolic violence” carries with it the inverse—an absence of symbolic violence-- a non-symbolically dominated agent capable of “critical space,” even if structurally dominated. I argue this possibility is an empirical and socio-historical fact, central to social transformation. Again using Black anti-imperialists as an example, structural domination was not denied nor ignored, but rather used to critique the dominant “doxa” of "civilization," displaying “doxic asymmetry” (Jung 2004). It was through critical and reflexive analysis of experience that they came to anti-imperialism.

In 1899, the central relevant “doxa” (Bourdieu 1993) for anti-imperialists and pro-imperialists alike was "civilization." Doxa is taken-for-granted knowledge by a shared culture that provides the limits of debate. The arbitrariness of its value goes unquestioned. This does not mean doxic value is necessarily unanimous, unlike Bourdieu’s original theorization (Jung 2004). However, the presuppositions that go along with doxa are the dominant interpretation and are key to the reproduction of domination. For example, "civilization" was never seen as a problematic organizing system based on racial superiority. It was very rarely questioned. Furthermore, democratic practice was seen as part of the march of civilization. The ambiguity of "civilization" provided the opportunity for it to be invoked in the name of equality and inalienable rights as well as to justify white supremacy.

Bourdieu’s theory of doxa implicitly accounts for structures of feeling and the accompanying impulses, restraints, and tone. However, it is worthwhile to make the relationship more explicit, which is mainly a question of emphasis. Bourdieu focuses on how the taken-for-grantedness of doxa limits perceptions of possibilities, which reproduces arbitrary values and hierarchies. An analysis of structures of feeling is
compatible with this theoretical project, but this type of analysis would emphasize the impulses, restraints, and tone of a particular case and how these aspects impacted history. I argue that the impulses, restraints, and tone that came and went with contests over civilization between anti-imperialists and pro-imperialists show its doxic limits and the utility of incorporating multiple vantage points across social position.

For example, civilization and the actual implementation of democratic practice have been historically fraught with elitism, racism, and sexism, but also have justified protests for a more equitable society. It was the application of democracy that was central to anti-imperialist and pro-imperialist arguments over whether the Philippines should be forced by the United States into "democracy" or whether this was indeed a benevolent policy for the Filipinos (Kramer 2006). These arguments formed a "field of opinion" (Bourdieu 1993), where the "field of opinion" designates a material outlet for tension between contradictory understandings of an event or policy. The field of opinion is where "heterodoxy," or the counter-hegemonic discourse that challenges the normalization of "doxa," and where "orthodoxy," or the hegemonic discourse of the status quo trying to protect that which preserves the dominant order of things, take place.

The battle over the field of opinion is key for winning the "politics of recognition" (Kramer 2006). The challenge for Filipinos was to establish "recognition" for their fitness to govern themselves. They worked to achieve this end with colonial and government officials in the Philippines, while also working with anti-imperialists to achieve these ends in the U.S. What they all came up against was shriveling tone of indifference.

The social position of anti-imperialists and their corresponding "habitus" (Bourdieu 1993) was central to their views on the traditions of U.S. democracy and, most
importantly, on its future formation. Social location informed anti-imperialists’ particular views on U.S. democracy, the material resources used to express their views, and the networks available to them in getting those views heard. Constitutive of these views were anti-imperialist racisms.

“Symbolic violence” is the case in which an agent internalizes the cultural arbitrariness of domination as the natural order, blaming self and/or others for her/his domination (e.g. bootstrap theory). This is key to the legitimation of physical violence. As such, one would expect anti-imperialist racisms to serve as a kind of “symbolic violence” (Bourdieu 1992) in which the physical violence against Filipinos in the Philippines and the increased lynching of Blacks in the United States was minimized, ignored, or simply not connected by many white anti-imperialists. Indeed, this was the case for some anti-imperialists (Jacobson 1995; Kramer 2006; Lasch 1973). According to Bourdieu (1993), this is crucial to how domination is reproduced, what Jung (2004) refers to as “tacit nonrecognition” and what appears as mere tone of indifference and the impulse for forgetting.37

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37 A common critique of Bourdieu’s theories is his lack of attention to social transformation, and following, his over-deterministic analyses. Unlike Jeffrey Alexander (1995), I do not think this is necessarily a fatal flaw in his theories. Some actors, as part of their habitus, consider themselves to be agents of influence and are highly active in the field of opinion. Anti-imperialist leaders were such agents. Additionally, sometimes efforts to reproduce social structures are at odds with each other. This was the case for anti-imperialists concerned with preserving democratic practice and the Constitution of the U.S. and pro-imperialists concerned with expanding U.S. control and influence abroad. Agents become involved in the field of opinion and put forth counter-hegemonic arguments. The relevant argument for this paper is that the particular arguments put forth derives from social position and that the collective tenor of this discourse stems from structures of feeling. However, I am not suggesting that any transformation is inherently liberatory or that actors’ vision for change is unquestionably just.
Given the theoretical underpinnings of this chapter, that the formation of political protest is affected by the emotions around events derived from actors' social position, the layers of emotional responses need parceled out. Therefore, I first outline anti-imperialists and their social positions. I then explain how their emotional excitement incited them to action. Jasper's (1998) concepts of "moral shock" and "injustice frames" help explain anti-imperialists' mobilization. At the individual level, "moral shock," a type of epiphany, is the emotional experience wherein one's doxic cultural beliefs and values are disrupted by some outside event. For anti-imperialists, the first event was the "benevolent assimilation proclamation." With the absence of strong social networks, "moral shocks" serve as mobilizing factors for recruiting strangers into collective action (Jasper 1998). As Jasper (1998) notes, "moral shocks," often the first step toward recruitment into social movements, occur when an unexpected event or piece of information raises such a sense of outrage in a person that she becomes inclined toward political action, whether or not she has acquaintances in the movement (Jasper and Poulsen 1995; Jasper 1997)" (p. 409). Alluding to the doxic underpinnings of experiencing political outrage, Jasper (1998) also highlights that "shocks depend on preexisting patterns of affect, which channel the interpretation of announcements and revelations" (p. 409, my emphasis). The type of experience described by Jasper does not necessitate transformation. It is the emotional motivation for political action.

This is exemplified by the experience of anti-imperialists whose racist beliefs compelled them to refuse the idea of more people of color from the Philippines joining
the United States and further complicating the "race problem."\(^{38}\) The importance of this difference will be developed in the next chapter. But for the purposes here, it is enough to note that this outrage across social position and ideology contributed to the AIL's initially broad stroke of "injustice frames," which are "a way of viewing a situation or condition that expresses indignation or outrage over a perceived injustice, as well as finding some human agency to blame for the transgression" (Jasper 1998: 414). Their injustice frame contributed to the collective identity of being "anti-imperialist" in the face of multiple anti-imperialisms.

\(^{38}\) Mrs. Jefferson Davis. New York. *The Arena*. Jan-Jun 1900. This article provides just one example of this line of argument.
Anti-Imperialisms and Social Position

As previously noted, the most well-known and documented anti-imperialists were white men from elite backgrounds and others who were nationally renowned, like Jane Addams, Samuel Gompers, and Mark Twain. The movement’s leadership comprised of privileged white men who were academics, politicians, lawyers, and businessmen.\(^39\) The histories written about the AIL and their activities have focused almost exclusively on these men from the northeast (Beisner 1968; Beisner 1970; Beisner 1973; Foner 1984; Hoganson 1998; Jacobson 2000; Lasch 1958; Markowitz 1976; Reyes 1971; Schirmer 1972; Tompkins 1970; Welch Jr. 1973; Welch Jr. 1979). Here, I expand the analysis to include anti-imperialist women, Blacks, and working classes. According to the AIL secretary's report of February 10, 1899, the "membership of the Anti-Imperialist League

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\(^{39}\) Among the various elite white men, Beisner (1968) lists anti-imperialists to include, "Ex-Presidents Benjamin Harrison and Grover Cleveland were anti-imperialists, as were many active politicians of both major political parties. Among the Democratic anti-imperialists were Presidential aspirant William Jennings Bryan, Representative Champ Clark, Senators Ben Tillman and Arthur Gorman, and former cabinet officers Richard Olney and J. Sterling Morton. Republican anti-imperialists included three New England senators, George F. Hoar, Eugene Hale, and Justin Morrill, House Speaker Thomas Brackett Reed, and John Sherman, who served as Secretary of State in 1897-1898 before retiring and entering the ranks of the opposition...The many reformers and political independents who flocked to the banner of anti-imperialism included in their numbers Carl Schurz, E.L. Godkin, Charles Francis Adams, Jr., Moorfield Storey, Gamaliel Bradford, Henry Demarest Lloyd, Jane Addams, and Horace White.

In an age when the general public paid respectful attention to the sayings and doings of university presidents, David Starr Jordan of Stanford lent substantial aid to the anti-imperialists while a more erratic and lukewarm attitude was expressed by Cornell’s Jacob G. Schurman, Michigan’s James B. Angell, Northwestern’s Henry Wade Rogers, and Charles W. Eliot of Harvard. Other academic figures in the movement included Yale’s William Graham Sumner, William James and Charles Eliot Norton of Harvard, Hermann von Holst of the University of Chicago, Graham Taylor, Thorstein Veblen, and Bliss Perry. Representing the clergy were Edward Everett Hale, Henry Codman Potter, Henry Van Dyke Charles H. Parkhurst, Theodore Cuyler, and John Lancaster Spalding" (pp. x-xii).
[was] considerably over 25,000.\textsuperscript{40} However, these numbers counted only full members, leaving out women and people of color involved in auxiliary organizations affiliated with the AIL, since formal membership only admitted "men able and willing to work."\textsuperscript{41} That members were to be white went "without comment" (Jung 2009). However, using various collections of active AIL members, edited volumes that account for Black anti-imperialists and working classes (Gatewood 1971; Schirmer 1987), and newspaper articles, I include the activities of women and people of color in the history of the anti-imperialist movement. For instance, in the same report delineating male membership, the AIL also reported that in Cincinnati a committee of women put together an anti-imperialist petition with the names of over 2,000 women.\textsuperscript{42} Accounting for the subjectivities of those involved in anti-imperialist activities helps illustrate the relationship between social position and emotion, which led to the particular formation and path dependent strategy of the AIL.

Manifest Destiny had been the call early in the nation’s settlement history, but during the late 1890s this discourse was increasingly invoked to justify pro-imperialist interests in Hawai‘i, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Samoa, and the Philippines (Jacobson 2000; Rydell 1984; Tompkins 1970). These imperialist policies offended the sensibilities of many Republicans and Independents, who believed in self-determination and understood Americanism as synonymous with the ideals espoused in the “Declaration of Independence” (Beisner 1968), as well as many southern Democrats, who believed there

\textsuperscript{40} Annual Report of the Anti-Imperialist League, Feb. 10, 1899, Record Books of the Anti-Imperialist League, Vol. 1, Maria Lanzar-Carpio Papers, Hatcher Graduate Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.
was already a “race problem” in the South and that bringing other nonwhite peoples into the republic would further complicate this “race problem” (Lasch 1973). Anti-imperialism transcended divisions of political party and ideology.

Many mugwumps went from party to party and considered themselves “the heralds of reform, at liberty to use their uncommitted votes to force reform upon the existing political parties, or if reforms were resisted, to threaten the parties with destruction” (Beisner 1968: 7). For the most part, they were of the Anglo-Saxon elite with particular ideals for the nation—insofar as it reflected the moral and cultural interests of what they viewed as their heritage. Other anti-imperialists were considered Boston Brahmins, upper-middle class men connected with the wealthy mercantile sectors and descended from Puritans and Pilgrims (Schirmer 1972). As for the role new European immigrants and working classes would contribute to the nation, “the mugwumps felt dislike and contempt not only for swarming immigrants and striking railroaders but also for the methods and manners of the businessmen of the age” (Beisner 1968: 12). Their particular brand of anti-imperialism corresponded with their Brahmin habitus, which instilled political independence and support for reformist policies. They were, comparatively, engaged citizens.

Gamaliel Bradford, one of these Boston elites, was the man who made the initial call for a meeting of anti-imperialist men at Faneuil Hall (Schirmer 1972).
Faneuil Hall was a significant part of Boston’s material political culture. The building symbolized reform movements like the abolitionist movement. For the elder statesmen and women of the anti-imperialist movement, Faneuil Hall invoked emotional memories of meetings during the abolition movement. Because of this, for progressive Bostonians the building itself created “emotional excitement” (Mukerji 2006) coming from the tradition of protesting for equality and liberty. For example, Bradford implored, “If free speech is to be suppressed in Massachusetts, if Faneuil Hall is to be converted into a silent tomb, if the spirit of Wendell Phillips and William Lloyd Garrison – sorely needed to avert a slavery worse for Massachusetts at least, we had better find it out now. If enough men will join with me to secure the hall, I for one, will stand up and have my say against the insane and wicked ambition which is dragging this country at least to moral ruin” (as quoted in Schirmer 1972: 73). For these men, who grew up knowing soldiers
of the Revolutionary War and who often participated in the abolition movement, the Constitution and U.S. democracy transcended personal interests; they were sacred. Deviating from these tenets created a crisis of their political identity as "Americans." As a result, they expressed emotions ranging from debilitating depression to mobilizing outrage at the course of American democracy. Those motivated by the energy of outrage began to organize against imperialism.

White Working-Class Anti-imperialists

Many white working-class anti-imperialists' political emotion was expressed around having family and/or friends in the military. As the Spanish-American War came to an end in 1898, the Philippines took center stage and widespread support for war began to wane. Public opinion began to shift in support of bringing the troops home, especially in regions where some of the soldiers were loved ones (Schirmer 1972). In fact, it was often letters from the soldiers themselves that began to contribute to the anti-Philippine-American war position. Soldiers' letters often conveyed both opposition to the war and views that conveyed the violent tactics were unproblematic and/or necessary (Schirmer 1972).

As fighting in the Philippines began to break out between U.S. troops and Filipino revolutionaries in early 1899, family members and state officials requested for volunteer regiments to be sent home. These requests came from California, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Oregon, Minnesota, and Nebraska (Schirmer 1972). Soldiers from the Tenth Pennsylvania stationed in the Philippines wrote home in March to inform

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43 Either way, anti-imperialist leaders used their reports as sources of information to learn of the situation in the Philippines.
family and friends that the government was suppressing information that would report
accurate death rates for volunteers and, therefore, underreported the numbers. As a result,
family and friends began organizing to have the troops returned home (Schirmer 1972).
Then, in April, “[r]elatives and friends of Oregon volunteers, supported by newspapers of
that state, called for the return of the Oregon troops, ‘who never enlisted for such a war’”
(Schirmer 1972: 150). The South Dakota Governor wrote to President McKinley stating,
"that the Philippine war was 'repugnant to the fundamental principles of government,' and
that South Dakota men were being held in the army against their will” (Schirmer 1972:
150). Further, several hundred parents of the First Nebraska Regiment “demanded that
‘the government send back home those who have not contributed their precious fever-
stricken or bullet-torn bodies to enrich the soil of Luzon’” (Schirmer 1972: 151).

In a variety of ways that became important later, soldiers were central to the
debate between anti-imperialists and pro-imperialists. Here it was in their role as
volunteer soldiers, who had expectations about the war in which they volunteered to
fight. With those expectations not met, familial support for the war began to wane.
“Reporting on public opinion outside New England early in April, [Vice President
Herbert Myrick, owner and editorialist of farm papers] claimed ‘an utter absence of
imperialist spirit among the rank and file of the people throughout the West and
South…the unpopularity of the war increases with each Western boy who is killed or
wounded.’ ‘Each mail from Manila’ intensified this feeling, ‘especially in the Pacific
states’” (Schirmer 1972: 150). Clearly, soldiers were more than symbolic tropes of
American martial masculinity for family members and friends regardless of the paternalistic imperialist discourse advancing the cause in the Philippines.44

In addition to their families in the metropole, soldiers fighting in the Philippines were increasingly becoming disillusioned. As volunteers who signed up for the Spanish-American War, fighting in the Philippines was not something they had anticipated. This became a problem for the McKinley administration as the vast majority of soldiers chose not to re-enlist when they called for 100,000 more soldiers and General Otis’ claims that the war in the Philippines was almost over proved to be false (Schirmer 1972). In fact, Washington admitted in April that only about 7% of the volunteers planned to re-enlist, despite being offered $500 per man as a re-enlistment bonus (Schirmer 1972). In 1899, the AIL published Soldiers’ Letters: Being Materials for the History of a War of Criminal Aggression, in which letters from soldiers in the Philippines wrote home of “taking no prisoners” as a policy along with the “progress of this goo-goo hunt,” which was a particular racialization of Filipinos (and a precursor to the similar racialization of Vietnamese as "gooks", e.g. see Roediger [1994] Toward an Abolition of Whiteness). Some letters from soldiers also expressed their distress at the U.S. treatment of the Filipinos, no more benevolent than Spain’s, and confusion over the war in the Philippines in general.45

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44 Although this was surely also a point of pride for many of the family and friends of soldiers, admiring them for what they symbolized to the nation.
Beyond the point-of-view of soldiers and their families, the AIL also attempted to garner support from workers. After the anti-imperialists were defeated in blocking the Treaty of Paris,

the Anti-Imperialist League decided that ‘especially every effort should be made to strengthen the anti-imperialist position of labor and agricultural unions and organizations.’ As a consequence, a public meeting was held in Boston on March 21 at which Samuel Gompers was the main speaker, seconded by George E. McNeill and Henry Lloyd. Gompers denounced the United States war ‘against the only Asiatic country that has ever made an attempt to establish a republican form of government,’ and warned that ‘if peace cannot be secured in any other way, the time is coming when federated labor will refuse to make implements that are intended to strike down their fellow-men’ (Schirmer 1972: 139).

One of the original vice presidents of the AIL, Samuel Gompers proved to be a wishy-washy anti-imperialist. He refused to endorse William Jennings Bryan’s candidacy for president—running on an anti-imperialist platform—because Gompers did not want to upset capitalists by labor formally taking on the anti-imperialist issue.

Despite Gompers' wavering views, newspapers directed toward organizing workers as well as those with a more explicitly socialist bent had their own take on events in the Philippines as they related to workers and capitalist society. The Social Democratic Herald, associated with Eugene Debs and the Social Democratic Party, strategically highlighted the violence in the U.S. including that against Blacks (lynching) and the violence in the Philippines listing a single day’s newspaper headlines involving violence—and highlighting the contradictions of the civilized/savage discourse—in a
column titled, "Capitalist Civilization." Newspapers directed toward the organization of the working classes published letters from soldiers in the Philippines and were directly critical of the administration's call for more troops, doing their part to avert soldier re-enlistment. Referring to the violence the government was using at home against striking workers at a speech for William Jennings Bryan, Gamaliel Bradford stated, "[t]he rich in this country are beginning to distrust the multitude and get ready the sword for their protection. The danger of violence is not from below, but from above" (as quoted in Schirmer 1972: 206-208).

While the rest of the country was perceived to be in a jingoist fever over liberating the Cubans from Spain's tyranny, the American Freeman ran poems such as "We are Savages," and "Sham Soldiers" in 1898. Unlike other labor newspapers, American Freeman also ran articles stating the army would be a good place to recruit for the revolutionary cause and that the army's recruiting tactics were suspect in recruiting criminals into the army in exchange for a suspended sentence. The paper, based out of Kansas, consistently ran articles on soldiers as being exploited by the government using a populist tone. In contrast, the National Labor Tribune still celebrated the U.S. troops' victories in the Philippines, after the Cubans were "liberated," but was also critical of the expansionist policy of the government. One of the tamer labor newspapers, the Journal

47 Workers Call. April 22, 1899. "100,000 More: Need for More Butchers to Slaughter Filipinos [sic], Wholesale Murderers Needed." And "Letters from Soldiers."
48 American Freeman. May 28, 1898. "We are Savages," and "Sham Soldiers."
of the Knights of Labor, became more and more critical of the U.S. war in the Philippines over the course of 1900, publishing a critique of the passed request for the 100,000 standing army in congress, followed by a soldier’s letter titled “War is Hell.”

What is known about working-class anti-imperialists motivated by outrage over friends and family members fighting a war with changing rationales, or being the one to fight the war, is that they wrote to their representatives and local newspapers uncovering the violence censored by the mainstream newspapers. As such, their argument focused on the violent materiality of war and democracy, rather than the abstract ideological meaning of imperialist violence and democracy as was the case for the elites.

Black Men and Black Women Anti-imperialists

As comparatively progressive as the white anti-imperialist leaders in Boston were to many of their contemporaries, they still capitulated to the norms of the times where the segregation between Blacks and whites was concerned. Therefore, a colored auxiliary to the AIL was proposed by Clifford H. Plummer, a Boston attorney and secretary of the National Colored Protective League, in the summer of 1899 (Schirmer 1972). In Plummer’s discussion with members of the press regarding the potential organization he mentioned McKinley’s refusal to speak out against lynching of Blacks in the south as a point of comparison with the president’s aspirations for the “negroes” in the Philippines Over Filipinos.”; National Labor Tribune. March 2, 1899. “Permanent Army Increase Beaten.”; National Labor Tribune. “Labor’s Voice of Protest. Agitation Against the Imperialistic Policy Started. Ringing Circular to the K. of L.

51 Journal of the Knights of Labor. November, 1900. “A Standing Army” and “War is Hell!”

52 The degree to which they joined anti-imperialist organizations is still in question as the papers for AIL chapters in the west and middle west are not available, if they exist.
(Schirmer 1972). Then at the subsequent meeting to form the colored auxiliary attended by Boston Blacks and whites, like William Lloyd Garrison, “the assembly passed resolutions condemning McKinley for his war in the Philippines and for his silence on lynching” (Schirmer 1972: 172). More Black men formed their own organizations such as the "Colored National Anti-Imperialistic League" and the "Negro National Anti-Imperial and Anti-Trust League" (Foner and Winchester 1984: 167). Willard Gatewood, Jr. (1975) noted in *Black Americans and the White Man’s Burden* “[w]hether he favored or opposed expansionism, the white American was also likely to interpret the issue in racial terms; however, his approach bore little resemblance to that of the black citizen” (p. 182). Here Gatewood refers to the differences in tone that arose from social position and the racialized doxa that allowed Black anti-imperialists to make connections between the racialized violence of lynching and racialized violence committed against Filipinos.

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Daniel B. Schirmer (1972) notes, “at a meeting of Boston’s black citizens to commemorate the 129th anniversary of the death of Crispus Attucks, speakers attacked Anglo-Saxon colonization and opposed killing Filipinos because they were ‘fighting for just what our forefathers sought thirty-five years ago’” (p. 138). Further expanding on this relationship, Howard University mathematics Professor Kelley Miller, and later colleague of W.E.B. Du Bois in editing The Crisis, wrote a pamphlet delineating the connections between the deteriorating conditions of Blacks at home with the plight of Filipinos abroad in his pamphlet “The Effect of Imperialism Upon the Negro Race" (Schirmer 1972). Miller stated, "The whole trend of imperial aggression is antagonistic to the feebler races. It is a revival of racial arrogance." Booker T. Washington wrote to the New York AIL declaring his support of anti-imperialist efforts and publicly declared his opposition given already existing "race problems" (Gatewood 1975). The anti-imperialist analyses of Black men ranged from radical to moderate, but they were all rooted in critiques of spreading race prejudice beyond the U.S. "race problems" with Indians and Blacks (Gatewood 1975). The significance of these connections for understanding imperialism was indeed more urgent for Black anti-imperialists than the understanding of these racial connections for white anti-imperialists.

The anti-imperialist African-American newspapers were also vocal through editorials and letters from soldiers and the relationship between the Philippines and the

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56 Letter dated May 14, 1901, Box 1.
plight of people of color at home, seeing the Philippine-American War, and expansion more generally, as part of a larger race question (Gatewood Jr. 1975). Indeed, with the war department calling for “colored” troops and organizing “colored” regiments, led by white officers, anti-imperialist papers addressed the issue of colored people fighting colored people for whites on one hand and the demand for protection and recognition of Blacks’ rights at home if they were to fight abroad. The “White Man’s Burden” was clearly hypocritical and racist to Black citizens (Gatewood Jr. 1975). Replies entitled “The Black Man’s Burden” sprung up by the dozen across Black newspapers (Gatewood Jr. 1975). One such poem by H.T. Johnson, editor of the *Christian Recorder*, stated:

Pile on the Black Man’s Burden.

‘Tis nearest at your door;

Why heed long bleeding Cuba,

Or dark Hawaii’s shore?

Hail ye your fearless armies,

Which menace feeble folks

Who fight with clubs and arrows

And brook your rifle’s smoke.

Pile on the Black Man’s Burden

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His wail with laughter drown
You've sealed the Red Man's problem,
And will take up the Brown,
In vain ye seek to end it,
With bullets, blood or death
Better by far defend it
With honor's holy breath (as quoted in Gatewood Jr. 1975: 184).

Here Johnson compares the similar subjectivities of Filipinos, Blacks, and Indians with regard to U.S. and violence. A paradox is how the observations of the anti-imperialist Black newspapers were similar to the most avid and racist white pro-imperialists in that the pro-imperialists also compared the Filipinos as potential race problem in the U.S. with Indians and Blacks. Unlike more reformist, or progressive, pro-imperialists that wanted to civilize Filipinos, these anti-imperialists did not care to mince their words about nonwhites. For its part, the AIL struggled to frame U.S. imperialism in the Philippines like the abolitionist movement had been framed. For example, while the U.S. military was taking notes from General Weyler in Cuba (later imposing reconcentration camps such as had been used in Cuba as "reconcentrados" and "the water cure") Bruce Grit [a pen name for John E. Bruce (Gatewood Jr. 1975)] wrote to The Colored American:

There you have it. The Tagals or Filipinos, have an American Weyler on their hands in the person of General Otis. He believes they are inferior to Americans (white), and he is going to crush them if he can, because of their resistance to the armed authority of the United States and to the arbitrary attempts of this
government to force upon them a system of government which they do not want. In their resistance to this effort of the United States and its ‘humane’ policy in the Philippines in what respect are they different from the American colonists who, a hundred years ago resisted the attempt of Great Britain, which arbitrarily sought to make laws for them without their consent, and persistently denied them the right to participate in the making of those laws.60

But it was the simultaneous increase in the numbers of lynchings at home, while Black troops fought abroad against other colored peoples that continually fed the anti-imperialist outrage of black citizens. This further convinced them that “any government that could not or would not protect its own citizens from atrocities was in no position to become the standard-bearer of enlightenment among other people” (Gatewood Jr. 1975: 199). Thus, the racial component of the Philippine-American war was central to black anti-imperialists emotional-cognitive interpretation, informed by their social position and habitus.

White Women Anti-imperialists

In Republic or Empire (1972), one of the most thorough histories of the anti-imperialist movement noting the expansive outreach of the Boston reformers to garner support across race, class, political party, and region, Schirmer states “[t]he elected leadership of the Anti-Imperialist League gave evidence of this policy in all save one respect: it included no women. Evidently even the pressing need for anti-imperialist unity could not

subdue this stubborn prejudice” (p. 17-18). But, as Schirmer (1972) highlighted in
discussing the very first meeting of anti-imperialists at Faneuil Hall, “[t]he papers noted
that ‘Boston protest…apparently comes from the older element in the community
for…there was but a handful of young men,’ that nearly half the audience were women,
and that the city’s reformers were well represented, ‘on all sides could be seen the well-
known faces of leaders of good causes’”[my emphasis] (p. 75). In fact, women were
active in the AIL, and in anti-imperialist causes on their own, despite being blocked from
membership.

Although many women supported anti-imperialism, most of the women directly
involved with the AIL were white and middle-class, a fact that enabled them to make
monetary contributions to the movement. White women from the Midwest and the East
Coast formed auxiliary organizations of the AIL.61 The women's auxiliary of the Boston
AIL petitioned other women for support in 1899. They implored, "We, women of the
United States, earnestly protest against the war of conquest into which our country has
been plunged in the Philippine islands. We appeal to the Declaration of Independence,
which is the moral foundation of the constitution you have swore to defend, we reaffirm
its weighty words."62 Other women’s organizations such as the Women's Christian
Temperance Union (WCTU), the Congress of Mothers, and the Daughters of the
American Revolution (DAR) also took official anti-imperialist stances, offering the AIL

support. WCTU leadership educated affiliated women on international affairs and violence in the Philippines, which they attributed to prostitution and liquor (Papachristou 1990).

Many women wrote poems expressing their anti-imperialist views in the metropole. Women, in particular, were more likely to express their political views through poems. The less direct format of poetic imagery allowed these disfranchised citizens a more conventionally accepted but still public outlet for civic participation. But, at the turn of the twentieth century, poems were a legitimate public medium for both women and men (Harrington 2002; Nelson 2001). Contributing a poem to a public forum was just as appropriate as a letter to the editor for political expression, with newspapers allotting space specifically for the genre. As an organization the AIL also contributed poems to the debate, including some authored by women. In 1900, the New England AIL published a volume entitled, *Liberty Poems: Inspired by the Crisis of 1898-1900*, whose publication was underwritten by Mary Pickering, a substantial AIL donor (Zwick 2005). In total, the volume included 76 poems, with most written by anti-imperialist leaders and 13 authored by women.

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63 Moorfield Storey Papers, Library of Congress; Edward Ordway Papers, Manuscripts Division, New York Public Library; Record Book Vol. I, Anti-Imperialist League, Maria Lanzar-Carpio Papers, Hatcher Graduate Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

Frequently listed today as one of the AIL's most well-known vice presidents was Jane Addams of the Chicago organization, the American Anti-Imperialist League. Addams lent her name to the cause as well as spoke at the Chicago Liberty Meetings on April 30, 1899 against imperialism, which overflowed the Central Music Hall. According to the annual report of the Anti-Imperialist League, the meeting was "attended by some ten thousand people." Her speech was published as “Democracy or Militarism” in which she opened, “None of us who has been reared and nurtured in America can be wholly without the democratic instinct. It is not a question with any of us of having it or not having it; it is merely question of trusting it or not trusting it.” This illuminates the U.S. American democratic doxa. In that same speech, Addams credits workingmen with having incited the cause for peace and with having the most to lose under a militaristic policy.

Josephine Shaw Lowell was the first woman elected vice president in 1901 of the New York Anti-Imperialist League. Lowell, well into her 60s, was incredibly involved in New York AIL strategy, monetary donations, and especially emotional support for her friend, the secretary Edward Ordway. Lowell had lived with her husband in military camps during the Civil War. She subsequently devoted her life to philanthropic and reform work in the New York region. Like Addams, she was a seasoned and connected

65 Other recognizable names of women involved with the AIL or anti-imperialist writings include Mary Emma Byrd, Alice Thatcher Post, Lucia Ames Mead, Fanny Garrison Villard, Elsie Clew Parsons, and Caroline Pemberton.
68 Anti-Imperialist League Papers, Swarthmore Peace Collection, Swarthmore College.
69 Edward Ordway Papers, Manuscripts Division, New York Public Library.
reformer when she took on the cause of anti-imperialism. Mary Storer Cobb of Northampton, Massachusetts helped form a chapter of the AIL, in which Mary Emma Byrd was the secretary, and prepared soldiers to go before the SIAP in 1900. Helen Wilson, under the anonymity of "A Massachusetts Woman," published her findings on the military reconcentration policy while she was on a fact-finding mission, sponsored by anti-imperialist Fiske Warren. Clemencia Lopez, sister to Sixto Lopez who was initially the main Filipino contact for U.S. anti-imperialists, also played a significant role in the anti-imperialist movement in the U.S.

Although Edward Atkinson noted as early as 1899 that having influential women in public leadership roles would be beneficial for gaining the support of organized women's groups in the U.S. (Hoganson 1998), and Herbert Welsh made efforts to obtain women activists, mentioning to AIL president, Moorfield Storey, that well-known women would be helpful for organizing other women, no organized plans were made to involve women as a group. Despite this, over time white women were increasingly granted the symbolic office of vice president of the AIL.

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70 Newspaper clipping, undated. Herbert Welsh Papers, Special Collections, Hatcher Graduate Library, University of Michigan.
72 Mary Storer Cobb Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society.
73 "A Massachusetts Woman in the Philippines"
74 Letter dated February 4, 1902, Box 1, MSLOC.
Injustice Frames, “The White Man’s Burden,” and the Boer War

As the war in the Philippines raged, war in South Africa between the Boers and the British broke out. Response to the Boer war among anti-imperialists in the United States tellingly reveals the relationship between injustice frames and structures of feeling, as exemplified in the inter-imperial field of “the white man’s burden.” According to Jasper (1998), "Gamson, in particular, has elaborated the concept of an injustice frame, a way of viewing a situation or condition that expresses indignation or outrage over a perceived injustice, as well as finding some human agency to blame for the transgression...Of all the emotions, injustice is most closely associated with 'the righteous anger that puts fire in the belly and iron in the soul' (Gamson, 1992:32)” (p. 414). Across the board, anti-imperialists were against Britain’s interference in the Boer Republic. However, the different injustice frames they invoked highlights how structures of feeling are linked to social position and emotions in protest.

The Anglo-Saxonism of the eastern elite was demonstrated through a rapprochement between the British and U.S. imperialists as well as a counter-rapprochement with the anti-imperialists manifested in the sentiment of a disappointed identification with the British War with the Boers. Eastern elites believed the United States and the British to have significant blood ties in Anglo-Saxonism regardless of their stance on imperialism (Kramer 2002). The newspapers of white workers, however, showed a Boer rapprochement and a kind of anti-Anglo-Saxonism, rather than a counter-rapprochement. Identifying with the Boers as settler-colonizers trying to throw off the control of the British Empire, as had been done in the United States, working-class newspapers decidedly favored the Boers. Indeed, many American workers of Irish
descent had an anti-British and anti-Anglo-Saxonism sentiment regardless of the issue.

Senator Hoar condemned Great Britain’s war against the Boer Republic of South Africa, while Senator Pettigrew of South Dakota put forth a resolution of sympathy for the Boers (Schirmer 1972). Patrick Collins, an anti-imperialist and labor leader in Massachusetts, claimed that Great Britain wanted to control the South African gold mines, while Irish-Americans held numerous protests against the Boer war (Schirmer 1972).

In the newspapers of white workers, the articles on the Boer war in South Africa were more frequent than the articles on the war in the Philippines, a war in which their fellow citizens were fighting. This was not the case for Black newspapers, with noticeably more articles on the Philippines than the articles on the Boer War. This shows the differences in their impulses for interest and the tone of racialized indifference. The injustice frames of white workers and Blacks were subjected to racialized structures of feeling, however both related to the violence of the state.

The "Moral Shock" of Censorship and the Atkinson Affair

Although the older anti-imperialists looked to the past for arguments highlighting the contradictions between democracy and imperialism, they also saw themselves as the defenders of civil rights, from the abolition of slavery to freedom of speech. When U.S. newspaper correspondents organized in the Philippines to expose a pattern of censorship, anti-imperialists saw this as a violation of civil rights and another issue to protest. Defending democratic civil rights was a defense of the progress of "civilization."

As early as July of 1899 newspaper correspondents in the Philippines began making claims that the military in the Philippines was censoring news sent back to the
United States, framing an unlikely optimism about the Philippine War (Foner and Winchester 1984). They reported:

Under date of July 17 the Manila correspondents of the New York Herald, the New York Sun, the Chicago Record, the Chicago Tribune, the Associated Press, and the Publishers' and Scripps-McRae press associations, sent, by way of Hong Kong the following Statement relative to the military situation in the Philippines, and the censorship at Manila. So far as we have observed, the New York Sun is the only daily paper in the United States that failed to publish and comments upon the correspondents' protest:

'We believe that owing to official dispatches from Manila, made public at Washington, the people of the United States have not received a correct impression of the situation in the Philippines, and that the dispatches presented an ultra-optimistic view not shared by the general officers in the field.

We believe these dispatches incorrectly represented existing conditions among the Filipinos respecting internal dissension and demoralization resulting from the American campaign and the brigand character of their army.

We believe the dispatches err in the declaration 'that the situation is well in hand,' and the assumption that the insurrection can be speedily ended without a greatly increased force.
We think the tenacity and purpose of the Filipinos have been underestimated and that the statements are unfounded that the volunteers are willing to give further service.

The censorship has compelled us to participate in this misrepresentation by excising or altering uncontroverted statements and facts on the plea, as General Otis stated, 'that they would alarm the people at home,' or 'have the people in the United States by the ears.'

Specifications: The prohibitions to send hospital reports and the number of heat prostrations in the field; the suppression of full reports of field operations in the event of their failure; systematic minimization of naval operations, and the prohibition to send complete reports of the situation.  

The anti-imperialist press responded to the correspondents' protests by condemning the censorship in Manila. The Springfield Republican, one of the most outspoken and consistent anti-imperialist papers, and the Baltimore American, reported on the discovery of the removal of the censorship by the administration in October of 1899. Having already suspected that the news reported in the U.S. on the Philippines was questionable, anti-imperialists were ready to go into action to discern the situation in the Philippines through the best sources at their disposal, soldiers returning from the Philippines.

By spring, letters from soldiers in the Philippines were filtering back to family members (and then making their way to the press) documenting violence against the

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Filipinos as well as the disillusionment of soldiers who had volunteered to fight Spain, not guard Filipinos. In turn, family members of volunteers, already skeptical of the war in light of anti-imperialist debates, became increasingly vocal in bringing the troops home from the Philippines (Schirmer 1972). Many anti-imperialists in the Midwest were family of soldiers in the Philippines. In late April 1899, some of these women in Nebraska sent a telegram, intercepted by the censor, telling their soldiers, son and husbands, not to reenlist.

Anti-imperialist and labor reformer, Edward Atkinson, learned from what he deemed “good authority” that family members of a Nebraska regiment were not able to send letters to their soldiers via U.S. mail. Already one of the more surly anti-imperialists, Atkinson set out to test the censorship of the mail system in the United States by telling the Secretary of War he would like to send pamphlets to officers and privates in the Philippines, asking for a list of names. Of course, he never received such a list. His letter to Secretary of War Russell Alger requested to send a large number of pamphlets entitled “The Hell of War,” “The Cost of a National Crime,” and “Criminal Aggression” to the officers and privates in the Philippines—to which he received no reply. In the meantime, he sent these pamphlets to the Peace Commission leadership, including Admiral Dewey, President J.G. Schurman (Cornell University), Professor Dean

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78 As Kristin Hoganson’s (2000) work has highlighted, many of the volunteers saw the war with Spain as an opportunity to cultivate and prove their masculinity. Initially in the Philippines they were commissioned to keep the peace, not fight (Kramer 2006).
81 Ibid.
C. Worcester (University of Michigan), General E. Otis, General Lawton, General Miller, and J.W. Bass (correspondent for "Harper's Weekly"), all of which were seized.

Writing to Secretary of the Treasury Gage, Atkinson said contacting volunteers had not been done but that he found it a good suggestion (Schirmer 1972). Atkinson simultaneously made the Boston press aware of his plan as well as the Executive Committee of the AIL. In late April, the official stance of the AIL was to publicly announce that Atkinson had acted at his own behest and not in his capacity as an AIL vice president.

It was only through the press that Atkinson learned he was going to be charged with treason by the Attorney General and that the Post Master General would seize the pamphlets. This sparked a fury of debate in the press over censorship at home and what constituted "seditious" acts of critique for several weeks. In his letter to the Attorney General, Atkinson gave the reason for his actions as "indignation." Stating,

Moved by a sense of profound indignation at such a state of affairs [censorship] and for the purpose of ascertaining whatever or not the United States mails were or were not open to the citizens of the United States residing in Manila, I addressed at once on April 22nd a letter to the Secretary of War...

He went on,

"It is said that the circulation of these pamphlets in the United States will be permitted. I shall continue to use the United States mail for their

\[82\] Ibid.
transmission in this country not as a matter of permission but as a matter of right.\textsuperscript{83}

Rallying around civil rights during the Atkinson Affair, some anti-imperialists used the suppression of freedom of speech at home to publicize their cause in the metropole, while others tried to distance themselves from what was seen as Atkinson’s radical tactics. Charles Francis Adams was one of the most conservative and internally influential anti-imperialists—as a member of the executive committee—and was greatly upset with Atkinson’s actions, believing them to be too radical. Adams and other conservative members of the executive committee led the way, initially, to distancing Atkinson’s actions from the AIL.\textsuperscript{84} They believed he would harm the reputation of the AIL, de-legitimating their cause and influence (Williamson 1934). However, by May 9th they were supporting his right to free speech and condemning the censorship of the government stating,

\begin{quote}
Whatever difference of opinion may exist as to the propriety of the circulation which you suggested, (but which we understand has not been attempted,) there should be only one opinion as to the far more serious issue which has been raised by your experiment [...] which are reported to have been taken from the mails by order of the Postmaster General. Against this act of arbitrary and illegal power, which would hardly be attempted by any Government of Europe except, perhaps, that of Russia, the league calls on all good citizens to protest as a serious blow to
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{84} However, Atkinson did have the support of many individual Anti-Imperialist League members.
republican institutions, which are now so gravely threatened by imperial policies at home and abroad.\textsuperscript{85}

Swayed by public support for Atkinson and the larger civil rights issue at question, the AIL decided to take a stand in his defense. Atkinson wrote to Senator Hoar that he was glad at having exposed the government's actions in depriving dissenters their constitutional rights (Welch Jr. 1979).

If Atkinson had at first felt ostracized and abandoned by his fellow anti-imperialists, he soon received personal letters of support praising him for moral leadership and courage. In addition, the fury in the press created a previously nonexistent demand for his pamphlets. In a letter to the \textit{New York Times}, Atkinson noted that he had not anticipated much of an interest in his pamphlets given the “excited state of the public mind” in support of war, especially against Spain, but that since the controversy had ensued 60,000 copies of the documents had been put in circulation and he expected 100,000 to be in circulation when all was said and done.\textsuperscript{86} He further stated in the same letter to the \textit{Times}, which had sided with the government in labeling Atkinson as disloyal and a traitor guilty of treason, that given the debate in the press he no longer needed to send pamphlets to soldiers in the Philippines as they could gather their content from the controversy printed in the \textit{Times}. Atkinson received letters requesting his pamphlets and supporting “the noble stand which [he had] taken against ‘Criminal Aggression’”\textsuperscript{87} from 18 different women, many offering donations to the anti-imperialist cause as well as

\textsuperscript{87} Letter to Atkinson from Annie W. Stetson, May 20, 1899, Edward Atkinson Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society.
offering to circulate the pamphlets. This is worth noting as no other AIL member had so much support from women over a particular issue as Atkinson did over the issue of freedom of speech. Newspapers printed letters to the editor from men in support of Atkinson as well.

The administration seemed to become aware that its critiques of Atkinson did more to publicize his works than simply ignoring him. Those who had previously been unhappy with the course of the government’s policies expressed a “moral shock” at the censorship of government at home, already suspecting it abroad (Jasper 1998). The government’s affront to free speech for its citizens was too much to ignore. Despite lacking networks of anti-imperialists from the East, Atkinson’s tussle with the government recruited new anti-imperialists across the United States and gained notoriety, wanted or not, for the AIL. “Atkinson’s intervention stressed anew the informal unity of action that had come about between the Populist anti-imperialism of the West and the Mugwump anti-imperialism of the East, first against the treaty, then against the war” (Schirmer 1972: 157). Atkinson’s intervention not only underscored the anti-imperialist sentiments across the nation, it also implicated the government’s imperialist policies abroad in coming home. Imperialism not only threatened the civil rights of Filipinos abroad, but also the civil rights of U.S. citizens at home. Imperialism threatened core democratic institutions.

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88 In a June 8, 1899, letter to subscribers of the “Anti-Imperialist,” a periodical Atkinson had started, he wrote, “There has been a sudden cessation of the attack of the Administration papers upon myself personally, which I regret. I think it had become evident that the more bitter this attack the wider the influence of my own work.” Moorfield Storey Papers, Library of Congress.
CHAPTER 4: HERALDS OF CIVILIZATION: ANTI-IMPERIALISTS AND "CRIMINAL AGGRESSION"

To ‘protect the weak’ has always been the excuse of the ruler and tax-gatherer, the chief, the king, the baron; and now, at last, of ‘the white man.’


Anti-imperialists hailed from all strata of society and often mobilized for competing and contradictory reasons, which was covered in chapter three. The Anti-Imperialist League (AIL), based out of New England, organized this movement through meetings, petitions, and letters-to-the editor. They harnessed the emotional excitement of outrage against colonialism. This chapter outlines how anti-imperialists believed government policies trespassed the "sacred" tenets of democracy as laid out in the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution. In so doing, pro-imperialists rearticulated schemas of U.S. democratic "civilization," such as "benevolent assimilation," and began building an imperialist environment that constituted the rearticulations (Sewell 2005). These imperialist rearticulations of American democracy and "civilization" were unacceptable transformations for anti-imperialists. Therefore, after the benevolent assimilation proclamation was publicized and Congress ratified the Treaty of Paris, anti-imperialists began a campaign in 1900 to elect an anti-imperialist candidate for President, William Jennings Bryan.

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89 I quote "sacred" here to underscore the socially constructed nature of the language anti-imperialists and pro-imperialists used to refer to U.S. traditions and democracy as an institution. In this chapter I hope to demystify the language they used, specifically to mystify these social practices and relationships as something transcendental.

90 Here I am using William Sewell’s (2005) idea of "built environment" to address the changes in the material environment and practices that came with the imperialist policies of benevolent assimilation.
First, I give a brief overview of AIL activities after the ratification of the Treaty of Paris, showing the contradictory positions within the coalition that created tensions and forced compromises to obtain anti-imperialist goals. Schemas\textsuperscript{91} of "civilization" influenced the formation of AIL strategies that ultimately served to limit their coalition while solidifying an organized and motivated core group of activists focused on exposing violence. The AIL leaders saw themselves as the "heralds of civilization," responsible for the maintenance of democratic traditions in the face of the decaying despotism of imperialism.

Next, I outline how "civilization" was a conglomeration of ambiguous cultural ideas at the turn of the twentieth century that influenced anti-imperialist activism and anti-imperialist resources. For anti-imperialists and pro-imperialist alike, "civilization" incited structures of feeling that informed collective emotions and set a moralistic tone. Anti-imperialists fervently believed in their responsibility to maintain democratic governance as citizens, which was constitutive of their performances as Anglo-Saxon anti-imperialists (Jung 2009). At the same time, imperialists believed in the expansive notion of "civilization" and progress for racialized subjects, which was constitutive of their performances as Anglo-Saxon imperialists and their structural development of "benevolent assimilation." Against these opposing imperialist views of civilization, progressive anti-imperialists developed arguments for civil rights, liberty, and freedom rooted in the texts of the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution.

\textsuperscript{91} While I find the term "built environment" useful and compatible with Sewell's earlier "Theory of Structure" (1992), I still prefer the terminology of "schema," "resource," "transposition," and "rearticulation," in addition to Jung's (2009) "Restructuring a Theory of Race" that elaborates "performance," over Sewell's accompanying conceptual revision of "language game." The latter elides the individual embodiment of relations, which I think is important to keep separate in processual changes and rearticulations.
Anglo-Saxon anti-imperialists' schemas of "civilization" delineated the choices and constraints of the central problem of this chapter, their practices that relied on networking. Although citizens self-identified as anti-imperialists for various ideological reasons the most active anti-imperialists were politically progressive. It was impossible to avoid infighting and tensions over appropriate agendas and courses of action while trying to sustain a coalition across the various conservative and progressive anti-imperialisms. By progressive, I do not mean today's idea of political "progressives," although many of these activists would have fit with this idea. In the "progressive era," these activists were on the Left. However, true to the impulses that have described those of the Progressive Era, they advocated for reformist policies often in the interest of more abstract notions of "progress." In navigating these tensions and determining acceptable compromises, anti-imperialist leadership formed a core group of activists.

In the section "Civilization and Civil Religion," I show how schemas of "civilization" and "Anglo-Saxonism" informed the development of AIL strategies and access to resources, like the U.S. Constitution that they framed as sacred. In "Civil Rights and the 'Moral Shock' of Censorship," I illustrate the AIL tensions and strategic infighting in the case of the Atkinson Affair. When the government threatened censorship both in the colony and the metropole, those already wary of civil rights being chipped away under imperialism, expressed shock and outrage. Ambivalent about which route to take, AIL leaders found their cause had more support from the American public, and from followers of Edward Atkinson, an anti-imperialist member who was less conservative and more incendiary in his tactics. These followers were more often women and working-class anti-imperialists, less than ideal supporters to the Anglo-Saxon leadership. I then
cover the election of 1900, again showing the tensions between anti-imperialists over whom to support and which anti-imperialist route to take.

After Bryan lost the election, many anti-imperialists lost interest and accepted the imminence of the imperialist path. Those who remained active in the AIL formed a core anti-imperialist group that focused on remobilizing anti-imperialists, informing the American people on U.S. imperialist activities, lobbying the U.S. government, and organizing their own investigations into U.S. military activities in the Philippines. Once anti-imperialists lost the presidential campaign, the anti-imperialist leadership reassessed their strategies and previous compromises with conservative anti-imperialists. Dissatisfied with the lack of results from these political compromises, the Anglo-Saxon progressive anti-imperialists began more self-consciously networking and focusing on an information campaign. This reassessment led to the AIL’s final campaign opposing the violent policies of "benevolent assimilation."

I conclude that through their focus on returning to the past of America's democratic traditions, limited as they were, anti-imperialist networking effectively excluded women, Blacks, and working classes from the AIL. However, once the AIL solidified their core group of activists, they began reaching out to soldiers returning from the Philippines to uncover the violence they witnessed, utilized ties with revolutionary Filipinos, and sent their own investigators to determine the situation in the Philippines. Nevertheless, resting on the laurels of democratic advances of the past, anti-imperialist leaders failed to generate a more inclusive vision of a democratic future for the U.S. Imperialists, on the other hand, were future-oriented with a rearticulated vision of
expansion and a justification for expansion following the path of a transcendant "Providence" and "civilization."

Anti-Imperialist Arguments for Democracy

Anti-imperialist arguments initially centered on the contradictions between democracy and imperialism in their anti-imperialist materials and meetings. These arguments were backward-looking, rooted in the logic of U.S. tradition. In these speeches and pamphlets, they used words and phrases regarding the U.S. Constitution and Declaration of Independence that denoted them as sacred texts, which itself was a strategy for legitimacy. Anti-imperialist arguments against violence formulated a binary discourse that framed U.S. governance as either rooted in democracy or imperialism. Later, the anti-imperialist campaign against violence was forward-looking, rooted in a similar, but different, vision of a "civilized" society and a fear of the institutionalization of imperialist violence. The organized anti-imperialist campaigns first focused on defending democracy by opposing censorship and campaigning for an anti-imperialist presidential candidate.

Much has been made of the reputations of the AIL leaders in the histories of the movement and the organization (Beisner 1968; Beisner 1970; Beisner 1973; Foner 1958; Schirmer 1972; Tompkins 1970; Welch Jr. 1979), because of the accompanying influence. Anti-imperialist leaders were very self-aware of their influence, therefore, guarded their reputations carefully. While the reputations have been duly noted, the self-conscious strategy of the AIL has been only briefly discussed in these studies. The formation of the AIL has been largely taken-for-granted and dismissed as an elitist organization within the larger contradictory anti-imperialist sentiments (Kramer 2006).
The sociological importance of understanding the AIL organizational strategies along with their successes and failures, lies in the transition of the anti-imperialist movement's broad coalition into a leaner advocacy group focused on exposing imperialist violence. I argue these strategies changed because of rearticulations of "civilization" and "Anglo-Saxonism" in the practice of imperialism.

The AIL initially had a two-pronged organizing strategy centered on networking with other Americans of significant political influence and educating the American public on the U.S. government's intent in the Philippines. These men were leaders known for crossing party lines and were widely regarded as "mugwumps," political independents who voted according to single issues rather than party politics (Beisner 1968). They used their reputations and political unpredictability to help set political agendas according to what they saw as the most pressing issues. Many "mugwumps" had previously been Republicans (many were party founders), but they no longer saw the Republican Party as the party of Lincoln. Therefore, their votes and influence were up for grabs according to the party that would take up their issue, their way.

Because these initial AIL members saw themselves as loyal to the U.S. Constitution and democracy, AIL leaders crossed party lines to vote their conscience, even if only to make a symbolic point about democratic governance. Both staunch anti-imperialist Democrats, such as Senator Edward Carmack of Tennessee, and staunch anti-imperialist Republicans, such as Senator George Hoar of Massachusetts, actively debated against imperialism in Congress. As discussed in chapter three, anti-imperialists crossed not only political parties but also class, race, and gender to defend democratic
institutions. Depending on their social location, democracy held a different promise. Violating democratic tenets meant violating their vision for "civilization."

Although many anti-imperialists were Boston leaders (frequently called Boston Brahmins from middle and upper-middle class mercantile families), Daniel Schirmer (1972) notes, "[...] the Anti-Imperialist League, in the composition of its leadership at least, reflected efforts to set on foot a loose coalition of diverse social forces" (p. 17). Evidence of this includes the fact that labor, clergy, lawyers, and professors were part of the leadership in addition to the AIL efforts to move from New England to be headquartered in Chicago in 1899 (Welch Jr. 1979). AIL leaders hoped this strategy would garner more support from the Midwest. After the November 1898 anti-imperialist meeting in Boston at Faneuil Hall, anti-imperialists in the Midwest organized a national meeting at the Central Music Hall in April of 1899 in Chicago.

The Liberty Meetings took place on the heels of the ratification of the Treaty of Paris. Anti-imperialists had anticipated this course of action given the trend of annexing first Samoa and then Hawai‘i in 1898 (Beisner 1968). From this meeting the Central Anti-Imperialist League, which included anti-imperialists from the Midwest, published numerous volumes of *Liberty Tracts*. The first volume included a platform that was passed at these meetings and that accompanied the first page of many of their official publications. The platform stated, in part:

The frank expression of honest convictions upon great questions of public policy is vital to the health and even to the *preservation* of representative government. Such expression is, therefore, the *sacred* duty of American citizens.
We hold that the policy known as imperialism is hostile to liberty and tends toward militarism, an evil from which it has been our glory to be free. We regret that it is now necessary in the land of Washington and Lincoln to reaffirm that all men, of whatever race or color, are entitled to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. We still maintain that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. We insist that the forcible subjugation of a purchased people is 'criminal aggression' and open disloyalty to the distinctive principles of our government.92

In this quote, I emphasize the words and phrases that show the reliance on tradition for the legitimacy of the sacred. Putting their argument in terms of tradition emphasized the past of democracy, implying the legitimacy of their argument and anti-imperialist prestige more generally. For anti-imperialists, militarism was profane in terms of the democratic republic as they understood it. No future of the republic that included imperialist policies maintained consistency with the shape of the republic in which they believed.

Trying to maximize the benefit of social networks across regions, anti-imperialists organized the New England and Central Anti-Imperialist Leagues into the American Anti-Imperialist League.93 Anti-imperialist elites advertised and held meetings, started petitions that utilized the reputations of well-known and respected lawyers, judges,

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93 Well-known anti-imperialist men included Andrew Carnegie, labor leader Samuel Gompers, satirist Mark Twain, lawyer-activist Moorfield Storey, scholars like William James—and later John Dewey—and William Graham Sumner, reformers known for their abolitionist work or connections to abolitionists, like William Lloyd Garrison, Jr. and others famous for their lineage, like Charles Francis Adams.
politicians, and professors (Beisner 1968; Williamson 1934). Some individual anti-imperialist leaders also made efforts to organize beyond their social networks. Erving Winslow in Boston made attempts to organize working class and Irish groups to make strong anti-imperialist stances, often resulting only in these groups passing anti-imperialist resolutions (Welch Jr. 1979). Herbert Welsh made comments on the importance of organizing women, or rather getting prominent women to organize for anti-imperialist causes. Thus, the AIL leaders specifically sought to be the vanguard of the anti-imperialist cause.

However, for some anti-imperialists, such as socialist Morrison Swift (1899), the AIL was far too conservative (Welch Jr. 1979). William Appleman Williams (1972) has argued that rather than anti-imperialists (as they called themselves), they were more accurately anti-colonial imperialists. Although some of the anti-imperialists surely did attest to anti-colonial imperialist (or neocolonialism) beliefs, this was not their main reason for opposing imperialism (Beisner 1968; Tompkins 1970). Nevertheless, this was a problem for some of the more radical anti-imperialist contemporaries of the AIL. On the sacredness of the past, the influential socialist Daniel de Leon wrote for the The People in 1898,

Capitalism, threatened from behind by the Social Revolution, turns around to the uprising Proletariat, and with a sanctimonious scowl invokes the past as a sacred thing, to be worshipped and bowed down before. What?! Does the Socialist Movement want to break with the “time-honored” habits of the land? What?!

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94 Josephine Shaw Lowell's letters to Edward Ordway repeatedly discuss the formation and dispersion of such petitions. Edward Ordway Papers, Special Collections, New York Public Library.

Shall the principles of Americanism, consecrated by the Revolutionary Fathers, be done away with? What?! In horror the Pillars of Society throw up their arms, and the conviction leaps from their eyes that, as the Socialists have no reverence for the past, they must be wiped out. [...] Among the most venerated figures in the land, Washington holds very generally a leading place; to him our capitalist politicians, professors and parsons have ever turned; his words have again and again been quoted; and among the bad things imputed to the bad Socialists more than once has an intention to "repudiate Washington" been mentioned. And yet, what do we see now?

In Congress, in the press, in the pulpit, the Washingtonian warning against entangling alliances, conquests, etc., now frequently uttered against the plan to keep the Philippines, take Hawaii, etc., etc., is met with, what? With nothing short of a sneer at Washington, a declaration amounting to pronouncing him a "back number", in short, by throwing him overboard.

Washington, these same recent devotees of the past now say, could not have foreseen the changed conditions in which we now live; Washington, they tell us, wrote and spoke and thought in other and for other times; Washington, in short, is not now of any account.  

Here de Leon notes the change in the imperialists from a transcendental invocation of the past (akin to the religious practice of worship), to a future-oriented discourse of benevolent assimilation and the project of civilization. It was the liberal anti-imperialists who were still adhering to this worship of the past and Washington.

Additionally, racism was another motivator for many anti-imperialists in the South (Lasch 1973), keeping the full inclusion of black anti-imperialists off the agenda. Similarly, women were only partially included as anti-imperialists (Murphy 2009). Efforts to fully include members other than reformist middle or upper-class white men were not made. Rather, anti-imperialist leaders merely sought support for their activities in opposition to imperialism in the narrowest terms to obtain the broadest base. Because of the various reasons for opposing imperialism, anti-imperialists used a strategy of unification on simple opposition to garner the widest range of elite white male supporters. Matthew Frye Jacobson (2000) argues these varied arguments were what prevented the movement from having any longevity or coherence as a political coalition. However, as recent studies of racialized political coalitions have shown, it is not the variety of arguments that is problematic in forming a successful political coalition; rather, it is the ability to affirmatively incorporate varied arguments across race and gender into an inclusive vision fostering solidarity that has created conditions for success (Jung 2006).

Anti-imperialist politics were by definition reactive and oppositional. This was problematic for some anti-imperialist leaders, like the mugwump Charles Francis Adams, Jr. (Beisner 1968). For Adams, focusing the movement in negative terms oriented toward the past seemed futile. In contrast, imperialist politics were future-oriented and deployed in affirmative terms. However, anti-imperialists with politics and arguments oriented toward the future were the same anti-imperialists the elder leadership marginalized—laborers, women, Blacks, and socialists like de Leon. Anti-imperialist arguments for democracy tied to the past did not appeal to many workers and small farmers (Markowitz
1976). This was one of the major strategies of the AIL that worked against their stated goal of increasing the anti-imperialist membership.

The broadsides (extensive political pamphlets often numbering around 100 pages) entreat the cause for democracy and the legacy of freedom published by the AIL were the main sources for these arguments. Through these broadsides and published speeches, anti-imperialists developed detailed arguments against U.S. imperialism by pitting it against democracy. They focused on contradictions in both imperialist policies and imperialist discourse. Treating democracy as explicitly "sacred," anti-imperialists framed the U.S. activities in the Philippines as "criminal aggression" using McKinley's words against him. According to anti-imperialists, this aggression was constitutionally and "morally" criminal, as President McKinley noted.

Anti-imperialists argued a republic could not have subjects, and neither imperialists nor anti-imperialists argued for the Filipinos to become citizens (Lasch 1958; Lasch 1973). In the "Declaration of Principles and Preliminary Organization," the AIL's first principle read, "A true republic of free men must rest upon the principle that all its citizens are equal under the law; that a government derives its just powers from the consent of the governed, and that there must be no taxation without representation. These principles abandoned, a republic exists but in name, and its people lose their rights as free men."97 Titling many of the their broadsides and speeches in binary, antithetical terms, anti-imperialists argued the U.S. could either have "Liberty or Despotism," "Republic or

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Empire," "Democracy or Tyranny," "Democracy or Militarism," but it could not have both.  

As noted earlier, it has been argued that these "mugwump" anti-imperialists were "anti-colonial imperialists" (Williams 1972) and that anti-imperialism was merely a cover for those who believed imperialism should develop through an informal empire based on trade. However, I argue that while some anti-imperialists may have supported what today would be called informal imperialist policies, this was not the case for all anti-imperialists nor the AIL. As Beisner (1968) noted, many anti-imperialists did not even consider the "economic implications of imperialism, and those who did almost invariably subordinated them to moral, racial, historical, and constitutional considerations" (p. 87).

As events progressed in Congressional debates over the Philippines along with the up-coming presidential election, lines were drawn and sides were taken. The populist Democratic presidential candidate, William Jennings Bryan, came down on the side of anti-imperialism and McKinley, up for re-election as the Republican candidate, maintained his support of imperialism. Given that many anti-imperialists were Republicans, supporting Bryan took debate and convincing. Bryan's support of the "silver standard" and his conservative view on the treatment of Blacks in the South were problematic for many northern Republicans. Bryan spoke out against U.S. imperialist involvement in the Philippines but also against the rights of Blacks in the South. His stance on these two issues split the Black anti-imperialist vote as well as the votes of those who opposed colonialism abroad but supported the civil rights of Blacks at home.

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98 See appendix for list of anti-imperialist broadsides.
Many Republicans, both Blacks and whites, were already split between party loyalty and voting for an anti-imperialist candidate. But McKinley, the incumbent, was successful in setting the agenda and arguing that he was the better candidate for putting "lunch in the lunch pail," compared with Bryan's "ill-advised" support of a single-tax system and silver backing the dollar (Williamson 1934).

Because of this discontent, some anti-imperialists held a third-party anti-imperialist convention, testing their own anti-imperialist candidate under the "National Party." Like other anti-imperialists, those involved with the third-party ticket saw the beginning of imperialism as seriously starting with the annexation of Hawai'i. Moorfield Storey was asked to run on the third-party ticket but declined (Beisner 1968). The National Party finally settled on Senator Donelson Caffery of Louisiana, who was in line with Republican Party values and an anti-imperialist. However, he was not able to run for personal reasons, so the existence of the National Party was only brief. Closing the chapter on the National Party in 1903 under "The Suicide of a Political Infant" the author noted,

The two great parties having declared free silver and not Imperialism the issue, the small but respectable minority who set Imperialism first were confronted by a dilemma. It is interesting to see how, in such a crisis, men who agreed wholly in principle, differed widely in action. Senator George F. Hoar, who had denounced Imperialism with a wide-sweeping eloquence that reminded us of Webster and a moral fervor that recalled Sumner, --who had voted against every Imperialistic advance, and had characterized, with judicial moderation, the new policy as

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100 Ibid.
'damnable', chose nevertheless to stand by the Republican party. On the other hand, many of the leaders of the Anti-Imperialist League, led by Governor Boutwell and Mr. Moorfield Storey, - went to a convention at Indianapolis, on Aug. 14, listened to the warblings of the Prairie Siren, and persuaded themselves that the country could be saved by electing Mr. Bryan (p. 4).101

Most anti-imperialists, though preferring Republican Party politics, wanted a viable anti-imperialist candidate for President. Therefore, despite his politics on other issues, the AIL put its support behind Bryan. At a separate meeting for anti-imperialists to determine which presidential candidate they would officially endorse, Democratic candidate William Jennings Bryan was selected regardless of the potential for an anti-imperialist third-party candidate so as not to split the anti-imperialist vote (Schirmer 1972). This endorsement was made with the qualification that the AIL supported full political and civil rights for Black citizens in the North and South (Schirmer 1972).

In the end, the argument for economic prosperity at home won over the opposition to imperialism in the Philippines. Those who remained active in the anti-imperialist movement were more ideologically aligned with one another. They were against imperialism for compatible, liberal reasons, rather than conservative, outright racist ones.

The competing liberal and conservative anti-imperialisms along with liberal and conservative pro-imperialisms highlights the competing racisms that came into play over the Philippine-American War. Different racisms in the same culture and historical moments make significant differences in the material development of race relations (Go 2004). For my case, the importance of these differences lie in the way the middle-class

101 Ibid. My emphasis to note the tone of the religious language again.
Anglo-Saxonist schemas influenced anti-imperialist organizing and interpretations of civilization and focused on lobbying the state with their resources. Seeing the differences between anti-imperialists, the leadership reassessed their strategies. Rather than focusing on the coalition, they focused on reputation, as a distinctly classist practice. After more conservative and lukewarm anti-imperialists were silenced with Bryan's defeat and McKinley's promises of benevolent assimilation, there were fewer differences on racial ideology in the anti-imperialist movement. It is not that anti-imperialist leaders were not racist in any way. Rather, they had different racisms (Go 2004), and the differences they did have were underemphasized. For instance, Herbert Welsh had earlier paternalistic dealings with American Indians, while Moorfield Storey held a racist disdain for working-class Irish immigrants in Boston.

These activists formed an anti-imperialist advocacy network that utilized their own personal networks with people of influence, forged networks with Filipino revolutionaries, gathered information on U.S. military activities in the Philippines, and disseminated this information to the American public. They began lobbying the Congress and petitioning the President with their information focusing on the legality and compatibility of imperialist violence, democracy, and "benevolent assimilation."

Civilization and Civil Religion

Anti-imperialists treated the legacy of U.S. democracy as a civil religion. Civil religion was an achievement of "performance" (Jung 2009), not in the sense of putting on any religious pretense, but rather in the sense of social practices that demonstrated doxic beliefs. Practices of civil religion drew on a set of historically contingent cultural
structures, for my case at the turn of the twentieth century in the United States, with schemas declaring the sacredness of democracy, liberty, and freedom. Particular repertoires of performance that depend on one's social position practiced civil religion and drew on resources that were available, again, according to one's social position (Jung 2009). The civil religion of a sacred democracy was transposed to specifically fit with the racialized cultural order of Anglo-Saxon "civilization."

In particular, anti-imperialist performances demonstrated their beliefs that sacred principles of democracy were threatened by imperialism. In the case of imperialism versus anti-imperialism, there was a binary discourse and corresponding activism based on sacred democracy and profane imperialism (Alexander and Smith 1993). Practicing democracy as a civil religion was in-line with the missionary-like zeal pro-imperialists professed for their cause. The imperialist culture of the U.S. at the turn of the century fostered an ambiguous religious ethos that implied transcendent qualities of time and culture for "civilization." The religiosity of the debate was never questioned, except for accuracy. Rather, pro-imperialists and anti-imperialists vied over the best religious argument. In this way, performances of civil religion tied schemas of "civilization" and "democracy" to social resources that bestowed widespread legitimacy for anti-imperialists.

Pro-imperialists believed the future of the republic was reliant on expansion of territory insofar as it enabled the expansion of trade. The people that came along with the territory were projects for civilization. Responding to the sanctimonious arguments of anti-imperialists, McKinley argued for his own sanctity in October of 1899, "In the Providence of God, who works in mysterious ways, this great archipelago was put into
our lap."\(^{102}\) When pro-imperialists performed civil religion, the language of the transcendental and sacred elided personal responsibility. Rather, pro-imperialists acted as if they were mere servants of "Providence."

Senator Albert Beveridge was one of the most active and unapologetic pro-imperialists, couching his arguments in racialized terms conflated with religiosity (Bellah 1992). After a visit to the Philippines in late 1899, he addressed the senate in January 1900 stating,

God has not been *preparing* the English-speaking and Teutonic peoples for a thousand years for nothing but vain and idle self-contemplation and self-admiration. No. He made us master organizers of the world to *establish* system where chaos reigned. He has given us the spirit of progress to overwhelm the forces of reaction throughout the earth. He has made us adept in government that we may administer government among savage and senile peoples. Were it not for such a force as this the world would *relapse* into barbarism and night. And of all our race He has marked the American people as His chosen nation to finally *lead in the redemption* of the world (as quoted in Bellah 1992).\(^{103}\)

Here Beveridge couches his imperialist support in terms of the futuristic vision of the white man's burden, where it is a religious duty to civilize as God's "chosen nation."

Robert Bellah (1992) states in *The Broken Covenant,* "The idea of reform is far older than the Reformation and is, in fact, central to Christianity itself. It is related to the idea of

\(^{102}\) Quoted in "Republic or Empire with Glimpses of Criminal Aggression" by Edwin Burritt Smith, 1900, *Liberty Tracts,* Vol. 9, Chicago: American Anti-Imperialist League. Box 1, Anti-Imperialist League papers, Swarthmore Peace Collection, Swarthmore College.

\(^{103}\) My emphasis here is to highlight the overshadowed future-oriented discourse of pro-imperialist arguments.
conversion, the turning from evil to good, from self to God..." (pp. 9-10). The anti-imperialists of the AIL, were reformers in conversation with the discourse and practices of the evangelical and imperialist impulses of the 19th century United States. Radical anti-imperialists of the time for the most part focused on labor issues. However, those seeing themselves as reformers focused on preventing the U.S. from the evils of imperialism.

I do not only attribute America's civil religion to a transcendent ethos (Hughey 1983). As Jacques Ellul (1975) notes, "religion, rather, is one possible rendition of the sacred" (p.48). "Civilization" was at the center of cultural debates over imperialism.

Determining the sanctity of democratic institutions versus the sanctity of civilization as moral uplift was not a schema pro-imperialists could ignore. This was also because of their doxic beliefs in democracy and civilization. Rather, benevolent assimilation as policy and ideal was made to coincide with their take on Anglo-Saxon "civilization." This left the contradictions between the civilizing projects of "benevolent assimilation" and imperialist violence at the center of the debates.

Anti-imperialists and pro-imperialists attributed their beliefs against, or for, imperialism to a transcendent ethos (Welch Jr. 1979). The repertoires for performing pro-imperialism and anti-imperialism involved defining limits of democracy through practicing colonialism and/or in engaging in war against Filipinos (Jung 2009).

"Civilization" consisted of a constellation of racial, gendered, and imperialist structures with schemas, practices, and material resources that promoted organizing, governing, and ordering society based on gendered and racialized relations in a larger imperialist field. Performances of civil religion appealed to "progress" and "divine" good on behalf of whatever issue it was invoked to justify or oppose. Bellah (1992) noted that attempts to
clearly and neatly define civil religion rendered it almost a futile term. What he argued instead was that the inherent contradictions and paradoxes of the term were part of the ambiguity of society's moral practices. Explaining civil religion as performance in Jung's (2009) terms of "structures" not only accounts for these apparent paradoxes, but also shows the utility of ambiguity for promoting Anglo-Saxon and masculine domination, through paternalistic claims to benevolence.

A significant component of what structured Anglo-Saxon "civilization" were feelings about the immorality of imperialist violence. The moralizing of anti-imperialists on the profanities of imperialism came out in desperate terms, fearing the end of the United States as it had been known, but, again, without a more inclusive vision of the future. "Moralizing is a product of those societies in which the sacred fades out and tends to disappear. It is a weak substitute for that which had been radical, ultimate, and established beyond dispute. The more morality is rational, the further removed it is from the sacred, and the weaker it is" (Ellul 1975: 54). If the assertion here is accurate, the radicalism of democracy would have faded by the turn of the twentieth century. But, the history of U.S. democracy is riddled with racialized violence and opposition to it. The moralizing tone of civil religion has been formative arguments in the radicalization of democracy as in the case of the civil rights movement appealing to our "better angels" – even if change ultimately relied on committed actions of contentious politics.

On November 19, 1900, the anti-imperialist paper the *Springfield Republican* (from Massachusetts) printed an article that demonstrates the moralizing tone. It reads, "Violated moral law sooner or later inflicts its punishment on the violator, in such fashion that he is constrained to acknowledge and repent of the wrong, or else it destroyed him."
Even favored America can not [sic] break with impunity the eternal laws. She is not so great as God.\textsuperscript{104} The Philippine-American War marked the turning point at which democratic practice was not beyond dispute, nor radical in its implementation. Rather, imperialists used tenets of American democracy to expand the limits of U.S. control and deepen the racialization of the state through a hegemonic whiteness transposed from republican Anglo-Saxonism (Roediger 1991).

Changes in the sacred status of past formulations of U.S. democracy required changes in AIL strategic emphasis over time. The election of 1900 proved to be a critical turning point for the nation in terms of imperialism and for the anti-imperialist movement's decline. For the nation, the election was interpreted as a passive acceptance of imperialist policies. Therefore, imperialists claimed the election as a defeat over anti-imperialists. However, historians argue, as did anti-imperialists in their own time, that Bryan was more likely defeated for his economic policies and McKinley re-elected for his. Imperialism in the Philippines took a backseat to economic stability at home (Beisner 1968; Tompkins 1970).

Therefore, after the election of 1900 and the defeat of Bryan, the broad base of anti-imperialists began to dwindle. Keeping anti-imperialists mobilized was a major focus for the AIL early on. Mobilization was done through letters of solicitation for funds as well as networking through petitions. Particularly reputable individuals were targeted in hopes of using their influence to get others to join the cause. This yielded a core group of activists that created a more homogenous organization and movement of active, middle-class, white citizens. Although the networking encouraged diversity across

ideology, diversity across social position was not a serious concern. These citizens were in the "herald of civilization" habitus—that made up a middle-class, Anglo-Saxon, reformist disposition. Therefore, networking determined the anti-imperialist movement's limited expanse. As this was happening, the focus of the movement changed from a historical defense of democratic practices in the metropole to a concerted future-oriented opposition to violence in the colony rooted in the defense of civilization as "sacred."

Civilization and "The White Man's Burden"

The AIL focused on government officials and voters as their target audience, leaving most Blacks and women ignored. Despite the fact that Black men had mobilized their own parallel organization and were prolific in the Black press over the relationship between imperialism and race, the AIL did not focus on strengthening these ties. Rather, the anti-imperialist efforts of Blacks were seen as a related, but separate, effort. In contrast, the Negro National Anti-Imperial and Anti-Trust League focused on anti-imperialism and anti-trust as related issues.105

As for white women, two in particular transcended the typical gendered roles expected for women in the AIL, Jane Addams and Josephine Shaw Lowell. Frequently listed today as one of the AIL's most well-known vice presidents was Addams of the Chicago organization, the American Anti-Imperialist League.106 Addams lent her name to the cause as well as spoke at the Chicago Liberty Meetings on April 30, 1899. While

105 Ibid.
106 Other recognizable names of women involved with the AIL or anti-imperialist writings include Mary Emma Byrd, Elsie Clews Parson, Katherine Lee Bates, Alice Thatcher Post, Lucia Ames Mead, Fanny Garrison Villard, Alice Stone Blackwell, and Caroline Pemberton.
Addams supported the anti-imperialist cause, her efforts remained focused on conditions in Chicago, lending her ideas and reputation to anti-imperialism only periodically.

More common was the formation of auxiliary organizations of the AIL, joined by many unnamed women from the Midwest and the East Coast. The women's auxiliary of the AIL in Boston wrote a petition imploring other women for support in 1899. It opened, "We, women of the United States, earnestly protest against the war of conquest into which our country has been plunged in the Philippine islands. We appeal to the Declaration of Independence, which is the moral foundation of the constitution you have swore to defend, we reaffirm its weighty words." Women's organizations such as WCTU, the Congress of Mothers, and the Daughters of the American Revolution (DAR) also took official anti-imperialist stances offering the AIL support. WCTU leadership also educated affiliated women on international affairs and the violence in the Philippines, which they attributed to problems of prostitution and liquor (Papachristou 1990).

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Women in the Public Debate on Imperialism

Partaking in the public debate on imperialism, many women wrote poems expressing their anti-imperialist views to various newspapers in the metropole as well as letters to the editor in *The Woman's Journal*. Poems at the turn of the century were a much more public medium than today for both women and men (Harrington 2002; Nelson 2001). Contributing a poem to a public forum was just as appropriate as a letter to the editor for political expression. Rudyard Kipling's infamous poem advising the U.S. on involvement in the Philippines, "The White Man's Burden: The United States and the Philippine Islands," published in the February 1899 edition of *McClure's* magazine, sparked a flood of anti-imperialist poems in response. Women, in particular, were more likely to express their political views publicly through poems.\(^{110}\)

One of these women, Alice Smith-Travers, contributed the poem, "The White Man’s Burden" published in the Black Indianapolis newspaper, *The Freeman*, March 4, 1899, focusing on the horrors of violence and the "Judas"-like behavior of the United States. She wrote,

'Take up the white man's burden!'

That causes the heart to quake

As we read again with horror,

Of those burnings at the stake,

Of white caps riding in the night,

And burning black men's homes,

\(^{110}\) Perhaps the less direct format for political expression through poetic imagery allowed these disfranchised citizens a safer, or more accepted, outlet for their civic participation.
Of the inmates shot as they rush out
And the awful dying groans,

Of crimes that would outnumber
Those in the foreign Isle,
Committed by heath[sic] people
'Half devil and half child.'

Then free those Filipinos[sic] people,
From the accursed rule of Spain,
And put on them the shackels
Of a haughtier nation's reign.

With 'Judas' acts in every form,
Conceivable by man,
And the thirst for blood, and greed for gold
Is surely the white man's plan.111

Anna Manning Comfort, a leading suffragist, also related the problem of the "White Man's Burden" with lynching, treatment of Indians, and women's suffrage in her poem

"Home Burdens of Uncle Sam."\textsuperscript{112} Some women's poems were included in a volume published in 1900 entitled, \textit{Liberty Poems: Inspired by the Crisis of 1898-1900}, published by the New England Anti-Imperialist League (Zwick 2005).\textsuperscript{113} Through poems and letters to the editor, women consistently highlighted the violence being committed in the Philippines and raised the question of women's suffrage pointing out the hypocrisy of spreading liberty abroad while disfranchising citizens at home. These women publicly expressed their cynical indignation with regard to "The White Man's Burden" both as women without the vote and as citizens, many of them mothers, with the moral duty as women to show their abhorrence for violence committed in the name of liberty.\textsuperscript{114}


Image 4. *Liberty Poems: Inspired by the Crisis of 1898-1900.* On the inside cover of this anti-imperialist volume is a picture of a trench in the Philippines, with dead Filipinos and American soldiers standing above them. The volume contains poems contributed by women and was published through the funding of Mary S. Pickering, one of the most generous contributors to the AIL. Picture taken by author.

*Women's Monetary Contributions*

In addition to entering the public debate through the criticism of violence, less well-known women with anti-imperialist views were contributing monetarily to the AIL.

Sometimes they did both. The AIL’s ledger books contain page after page with women’s names and their corresponding donations.115 Between 1898-1902, the dates recorded in

115 Moorfield Storey Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society.
the ledger books, women gave $7,082, which was 29% of the total number of donations to the AIL's funds. Even more significant, in light of assertions of their noninvolvement and general inattention, is that of the total AIL budget between 1898-1902, multi-millionaire Andrew Carnegie—who contributed $1000 at a time—contributed $4,400, which was 20% of the total funds, women's contributions totaled 33% of the AIL funds, and other men's contributions totaled $10,236, or 47% of the AIL funds.116

Given this time period and the availability of independent expendable income for women, the fact that women gave more than their representative numbers is demonstrative of anti-imperialist women's concern and corresponding mobilization over racialized imperialist violence. That this has been overlooked in anti-imperialist histories of the Philippine-American War is also demonstrative of studies on resistance treating their subject un-self-consciously as "political man" (Ferree and Merrill 2000).

The Presidential Campaign of 1900

For Bryan, the election of 1900 was a question of “the marshalling of democracy against plutocracy, the man against the dollar, republic against empire” (Schirmer 1972: 208). While McKinley seemed to agree the election was one over foreign policy, the president’s advisor, Mark Hanna, framed the election as one of a robust economy with workers earning better wages under Republicans than in previous Democratic administrations (Beisner 1968; Schirmer 1972). Anti-imperialists were themselves

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116 These numbers come from my calculations based on the information found in the ledger books of the Anti-Imperialist League. Moorfield Storey Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society.
divided, struggling within the movement to decide the best course of action (Beisner 1968).

Nevertheless, the Chicago Liberty Meetings in April 1899 endorsed the Bryan campaign (Foner and Winchester 1984). “A few days after these meetings took place Atkinson wrote Lyman Gage, the Midwestern Gold Democrat McKinley had appointed Secretary of the Treasury, that the ‘leading Labor Reformers, Gompers, McNeill and others are with us...Leading Irishman have written, The grangers are with us under the lead of Herbert Myrick.’ The Boston man was quick to tell Gage, who had the ear of the President, that the anti-imperialists planned to set on foot a movement of coalition character, which, if realized would have significant political impact” (Schirmer 1972: 99-100). However, Atkinson could not be convinced to vote for Bryan given his financial policies (Williamson 1934).

Other anti-imperialists had similar qualms. Although Bryan came out against imperialism, he had voted for the Treaty of Paris, had questionable economic policies, and was a populist (Tompkins 1970). Dissatisfied with both Bryan and McKinley, many anti-imperialists gave serious consideration to voting for a third-party ticket. They organized a special Liberty Convention in Indianapolis, Indiana to decide on an official candidate to back in the summer of 1900 with Edwin Burritt Smith presiding over the party (Tompkins 1970). Moorfield Storey was asked to consider running for president on such a ticket. However, he declined stating that the only way imperialism would be defeated would be if McKinley were defeated (Tompkins 1970).

Although Massachusetts Senator Hoar was an anti-imperialist, he was still a Republican party-man. He campaigned against Bryan and the southern Democrats’ policy

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of disfranchisement of Black voters (Schirmer 1972). Anti-imperialists countered that McKinley's imperialist policies fostered racism at home and abroad (Schirmer 1972). Reformist labor leader and anti-imperialist, Samuel Gompers told a vice president of the American Federation of Labor (AF) not to commit to supporting either Bryan or McKinley, but to put forward a policy of neutrality between the parties (Schirmer 1972). While most Irish laborers and labor leaders in Boston, such as Patrick Collins, came out in support of Bryan, across the country organized labor did not explicitly support Bryan although working people generally did (Schirmer 1972).
Black men's support for the Republican Party after the Civil War was almost unanimous. With worsening economic conditions and increased violence resulting from the rescinding of radical Reconstruction policies in the Democratically controlled South, McKinley enjoyed Black support by default. However, Black anti-imperialist leaders in the North made appeals to Black men to vote against McKinley's policy of imperialism. One specific target for Rev. W. H. Scott of Boston was Theodore Roosevelt and his claims that Black soldiers were cowards on San Juan Hill, while he took the glory for the achievement of that battle (Schirmer 1972). In the face of Booker T. Washington's pleas to stay out of politics and focus solely on economic advancement, W.H. Scott and C. H. Plummer—the two most prominent Black anti-imperialists in Boston—entreated Blacks at a meeting at Faneuil Hall to vote against McKinley, especially in states where they had the majority of votes (Schirmer 1972). However, the majority of Black men voted for McKinley.

117 However, Washington did contact Edward Ordway, secretary of the New York Anti-Imperialist League, stating he supported the anti-imperialist cause in 1901. Letter from Booker T. Washington to Edward Ordway, May 14, 1901, Edward Ordway Papers, Manuscript and Archive Division, New York Public Library.
In the end, Bryan received 6,360,796 votes to McKinley’s 7,238,543, giving him the popular vote (Schirmer 1972). Robert Beisner (1968) wrote, "It was nearly impossible
for any American to leave the polls on election day, 1900, with confidence that he had taken a clear-cut stand on the question of imperialism. The sheer lapse of time had diminished the importance of the issue in the minds of many voters: more than two years had passed since the end of the war with Spain and twenty-one months had elapsed since the ratification of the peace treaty and the beginning of the Filipino rebellion. To others imperialism already seemed an established and unalterable part of the political landscape." (p. 120-121). Furthermore, for all their railing against imperialism, the future policies Democrats promised to deal with in regard to imperialism were not significantly different from Republicans. Democrats promised to "give" the Filipinos a "stable form of government" and "'independence' but fail[ed] to offer any timetable for its realization, [...] disappoint[ing] those who wanted a pledge of immediate independence" (Beisner 1968: 121-122).

With the defeat of Bryan, many lukewarm supporters of anti-imperialism lost interest. Those who remained active in the AIL were more ideologically in line with one another. The consensus for anti-imperialist leaders was that voting for Bryan was a distasteful protest against imperialism (Tompkins 1970). These anti-imperialists formed a smaller, more organized, network of anti-imperialists. At the same time as Bryan's defeat, soldiers began returning home from the Philippines with stories of violent atrocities committed in the name of benevolence and tutelage. As activists gathered the stories of soldiers, they took on a new strategy of protest focused on the contradictions of imperialist violence and democracy.
Strategies of the Anti-Imperialist League

Not wanting to be dismissed as radicals like de Leon, many influential leaders were centrally concerned with the public image of the AIL (Beisner 1968). Others were more concerned with increasing widespread support, such as Herbert Welsh. He entreated individuals in his own network and other AIL leaders to reach out to progressives.\(^{118}\)

Initially, building the movement around an identity of anti-imperialist politics gave it an unrivaled inclusiveness of any previous mass movement.\(^{119}\)

White anti-imperialist men, for their part, had an ambivalent take on gender and women as anti-imperialists. Their anti-imperialism came from a particular conception of their role as responsible citizens, carrying out their obligations to keep the nation true to its democratic legacy. Implicit in this conception of responsible citizens was seeing themselves as civil leaders, continuing the legacy of abolitionists. As Anglo-Saxons, they were "white" men responsible for the project of "civilization" and according to Anglo-Saxon "civilization," women were to care for the home and children (Beisel and Kay 2004). While their discourse touted democracy, freedom, liberty, and self-determination, their practices maintained patriarchal control of the movement (Murphy 2009).

Looking to the success of progressives from the past, they failed to set their own affirmative agenda for the future. While they opposed the nation-state committing violence against racialized imperialist subjects, their personal practices kept women, Blacks, and the working class at the margins of the movement. They spent little time

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\(^{118}\) Herbert Welsh Papers, Special Collections, Hatcher Graduate Library, University of Michigan. Moorfield Storey Papers, Special Collections, Library of Congress.

\(^{119}\) Christopher Lasch (1958; 1973) discusses how some anti-imperialists came to their politics for racist reasons. Anti-imperialists also made their stance for radical socialist reasons (such as Morrison Swift, Daniel de Leon, and Eugene V. Debs), but were also less active in the AIL.
discussing women, gender, or themselves as "emasculated" men in their correspondence with each other. Only after they lost the election of 1900 did they focus on arguments the progressives of the younger generation, women, Blacks, and workers had been making all along regarding violence.

Therefore, AIL leadership maintained their nationalist, masculinist, and Anglo-Saxonist claims to the legacy of democracy and justice to secure their legitimacy by excluding women, workers, and Blacks as collectives. At the same time, women's resources were crucial to the effectiveness of the anti-imperialist campaign. Additionally, women's private influence over male family members could also prove to be effective. Therefore, women could not simply be dismissed or completely excluded, nor were they. Similarly, Black leaders were dealt with as individuals, but Blacks as a collective were directed to auxiliary organizations. White soldiers from the working class were also dealt with individually.

Social Influence

The public uproar over the Philippine-American war dissipated after William Jennings Bryan's defeat. Tompkins (1970) notes, "The election of 1900 marked the apogee of the debate over imperialism in the United States. It was to continue, but with gradually and steadily diminishing intensity" (p. 236). Because of the decline of the movement, most researchers of anti-imperialist have ended the story there – the movement waned especially after the declaration officially ending the war in 1902. However, after 1900, an anti-imperialist group formed that began to focus on violence. This is important for understanding the decline in the coalition, given these arguments were made earlier by
marginalized anti-imperialists and for understanding the way violence became both denied and institutionalized through "states of exception."

The AIL focused on soliciting soldiers coming back from the Philippines and utilized networks with elite revolutionary Filipinos to gather information for educating the American public. Through fostering networks, the AIL gathered more reliable information on the situation in the Philippines than was provided in the press. They were also able to disseminate it to a larger extent at home.

Concentrating their social influence served three main functions: 1) Before 1900, it developed alliances with prominent public figures lending much needed legitimacy for anti-imperialists, 2) After 1900, it provided opportunities for gathering information from soldiers and Filipinos with actual experience of the Philippine-American War, and 3) Both before and after 1900, it created more outlets for disseminating this information to the American public. For example, attempting to garner more anti-imperialist support, the leadership looked to organize beyond the New England region, where the most active anti-imperialists resided. They also sought to organize influential persons to add to their long list of vice presidents in support of anti-imperialism.

Anglo-Saxonism delimited their conceptions of activism and vision for democracy. Anglo-Saxon rapprochement between Britain and the U.S., at times, meant a shared "race instinct" (Miller 1982). Therefore, Anglo-Saxonism was ineffective in uniting "white" working classes, including immigrants, against imperialism (Jacobson 1995; Roediger 2005). In fact, it was often a deterrent for anti-imperialists of working classes and immigrants given that they were not included in the class or lineage of
"Anglo-Saxons" (Jacobson 1995). Anglo-Saxonism worked as a less explicit racial justification for imperialism amongst "English-speaking" people (Dyer 1980). Anglo-Saxons were simply the pinnacle of "civilization" (Beisel and Kay 2004). As a schema, Anglo-Saxonism rearticulated the intersection of (the white) race, (the middle) class, and (patrilineal) gendered structures with resources and performances developed under imperialist relations pitting "civilization" and "barbarism."

For example, the activism of Josephine Shaw Lowell shows the performance of Anglo-Saxonism and the way resources were identified and utilized. She contributed generous monetary donations and emotional support for her friend, the New York AIL secretary, Edward Ordway.121 Highly involved in the activities of the AIL chapter in New York, Lowell gave opening and closing remarks at multiple AIL meetings.122 She had the most prolific correspondence with Ordway of any anti-imperialist, humbly making suggestions as to the best and most effective courses of action. She also agitated for more protests and public demonstrations against imperialism, specifically requesting something akin to what was done during the abolitionist movement.123

One of Lowell's favored tactics was gathering petitions with the names of prominent U.S. Americans in supporting particular issues against the imperialist involvement in the Philippines. This was indeed a common tactic used by the New York AIL. (other prominent members of the New York AIL included Andrew Carnegie, Carl

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120 Nevertheless, Anglo-Saxonism was also ineffective in uniting the masses for imperialism.
121 She died in 1905. Edward Ordway Papers, Manuscripts Division, New York Public Library.
122 Correspondence to Edward Ordway from Lowell, October 19, 1899. Edward Ordway Papers, Manuscripts Division, New York Public Library.
123 Correspondence Folder 1901, Edward Ordway Papers, Manuscripts Division, New York Public Library.
Schurz, Mark Twain, William Dean Howell, and Samuel Gompers). Although she gave considerable time and money to the anti-imperialist cause, she was also aware of Anglo-Saxon gender politics of women’s involvement in such activities. Lowell believed that keeping her name off petitions and other public matters would garner more support for anti-imperialism than taking credit for her activities. Therefore, she asked to have her name left off many petitions, even though her activities had been critical in making them happen.\(^{124}\) She also feigned ignorance at how much money she was donating so as to convince Ordway to take her frequent and generous donations.\(^{125}\)

The work of the leadership to network has been noted in multiple histories. The names listed on the AIL official stationary consisted of its vice presidents, often of notable public influence. These names were referenced again and again in attempts to gather more support for petitions and donations. While the anti-imperialist leadership utilized the influence of their members and vice presidents, they also began more concerted efforts toward reaching out to Filipinos and U.S. soldiers for more accurate information.

**An Information Campaign**

*Filipino-Anti-imperialist Alliances*

Periodically, members of the AIL and members of the Central Filipino Committee worked together by sharing information in order to convince the U.S. to stop the colonization of the Philippines. Jim Zwick (1998) writes, "Because most later studies of the League focused primarily on its activities from 1898 to either the presidential election

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\(^{124}\) Edward Ordway Papers, Manuscripts Division, New York Public Library.

\(^{125}\) Ibid.
of 1900 or the official end of the Philippine-American War in 1902, [the] aspect of the League's activities [involving Filipino-Anti-imperialist solidarity], which began as early as 1898 but became more pronounced after 1900, has been neglected" (p. 55). Zwick (1998) has done the most extensive work on this topic to date. But, Daniel B. Schirmer also noted that “…the movement that the anti-imperialists built in the United States gave political and moral support to Philippine independence, creating difficulties for the American imperialists in the execution of their program. The relationship between American anti-imperialism and Philippine nationalism proved reciprocal in effect, and so it continued, with varying intensity, as long as did the movement that originated in Faneuil Hall” (Schirmer 1972: 65-66). Julian Go (2007) has argued it was the Filipino resistance in the Philippines that created the difference between colonial rule, and eventual liberation, in the Philippines and colonial rule in Puerto Rico, for example.

Here, I show how Filipino resistance and anti-imperialist opposition worked together not only to oppose arguments that Filipinos were not "civilized" enough for self-rule, but just as important, they worked together to spread information on the violence the U.S. military was committing in the Philippines. This had the greatest impact on the arguments against violence and for "civilization" in the metropole, which I cover in the next chapter.

Fiske Warren was the anti-imperialist vice president most involved with developing Filipinas/os alliances.¹²⁶ Warren traveled with Sixto Lopez to and from the Philippines as well as to Hong Kong where the Filipino revolutionary junta was located

¹²⁶ See Fiske Warren Diaries. Herbert Welsh Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan; Herbert Welsh Papers, Hatcher Graduate Library, University of Michigan; Moorfield Storey Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society.
(De Ocampo 1977; Reyes 1971). Lopez was a correspondent in Britain for the junta initially, but eventually became more excluded from their activities (Reyes 1971). He traveled to the U.S. and spoke out extensively on the Philippine issues and over the question of "civilization." Warren and Lopez worked together until Lopez was arrested by U.S. officials in the Philippines for refusing to pledge allegiance to the United States. Warren, once a member of the executive committee, had traveled to Manila with Sixto Lopez and Lopez's secretary Thomas Patterson in 1901. Upon arriving, Lopez was denied entry to Manila for not taking an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a citizen of the British Empire, Patterson was exempt from such an oath. Unwilling to make an oath of allegiance to the U.S., Lopez returned to Hong Kong. While in Manila, Warren worked to get Lopez admittance to see his family, but he also made connections with Americans in Manila and discussing the war.
Felipe Agoncillo and Galicano Apacible, both served as presidents of the Central Committee at different times. They traveled to the United States to make the case for Filipino independence. They had direct contacts with Emilio Aguinaldo, the military leader of the Filipino forces. After the U.S. was at war with the Philippines, they based
their travels out of Toronto (Reyes 1977). "From Toronto they made frequent trips to Washington, D.C. and New York City to confer with sympathizers of the Philippine Cause, like the members of the Anti-Imperialist League..." (Reyes 1977: 85). Apacible also met with William Jennings Bryan while Bryan was the Democratic presidential candidate (Reyes 1977).

The AIL published multiple statements by Filipino leaders in the U.S. in attempts to prove the Filipinos' capacity for self-government (Zwick 1998). "Among [the Anti-Imperialist League's] early publications were Emilio Aguinaldo's *The True Version of the Philippine Revolution*, the constitution of the Philippine Republic and other official documents, the memorials to the U.S. Congress by Philippine Envoy to the United States Felipe Agoncillo, the Central Filipino Committee's address *To the American People* (also distributed by the New England Anti-Imperialist League), a numerous letters, pamphlets and addresses written by Sixto Lopez, and a comparison of the views of Theodore Roosevelt and Apolinario Mabini" (Zwick 1998: 71).

Knowing the U.S. American audience's lack of confidence in Filipinos' capacity for self-government, Apacible wrote in "To The American People,"

We, the Filipinos, are a civilized, progressive and peace-loving people. Many impartial writers and speakers have testified that we are advanced in civilization, that we are capable of improvement, that many of our people for two centuries have enjoyed the advantages of university education, that the number of illiterates among our people is small, and that as artists, scientists, magistrates, generals and dignitaries of the Church, the sons of the Filipines [sic], have distinguished
themselves greatly and have achieved many positions of eminence especially so in Spain.¹²⁷

Clemencia Lopez, Sixto Lopez's sister, visited the United States as a guest of the AIL in 1902-1903 (Zwick 2001). She too spoke to various groups across the U.S. disputing the idea that Filipinos were too uncivilized for self-government.¹²⁸ She was living evidence to the contrary according to instructors at Wellesley College, where she studied English and further convinced other women of the anti-imperialist cause (Zwick 2001). Clemencia Lopez spent almost two years in the U.S. speaking on conditions in the Philippines and made a special appeal to President Roosevelt on behalf of her family. Three of her brothers had been imprisoned by the U.S. military government in Batangas (Zwick 2001). In a farewell speech at the luncheon given in her honor by the AIL, she said,

When I planned to return to my native land it never occurred to me that my friends would gather to bid me farewell. Still less could I have expected that the gathering should be presided over by the friend of John Brown [Mr. Sanborn]; that the words of parting should fall from the lips of the son of the Liberator [Mr. Garrison]; that I should see among the guests the secretary of Charles Sumner [Mr. Storey]; and that there should be present in propria persona that aged and

¹²⁷ To the American People, by Galicano Apacible. June 1900. Swarthmore Peace Collection, Philippines Box.
¹²⁸ This was a particularly persuasive discourse with the American public for justifying imperialism in the Philippines, buttressed by "the white man's burden." Kramer (2006) also contends this argument centrally contributed to colonial policies of indefinite "tutelage" in democracy in the Philippines.
honored paladin of liberty, Gov. Boutwell. These names became famous at a time when the victim was the black man. Now it is the brown.¹²⁹

Like the other Filipino revolutionaries, especially Apacible (Reyes 1977), Lopez was familiar with the racist history of U.S. democracy and understood the implications for this racism on the chances for democracy in the Philippines under the rule of the U.S. The

AIL continued its connections with Filipinos throughout its existence. Zwick (1998) notes that although the AIL and the Filipino revolutionaries did work together, they did so in a complementary way. They had the same end goals and complementary tactics, but both organizations held nationalist agendas motivating their cause.

Soldiers' Letters on War

David Starr Jordan (1899), at the time President of Stanford University, stated in one of his repeatedly requested anti-imperialist addresses entitled "The Question of the Philippines," "We know nothing of Philippine matters, save through cablegrams passed through government censorship, and from the letters and speech of men of the army and navy." In response to the censorship, the first major publication of the AIL on soldiers' first-hand accounts of the violence was in 1899. This broadside titled, *Soldiers' Letters*, displayed both soldiers' remorse and callous disregard for the violence they perpetrated, witnessed, or both. But, most importantly, it documented the violence indisputably to the public.\(^{130}\) This publication included the infamous letter from one soldier that compared the war against the Filipinos with "hunting jackrabbits" as well as references to Filipinos as "niggers."\(^{131}\) Anti-imperialists used this document as a resource for exposing the contradictions of "benevolent assimilation." However, these letters were compiled from articles previously published in hometown newspapers.

For example, in cooperation with her husband, a captain's wife stationed in the Philippines first wrote to a newspaper in the United States breaking the story on the


\(^{131}\) Ibid.
military's use of the "water cure." Together, they thought it better for her to expose the story, as his wife, than him, as a commissioned officer. This story and others like it set the anti-imperialists into a fury of investigations into the violence used by the military and general conditions in the Philippines that was not being reported in the press at home.

At the forefront of the anti-imperialist information campaign on exposing the violence in the Philippines was Herbert Welsh. Centered out of Philadelphia, he was the editor of City & State, an anti-imperialist newspaper. Welsh was active in the anti-imperialist movement from the beginning. He was an avid researcher and compiled statements made in defense of imperialism only to use them against those who made the statements and imperialist policy in his various publications (Welsh 1900). From his office, Welsh corresponded tirelessly with other anti-imperialist leaders on the need to investigate and expose the violence committed by the U.S. military in the Philippines. Welsh organized this campaign and published his findings in City & State. He hired two investigators to contact soldiers and officers, interviewing them carefully on what they witnessed in the Philippines. The investigators were to corroborate reports on the "water cure" and develop a case with which to petition Congress. In response to his solicitations, some soldiers began to specifically seek out Welsh to report what they knew.

Welsh pieced together events in the Philippines based on these newspaper accounts of soldiers in 1900 to support his case in his broadside, The Other Man's Country (Welsh 1900). Storey and Lichauco (1926) also used the first-hand accounts of

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132 Correspondence from Herbert Welsh to Storey, January 31, 1902. Moorfield Storey Papers, Library of Congress.
133 Herbert Welsh Papers. Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan; Herbert Welsh Papers, Hatcher Graduate Library, University of Michigan.
soldiers as evidence. For example, in their book *The Conquest of the Philippines by the United States 1898-1925*, they quoted Charles Brenner, a private from a Kansas regiment as an example of how investigations into violence began. They stated, "The first investigations which finally resulted from the innumerable letters coming from the soldiers themselves, was the case of Charles Brenner, a private in a Kansas regiment. Speaking of the battle of Caloocan, he wrote to his mother:

'Company I had taken a few prisoners and stopped. The colonel ordered them up into line time after time, and finally sent Captain Bishop back to start them. Then occurred the hardest sight I ever saw. They had four prisoners and didn't know what to do with them. They asked Captain Bishop what to do; and he said 'You know the orders,' and four natives fell dead (8)' (p. 130-131).

A particularly brutal account of torture involved a Major Howze and his treatment of Filipino prisoners. Welsh wrote the broadside, *To Lincoln's Plain People: Facts Regarding 'Benevolent Assimilation' in the Philippines*, which was based on accounts of these news stories from the *Evening Post*.

In addition to peculiar tortures, Howze was accused of committing other cruelties to Filipinos including killing them from beatings in 1900. For anti-imperialists, the additional rub was that General Miles had heard of Howze's practices and only sent an officer to investigate, which was the reason the story leaked. Miles was hoping for the incident to stay quiet within the military rather than made public.

Working with Welsh, Mary Storer Cobb of Northampton, Massachusetts, took an active, if uncredited, role in the AIL. In Northampton, Cobb helped form a chapter of the

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AIL, in which Mary Emma Byrd (Professor of Astronomy at Smith College) was the secretary.\(^{135}\) Cobb was most active in the AIL's information gathering campaign in 1901 preparing for the senate investigation on Affairs in the Philippines, which included lines of questioning on the violence committed by the U.S. military.\(^{136}\) On this, Cobb prepped soldiers, who had offered information on the violence, to go before the Senate Investigation Committee on the Philippines in 1902.\(^{137}\) Cobb worked closely with Herbert Welsh on the soldiers' testimonies and also received support from J.S. Lowell in her efforts.\(^{138}\)

Anglo-Saxon anti-imperialists in the AIL saw themselves as being on the "right" side of "civilization." Through networking with other Anglo-Saxons as part of the AIL's official capacity as "heralds of civilization," disseminating information they gathered through their networks with working-class soldiers as well as Filipinos, they began a focused campaign on exposing violence and the details of "criminal aggression."

**Conclusion**

"Civilization" provided the doxic limits of debate for AIL arguments for democracy rooted in American traditions and conceptualized in a racial, gendered, and imperialist field. Imperialists let go of discursive uses of the democratic past and stressed the future of a "deeply" racialized (Jung 2009) and rearticulated "civilization." Imperialist discourses were visionary, and as such, more appealing to younger generations of U.S.


\(^{136}\) Senate Investigation on the Affairs in the Philippines. 1902. Congressional Hearings.

\(^{137}\) Mary Storer Cobb Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society.

\(^{138}\) Ibid.
Americans. Discursive uses of time mattered for anti-imperialists and imperialists in conveying their visions of American democratic formation. Orientations of democracy rooted in tradition were less useful for organizing anti-imperialists of younger generations, such as blacks, women, immigrants, and workers, with an eye to the future and concerns over the rapid changes in society that coincided with industrialization. After all, democratic practices that excluded them would not be as motivating.

Therefore, anti-imperialism went from a burgeoning movement to a smaller group of advocates after the election of 1900. This was a result of addressing tensions within the movement, and looking for ways to get something accomplished. Yet, the leadership's ambivalence, stemming from Anglo-Saxonist schemas of "civilization," over creating coalitions with their natural allies of workers, Blacks, and women limited a larger movement and determined the structural organization of an advocacy network.

Not giving up on democracy and a "civilization" that abhorred racist violence, however, the Anglo-Saxonist "heralds of civilization" clung to their morality. While they may not have been able to work and utilize the energies of Blacks, workers, and women as collectives, they did work with them on individual bases. Chapter five outlines their campaigns against violence and the networking they did to try to keep policies of benevolent assimilation, at least, honest.
CHAPTER 5: EXPOSING CRIMINAL AGGRESSION: BENEVOLENT
ASSIMILATION AS EXCEPTIONALIST POLICY

With the defeat of Bryan, the AIL leadership shifted their emphasis from arguing over the
abstract contradictions between the principles of democracy and imperialism to an
emphasis on arguing over the contradictions between the practices of democracy and
benevolent assimilation. Proponents of U.S. empire argued its exceptional characteristics
in that the U.S. would offer “tutelage” in democracy to the “little brown brothers” in the
Philippines for however long it would take (Kramer 2006). According to the benevolent
assimilation proclamation, a major goal of U.S. military administrators would be to win
the confidence of the Filipino people. By doing this, the U.S. would expose the
Philippines to democracy, literally teaching them how to practice democratic ideas.

Go (2007) states,

The United States would rule foreign peoples while using its colonial power to
uplift them towards the light of democratic self-government. The Philippines was
the model par excellence. ‘The Philippines are ours not to exploit,’ insisted
President McKinley, ‘but to civilize, to develop, to civilize, [sic] to educate, to
train in the science of self-government.’ This so-called ‘mission’ of ‘democratic
tutelage’ is what would distinguish American empire from the ‘tyrannical’ empires
of European powers (p. 76).\(^{139}\)

However, anti-imperialist leaders saw these U.S. activities not as exceptional, nor as
benevolent paternalism. Rather, they treated it as all too expected with violence crossing
the dangerous borders of banality by becoming normalized in imperialist practices. This

\(^{139}\) Various empires claimed their own exceptional nature, making the discourse of
imperialist exceptionalism not only unexceptional (e.g. see Steinmetz 2007) but also
constitutive of efforts to legitimate empire.
meant that particular violence was accepted by the administration and explained as
necessary for enterprises in the Philippines. Meanwhile, the wider U.S. public remained
concentrated on the economy at home, becoming increasingly indifferent to U.S. affairs
in the Philippines.

Therefore, anti-imperialists established a campaign with the sole purpose of
uncovering the various forms of violence in the Philippines. This course of action was to
highlight the contradiction that the military’s extraordinary use of violence against
Filipinos was at cross-purposes with the larger project of bringing Filipinos
“civilization.” Anti-imperialists stated this position at length in numerous broadsides.\(^\text{140}\)
Given the doxic limits of "civilization," colonial administrators and military officials
shared an underlying assumption that indiscriminate violence was out of the bounds of
“civilization.” Therefore, they argued the use of violence was exceptional and that it was
only used to control the indiscriminate and savage violence of Filipino “insurrectos” and
“ladrones.”\(^\text{141}\)

Given a clear shift in AIL focus, in this chapter I look at how anti-imperialists
made the shift to focus imperialist violence and whether these changes affected U.S.
imperialism. Maria Lanzar’s (1928) dissertation did acknowledge the sincere focus of
anti-imperialist activity on the violence in the Philippines, but her successors have mainly
colonized on imperialists' excuses for the violence rather than ant-imperialists' efforts
to expose it (Jacobson 1995: 2000; Kramer 2006; Welch 1979) (but see Daniel B.
Schirmer's (1972) brief chapter on the shift entitled, "Against Atrocities: The Last

\(^{140}\) See appendix for list of broadsides.
\(^{141}\) Insurrectos were leftover from the revolutionary army, while ladrones were
understood to be gangs of thieves. Filipino fighters earned this designation after
Roosevelt declared the fighting over.
Campaign"). Because the issue of how anti-imperialists' efforts to exposing violence has not been given systematic attention, the issue of how these efforts affected the process of U.S. policy-making has not been addressed.

Anti-imperialist efforts to limit imperialist violence by exposing it had lasting implications for the development of a racial state of exception, born of an imperialist racial project that reformulated and expanded the limits of the "racial state" (Omi and Winant 1994). Including the Philippines under the authority of U.S. governance accompanied Filipinos’ exclusion from U.S. citizenship, not that this is what they were asking for. This form of inclusion/exclusion was an expansive racial project the U.S. government undertook in its acquisition of the Philippines, and the central reason racist anti-imperialists opposed taking the Philippines as a colony.

Anti-imperialists incited a debate between government officials, which led to them questioning the limits of racial exceptions that ran parallel to "civilization" schemas. Although the public may have been largely indifferent, such schemas were influential in the field of opinion. These debates raised the issue of where violence in the Philippines fell concerning established rules of law in the metropole with rules of "civilized" warfare and, more generally, with a "civilized" society.

As the anti-imperialist movement evolved, the most organized and involved anti-imperialist activists understood the violence committed in the Philippines as not only attributable to “race prejudice,” but also normalized and unquestionably antidemocratic. Caroline Knowles (2003) calls what anti-imperialists referred to vaguely as "race prejudice" more precisely the "racial grammar" of a society, which are "the practices to which race/ethnicity give rise" (p. 18). This refers to the most diffuse personal
interactions as well as concentrated nodes of resources that are racializing. Anti-imperialists were concerned with the process of normalizing imperialist racial practices that would deepen and elaborate inscriptions of racial violence into the state apparatus.

Therefore, they did not blame the "water cure" on individually sadistic soldiers. Anti-imperialists perceived it as a problem stemming from the complacency and complicity of government officials, such as Secretary of War Elihu Root, as well as multiple military officials from the Governor General of the Philippines to officers and soldiers in the field. A great deal of the anti-imperialist leaders' energy went to elucidating tedious arguments on the antithetical relationship between democracy and imperialism, with its militaristic moral failings. As outlined in chapter four, this behavior elaborates their own performance of responsible citizenship.

Given the limitations of media coverage in the metropole on the Philippine-American War, the AIL organized to ascertain the situation on the ground in the Philippines through testimonies of people who had witnessed the Philippines firsthand, including: soldiers, Filipinos, Filipino newspapers, and investigative trips by AIL representatives. Lobbying government officials using this information bolstered their arguments and helped expound the contradictions between imperialism, democracy, and their violent exceptions with concrete accusations rather than abstract platitudes. By inciting these debates, anti-imperialists established the groundwork for widespread agreement over a need for an official investigation, covering the violence committed by the military against not only the Filipino soldiers but also Filipino civilians.\footnote{142}

\footnote{142} Anti-imperialist senators, though outnumbered on the committee, consistently questioned the burning of villages and the innocence or culpability of villagers.
By acknowledging and using multiple vantage points on the issues in the Philippines, the AIL formed a core group of activists focused on exposing violence in the Philippines and debunking claims to benevolent assimilation. Looking at the anti-imperialists’ focus on imperialist violence as problematic for “civilization” allows for an analysis of why “civilization” pressured imperialists to reformulate their justifications for using violence in the Philippines. Imperialist rearticulations of “civilization” justified the use of violence, developing a new kind of American imperialist “exception.” This exceptionalist “civilization” rationalized the legitimacy of imperialist violence under certain “states of exception,” where Filipinos were in some way, varying by ethnicity, outside of the realm of “civilization.”

Addressing the role violence played in determining the deployment of anti-imperialist resources during the Philippine-American War, I empirically document the constitutive relationship of citizens and the state. Anti-imperialists’ self-conceptions as the “heralds of civilization” were reflected in their performance in defending the “national honor” as responsible citizens and ultimately led to the triangulation of multiple vantage points in their investigations. Following the rearticulation of “civilization” in debates over whether U.S.'s continued involvement in the Philippines was "criminal aggression" or “benevolent assimilation,” I look at the effects of empire's relations in the

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143 The 1904 World’s Fair in St. Louis emphasized this point at home (e.g. see Robert Rydell (1984) *All the World's a Fair: Visions of Empire at American International Expositions, 1876-1916* and Laura Wexler (2004) *Tender Violence: Domestic Vision in the Age of U.S. Empire.*)

144 Maria Lanzar-Carpio’s (1928) dissertation does account for the Anti-Imperialist League’s focus on violence in the Philippines. However, subsequent histories ignore her contributions in this direction. I believe the majority of the papers on the Anti-Imperialist League found at the University of Michigan both at Bentley and Hatcher, where she received her Ph.D., were papers she gathered and annotated as part of her dissertation research.
metropole. This enables me to account for both the weak and strong transnational ties between Filipinos and anti-imperialists.\textsuperscript{145}

To do this, I chronologically trace the shift in anti-imperialist emphasis to focus on the campaigns “exposing criminal aggression” such as the “water cure,” reconcentration, and other cases of imperialist violence that led to questions over military rules of engagement. Their campaigns bolstered the call for a Senate Investigation on the Affairs in the Philippines in 1902 (hereafter referred to as SIAP), in which anti-imperialist senators raised issues over the violence. The U.S. government’s response to the violence included announcing the official end of the war in the Philippines on July 4, 1902, the resignation of the Secretary of War Elihu Root that year, the passage of the Pensionado Act of 1903 allowing Filipino students to attend U.S. universities, and further embedding American-style education in the Philippines.

\textbf{Changing Emphasis: Exposing Criminal Aggression}

When the U.S. military distributed the benevolent assimilation proclamation to Filipinos, General Miller reported that Filipinos laughed at the proclamation in Iloilo in his testimony before the SIAP. However, it was the U.S. leader’s intention that U.S. citizens and Filipinos were to believe imperialism would be implemented in the Philippines with temperance and justice. As such, U.S. imperialism was to be different, more benevolent than other empires, especially more benevolent than recently defeated Spain. Go (2008) argues that American Empire in the Philippines was different than other colonial governments, but this had more to do with Filipino elites negotiating with the U.S.

\textsuperscript{145} Jim Zwick (1998) was the first to point out these connections and advocate their historical significance.
colonial officials than with the sheer benevolence of the U.S. As discussed in chapter two, if the U.S. empire was different from other empires, it was because Filipino resistance (revolutionary and diplomatic) forced the colonial government in the Philippines to make concessions allowing more Filipino participation than in Puerto Rico by comparison (Go 2007). However, this still leaves the question as to whether the opposition of anti-imperialists in the metropole played any formative role in making U.S. Empire different, if not exceptional.

At the Chicago Liberty Meetings in April 1899, the Anti-Imperialist Platform passed stating:

We earnestly condemn the policy of the present national administration in the Philippines. It is the spirit of '76 that our government is striving to extinguish in those islands; we denounce the attempt and demand its abandonment. We deplore and resent the slaughter of the Filipinos as a needless horror, a deep dishonor to our nation.

We protest against the extension of American empire by Spanish methods, and demand the immediate cessation of the war against liberty, begun by Spain and continued by us.

As demonstrated in their platform, the use of violence against a revolutionary movement was particularly profane for anti-imperialists from the beginning. "Spanish" methods threatened their self-conceptions as U.S. citizens and American "civilization." This exemplifies the provincial focus of the movement emphasized in previous works on anti-imperialists. At the outset of the war some anti-imperialists argued violence degraded democratic institutions in the U.S. While making this argument, however, their focus
remained on the importance of maintaining democratic institutions and the “national honor.” Nevertheless, this emphasis changed to exposing the violence in the Philippines both as evidence of failed benevolent assimilation and evidence imperialist violence was institutional, not merely perpetrated by a few individually bad or undisciplined soldiers.

Imperialists' invoking the "exceptional" benevolence of U.S. imperialism to gain support at home and in the Philippines became the nodal point around which anti-imperialists focused their accusations of contradictory and disingenuous imperialist policies. Initially, the AIl used violence as the backdrop to their main argument of republic versus empire. However, as the emphasis shifted from democracy versus imperialism as abstract principles to democracy versus imperialism in practice, their organizing changed to show evidence of the unexceptional, yet extraordinary, use of violence in the Philippines.

Early in the Philippine-American war, information from the Philippines was limited given that news sources were funneled through official channels (Schirmer 1972). For example, before 1901, there were no newspaper articles specifically on the “water cure” in the Philippines in the Proquest Historical Newspapers database. Between 1901 and 1905, there were about 180 articles on the issue found in this database, within 160 of them published in 1902, the year of the senate investigation. These stories made their way into the newspapers through soldiers' letters home.

Therefore, the letters soldiers wrote in the Philippines and sent to friends and family at home became important for gathering information on Filipino casualties as well as the general state of things on the ground. Soldier's Letters: Being Materials for the
History of a War of Criminal Aggression published in 1899 by the AIL showed soldiers' accounts of violence as unapologetic for some and full of shame for others. Many of these letters discussed orders of taking no prisoners and burning and pillaging villages. The order to take no prisoners set the tone of the war for soldiers.

Employing the racial schemas of U.S. imperialist culture underscored the racial hierarchy of "civilization." For example, soldiers referenced the war against Filipinos as hunting "jack rabbits," killing "niggers" or "injuns," and wounding women and children. This shows how their racial schemas were transposed from racialized groups in the metropole to the racialized people of the colony (Murphy 2005). Anti-imperialists hoped showing the war through the perspective of soldiers would put the contradictions of "civilization" in sharp relief. Accounts by soldiers were later used as focal points for questioning during the SIAP.

The anti-imperialists consistently reiterated the message that McKinley's policy of "benevolent assimilation" in the Philippines was at best a farce to gain the support of the American public. Publicizing the letters of soldiers that detailed the violence and racism in the Philippines was but an initial tactic in pursuit of this strategy. Additionally, anti-imperialists cited statistics from reports that "the United States [had undertaken] an undeclared practice of taking no prisoners [which] was in evidence [through...] point[ing] to the Filipino battle ratio of five killed to one wounded (the reverse of the usual as confirmation of these reports)" (Schirmer 1972: 226). Indeed, "[w]hat was new at this point was that the McKinley Administration elevated the application of extreme measures, hitherto unofficial and unacknowledged, into a policy that was official and

146 Box 1. Anti-Imperialist League Papers. Swarthmore Peace Collection, Swarthmore College.
acknowledged—from the highest cabinet level through the War Department to MacArthur and the forces in the field" (Schirmer 1972: 227). Stressing the aberration from historical records in the numbers of Filipinos killed from previous wars was one concrete way anti-imperialists set out to establish the extraordinary nature of the violence committed by the U.S. in the Philippines.

Throughout the rest of 1900 and 1901 stories from the Philippines of reconcentration and the "water cure" leaked into newspapers that were supportive of McKinley’s policies and Theodore Roosevelt’s determination to see them through once McKinley was assassinated. However, mainstream newspapers still ignored these stories. By the time reconcentration in the Philippines came under scrutiny, anti-imperialists had already begun investigations and were prepared to publicize this military strategy as part of a larger story of imperialist violence. Publicizing the use of the "water cure" was also part of the anti-imperialists cries of extraordinary violence committed by the U.S. in the Philippines.\footnote{It was said that U.S. soldiers learned the "water cure" method from the Macabebes (mercenary scouts), who had learned it from the Spanish as a torture tactic used during the Spanish Inquisition (Schirmer 1972). It was also argued that it was the Macabebes who implemented the "water cure," rather than U.S. military personnel. But, in either case, the Macabebes worked in conjunction with and under the command of U.S. military officers.} Burning and pillaging villages and taking few prisoners were proving not to be extraordinary enough to garner public dissent.

With the U.S. colonial government still contested in the Philippines and in the U.S., Sixto Lopez, who had been touring the U.S. and speaking out on behalf of Filipinos for independence, decided to return to the Philippines along with anti-imperialist Fiske
Warren[^148] in 1901[^149]. An article from the *Colorado Springs Gazette* quoted Lopez as stating, “My object is to make an impartial investigation of the present conditions in the Philippines and to furnish evidence of the real desires and aspirations of my fellow countrymen.”[^150] Upon his arrival in Manila, U.S. officials requested Lopez to pledge allegiance to the United States, which he refused to do. Therefore, he was denied entry to the Philippines and sailed back to Hong Kong, where he remained in limbo. Thomas Patterson, Lopez’s secretary, was exempt from the pledge as he was a citizen of the British Empire. Warren was a U.S. citizen with no qualms over pledging his allegiance. Once admitted Warren carried out some of Lopez’s tasks in Manila including visiting Emilio Aguinaldo, who was held captive by the U.S. after surrendering. According to his diary, Warren brought Aguinaldo two diplomas and certificates for conducting a humane war by the Spanish Red Cross.[^151]

**Investigations into Imperialist Violence**

Anti-imperialists began focusing on the military use of the “water cure” as well as the reports that soldiers were to “take no prisoners.” As Filipino reports of the U.S. military using reconcentration camps made their way back to the metropole, anti-imperialists looked into their credibility. Once anti-imperialists determined reconcentration was a

[^148]: Frederick Fiske Warren was his given name, but he was commonly referred to as Fiske.


[^150]: Ibid.

[^151]: Fiske Warren Diary, January 9, 1902, J.R. Hayden Papers, Bentley Historical Society, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
policy being employed in the Philippines, the AIL executive committee decided further investigations were warranted.

The executive committee appointed Herbert Welsh of the Philadelphia AIL, as well as the editor of the anti-imperialist newspaper *City & State*, to be in charge of these investigations. Welsh organized an investigation determined to uncover the violence. He kept AIL president, Moorfield Storey, and the rest of the executive committee up to date with any developments. Welsh had two assistants significantly involved, Matthew K. Sniffen and J. Leroy. Their operations were based out of the Philadelphia office of *City & State*. Welsh also solicited the help of other anti-imperialists, including Mary S. Cobb of Northampton, Massachusetts, to interview soldiers as they came home about their experiences in the Philippines and to assess their willingness to publicly testify to the use of violence in the Philippines.

Eventually, anti-imperialists were able to use these reports from soldiers and Filipinos in a congressional investigation over affairs in the Philippines. A Republican and anti-imperialist, Senator George Frisbie Hoar made the public call for a special investigation in the senate on the Philippines (Schirmer 1972). In the face of defections from prominent supporters of imperialism, Republicans agreed to an investigation so long as it stayed under the Philippine committee chaired by Senator H.C. Lodge, also a Republican but a strong supporter of imperialism (Schirmer 1972). Lasting from February-June of 1902, the investigations highlighted the administration’s knowledge and tacit approval of violent methods used in the Philippines by the military.

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152 Welsh had already used his newspaper to publicize the violence he discovered in other newspaper accounts from soldiers.
Senator Hoar pointed out that military censorship affected news coming from the Philippines to the United States as well as the other way around. "The information which we get as to the events in the Philippine Islands comes almost wholly from sources interested in the promulgation of the war." He hoped that "every effort will be made to give the people full and accurate knowledge of the facts...so carefully withheld or perverted by the organs of imperialistic policy" (Schirmer 1972: 141). The sanitized version of news coming from the Philippines had only served to disengage the public. Sharing in these beliefs, anti-imperialists were further convinced that independent investigations could shed some light on events in the Philippines and reengage the public.

In April 1902, anti-imperialists from across the country met in New York to determine the next course of action for the AIL. It was at this meeting that they decided to institute "a committee that would 'effect the full disclosure of the facts' about the conduct of war in the Philippines, and do whatever necessary 'to vindicate the national honor'" (Schirmer 1972: 243-244). No more was populism or antimonopoly central to their anti-imperialism. At this point, it was antimilitarism.

**Senate Investigations on Affairs in the Philippines**

The AIL began more focused programs of lobbying individual politicians and calling for inquiries into the violence, which contributed to a consensus over the need for the SIAP. With investigation reports as part of the public record, AIL leaders believed they would again be able to mobilize citizens against U.S. Empire.

To ensure anti-imperialist concerns would be addressed, Welsh continued to investigate "atrocities" in the Philippines and armed senators and witnesses with
information. During the SIAP, soldiers saw how those reporting on the violence they
witnessed in the Philippines were often subject to blame and punishment themselves.
Even so, soldiers continued to write home of things they saw (Storey and Lichauco
1926). In fact, they gave more testimony on how a Filipino prisoner was hanged by his
thumbs, tortured in other ways, in addition to the "water cure" (Storey and
Lichauco1926).

Welsh had soldiers returning from the Philippines interviewed, who were willing,
and used this information to establish what he believed was indisputable evidence that
atrocities had occurred. While he was gathering information for the official
investigations, he simultaneously compiled and published his findings for public
consumption. He also continued to interrogate the officials who were to appear from the
Senate committee, also called the "Lodge Committee." Chaired by Henry Cabot Lodge,
the other pro-imperialist members of the committee were Senators William Allison,
Eugene Hale, Redfield Proctor, Albert Beveridge, Julius Burrows, Charles Dietrich,
Joseph Rawlins, while anti-imperialist members included Charles Culberson, Fred
Dubois, Edward Carmack, Thomas Patterson, and George Hoar. Anti-imperialist senators
made sure three issues of concern were addressed with the witnesses: (1) military rules of
war, (2) the “water cure,” and (3) the burning of villages and forced reconcentration.

Rules of Engagement

Under General Rule 100 implemented by President Lincoln during the Civil War, U.S.
soldiers were to observe a particular conduct of warfare. By 1899, these were still the
standing rules for warfare with adherence to these rules considered civilized warfare. In
the SIAP, the fact that torture for the extraction of information was explicitly forbidden in these rules came up repeatedly. When it was clear these standards were compromised in the Philippines, apologists both in the committee and witnesses testifying rationalized that civilized war was only required for civilized people, and Filipinos were considered savage in toto.

In one major incident known as the Balangiga Massacre in 1901, Filipino guerrilla fighters entered the local village disguised as women, aided by the local population. They then attacked U.S. soldiers in their sleep, killing 48. Brigadier-General Jacob Smith retaliated against the local population by turning the area into a "kill-and-burn" policy (Ileto 2002; Kramer 2006). The most famous phrase for this policy came from orders by General Smith to turn Samar into a "a howling wilderness" (Miller 1982). "Waller was considering a march across the island in search of a rumored Spanish trail when one of his junior officers, Lieutenant H. A. Day, delivered an unsigned, handwritten message from General Smith declaring that 'the interior of Samar must be made a howling wilderness.'" (Miller 1982: 222). Anti-imperialists used this as evidence of what they had already stated regarding the "take no prisoners" policy, which perhaps had gone unstated so as to be only understood, that is, prior to Smith's orders.

When General Smith ordered Waller to shoot every Filipino male over the age of 10, junior officers obliged, though not without hesitation. Describing the exchange between Waller and Smith, Stuart Creighton Miller (1982) wrote,

...Waller seemed unprepared for the orders he received from General Smith: 'I want no prisoners. I wish you to kill and burn, the more you kill and burn the better it will please me. I want all persons killed who are capable of bearing arms in actual
hostilities against the United States.' Since it was a popular belief among the Americans serving in the Philippines that native males were born with bolos in their hands, Waller demanded 'to know the limit of age to respect.' He was told 'ten years of age.' Seeking further clarification, the marine commanders asked the general if he really meant that males of ten years and older were to be 'designated as capable of bearing arms.' Smith confirmed his instructions a second time (p. 220).

News of this raised the ire of anti-imperialists across the U.S. There was no room for this kind of violence to fit into their conceptions of "civilization".

William Howard Taft was appointed the civilian Governor of the Philippines in 1901-1903 after having chaired McKinley's first civilian Philippine Commission in 1900. His politics and governance abided by his interpretation of "benevolent assimilation." Therefore, he focused on implementing a tutelary colonial government in the Philippines (Go 2008). Questioning Taft on the character of warfare in the Philippines, Senator Patterson of the investigation committee asked:

Is guerilla warfare legitimate [sic] warfare?

Taft responded:

I am not an expert on the laws of war, but I have always understood that it was hardly within the laws of war or legitimate warfare for men to wear the uniform at one time and then slip into a village and appear friendly and then go out again and ambush people.

Patterson:

They have guerilla warfare in South Africa, and yet when those who are conducting it are captured they are treated, as I understand, under the rules of warfare. They are not regarded as outlaws.

Taft:

There certainly never was a case when an insurgent captured was, with the authority of the commanding officer, treated otherwise than according to the laws of war. But as to what the rules are with respect to guerilla warfare, you will have to ask an army officer, for I am not competent to tell you.153

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Taft’s performance in testifying before the committee served to establish the U.S. civil government in the Philippines as “civilized,” while the Filipinos were not. He stated that the uneducated native was “cruel to animals and has as little regard for human life [...] Therefore, in many instances where soldiers were ambushed, where Signal Service men were ambushed, there were bodies mutilated and evidences of cruelty that were most likely to cause retaliatory measures.”154 Senator Culberson, another anti-imperialist, then asked Taft if he had similarly heard through hearsay that American soldiers had “been guilty of what might be termed cruelty.”155 Taft responded that he had never heard of soldiers mutilating bodies, but that he had heard charges of using the “water cure” were rife in Manila.156

Furthermore, Taft stated that the character of Filipinos, in general, was that they did not treat human life with “sacredness.” In fact, “The uneducated Filipino is a docile person, but left to the natural ferocity which war and hostility of that sort provoke he becomes very cruel. War of course, provokes some cruelty in everyone. Certainly the experience in China is evidence that civilization itself does not prevent it at times.”157 His mention of China references the Boxer Rebellion, insinuating that although China had “civilization” it did not stop Boxers, Chinese nationalists, from attacking European and

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154 SIAP, p. 74.
155 Ibid.
156 Ibid.
157 SIAP, p. 77, my emphasis.
U.S. American missionaries increasingly across China.\textsuperscript{158} Therefore, for Taft violence was not a question of "civilization" alone.

The question of "civilization" and race continued with Patterson asking: "When a war is conducted by a superior race against those whom they consider inferior in the scale of civilization, is it not the experience of the world that the superior race will almost involuntarily practice inhuman conduct?" Taft responded, "There is much greater danger in such a case than in dealing with whites. There is no doubt about that."\textsuperscript{159} Taft went on to say that American forces in the Philippines demonstrated more "compassion [...] restraint [...] and [...] generosity" given a war, than the previous treatment of Filipinos, presumably by the Spanish.\textsuperscript{160} This exchange suggests the racial implications of violence is that "inhuman conduct" increases when whites fight nonwhites in the name of the state as compared to when whites fight against whites, the superior race of whites is to go without saying.

General Rules 100, as implemented in 1863 under President Lincoln, were consistently invoked by military officers as the standard to which the military was to hold itself in the Philippines. Rule 16 specifically states, "Military necessity does not admit of cruelty—that is, the infliction of suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge, nor of maiming or wounding except in fight, nor of torture to extort confession."\textsuperscript{161} Secretary of War Elihu Root alleged "the war on the part of the Filipinos has been conducted with the barbarous cruelty common among uncivilized races, and with general disregard of the rules of civilized warfare." In contrast, the U.S. military had tried 44 officers, soldiers,

\textsuperscript{158} For more on the Boxer Rebellion see Steinmetz (2007).
\textsuperscript{159} SIAP, p. 77.
\textsuperscript{160} SIAP, p. 78.
\textsuperscript{161} SIAP, p. 950.
and “camp followers,” 39 of whom had been convicted for not abiding by the General Rules 100.  

Colonel Wagner, the Assistant to the Adjutant-General, testified that under the General Order No. 100, the indiscriminate burning of barrios, or villages, and towns was permissible given that it was not always possible to make a determination between friendly and hostile Filipinos. Therefore, entire barrios believed to harbor insurgents or locations with high levels of hostility could reasonably be leveled.  

Senator Culberson tried to force Wagner to draw a clear line where it would be against General Rule 100 to level a barrio. Wagner said the line was left to the judgment of the officer in charge and that the indiscriminate burning Culberson referred to had never occurred in his knowledge. At the apex of their exchange, Culberson asked:

I am speaking with reference to the deliberate act of burning the houses of noncombatants, as seems to have been done in some cases in the Philippines, which have been testified to before this committee. That is the case I am trying to get your judgment upon.

Wagner replied:

The destruction of the property of noncombatants, when the property is known to belong to noncombatants and there is no military necessity for destroying it, is inexcusable. The destruction of property of noncombatants may be necessary, though, for two reasons. It may be impossible to separate the property of innocent people in their towns from property of the guilty. The whole community there must suffer, if the crimes of the community have been sufficient to warrant it.

\[162\] SIAP, p. 950.

\[163\] SIAP, p. 2857.
Again, as I stated before, I think, the property of a noncombatant must be destroyed if an enemy is making use of that to our prejudice and hurt in military operations.

Here the anti-imperialist Senator Culberson tried to pin down Colonel Wagner in the implementation of rules of war. What came out was a justification for racial exceptions to the established rules of war. The acceptance of which came through imperialists' ambivalence, but more significantly, through their pronounced indifference. Imperialists were rewriting the rules as they went.

**The water cure**

The "water cure," as it was called, was a practice the U.S. military used against Filipinos to extract information, usually about the location of a cache of guns. The victim was held down on his back with his mouth forced open while water was poured down his throat until his stomach swelled. Then the water was pushed out of him, and the process repeated until the captive talked.

The narrative from soldiers testifying before the committee regarding the "water cure" was that it was learned from the Macabebe Scouts (aka Gordon Scouts) under Lieutenant Conger and Captain Glenn. It was said that Filipinos used the method on the Macabebes and that it was originally learned from the Spanish. From there, U.S. soldiers learned the method from other companies, and so the practice for obtaining information

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164 One soldier, Sergt. Januarius Manning, also testified that his company employed the water cure to obtain confessions for the murder of a Private O'Hearn. SIAP, p. 2255.
spread.\textsuperscript{165} Seiward J. Morton testified in front of the SIAP describing his experience in conducting the water cure:

I was on guard and acting corporal of the scouts. A man named Bender, who belonged to Company I, I think, of the Eighteenth Infantry came up and told me he wanted me to help ‘water cure’ this native. I told him that I had no particular objection. [\ldots] We were directed there to throw the native or take him down, and we picked the native up and laid him down. He was a small man, and he didn’t make much resistance. One man had hold of his leg, and I had hold of his leg, and another man had hold of a leg, and we laid him on his back. Another man had hold of an arm, each arm. Then Bender took the water with a cup, dipped it out of a pail, and first they took a stick about 2 inches wide and placed it between the native’s teeth like this [indicating]. The stick was probably about a quarter of an inch thick. When they did that they twisted the stick around so that it forced the native’s mouth open the width of the stick. Then Bender dipped the water from the pail and poured it in the native’s mouth, and finally the native stiffened; that is, he appeared--I thought he was going to die then. I had never seen it done before then. I refused to have anything more to do with it, and Bender and I had a slight altercation there; I don’t remember the exact nature of it, but I told him I would have nothing more to do with it. My connection with the affair ended there.\textsuperscript{166}

\textsuperscript{165} Ibid, e.g. testimony of Januarius Manning.
\textsuperscript{166} Ibid, pp. 2897-2898. Other soldiers testified that they saw the water cure administered, but often by the Macabebe mercenaries. Macabebes scouts were treated as a Filipino ethnic group with antagonism toward the Filipino’s responsible for the revolution, mainly Tagalog and mestizo Filipinos.
News of the water cure inspired Chicago anti-imperialist poet Bertrand Shadwell, quoted earlier, to write “Death of a Filipino Under Torture,” which he gave to Welsh for publication “free of charge.”\textsuperscript{167} Shadwell also wrote "Imperialism in the Philippines" regarding killing guides who refused to lead the U.S. military to "insurrectos."\textsuperscript{168}


Before any soldiers were called to testify, Governor Taft attested to his assessment of the current situation. When Senator Patterson asked Taft about the “so-called water cure,” Senator Beveridge, of Indiana, interrupted and asked him to address

\textsuperscript{167} "Death of a Filipino Under Torture," by Bertrand Shadwell, J.R. Hayden Papers, Bentley Historical Society, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; Bertrand Shadwell also authored the poem "Aguinaldo," written after Emilio Aguinaldo surrendered to the U.S. forces in the Philippines.

\textsuperscript{168} "Imperialism in the Philippines," by Bertrand Shadwell, Herbert Welsh Papers, Hatcher Graduate Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
the issue of "irreconcilables" sent to Guam, such as revolutionary and Filipino national hero Apolinario Mabini. Taft recalled 25 were sent to Guam to quiet the insurgency in the Philippines. Following Taft, General Robert Hughes testified. When asked about the water cure, he flatly denied having ever heard of it, but then also asserted that the water cure could mean many different things. Finally, he admitted to having heard of it used once by American police and that they would not use it again. The equivocations of officials over admitting to understanding what the water cure was and over admitting to military personnel's administration of it evidences a rift between racial structures buttressing "civilization." On the one hand, believing in whites' racial and, therefore moral, superiority should have granted U.S. military officers the justification to implement whatever practices they deemed necessary, especially if Macabebes were the persons directly implementing the torture. On the other hand, as the race at the highest point of civilization, whites were to be above barbarism and savagery, and perform force only under the most just circumstances. The fact that General Rules 100 prohibited the use of violence to extract information also presented a potential legal predicament for these structures of white dominion that inclined toward "white is right" and social Darwinism that inclined toward "white is moral."

General Funston denied charges of any white men resorting to the use of the water cure claiming soldiers reporting such events were trying to get attention and were

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169 Mabini had been the first Prime Minister of the Filipino government, while Emilio Aguinaldo had been the first President. He was sent to Guam in 1901, under the U.S. accusations that he was inciting insurgency. Mabini authored some of the foundational texts of the government. During and after the Filipino revolution, he suffered from paraplegia having survived a disease with the lasting effects of paralysis. Therefore, the threat he posed to the U.S. empire was from his pen.

170 SIAP.

examples of "braggadacio."\footnote{SIAP, p. 951.} Granting Funston that some men may have written home about stories of the water cure and other violent practices to flaunt, it raises the issue as to what they were proving about themselves. Were they good white American men putting people of color, racialized objects, under the control of the U.S. in their place? Whatever self-conscious ideas they had about what their behavior said about them as U.S. soldiers, these letters convey the necessary racialized symbolic violence that legitimates physical violence (Jung 2004). It shows the inundation of racial practices that simultaneously constitute the structural racial project of incorporating the Philippines into the racial U.S. state.

Sgt. Charles Riley from Northampton, Massachusetts testified that he had witnessed the "water cure" performed on the mayor of Igbaras twice and that it was facilitated and witnessed by officers in the regular army. Private William Lewis Smith testified to the same incident. Macabebes were also there aiding the American forces against insurgent forces under the command of Lieutenant Conger and the aid of a Dr. Lyons, contracted by the military. Riley testified that this incident was witnessed by about 80 soldiers, many of whom stated they had seen many more instances of the "treatment."\footnote{SIAP, pp. 1527-1531.} Senator Beveridge disputed this point on hearsay, invoking the rituals of law as a resource to prevent the admission of evidence that was at odds with his agenda.

Officers repeatedly argued that the Filipino insurgents did not participate in civilized warfare nor adhere to the rules of war as stated in General Rule 100. These comments were made to demonstrate the uncivilized ways of Filipinos and justify the slips into uncivilized warfare of U.S. troops. Senator Culberson and Senator Burrows
questioned officers and soldiers to ascertain whether those who were victims of the water
cure were the same insurgents committing treacherous acts of war, such as raising white
flags only to surprise attack American forces. The answer was consistently "no" that the
water cure was not revenge against particular Filipinos for egregious acts of violence.
Rather, the purpose of using the water cure on Filipinos was specifically to extract
information. This argument was also to justify the practice of burning villages.

These testimonies, and others, led to the court-martial trials of Lieut. Arthur L.
Conger and Major Edwin F. Glenn, then Captain Glenn, as well as Capt. and Asst. Surg.
Palmer Lyon, then a contract surgeon--all of whom were in charge of the Macabebe
Scouts, who were officially deemed the main administrators of the water cure.174

Court-martials performed and rearticulated the racial supremacy of whites by re­
establishing their place at the highest level of "civilization." Court-martials provided a
degree of separation between the Macabebees, who were uncivilized to begin with, and the
U.S. military as well as the federal government by extension. They also emphasized the
*individual* white military personnel, who descended into the uncivilized practices of
nonwhites, rather than the institutions or policies these practices sprang from. The
debates on the water cure show how an imperialist racial state rooted in schemas of white
moral superiority and exceptional rationality maintained claims to higher civilization
while also utilizing what it deemed as "savagery."

As to whether soldiers conducted the water cure on their own volition, rather than
at the request of their commanding officers, Seiward J. Morton, whose description of the
water cure opened this section, stated "I do not know of any instance where a native was

174 General Smith was also put on trial for court-martial for his orders to "kill and burn."
‘water cured,’ under the orders of a soldier alone, and I do not think a soldier would assume that responsibility. Whenever an act is executed by a soldier and an officer is present the inference can safely be drawn that that officer gave the order and that the soldier was obeying it.” Senator Beveridge responded, “you should do as the Senator from Texas suggests, simply give the facts, and the committee is competent to draw inferences.”\(^{175}\) One such officer, Captain Fred McDonald, testified that he did not know of any officer that gave orders for the water cure. Rather, he said, officers simply acquiesced to it happening.\(^{176}\)

**Reconcentration**

Once it was clear to U.S. military commanders in the Philippines that the war was not ending quickly or easily, they began looking at the local population’s role in aiding the insurgents. The local population came to be seen as a fair military target. Commander General Bell announced, “…every barrio in Batangas and Laguna will be burned, if necessary, and all the people concentrated in the town... Henceforth no one will be permitted to be neutral... The towns of Tiaong, Delores and Candelaria will probably be destroyed unless the insurgents who take refuge in them are destroyed” (as quoted in Ileto 2002: 11). In their testimonies before the SIAP both soldiers and officers referred to the camps interchangeably as "concentration" or "reconcentration" camps. Storey and Lichauco (1924) began their description of reconcentration to say,

> General Smith had been in charge of subduing the island of Samar and his first step had been to install a system of reconcentration. For the benefit of those unfamiliar

\(^{175}\) SIAP, pp. 2898-2899.

\(^{176}\) SIAP, p. 2784.
with this drastic term it should be explained that reconcentration (as practised by Weyler in Cuba and the American commanders in the Philippines) means the establishment of a certain prescribed zone or place where the people of a district may be herded together. The establishment of this zone is announced by proclamation or otherwise some days in advance and all persons must leave their homes and come within this area, there to remain until further orders. All persons found outside that zone are then treated as public enemies (pp. 138-139).

Seiward J. Morton and Mark H. Evans testified before the committee that when Filipinos fired on a contingent of soldiers marching, the U.S. responded by burning all the houses and/or buildings in the vicinity. They testified further that they had no clear idea how many villages, towns, or houses were destroyed because of these practices. To establish historical precedent, Captain Fred McDonald testified that “Sherman’s march to the sea” used exactly this sort of indiscriminate burning.

\[177\] SIAP, pp. 2900-2901.
\[178\] SIAP, p. 2786.
This effectively created "protective zones" as the military referred to them (Ileto 2002) within "deadlines," or the "reconcentrations" or "concentration" camps as anti-imperialists also interchangeably referred to them. The fact that neither the military nor anti-imperialists had a consistent label for these practices evidences the newness of the policy--with no prior description clearly defining the practice. To this effect, Ileto (2002) suggests "Bell seemed unaware that his actions were replicating what Spain and its missionaries had achieved two centuries earlier. Through the policy of *reducción*, scattered settlements were reconcentrated in Spanish-style pueblos dominated by a church-center" (p. 13). The assistant to the Adjutant-General, Arthur Wagner, gave verbal testimony of his report on the camps. In this testimony he was careful to attend to

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179 Letter from Winslow to Welsh, Bentley; F. Warren Diary, Nov. 11, 1901, J.R. Hayden Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
the fact that inhabitants remained grouped with neighbors and that “sanitary conditions were carefully looked after.” Attention to the sanitary conditions was to assuage accusations that the camps were, in fact, “cholera camps” where disease ran rampant from filthy conditions and malnourishment. In his testimony, Wagner also pointed to pigs scavenging in the camps as evidence of sanitation, since they ate waste throughout the camp, rather than as evidence of filth.

Stuart Creighton Miller (1982) wrote,

Everything outside of the camps was systematically destroyed --humans, crops, food stores, domestic animals, houses, and boats. Actually, a similar policy had been quietly initiated on the island of Marinduque some months before. When one editor got wind of it, the War Department anxiously inquired of MacArthur if Major Fred A. Smith had ordered the natives into the five principal towns on Marinduque. MacArthur wired back: His action effectively suppressing insurrection there which past three months presented obstinate resistance. Exclusively a military measure carried out without objectionable or offensive features and effected end in view (p. 208).

For MacArthur, it was unobjectionable and inoffensive to include military measures against civilians as long as the sought outcome resulted.

Wagner also testified to the absolute freedom of inhabitants of the reconcentration camps, within the "dead-lines." “The orders to the troops were to shoot anybody beyond the dead line who went without a pass--or, rather, the natives [the Constabulary] were informed that those were the orders; but orders were given under no circumstances to

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180 SIAP, p. 2947.
181 Ibid, p. 2849.
shoot any decrepit person, child, or woman and to avoid shooting a person under any circumstances if the necessary end could be obtained without it. At various times, the Senators conducting the investigation would coach the interviewee on using more sanitized language. For example, Senator Dietrich corrected Wagner's reference to the use of "military force" for policing the "dead lines" by suggesting that perhaps he meant "protection" from insurgents and ladrones. Clearly, the cultural meanings of the military actions taken were key in the providing justifications that adhered to schemas of "civilization." Following, Beveridge asked Wagner whether there were clear differences between the Weyler camps in Cuba--widely agree upon by the U.S. public as indiscriminately violent and therefore uncivilized, and as such provided the rationale for aiding the Cubans in freeing themselves from Spain--and reconcentrations in the Philippines. Although Wagner claimed he knew nothing of the actual Spanish camps other than the popular ideas that starvation and unsanitary conditions were rampant, he stated once pushed far enough by Beveridge, "comparing these camps of ours with the Spanish camps would simply be comparing mercy with cruelty." When backed into making an unequivocal statement, he resorted to the schema of superior morality.

Questioned on Bells' order, Taft argued "there is something said about it" and that it would not be needed after an embargo was put on trade in areas where there was still fighting, specifically Batangas, preventing the wealthier insurgents from obtaining more weapons and financially stifling them. Rather, Taft alleged the Filipinos still fighting were committing a "crime against civilization" and "a crime against the Filipino people"

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182 SIAP, p. 2849.
183 SIAP, p. 2852.
to continue fighting the United States forces in the Philippines.\textsuperscript{184} Indeed, it was the fault of the insurgents that their people were being subjected to "the greatest privation and suffering."\textsuperscript{185} One of the wealthier families targeted in Batangas was Sixto Lopez's family. After Sixto refused to make the pledge of allegiance to the U.S., the military seized three of his brothers in early 1901, without any clear charges against them, along with their ship the "Purisima," which was their main source of income at that time.

Clemencia Lopez, along with her younger sister Maria, had been in Hong Kong visiting Sixto when their brothers, Cipriano, Manuel, and Lorenzo were apprehended. Clemencia determined she would go to the U.S. to appeal directly to the U.S. government on behalf of her family, rather than depend on the justice of the military government in the Philippines (Eyot 1904 [2001]). This was why she, like Taft, was able to testify before this same committee.

\textbf{Following Taft's lead, General Hughes' testimony discussed the escalation of violence against insurgents, and especially civilians, in terms of civilization. He said the policy against civilians in particular became}

\begin{quote}
Stiffer; and in this way: In the first campaign, or the first summer, you might say, we started out to contend with a united force, and we attacked it and pursued it in exactly the same way that you would do in any civilized country--no harm to noncombatants; everything we got paid for, if they could prove property, etc.

They were notified, however, before that campaign was over, owing to a few shots that were fired at some people near camp, that if that sort of thing was practiced, that if they allowed the guerrillas to conceal themselves in their barrios
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{184} Ibid, p. 78.
\textsuperscript{185} Ibid, p. 79.
and town inside our lines and fire on our detachments passing through, we would burn the place. In this course of time there were quite a number of fires as the result of that practice.\textsuperscript{186}

Hughes went on to testify that these measures were not enough and that more “stringent” measures were later called for. The committee further questioned Hughes over how a decision was made over a departure from “civilized warfare,” such as whether the discretion for appropriate violence was put to the commander in charge, who was then left without limits of severity. Hughes replied, “There is one rule that is generally pretty safe, and that is that the army officer is an educated man, a man educated in civil society,”\textsuperscript{187} implying that U.S. officers, at this time all white by decree, were civilized and that was enough for proper discretion over the question of severity. The committee pressed further; however, this line of questioning broke down and escalated into an argument between committee members. His testimony and the line of questioning by the senators also indicated that the Filipinos were not only ferocious in their treatment of American soldiers, but also in their treatment of each other. This suggested that Filipino “capacity for civil government” was questionable and the guidance of the United States was still imperative.\textsuperscript{188}

Like Taft before him, any specific atrocities in question were said to be without Hughes’ knowledge, and therefore he did not feel competent to comment. Anything that may have occurred under his command, he seemed unaware of, since they did not come

\textsuperscript{186} SIAP, p. 558.
\textsuperscript{187} SIAP, p. 560.
\textsuperscript{188} Paul Kramer (2006) outlines this argument on the part of the U.S.
from his orders directly. Finally, when explicitly pressed on the issue of "concentration" policies, Hughes stated:

It is a misnomer to call it a policy of concentration, because the world has learned to put a significant meaning to that word. The policy as practiced in the Philippines has no element of cruelty in it. It is simply an order to the inhabitants of a particular locality to move from one portion to another, and there they reside and carry on their operations and business. If the locality into which they have moved does not afford them ample support, the United States Government provides them with food and shelter. The people are pleased with it, because they are permitted to lead an easy life, much easier than at home. There is no element of punishment or deprivation. They are simply requested to come into a certain district. 189

No Filipinos in the concentrations were interviewed to express their firsthand experience, although the Filipino newspaper El Renacimiento wrote in vociferous opposition to the practice.

General MacArthur testified that the U.S. military’s standards of war were on a “high ideal plane” and established through general orders and court-martials, further arguing both that “in conducting war all of humanity is brought to the surface, and in individual instances excesses have been committed” putting the onus for reports of cruelties in military conduct on individual soldiers. To reiterate this point, he went on, “Individual men have committed individual outrages; but when we compare the conditions that exist in the Philippines to-day in that respect with what have existed in all

189 SIAP, p. 665.
modern wars between civilized states the comparison is absolutely in favor of the self-restraint and high discipline of the American soldier.\textsuperscript{190} MacArthur self-consciously reported to be commanding an army that was “representing the highest stage of civilization.”\textsuperscript{191} Encouraged by this statement, Senator Beveridge followed these comments asking, “The general conduct of our soldiers and officers there, irrespective of orders from headquarters, was in the direction of kindness, mercy, and humanity, was it?”\textsuperscript{192} Again, individual soldiers and officers were the focus of carrying out moral "civilization" in Beveridge's view of imperialism. In contrast, anti-imperialists looked at the violence as an institutional problem evidenced by the orders or acquiescence of officers in the field to the water cure. And following, they saw immorality as a systemic problem stemming from the corruptive influence of imperialism.

While Filipino testimonies were not sought after by the SIAP, Clemencia Lopez took it upon herself to partake in submitting testimony in cooperation with anti-imperialists. She also sent a letter directly to President Roosevelt on March 15, 1902, imploring him to release her brothers Manuel, Lorenzo, and Cipriano. When her brother Sixto was banned from returning to the Philippines without taking an oath of allegiance to the U.S., it was followed by a small media event. It appeared that General Bell made the family, originally from Batangas where much of the resistance was still active, a target to convince Sixto to take the oath (Eyot 1904 [2001]). Therefore, Manuel and Lorenzo were held without any charges, while Cipriano was held with no evidence for an

\textsuperscript{190} Ibid, p. 870-871.
\textsuperscript{191} Ibid, p. 871
\textsuperscript{192} Ibid, p. 871.
alleged crime of hiding 50 guns. None of them had any promise of a trial. Therefore, the brothers were being held indefinitely under the command of General Bell.

Clemencia stated that the Lopez family's home and land in Batangas as well as their ship was confiscated by the U.S. military government as part of the penalty for Cipriano's alleged involvement with insurgents. Cipriano had earlier been part of Aguinaldo's army, but surrendered his regiment earlier in 1900 under terms that he could not be charged with any actions against the U.S. military (Eyot 1904 [2001]). Additionally, she wrote that the superintendent of their estates, a man by the name of Isabelo, had been arrested, tortured, and killed in an effort by the US military to get the location of Cipriano's alleged guns. Clemencia believed that her brothers were not being held because of the accusations against Cipriano.

Rather, she charged this was a result of Sixto, a declared enemy of the U.S. government, refusing to pledge allegiance to the government of U.S. to get back into the Philippines, preferring rather to go back to Hong Kong. She believed her family was being punished for Sixto's politics of Philippine independence.193 Her attorney, anti-imperialist Louis Brandeis (later a Supreme Court Justice) was a mutual friend of the Warren family (Green 1989). He helped Clemencia in submitting her letter to the hearings and submitted a letter accompanying hers in support. Hers was the only firsthand account testifying to the practices of indiscriminate control of material goods, and bodies, in the Philippines.194 Her brothers were granted no individual rights, and her family was granted no economic rights. However, her testimony was the basis for a new

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194 However, Felipe Buencamino, who was working with colonial administrators, was asked to testify.
AIL publication, *The Story of the Lopez Family*, published in 1904 in the U.S. in which anti-imperialists, like Helen C. Wilson, translated letters between members of the Lopez family regarding the retention of their brothers and conditions in Manila and Batangas interspersed with anti-imperialist commentary.\(^{195}\) For example, anti-imperialists stated, "All of the misunderstanding, all the injustice, all the evil, all the cruelty and horror are due to the violation of an eternal principle which affirms the right of every people to govern itself. And all the considerations about 'philanthropic intention' and the 'white man's burden' and the 'elevation of alien races' and the 'blessings of good government' and the 'resplendent world-mission of America' cannot excuse the violation of that principle or obviate the evils and horrors that must follow its violation" (Eyot 1904 [2001] p. 31).

H. Parker Willis (1905) stated on the policy,

The number of persons thus recently affected by this policy [reconcentrations] under the civil government may be summed up as follows:

Batangas, 1902 .................. 100,000
Albay, 1903 .................. 300,000
Tayabas, 1903 .................. 15,000
Cavite, 1904 .................. 16,000
Samar, 1904 .................. 20,000
Total .......................... 451,000

Of these cases of reconcentration, the first four occurred on the island of Luzon, the last on that of Samar. The combined population of these islands being 3,921,000, it

\(^{195}\) For more information on the origination of this publication, see Jim Zwick's introduction to the 2001 republication.

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thus appears that about one person in nine throughout the whole population suffered confinement in the camps at some time during the years 1902-1904. [...] We may fully accept the belief that reconcentration results in terrible hardship. In the camps, food is distributed only when extreme want requires it, work on the roads being sparingly furnished to those who are able thus to supply themselves with rations. The lack of house accommodation and the scarcity of food, as well as the overcrowding of inmates of the camps, have invariable caused marked increase in mortality. At the same time, there has been a tremendous loss of crops and houses throughout the districts in which reconcentration has taken place (pp. 131-132).

Even the historical event of the SIAP was unable to resolve the conflict between pro-imperialists and anti-imperialists. Sewell (2005) states, "ritual does not only construct community amongst all participants - although it may redefine community against the preference of the participants, it can also reassert power and rearticulate structures of power" (p. 254). In this instance, the SIAP as ritual may have redefined community against the preference of the anti-imperialist participants. There was no emotional release that accompanies resolution for anti-imperialists. If anything, the SIAP reasserted imperialist power through outright suppression and rearticulated structures of power.

Aftermath of the Senate Investigations

Benevolent assimilation created an expectation for “civilized” treatment of Filipinos in the United States. Practices that could be construed as inhumane, or uncivilized, were scrutinized and opened up the possibility for "atrocities" such as the water cure, burning villages, and killing women and children to be received as scandal by the U.S. public. To
this end, Herbert Welsh intended to inform and galvanize the public. He continued to gather
information on cases he believed demonstrated egregious acts of violence, specifically focusing on military cases he thought should be investigated by the SIAP.\textsuperscript{196}

One such instance of this involved a Major Howze. Welsh was intent upon exposing reports of Howze's beating Filipino prisoners to death in 1900 (see chapter four for more on this case) and other stories like it. Welsh continued to gather testimonies of witnesses and secure their agreements to testify before congress. He also organized for three memorials to be sent before the Senate, but to no avail.\textsuperscript{197} Welsh hoped that the public hearings would be reopened and continued to send his new evidence to Senator Lodge to try to convince him it should be reopened.\textsuperscript{198}

As a result of the SIAP a few scandals did surface. The administration responded by targeting individual soldiers and officers, rather than treat atrocities as a systemic problem that would require a change in policy, which was what the anti-imperialists had hoped for.\textsuperscript{199} While the investigations were winding down and it was becoming apparent that soldiers who testified to the abuses in the Philippines -- ones who actually

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{196} Joseph Ralston Hayden Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
\item \textsuperscript{198} Joseph Ralston Hayden Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
\item \textsuperscript{199} The following officers were court-martialed: Brigadier-General Jacob Smith; Major Edwin F. Glenn, 5th Infantry; Lieut. Edwin A. Hickman, 1st Cavalry; Lieut. J.H.A. Day, USMC; Major L. W. T. Waller of the Marine Corps; Lieut. Preston Brown, 2nd Infantry; Capt. James A. Ryan, 15th Cavalry; Lieut. Cooke; Lieut. Julian E. Gaiyot; Lieut. N. E. Cook of the Philippine Scouts; Lieut. W.S. Sinclair, Ballation Adjutant 28th; Cornelius M. Brownell, Capt. of 26th Volunteer Infantry. As listed in letter to Welsh from C.F. Adams, January 24, 1903. Herbert Welsh Papers, Special Collections, Hatcher Graduate Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
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\end{footnotesize}
participated and were therefore more convincing witnesses -- were now targets for court-martials (e.g. the cases of Edwards or O’Brien). This scared away more witnesses. Those left willing to testify were already out of service and therefore, deemed to be of no further threat by imperialist senators since anything they had done or witnessed was all in the past. Much of their testimony ended up as hearsay. In any case, it was clear Lodge was not going to pursue further lines of anti-imperialist inquiry in the Philippines, despite repeated requests by Welsh.\textsuperscript{200} However, this did not deter Welsh from continuing his own investigations and securing additional witnesses to testify to the widespread use of the “water cure” or hanging men by their thumbs.\textsuperscript{201}

Since it was clear the investigations were not going to be reopened, and much of the AIL’s resources had been spent to bring soldiers to testify before the committee, the AIL held a public meeting in protest in Senator Carmack's office.\textsuperscript{202} Later, they held two public meetings, one in the afternoon and one in the evening, at Faneuil Hall on March 19, 1903. They advertised for these meetings and the reasons for them in at least five Boston newspapers. From the proceedings they published another broadside, \textit{Mass Meetings of Protest Against the Suppression of Truth About the Philippines}, in which they covered the testimony of some witnesses who had been prohibited from testifying before the SIAP. Altogether they published the commentary of eleven speakers, including

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\textsuperscript{200} Letter to Welsh from Senator Lodge, Jan. 8, 1903. Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. \\
\textsuperscript{201} Letter to Welsh from O’Connor, Dec. 14, 1902. J.R. Hayden Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; Philippine Atrocities, Herbert Welsh Papers, Hatcher Graduate Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. \\
\end{flushright}
George Boutwell (President of the AIL), Moorfield Storey, Herbert Welsh, and Thomas Patterson (Secretary to Sixto Lopez).

Welsh's commentary covered the testimonies of soldiers he and his associates had interviewed over the past years. Welsh also stated how he derived the need for such investigations,

Some two years ago, in the month of June, I was in a position of incredulity regarding the charge that torture was used as a military instrument under the United States flag. I well remember, at Lake Mohonk, at the peace conference, rather reproaching a brother editor, the editor of the Friends' Intelligencer, with having published one of these stories, which I could not credit. He told me that he believed it was true. I doubted it. Upon going to my home, a gentleman called at my office, who laid within my hands a letter written by an assistant commissary in the United States, army, recounting various experiences in the Philippine Islands; and, among others, describing what was afterwards well known as the water torture, or the water cure, euphemistically so-called. [...] I at once arrived at this conclusion—which has been abundantly justified since—that torture was being used as an instrument for gaining a military end. It was not torture used in retaliation, it was not torture used as an occasional outburst of rage by some soldier boy, as we have frequently heard since. [...] It meant that this was instrumentality which must have been known to high officers in the government in the Philippines. [...] Here, under circumstances which were peculiar, our men, far from home, confronted with a difficult situation, not controlled by any public sentiment, with a censored press, with an administration in Washington under the
strongest political pressure to hide the truth, were turning the wheel of civilization backward; they were going upon that road the descent of which is as easy as it is swift. [...] 203

Welsh goes on to note that he wrote President Roosevelt, a personal friend whom he had entertained in his home, about the information he had learned, but received no response. 204 One day after the compelling testimony of a soldier, Sgt. Riley, in front of the SIAP, Secretary Root asked for a full investigation into the water cure, "promising the people of the United States a thorough investigation and saying that no one would be safe from punishment, no matter what his position might be." 205 However, Welsh noted that he was still waiting for this promise to be fulfilled.

In the midst of the publicity around the hearings in mid April 1902, Welsh was contacted with information about the water cure of a Father Augustine. One of the most egregious cases for anti-imperialists was this water cure of a Catholic priest, and it was only discovered after the SIAP was winding down interviews. Albert Cross, a U.S. soldier, testified to giving the water cure to the prisoner, Father Augustine. Cross was stationed in Banate in the Philippines under the command of Captain Brownell and reported to Welsh having seen the water cure administered too many times to count. 206

According to Cross, Brownell ordered him to give Father Augustine the water cure under

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203 Mass Meetings of Protest Against the Suppression of Truth About the Philippines, Boston, 1903. Philippine Box, Swarthmore Peace Collection, Swarthmore College.

204 He learned that the charges in his letter had been forwarded to the general in command of the Philippines. He then read a report by Secretary of War Elihu Root that asserted the war in the Philippines was humane alongside a report of what Welsh deemed to be torture by dehydration, rather than the water torture.

205 Mass Meetings of Protest Against the Suppression of Truth About the Philippines, Boston, 1903. Philippine Box, Swarthmore Peace Collection, Swarthmore College.

206 Cross testimony, Oct. 13, 1902. J.R. Hayden Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
the accusation that he sympathized with and aided insurgents. Cross reported the water cure was administered to the priest three times, the last of which killed him. Cross was requested to assist in the third round but asked to be excused as felt it was "not right in one respect." In private correspondence with Matthew Sniffen, Welsh’s assistant, Cross believed that U.S. military officials assumed Augustine had insurgent funds hidden and that was the main reason for his "water cure treatment." According to soldiers who were part of the third administration of the water cure, they attempted to revive the priest and sent for a doctor, but nothing could be done at that point.

The case of Father Augustine incited anger amongst Catholics in the U.S. The idea of going to “civilize” people who already had a large Catholic population, given hundreds of years of Spanish colonization, was insulting. Norah Gleason of Germantown, Pennsylvania, was one of these Catholics that identified with Catholic Filipinos. She started a personal letter-writing campaign to the President over the treatment of Father Augustine. After she received a report from Secretary of War, Elihu Root, she responded to the President:

If you would kindly consider the injustice done to this poor priest, and by so doing you will do much towards your Catholic subjects, both in the United States and the Philippines. For although Secretary Root says it does not seem a matter of action for you, he must be mistaken, for you as the present head of both countries

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207 Letter from Cross to Sniffen, April 6, 1901. J.R. Hayden Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
208 "Ex-Soldier’s Tale of the ‘water cure,’ The Philadelphia Inquirer, April 24, 1902, J.R. Hayden Papers, Bentley Historical Society, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
209 Letter to President Roosevelt from Norah Gleason, March 26, 1903. J.R. Hayden Papers, Bentley Historical Society, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
210 Petition of the Catholic Central Union, San Antonio, 1903; St. Boniface, Benevolent Society, Burlington, Iowa, Committee on Insular Affairs, n.d. NARA, Washington D.C.
have the authority to act in such a small matter, and would naturally be the right one...  

Given that this was done against a priest and not just any “insurrecto,” there were many witnesses willing to come forward and testify. Indeed, the commanding officer General Hughes was considered for further inquiry after the SIAP ended, and Welsh was more than willing to provide information for his inquiry.  

Welsh closed his remarks in front of the meetings of March 19, 1903, telling the audience:  

I have been sometimes reproached for taking up these individual cases and clinging to them with such painful detail. I do it, not because I love these details or because, as a dear friend in New York wrote to me, I have any glee in finding out wickedness. Nay, it is not that. It is simply a knowledge which I have gained during a twenty years' experience in Indian affairs, that the way to arrive at the practical enforcement of a principle is to walk through all the tiresome and devious paths of concrete case.

While the other speakers at the meetings continued to reiterate anti-imperialist arguments intended to educate the public and enlighten them as to the questionable conduct in the Philippines, Thomas Patterson, as a friend of the Lopez family reported on a letter from Juliana Lopez, Sixto and Clemencia's younger sister.

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211 Gleason to President, April 13, 1903, J.R. Hayden Papers, Bentley Historical Society, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
213 Mass Meetings of Protest Against the Suppression of Truth About the Philippines, Boston, 1903. Philippine Box, Swarthmore Peace Collection, Swarthmore College.
Patterson covered a topic directly that anti-imperialists only periodically hinted to as a problem in the Philippines. Translating from Juliana's letter, dated January 31, 1903, he reported the rape of a Filipina woman by U.S. soldiers. The woman was the sister-in-law of one of Lopez family's workers, and he had killed an U.S. soldier. They believed this particular rape was retaliation. Juliana complained that when the soldiers were walking the streets of the towns at night drunk, these things too commonly occurred. Because of this, young women would not go walking out at night for fear of these "thieves of woman's honor."214

Although not commonly discussed, the rape of Filipinas went against notions of "civilization." Additionally, the case of the water cure on a priest again brought to the fore the questions of "civilization" and the benevolence of U.S. colonization in the Philippines. Faced with the reality of cases of rape and death by torture, the narrative of the benevolence of the U.S. in the Philippines came up against practices that showed otherwise, materially in this case, on the bodies of a woman guilty by familial relation and a priest.

The debates that came out in the investigations show how schemas of "civilization" were invoked and rearticulated through inventions of racial exceptions to maintain the moral superiority of whites in the face of evidence of their indiscriminate, by their own standard, use of violence. The performances involved in the investigations were to ostensibly demonstrate and enact democratic practices of hearing multiple points of view on issues, uncovering and gathering pertinent information for the governing body to make recommendations for institutional change.

214 Ibid.
But, the conclusion was foregone at the outset. What resulted in these performances, rather than committed democratic practice, was a placating ritual of "civilization" that involved the purging and cleansing of profane individuals (the proverbial bad apples) purported to be rotting the "sacred" democratic system. Although anti-imperialists were able to scratch the surface of affairs in the Philippines, the anti-imperialist politicians were in the minority and unable to sustain the investigation. Anti-imperialists involved in preparing testimonies were thwarted and felt the politicians had "stifled" the investigations before more damaging information came out to again rouse the public's consternation.\(^{215}\) Therefore, the claims to the U.S.'s overall "exceptional" imperialist practice in benevolent assimilation while challenged and nominally checked, continued largely unchanged.

After it became clear that there would be no public uprising around what was uncovered in the SIAP, AIL secretary Erving Winslow wrote to Welsh in May of 1902, "What headlines, Oh, no. What interests them is the price of beef."\(^{216}\) Then, on July 4, 1902, President Theodore Roosevelt declared the war in the Philippines over, despite the fact that fighting continued.

In the process of learning the details of violence in the Philippines, Welsh contacted Springfield Republican's Washington correspondent and anti-imperialist, H. Parker Willis. Willis was doing his own reporting on "the Philippine Question" and so was a logical ally. Welsh wrote to Willis asking him to find out more on the reconcentration camps in the Philippines. Willis responded in a letter of April 17, 1902,

\(^{215}\) Letter from W.J. Palmer to E. B. Smith March 18, 1903. American Anti-Imperialist Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

\(^{216}\) Letter to Welsh from Winslow, May 7, 1902. American Anti-Imperialist Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
I will try to find out the facts you ask for concerning the concentration camps in Samar. It may take me a day or so to get trustworthy information. I think the idea of sending assistance out there is a good one, although, of course, the ideas that our Government cannot supply what is needed is too disgraceful to think of. Assistance sent from here ought to arouse people to an adequate conception of the bad state of affairs.  

Both Willis and Welsh believed that providing the U.S. public with reliable information that showed the contradictions of "civilizing" Filipinos, would once again incite their indignation.

Despite the public’s lack of interest on affairs in the Philippines Welsh continued his research, finding further information for the more incendiary cases, like that of Father Augustine. Though a more conservative member of the executive committee of the AIL, Charles Francis Adams sympathized with Welsh. However, he noted the public’s inattention and wondered whether further investigations were warranted, or if it was wasted energy. In a letter to Welsh, Adams conjectured:

For instance: if our friends who opposed the Boer war in Great Britain, who made such a loud and very proper protest against many of the severities of that war, including the concentration camps, the destruction of homesteads, etc, etc, were to now keep up that fusillade, I think you would agree with me that it was a useless expenditure of force. The thing is now over and done; and the evil deeds of the past, while possible to affect at the time, cannot be remedied after the event.

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217 Letter dated April 17, 1902. American Anti-Imperialist League Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
Our position is now much the same. I should be glad to see justice done in the case of Father Augustine, and am entirely willing to contribute whatever I can to that end. On the other hand, I have to recognize the fact that public interest on the subject has died out, and that it is difficult, if not impossible, to revive it. Under these circumstances, the only matter for consideration is, what practical course we should pursue.218

Anti-imperialists were beginning to feel the chill of public indifference and its cooling effect on their effectiveness in lobbying the government. The Senate Committee on Affairs in the Philippines concluded their investigations in late June 1902. A committee of anti-imperialists from Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia and New York met in New York to discuss their next move.219 They determined that their efforts would maintain a focus on atrocities in the Philippines (Schirmer 1972).

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218 Letter to Welsh from Adams, December 12, 1902. J.R. Hayden Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
219 Members of the committee included Edwin Burritt Smith, Herbert Welsh, Charles Francis Adams, Carl Schurz, Andrew Carnegie, and Moorfield Storey as their attorney (Schirmer 1972).
CHAPTER 6: MONITORING BENEVOLENT ASSIMILATION

If we arrive at some correct idea of what society is and what civilization is, we shall regard all such speculations as more absurd than witch-craft or astrology. We are the children of the society in which we were born. It makes us. We are products of the civilization of our generation. Only a handful of men can react upon the society and the age in which they live so as to modify it at all. They are the very *élite* of the human race, and after all what they can do is only infinitesimal. Civilization means the art of living on this earth.

—William Graham Sumner (sociologist and anti-imperialist) "The Power and Beneficence of Capital"

In a Senate speech May 31, 1902, Senator Carmack stated, "It is a cheering sign that the second sober thought has come, that the better nature of the American people is again in the ascendant, when the party responsible for a buccaneering war is compelled to veil the grossness of its designs (16)" (as quoted in Storey and Lichauco 1926: 178). Anti-imperialists became convinced government officials were going to great lengths in order to keep the violence in the Philippines veiled. They believed more "severities" would have been exposed during the SIAP had they been allowed to continue. Therefore, besides lobbying politicians, petitioning congress, petitioning the President, and publicizing the records of military officials, the AIL went around the government in Washington.

They did this by continuing to gather information from interviews with soldiers, trading information with Filipino newspapers and ilustrados, and sending investigators to the Philippines. In his "Report of the Secretary" at the annual Anti-Imperialist League

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meeting on November 25, 1905, Erving Winslow opened, "'We will be heard,' the motto of the great reformer [William Lloyd Garrison], the centenary of whose birth is about to be commemorated, has been the motto of the Anti-Imperialist League. Agitation is our imperative duty, agitation and still agitation, though it may sometimes seem out of season to the mere politician." At this meeting, Winslow also reported on the shift in concentration to "devote a large proportion of [the League's] means and its energies henceforward [to] the circulation through the press of trustworthy Philippine intelligence. We hope that a visit to the Philippines of a member of the Committee will have created some new channels of communication, but we have already established many, while the Philippine native newspapers furnish much valuable and useful information."  

Winslow thanked the following men who either investigated on behalf of the AIL or provided testimony on "conditions in the archipelago": "President Schurman, George Kennan, Professor Henry Loomis Nelson, Professor H. Parker Willis, Mr. W. J. Bryan, Dr. D. J. Doherty, Mr. Fiske Warren, Professor Frederick Starr, Senator Patterson, Representatives Shafroth, W. A. Jones, and many others" (1908: 13). This shows the AIL gathered information from firsthand sources on the conduct of the war as a strategy, beginning with their Filipino connections and soldiers returning from the Philippines in 1899 and thereafter. Their information highlighted disparities between the accounts of government officials' conduct of the war and anti-imperialists' sources. Because of the disparities between sources, AIL leaders determined gathering their own information in the Philippines was increasingly necessary. Immediately after preparing for the hearings

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222 Record Books of the Anti-Imperialist League, Vol. 3 (March 23-1905-March 11, 1909), Maria Lanzar-Carpio Papers, Hatcher Graduate Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
223 Ibid.
in the senate, the AIL made plans to send investigators to the Philippines to uncover the facts of the reports from soldiers and newspapers. They formed a committee comprised of Moorfield Storey, Charles Francis Adams, Carl Schurz, Edwin Burritt Smith, and Herbert Welsh to handle the task.\textsuperscript{224} As the member in charge of the Philippines investigations committee, Welsh wrote to his contacts hoping to gain funds for the project. In the letter he said,

The startling and terrible facts which have already been brought to the public attention through the trials of Major Waller and General Jacob Smith; the Cornelius Gardener report of conditions in Tayabas, Province of Luzon, the evidence of returned soldiers, particularly that of Sergeant Riley and Private Smith, which I personally secured, before the Senate Committee; these, and many other things are too numerous to mention, show beyond peradventure that the country is confronted to-day with a most serious situation. This situation is serious not only because it affects the rights and fortunes of ten million people in the archipelago, but because it affects no less powerfully the honor and discipline of the United States Army and the credit of the American nation in the eyes of the civilized world.\textsuperscript{225}

As the treasurer, Welsh reported to the Philippine Investigating Committee that between May 1, 1902 to Feb. 4, 1903 $6,835.34 had been secured for the investigations budget

\textsuperscript{224} Report of the Sixth Annual Anti-Imperialist League Meeting, Record Books of the Anti-Imperialist League, Vol. 2 (December 6, 1901-March 9, 1905), Maria Lanzar-Carpio Papers, Hatcher Graduate Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

\textsuperscript{225} Letter to E. Lewis from H. Welsh May 16, 1902. Herbert Welsh Papers, Special Collections, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
with a balance left of $619.51, the bulk of expenditures coming from printing sources, travel expenses, and attorney fees to secure witnesses.\textsuperscript{226}

Even among the most progressive anti-imperialists, there were competing anti-imperialisms. Given that the branches of the AIL were located in different cities, those branches with adequate resources implemented their own plans independently, although they did inform the other branches of their activities. Therefore, the AIL had investigators sponsored by the organizers in New York, Philadelphia, and Boston. Part of the reason the separate branches sent their own investigators were their disagreements over whom it would be appropriate to send, what these representatives should be investigating and reporting, and whether or not they should be officially affiliated with the AIL.

One of the unofficial investigators on behalf of the AIL was Helen Wilson. Wilson was fluent in Spanish and had connections with the Boston elite. Therefore, she had access in the Philippines to various U.S. officers and Filipino ilustrados, with the additional capacity to converse directly with Spanish-speaking Filipinos. In 1903 the Reconcentration Act was passed in the Philippines, which allowed the governor-general to grant provincial governors the authority to reconcentrate rural communities under the control of the Constabulary (Kramer 2006). Her firsthand account of the reconcentration policy published in 1903 was the first information available to the public to see how the military operations in the Philippines were affecting the Filipino people, not just insurgents. Her descriptions were published under the anonymity of \textit{A Massachusetts Woman} (1903).

\textsuperscript{226} List of receipts and expenditures, May 1, 1902. Herbert Welsh Papers, Special Collections, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
She discovered during this trip, which was sponsored by Fiske Warren rather than the AIL directly, that it was difficult to gain the confidence of Filipinos without an introduction from a Filipino of repute. Therefore, she gained many of her introductions by way of the Lopez family, with whom Warren was so familiar. Warren and his siblings had hosted Clemencia’s stay in the Boston area and introduced her to Brandeis in Washington DC (Green 1989). On her trip to Manila in 1903, Wilson stopped in Hong Kong and with proper introductions met with members of the Junta, including a brief meeting with Galicano Apacible and a longer one with Felipe Agoncillo. Her impression was that they were “discouraged” by the outlook in the Philippines, and “a little bit embarrassed to know how to deal with a strong-minded woman travelling [sic] around the world alone,” though this is exactly what Clemencia Lopez had done just two years prior.

She inquired about the health and status of Apolinario Mabini, finding that upon his release from prison in Guam he was very weak. Therefore, on arriving at Manila in February 1903 he took the oath of allegiance to the U.S.; later that May Mabini died from cholera. Wilson also met General Artemio Ricarte, who had been one of Aguinaldo’s chief officers in the revolution. He had been imprisoned and released with Mabini. Like Sixto Lopez, Ricarte chose to be taken to Hong Kong rather than take the oath in Manila. General Ricarte was therefore separated from his family, but at that time refused to be made a traitor to either the Philippines or the United States. He asked her to express,

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228 Ibid.
according to Wilson, to “those in America whose protest resulted in his freedom” his deep gratitude.\textsuperscript{229}

After arriving in Manila, Manuel Lopez, one of Sixto and Clemencia’s brothers who had earlier been imprisoned, met Wilson. He found her a room to rent with a Filipino family, an elderly couple caring for their grandson after their daughter died, in a large three-story home. Their daughter was married to a white American soldier, the father of the child, who came and visited periodically. Manuel also accompanied Wilson to Balayan, where she toured the towns and met military personnel, U.S. teachers, and Filipinos. Of one town, she wrote:

Tuy was burned to the ground by the Spanish, and the stone foundations of the large houses and the church were destroyed by the dynamite. The people have built for themselves little nipa and bamboo houses amongst the ruins, but the only indications of their ‘astounding progress’ is in the names of the streets which an enterprising presidente has changed with a due regard to the new future which lies before them. The desolate and dusty main road with its discouraged pigs and chickens is McKinley street, while to the right and left branch off Washington Ave., Michigan Ave., Roosevelt Ave., etc. Every one [sic] who could get a way [sic] has gone; there are almost no work animals, and the people are utterly discouraged and wretchedly poor. Yet only six years ago this was a vigorous and flourishing little town, and the ruins of the big church and the heaps of shattered stone about the town seem to indicate some little past prosperity. I asked the

\textsuperscript{229}Ibid.
Justice of the Peace if they hoped for better times soon, and he turned his dark and melancholy face away and said No, he was afraid it would be a long time.230

The people she met in Tuy recounted to her the public torture of one man and the death by water cure of another. Touring the country with Manuel, she met former soldiers turned colonial teachers. In Manila, she met women she knew from home, also now colonial teachers. She was advised by U.S. Americans to get work with the colonial government for guaranteed steady pay, but she believed this would create tension, or at least distance, between herself and Filipinos. Therefore, she started work as an independent stenographer. Wilson observed that Filipinos and U.S. American civilians in the Philippines alike deemed the colonial administrators inept at best. This was under the governorship of Luke Wright, who centralized the U.S. colonial government (Go 2008) and suspended the writ of habeas corpus in Batangas and Cavite. Upon her return to Boston in 1908, the AIL arranged for a luncheon in her honor as well as a “Mr. Dimayuga and any other such Filipinos as the secretary may think proper to invite.”231

Again, using the resources of their contacts and the economic resources of their supporters, the executive committee of the AIL made plans to send their own investigators to travel to Manila and then search out information from there. Like what had happened with the Atkinson Affair, however, there was dissension within the leadership as to how closely to identify the AIL with investigators. They determined that nominally these investigators were to be independent of the AIL. The New England AIL (Boston and Philadelphia) worked to send H. Parker Willis, who was originally the

230 Ibid.
231 Record Books of the Anti-Imperialist League, Vol. 3 (March 23-1905-March 11, 1909), Maria Lanzar-Carpio Papers, Hatcher Graduate Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
Washington newspaper correspondent for the *Springfield Republican* and had become an Economics professor at Washington and Lee University. Willis corresponded with Herbert Welsh in 1902 to prepare for his assignment in the Philippines.  

Willis was to make an academic study of the situation, sending back periodic reports to the AIL, not only news updates. He sent Welsh a report titled, “Plan for Organizing a Systematic Philippine Investigation,” in which he outlined his assessment of the Philippine situation. He believed that the Philippine Civil Government bill of 1902 opened the door for “a gross misuse of the appointments in the islands” which would only continue the unfortunate situation of using the Philippines as “a dumping ground for refuse political material” for “worthless political workers who must be rewarded.” He believed that the way to help rectify the situation was to create a “fear of scandals at home if the fundamental principles of decent government are too grossly violated.”

With this strategy in mind, “reliable” and “steady” information was “absolutely essential.” Therefore, investigations independent of the press, primarily the Associated Press who Willis believed to be subservient to the will of the government, because of the cost of reporting from the Philippines and the claim of newspapers at home that the stories were too “old” to print obviated the need to implement a representative in the Philippines for an “indefinite” amount of time.

Willis believed that this clearly showed a need for newspapers at home and that they would be willing to publish stories written on the Philippines, giving the story to only one paper in a given market to be published nationally on the same date. In essence,

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232 Welsh also had connections to Washington and Lee University.
233 Welsh Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
234 Ibid.
he believed this could be used as a “Philippines news service.” This news service would be funded by a “Philippine Information Association.” His plan impressed Welsh and the committee enough to sponsor Willis as their investigator in the Philippines.

Initially, Willis corresponded directly with Welsh. However, after the senate investigations were terminated and the likelihood of them being reopened proved doubtful, Welsh had a physical and mental breakdown and was therefore unreachable. His secretary, Matthew K. Sniffen, kept the work of City & State going as well as some of his anti-imperialist activities. But, at this point, Willis began primarily corresponding with Moorfield Storey, one of Willis’s prime benefactors (in addition to Charles Francis Adams of Boston and William J. Palmer of Colorado). On his way to Manila, Willis stopped in Yokohama and met with the U.S. Consul, who believed that there was not going to be much U.S. investment in the Philippines given the political situation surrounding the issues of violence brought up by the "grannies" (the anti-imperialists) (Schirmer 1972). After his investigations in the Philippines in 1904, Storey published Willis's manuscript entitled, Our Philippine Problem: A Study of American Colonial Policy.

The Philippine Census had also been conducted by 1904 determining “the total population of the Philippine Islands is 7,635,425, of whichumber 6,987,686 are classed as ‘civilized,’ 647,740 as ‘wild,’” which the AIL in Boston published to underline the point that, “the claim of the Anti-Imperialists that the Philippine people [were] capable of national evolution without foreign assistance...A comparison with previous statements of the population show[ed] a large falling off in many cases from the computations made by Spanish authorities, which is to be attributable to the mortality caused by war, famine and
disease incidental thereto, resulting from benevolent assimilation." Willis also made use of the information provided by the census in his reports. In fact, one of his reports published in the New York Evening Post, October 28, 1904, was attached as an appendix to anti-imperialist Senator E.W. Carmack's speech before the Senate on "Conditions in the Philippines." Willis concluded in his summary of conditions,

As General Davis mildly states the situation (Report, 1903, p. 31): 'Americans in the Philippines have not so far been an unmixed blessing to the native inhabitants.' We have, in fact, destroyed the public buildings of the country, inflicted continuous crop losses, during a period of six years; ravaged and burned large section of territory; produced conditions leading to the death of most of the farm animals and to serious human and animal epidemics; brought foreign trade to an unprofitable condition by our tariff legislation; inaugurated a tremendously expensive government for the benefit of foreign officeholders; established a partisan judiciary; crowded the prisons, and deported or sent to the gallows the best and most patriotic of the native leaders.

There are contradictory reports on the number of Filipino casualties that resulted from the fighting and reconcentration policies of the U.S. (Gates 1984). The discrepancies have been the subject of debates given that reports have ranged from 300,000 to 3,000,000 Filipino deaths, with the latter number based on a misprint quoted by Gore Vidal in New York Book of Reviews in 1981 (Gates 1984). More commonly,

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\begin{itemize}
\item[236] I thank Karen Hogenboom, Assistant Government Information Librarian at University of Illinois, for pointing me to this article in my search for reliable figures that would compare the number of Filipino deaths over the course of the war.
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reports on the number of casualties have been put between 200,000 at the low end (Blount 1913; Wolff 1960) to 600,000 at the high end (Willis 1905; Miller 1982; Zinn in Schirmer 1972; Constantino 1975) by historians and critics of U.S. involvement in the Philippines.\(^{237}\)

For witnesses of the time in which the U.S. was fighting in the Philippines, they were indeed concerned over the prospect of genocide and "extermination" given the recent history of U.S. treatment of Indians and were therefore skeptical of "benevolence."

This is the point. Whether the number of deaths from the U.S. involvement in the Philippines was 100,000 or 1,000,000, they were too many for anti-imperialists. Neither number was justifiable given the policy. Their fears that the deaths were in the range of half a million to a million were made real by the inability to find reliable information and by the fact that they were continually able to find information that had not only been unrevealed, but at times obscured. For example, Storey and Lichauco (1924) quote from "[...] Senate Document 331, 1902, p. 1628,"

\(^{237}\) In an attempt to shed light on this discrepancy, Gates (1984) made an investigation of the literature. Based on the work of other historians, Gates notes that Glenn May's study found the 1903 census conducted by the U.S. "grossly inaccurate" and that parish documents in the Philippines were "highly unreliable" (p. 373). Although Gates recognizes the unreliability of the figures available to start with, he goes forward and uses what he states represents the best information available and makes population projections, comparing these projections to what was found in the actual 1903 census. The range of difference between the numbers is what he determines to be the range of war-related deaths in the Philippines, between 127,593 - 362,659 estimated Filipino deaths (Gates 1984:374-375). Gates concludes, "This paper provides neither a reliable method for estimating war-related deaths in the Philippine-American War nor an exact estimate of their number. It does, however, indicate a few of the approaches that should not be used. [...] one should not trust the undocumented figures of authors who have an ulterior motive, such as proving that the American campaign in the Philippines was 'genocidal' or benevolent" (pp. 377-378). However, the original actors framed the debate of the Philippine-American war as either "genocide" or "benevolence," and students of this history since have simply carried forward this framing of history.
[which] read as follows: 'To combat such a population, it is necessary to make the state of war as insupportable as possible, and there is no more efficacious way of accomplishing this than by keeping the minds of the people in such a state of anxiety and apprehension that living under such conditions will soon become unbearable. Little should be said. The less said the better. Let acts, not words, convey the intention' (p. 120).

Anti-imperialists took these statements at their word, that acts had been committed that had not been publicly stated or adequately reported. The report went on,

Although no very careful estimate of the total casualties has been made, it is certain from the records, official and semi-official, that the Filipinos killed in battle far outnumbered the American losses. Judge Blount's examination of the available war records showed a ratio of sixteen Filipinos to every one American killed (20) (p. 122).

Blount's (1912) estimates are listed as the more conservative reports of Filipino casualties by Gates (1984). The following quote illustrated the rationality anti-imperialists used in taking officers at their word to "let acts, not words, convey the intention."

Examination of the casualties in the fiercest struggles of the nineteenth century, for example, show always a striking similarity between the proportion of men killed and the men wounded on the field of battle. Generally this ratio is six to one, or at least five to one, that is to say for every one man killed in battle five or six victims are wounded. [...] Turn now to the Philippine campaign where the aim of the military administration was to be one which would 'win the confidence, respect and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines (3). What do the official
war records show? Almost the reverse, that is to say that for every Filipino wounded in battle, five were killed (pp. 126-127).

For Willis, who calculated the original 600,000 estimated number of Filipinos killed, he believed he was erring on the conservative side given the scenario. He wrote,

Crops, houses, and villages were destroyed or burned for the purpose of depriving insurgents of means of support, and reconcentration was finally resorted to.

General J.F. Bell estimated in 1902 that one-sixth of the natives in Luzon died as the direct or indirect result of the operations, a figure which would mean a total death-roll of at least 600,000 persons. [Note that this is attributed to the wrong Bell as pointed out by Gates (1984), but this Bell was much more influential and would have carried more weight as a source.] Notable among these independent local campaigns [sic] were those of General J.F. Smith in Samar, signalised by the notorious 'kill and burn' orders which led ultimately to the retirement of that commander; of General Bell in Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas; and of General Hughes in Bohol and Cebu (Willis 1905: 23).

Meanwhile, El Renacimiento, the leading Filipino newspaper, in contact with the AIL, advocating for independence published “Filipino Opinion of Reconcentration,” June 30, 1905, expressing their continued contempt for the practice.

It seems that the magnanimous spirit which in the American Congress cried out so indignantly against the Weylerian proceedings in Cuba is unconcerned about conditions in the Philippines. The ordinance of the civil commission has fallen like a pestilence on the unfortunate people of Cavite. It is only natural that the present state of affairs should fill us with the gravest apprehension. We say
frankly and with deep sorrow that this measure which causes so much suffering is
not justified by the good at which it claims to aim. There are created by it feelings
of animosity and rancor that will not be forgotten for many years,—perhaps
never.238

Wilson continued her investigations on the effects of reconcentration in the Philippines
sending back reports to the Springfield Republican published in July 1905 (Kramer
2006). However, by the time her reports reached the U.S., reconcentration had been
discontinued as a policy in the Philippines (Zwick 2005). Having read the reports from El
Renacimiento on reconcentration, Wilson decided to visit the camps. She went to “camps
at Talisay, Naic, Imus, San Francisco de Malabon and other places where the conditions
were at least as bad.”239 She determined with her Filipino interpreters that although the
official rationale for reconcentration was to submit “hostile” groups, this was not the case
in Bacoor. Wilson reported that reconcentration of two neighboring villages was to gain
the surrender of one outlaw, Felizardo, likening him to the "James boys" of the U.S. Civil
War.

She also detailed the living conditions of those confined in the camps. They lived
in overcrowded bamboo huts, were made to attend roll call every night, and were given
no food rations. “Reconcentrados,” as they were called, had to beg for food from people
in the town or on the shellfish they could gather near the shore. Therefore, there was

238 El Renacimiento. “Filipino Opinion of Reconcentration.”
http://boondocksnet.com/ai/vof/er063005.html In Jim Zwick, ed. Anti-Imperialism in the
239 Helen C. Wilson. “Reconcentration in the Philippines.” (Boston: Anti-Imperialist
widespread "exposure" to the elements and malnutrition and their attendant illnesses, including malaria and dysentery. "There were several children with the thin little bodies and bloated abdomens which the pictures of reconcentration in Cuba and famine in India must have made familiar to every one; not such extreme cases, it is true, but none the less [sic] testifying to insufficient, improper or filthy food." In differentiating the reconcentration of the U.S. military in the Philippines with the Spanish reconcentrations in Cuba, Wilson stated, "The reconcentrados were free of the town during the day time; in spite of a great deal of evident destitution, there was no one actually dying of starvation, and while there was much illness it is doubtful whether the death rate was increased to an extraordinary degree. What had been done, apparently, was to take these 500 souls, warn them to bring food and provisions with them, and then turn them loose in the corner of a ten-acre lot to do the best they could for themselves." If the U.S. was supposed to be teaching Filipinos in the practice of democracy, she asked, "What conceptions of citizenship, of sovereign law, of individual rights and liberties are these people learning from us?" Her main point in writing to the U.S. was to highlight actual conditions of Filipinos' "liberty."

The New York AIL made plans for another investigator. As early as 1903 they began inquiring into the expertise of a Dr. David J. Doherty with Fiske Warren. Warren visited the Philippines in 1901 and 1903, which gave him the opportunity to learn of Doherty, who was already in the Philippines working as a medical doctor. In 1904, the

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240 Ibid.
241 Ibid.
242 Edward Ordway Papers, Manuscript and Archives Division, New York Public Library.
New York AIL officially split from the Boston and Philadelphia branches renaming itself the Filipino Independence Association, then later the Filipino Rights Association, and finally the Filipino Progress Association. Josephine Shaw Lowell spearheaded these efforts. The Chicago organization also split from the Boston AIL around the same time, making the AIL no longer an official national organization.

In 1906 Warren made another trip to Manila, and this same year Doherty was enlisted as an investigator for the New York AIL.


Although Doherty was a medical doctor and had submitted a report on disease in the Philippines to Congress, he had also published a book on the Hawaiian language. In 1900 he translated a report titled, "The Philippines: A Summary Account of their

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243 Ibid. The changes in name reflect the organization's desire for a change in focus.
Ethnographical, Historical and Political Conditions” written in German by Ferdinand
Blumentritt (Blumentriit 1900). He later published a book on Tagalog as well as a report
on conditions in the Philippines in 1904. Carl Schurz wrote to Adams in 1903 regarding
his impressions of Doherty’s report. Schurz said,

The report on the Philippine affairs written by Mr. Doherty is the most instructive
and important paper on that subject I have ever read. Mr. Doherty is evidently a
keen observer and what he says bears the mark of candor and conscientiousness.
The views he opens of the man in which the Filipinos are treated by the
constabulary are startling in the highest degree. As you are aware, I am a Forty-
eighter. When I look back upon the things which drove us into revolution in
Germany at that period, I can only say that they were as nothing compared with the
police-despotism to which the Filipinos are subjected under our flag.

The observations of Mr. Doherty on the administration of justice, on the
character of the American population there and on the aspirations of the Filipinos as
to their future are of the highest value. I think this paper ought by all means to be
brought to the notice of President Roosevelt. He ought to be made to read the whole
of it (pp. 308-309). 244

In letters back to Ordway, Doherty noted the difficulty in getting news from sources other
than the government. Therefore, Doherty had to go on the hunch that “in Samar the war
against the Pulahanes (or ‘bandits’) is one of extermination, which will run along in

244 Letter from Carl Schurz to Charles Francis Adams, Jr. Nov. 15, 1903 in Bancroft,
Frederic. 1913. "Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers of Carl Schurz." vol. VI.
guerilla fashion for along [sic] time." In his official letter to the Filipino Independence Association, Doherty reported that he was working with editors of newspapers who had been upset and writing about the "race question." He was therefore trying to smooth things over with them and find a Filipino editor. In his first six months in connection with the New York AIL, Doherty wrote back to newspapers at home reporting on issues in the Philippines.

Doherty helped establish the Filipina women's society "La Proteccion de la Infancia" or "Gota de Leche," which organized efforts to encourage and subsidize feeding infants sterilized milk and promoted the general health of infants and mothers. He donated the money to purchase the first building for the organization. The organization was originally populated mainly by elite Filipinas working together with white colonial American women in raising funds. According to Ordway the racial breakdown of attendance at the first major garden party fundraiser was "65% pure Filipino, 20% mestizo and only 15% American" (presumably white). Doherty passed away in 1908, one year after founding the organization.

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245 Letter from Doherty to Ordway, May 11, 1906, Edward Ordway Papers, Manuscript and Archives Division, New York Public Library.
246 Letter from Doherty to Ordway, June 10, 1906, Edward Ordway Papers, Manuscript and Archives Division, New York Public Library.
247 Edward Ordway Papers, Manuscript and Archives Division, New York Public Library.
248 Ibid. This was also corroborated in a December 7, 1910 article, "The Mission of La Gota de Leche" published in Renacimiento Filipino.
249 Letter from Ordway, February 1, 1907, Edward Ordway Papers, Manuscript and Archives Division, New York Public Library.
Filipino Voices and the Writ of Habeas Corpus

On July 31, 1905, the writ of habeas corpus was suspended in the provinces of Cavite and Batangas under the governorship of Luke E. Wright. Wright wanted the Philippines to be more conducive to business interests than the Philippines were under the governorship of Taft, who worked with the existing patronage system of government (Go 2008: Kramer 2006). Given that fighting continued in these provinces despite President Roosevelt's declaration the war was over, this act officially designated those still fighting against the U.S. as "insurrectos" or "ladrones." With attacks frequently coming against the Filipino Constabulary cooperating with the U.S. Wright stated,

Whereas, because of the foregoing conditions there exists a state of insecurity and terrorism among the people which makes it impossible in the ordinary way to conduct preliminary investigations before the justices of the peace and other judicial officers;

In the interest of public safety, it is hereby ordered that the writ of habeas corpus is from this date suspended in the provinces of Cavite and Batangas. (as quoted in Dy Yap 1972: 54).

This declaration was enabled by the Philippine Commission's Reconcentration Act of 1903 (aka the Brigandage Act). Suspending habeas corpus resulted in Filipinos being imprisoned for flying the Filipino flag, or for the purported support of the insurrectos. To this effect, Erving Winslow (1908) stated in a look back, "The vaunted liberty which has been given to the Filipinos has been circumscribed by unusual and severe sedition and libel laws. [...] Any public exposure, even in private premises, of insignia of the
Philippine Republic has been legally made an act of sedition. In the archipelago truth of a libel constitutes no defence [sic] for it" (pp. 9-10).

Given that there was no evidence needed to imprison Filipinos in these provinces, it was a significant challenge for lawyers on their behalf to obtain their freedom. One tactic to try to get the “state of emergency” repealed and to reinstate the writ of habeas corpus was to inform the U.S. American public through anti-imperialist channels.\textsuperscript{250}

Fiske Warren worked with Filipino lawyer Alberto Barretto, also a member of the Philippine Independence Party,\textsuperscript{251} in trying to alert anti-imperialists in the metropole and create further alliances.\textsuperscript{252} Doherty also took up the issue trying to research previous trials in the colony against Filipinos.\textsuperscript{253} Go (2008) notes that after 1903 the number of cases against Filipinos went up rapidly due mainly to Filipino domestication of the colonial legal system, meaning that Filipinos began using the legal system for their interests and making their own cases.

In 1905, Barcelon v. Baker directly challenged this colonial system legalizing reconcentration (Dy Yap 1972), and anti-imperialists in the U.S. publicized the case as it


\textsuperscript{251} A. Barretto to J.G. Schurman, March 28, 1906. Edward Ordway Papers, Manuscript and Archives Division, New York Public Library.

\textsuperscript{252} Warren was considered by many of his contemporaries as a radical. He was not a Marxist, but did come to advocate single-tax issues in the vein of Henry George. Warren was also a nudist and started a commune in Harvard, MA. (for more on Warren and his family see Green 1989). However, he did come from a well-known Boston family with money. Therefore, he had financial resources and connections but was considered fringe.

\textsuperscript{253} Doherty to Ordway, 1906, Edward Ordway Papers, Manuscript and Archives Division, New York Public Library.
went up before the Supreme Court. According to Erving Winslow, secretary of the AIL in Boston, in a letter to Edward Ordway, secretary of the Filipino Progress Association (formerly the New York AIL), the Supreme Court "decided that the suspension of the habeas corpus in case of disorder or insurrection is a matter entirely within the province of the executive and legislative department, that is, the Governor General and the Commission,—and that the Supreme Court has no right to make any inquiry in behalf of a petitioner as to whether the facts upon which the suspension of the habeas corpus were based existed [sic] or not." This was a legalized state of exception that was all encompassing. This Supreme Court ruling finalized that U.S. colonial subjects had no recourse to legal protection in the metropole from colonial decrees.

However, in the summer of 1905, a contingent from Congress visited the Philippines to study the situation, although many wanted this confined to an economic study.

It was only through the efforts of a member of the League who then happened to be in the Philippine Islands, urged and enforced by Senator Patterson and Representative W.A. Jones, that two days' hearing was given to the pleas which the Filipinos wished to offer and which they did offer, individually and by representative delegations, in behalf of immediate independence. The record of this hearing, which took place in Marble Hall at Manila August 29 and 30, 1905, was published and widely distributed, constituting, as it did, a reasonable appeal for a national evolution under the controlling influence of the large class of

254 Winslow to Ordway, Nov. 14, 1905, Edward Ordway Papers, Manuscript and Archives Division, New York Public Library.
intelligent and educated Filipinos competent to guide their countrymen towards a satisfactory and orderly government (Winslow 1908: 10).

Anti-imperialists referred to this meeting as "The Marble Hall Conference with Filipinos." This meeting was particularly heartening for anti-imperialists because it was reaffirming proof that Filipinos still wanted independence and were willing to express it to U.S. authorities when their testimony was allowed.

In the interest of enlightening the U.S. public on the situation in the Philippines and disproving the idea that Filipinos were unsuitable for self-government, the AIL translated Filipino newspaper editorials and began publishing them in English in the U.S. as "Voice of the Filipinos." They collected editorials from El Renacimiento, La Vanguardia, and El Ideal and distributed copies in the U.S. "before the eyes of many hundreds of thousands of readers" to demonstrate Filipinos' capacity for self-government and express Filipino views unfiltered by the U.S. press or government officials. In this way, Filipino opposition to a replay of the 1904 World's Fair displays of Filipino tribes in 1908 was expressed, as well as the frustration Filipinos felt with the

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255 Record Books of the Anti-Imperialist League, Vol. 3 (March 23-1905-March 11, 1909), Maria Lanzar-Carpio Papers, Hatcher Graduate Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.


257 Record Books of the Anti-Imperialist League, Vol. 4, (March 25, 1909-September 11, 1914), Maria Lanzar-Carpio Papers, Hatcher Graduate Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.


\textit{Moro Massacre}

In early 1906, while Wilson, Doherty, and Warren were still in the Philippines, news broke in the U.S. about the "Moro Massacre" also known as the Battle of Mt. Dajo and the Battle of Jolo. This "battle" took place on the island of Jolo in a crater at the top of Mt. Dajo, where Filipino Muslims were surrounded by U.S. military. It was led by Major-General Leonard Wood, who became the Governor of the Philippines 20 years later. At the end 600 Filipinos and 18 U.S. soldiers were killed, again, with no prisoners taken. The incident sparked a new spate of anti-imperialist cartoons and editorials.

The AIL in Boston used the situation to make a postcard of a picture taken on the battlefield of the aftermath in which men, women, and children lay dead in a crater with U.S. soldiers standing over them. Above the picture reads words of congratulation from President Theodore Roosevelt to Woods: "I congratulate you and the officers and men of your command upon the brave feat of arms wherein you and they so well upheld the honor of the American flag."
Underneath the photo gave its referencing information: “From a negative made on the spot the day of the ‘brave feat of arms’ when six hundred Moros, men, women and children were killed by the Army under Gen. Wood: ‘a logical incident in the sequence of events which will include the whole history of the Philippine possession’.” Anti-imperialists wanted to raise the consciousness of U.S. citizens at home as to the violence still occurring in the Philippines, frustrated by the public indifference. Using a picture that displayed these deaths on a postcard was a new tactic for the AIL. However, this was done in the historical context of trading postcards that recorded the lynching of Black men. Lynching postcards, as a genre, were treated as dark proof of the barbarity of some whites (mostly Southern) evincing horror from the disgrace. But these postcards were
also treated as the spectacular proof of white superiority for others. In any case, news of
the massacre and the pictures elicited a new spike in the public debate on the
Philippines.²⁶⁰

Moorfield Storey, then president of the AIL, wrote about the incident in the

*Boston Daily Advertiser*, March 13, 1906, informing the public of the incident and

comparing the situation in the larger inter-imperial and intra-imperial fields.

Suppose we had heard that the British had dealt thus with a Boer force, that the
Turks had so attacked and slaughtered Armenians, that colored men had so
massacred white men, or even that 600 song birds had been slaughtered for their
plumage, would not our papers have been filled with protests and expressions of
horror? [...] This outrage unhappily is only one in a series. The bloody record of
the Philippine conquest tells of many battles where Filipinos were killed, but none
were wounded and no prisoners taken; of systematic torture, of villages destroyed
by wholesale, of cruel reconcentrations, of brutality in every form...The spirit
which slaughters brown men in Jolo is the spirit which lynches black men in the
South. When such crimes go unpunished, far more when the men who commit
them are praised and rewarded the youth of the country is taught an evil lesson.

Race prejudice is strengthened and the love of justice, the corner-stone of free
institutions, is weakened. When a man is lynched the community which tolerates

²⁶⁰ Moorfield Storey collected many of these article clippings and cartoons, saving them
in his scrapbook, including: “Letters to the editor: The Battle in the Crater,” “Parkhurst
on Jolo Battle,” “Sharp Clash on Moro Massacre,” “Unavoidably Killed,” “Moro
Massacre Great Blot on American Name,” “What Passeth in Moro Land,” “Peace in
Jolo,” “Massacre of Moros,” “A Moro Slaughter,” “Soldiers View of 3 Days’ Jolo
Slaughter,” “900 Killed?” “Jolo and the Moros,” “Comment on Jolo Outbreak,” “Moros a
Fanatical People,” “Six Hundred Moros Have Sworn Allegiance,” “Lest We Forget,”
“The Latest Moro Slaughter,” “Maj-Gen Woods Explains.”
the offence [sic] suffers more than the victim. When we honor brutality in our army we brutalize ourselves. Our colleges have failed if they have not taught a better civilization than this, our church have failed if this is their Christianity.261 Storey's analysis of violence in the Philippines and violence at home against Blacks centered on the effects of "race prejudice" purchased with a state that inscribed an underlying and unquestioned white superiority. When such violent crimes not only went without punishment, but also left with praise, "civilization" was thoroughly discredited.

Another man wrote in an article "Sharp Clash on the Moro Massacre" in the Boston Herald, "we are carrying the white man’s burden. We are the greatest race on earth, but we must remember its superiority, its nobility and its responsibility. And as the other side is barbarous, ignorant, savage, so much more deeply must we recognize our responsibility."262 No practice could prove that whites held any savage or ignoble elements. Only the savagery of Filipinos proved the need for white’s to act responsibly—and physical violence is erased. To respond to these types of imperialist explanations, another article in the Washington Post by Anti-Imperialist League Vice President Charles Parkhurst read:

Consider the easy and self-satisfied way in which we regard the mowing down of the savage and semi-savage in the Philippine Islands, when they stand in the way of the national purpose, of which, after eight years of ‘benevolent assimilation’ we have just had a most startling and heart-rending example in the bombarding to

262 Emphasis added, Moorfield Storey Papers, Manuscript and Archives Division, Library of Congress.
death of 600 men, women, and children, collected in a crater in the Moro Islands.\textsuperscript{263}

The Filipinos killed were unquestionably "savage" in the debates, which both described their lifestyles and indicted their stunted development. In his personal papers, anti-imperialist Samuel Clemens (Mark Twain) wrote:

\begin{quote}
Let us now consider two or three details of our military history. In one of the great battles of the Civil War ten per cent of the forces engaged on the two sides were wounded. At Waterloo, where four hundred thousand men were present on the two sides, fifty thousand fell, killed and wounded, in five hours, leaving three hundred and fifty thousand sound and all right for further adventures. Eight years ago, when the pathetic comedy called the Cuban War was played, we summoned two hundred and fifty thousand men. We fought a number of showy battles, and when the war was over we had lost two hundred and sixty-eight men out of our two hundred and fifty thousand, in killed and wounded in the field, and just fourteen times as many by the gallantry of the army doctors in the hospitals and camps. We did not exterminate the Spaniards-far from it. In each engagement we left an average of two percent of the enemy killed or crippled on the field.

Contrast these things with the great statistics which have arrived from the Moro crater!\textsuperscript{[...]}\textsuperscript{264}
\end{quote}

However, these words were not published until 1924, eighteen years later, in a biography of Clemens. Beyond anti-imperialist protests, what happened instead were justificatory explanations, but mainly public indifference. Meanwhile the administration continued to laud the military's effectiveness in the Philippines, covering up the massacre with praise and patriotism. The irony of such a response was captured best in cartoons.

Image 13. "Covering It Up." Moorfield Storey Scrapbook. This image depicts Secretary of War, William H. Taft and President Theodore Roosevelt using the flag to cover up the incident on Jolo, Philippines. Library of Congress. Picture taken by author.

Benevolent Assimilation as Veil: U.S. Indifference and Forgetting

Self-satisfied indifference is a collective phenomenon of empire’s citizens regarding colonial subjects (Knowles 2003). It is also an indication of a system of privilege and how feelings, even of indifference and complacency, are structured. In his preface to Our Philippine Problem, H. Parker Willis (1905) wrote:

It is high time that citizens of the United States, interested in the conduct of our government in harmony with its fundamental principles, should abandon the attitude of indifference or obstinacy which many of them have hitherto adopted.
Whatever be our ultimate policy with reference to the islands, it can be properly
and honourably worked out only through the same direct interest and hearty co-
operation on the part of Americans which is the moving spirit in our management
of home affairs (pp. v-vi).²⁶⁵

By 1905 when Willis wrote his preface, it was clear to him that anti-imperialists were no
longer only struggling to convince government officials of the dire consequences of
imperialism for the U.S. and the Philippines, they were also struggling to convince the
U.S. public that it was a matter worthy of further debate and action. Erving Winslow also
referenced the problem of this attitude, stating in his 1905 Secretary's Report, "Our cause
must gain by every shock to that self-satisfied complacency with which the guardianship
of the weaker by the stronger nations, especially when the guardian is Anglo-Saxon, has
been accepted of late as a heaven-born institution."²⁶⁶ Indeed, the attitude of indifference
only increased after the senate hearings ended and President Roosevelt declared the war
over.

Defenders of imperialism invoked the commendable strides of benevolent
assimilation policies, especially the education system, when anti-imperialist critiques of
the U.S. in the Philippines were raised. In fact, colonial education in the Philippines had
made significant institutional inroads that defenders could point to in addition to some
elections. Therefore, they argued the U.S. involvement in the Philippines could not only
be distilled to violent practices. It was the experiment in exporting democracy and
education that interested U.S. Americans at home. The smugness of such an experiment

²⁶⁶ Record Books of the Anti-Imperialist League, Vol. 3 (March 23-1905-March 11,
1909), Maria Lanzar-Carpio Papers, Hatcher Graduate Library, University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor.
often came and went "without comment" (Jung 2009) because of racialized conceptions of "civilization."

The anti-imperialists left active after 1902 were those who most questioned the practices of racial ordering. Herbert Welsh had been an active founder of the Indian Rights Association, advocating for American Indians, and Moorfield Storey, always critical of lynching, became the first president of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People in 1910. These two organizers held incredible influence over the AIL's strategy after 1901 and were the most likely to listen to the anti-imperialist views of people of color. The question of racial paternalism informing their goals for Filipinos is unclear. What is clear is that their activism changed them. Welsh suffered a nervous breakdown after the SIAP was unsuccessful, and Storey became even more involved in advocating racial justice for Blacks as an activist lawyer. Fiske Warren resigned as a member of the AIL's executive committee so that he could be more directly involved in working with Filipinos without tarnishing the reputation of the AIL, leaving the activities of Welsh and Storey to work toward swaying public opinion and the activities of the government. This was concomitant with their expertise and resources. Fiske Warren used his financial resources, social networks, and influence to facilitate Filipinos' issues to be heard at home. They each leveraged their personal resources to maximize their structural influence in thwarting benevolent assimilation from functioning as a veil, shielding the U.S. public from questions of U.S. culpability in the racialized violence in the Philippines.

This led to public debates over the selective application of the established rules of

\[\text{267 Storey was unabashedly prejudiced against Irish workers in Boston and Welsh's work for Indians on reservations was paternalist framed in racialized "civilization."}\]
war using torture to extract information in the water cure, reconcentration, and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus as well as the resounding, manufactured indifference to the "Moro Massacre." This litany of issues publicized and debated by anti-imperialists were all examples of legalized "states of exception" (Agamben 2005). According to Giorgio Agamben (2005), "A recurrent opinion posits the concept of necessity as the foundation of the state of exception... More than rendering the illicit licit, necessity acts here to justify a single, specific case of transgression by means of an exception" (p. 24). If this is the case, determining who defines the social and legal meaning of necessity is worthwhile. In this case, it was unquestionably the imperialist white men in the U.S. government.

Agamben goes on to say, "[T]he state of exception separates the norm from its application in order to make its application possible. It introduces a zone of anomic into the law in order to make the effective regulation [normazione] of the real possible" (Agamben 2005: 36, emphasis added). In this instance, once the Treaty of Paris was signed, it was the institutions in the U.S. government, especially the officers in the field determining the application of rules of war, and the Secretary of War determining the scope of the "anomic zone" of colonial law where exceptions were possible. Here, rearticulations of "civilization" served to "regulate the real" functioning to separate the norm for whites from applying to Filipinos. "[A]t issue in the anomic zone is the relation between violence and law--in the last analysis, the status of violence as a cipher for human action" (Agamben 2005: 59). At every angle in the anti-imperialists struggle with imperialist violence, the schema of a racialized "civilization" introduced a zone of "anomie" into what seemed to them clearly illegal applications of violence. From this, we
can see the violence as a cipher of a racial state, with a racialized imperialist project.

Benevolent assimilation, therefore, served as an effective veil from the immorality (by their own standards) of the racial hierarchy, enabling the indifference of the U.S. public. The indifference to the violence at the time, in turn, also enabled its eventual forgetting. Racial schemas of America’s exceptional benevolence and practices of colonial education and colonial management instituting democratic practices enabled the violence to be forgotten in the anti-imperialists' time and in ours. Therefore, the racial state of exception was expanded along with the territory under the control of the U.S.
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION: THE EMERGENCE OF RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE RACIAL STATE OF EXCEPTION

It is not easy to escape mentally from a concrete situation, to refuse its ideology while continuing to live with its actual relationships. From now on, ["the colonizer who refuses"] lives his life under the sign of a contradiction which looms at every step, depriving him of all coherence and all tranquility.

– Albert Memmi (1965) *The Colonizer and the Colonized*, (p. 20).

Civilizing Violence

Anti-imperialist schemas took shape in debates with pro-imperialists over civilization and over racialized violence, but they also developed in contentious practices. Therefore, I turn to focus on anti-imperialist practices to further explain changes in activism. Changes in anti-imperialist schemas were shown by the increased focus on protesting violence in the Philippines between 1902-1906, the lull of anti-imperialist activism in 1907-1908, and finally in the shift of individual anti-imperialists' activism beginning in 1909 with the start of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in the U.S. and the start of Gota de Leche in the Philippines, in 1911 with the start of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), as well as individual anti-imperialist's associations with the National Consumer's League (NCL) and the Women's Trade Union League (WTUL).

This shift in activism showed a deeper shift in defining civilization. Rather than simply argue against imperialism, they would demonstrate how U.S. democracy, and on the grander level civilization, should operate, or in Sumner's words display "the art of living on this earth." The organizations anti-imperialists turned their attention to and, often, helped establish operated through a vision for a more just and equitable society, not
an agenda narrowly organized around opposition to particular U.S. policies (such as in the definition of anti-imperialism). Their national organizations focused on reducing violence and inequality against people of color and workers within the metropole, while the women's international organization focused on reducing violence across borders.

In 1908, the AIL in Boston published *The Anti-Imperialist League: Apologia Pro Vita Sua* (which means "in defense of one's life"). In this piece, Erving Winslow gives a history of what the anti-imperialists tried to accomplish in the decade of their opposition to imperialism. He stated that while they originally organized to oppose the ratification of the Treaty of Paris in 1898, "the motto of the League during the whole of the last ten years has been 'Fiat Lux' [Let there be light], in the belief that the light of knowledge must finally bring the Republic back to its true mind and its righteous attitude" (p. 5).

Winslow went on,

[s]ince that time the Anti-Imperialist's [sic] labors have been devoted to ameliorating the conditions and making reparation for the wrongs caused by the colossal blunder or crime involved in the efforts to subdue and retain under the United States sovereignty a people who had substantially won their independence from the Spanish power with which the United States was at war [...] (p. 5).

In fact, it had been the painful duty of the League to expose the 'marked severities' inflicted by the United States troops upon the Filipinos during the progress of the war of subjugation [...] The work of the League in this direction, which is very thoroughly substantiated, was made very difficult by the efforts of the Secretary of War to whitewash the proceedings in the army. *The blame for the individual*
exercise of brutal conduct was not attributed so much to the persons perpetrating it as to the conditions in which they had been placed by their superiors... (p. 8, my emphasis).

The misinformation by the McKinley and Roosevelt administrations focusing on the "benevolence" of the U.S. occupation of the Philippines coupled with stories of egregious violence coming from soldiers rather than news sources presented a call to duty for anti-imperialists (Storey and Lichauco 1924). They hoped to show the duplicity of the administrations' policies by informing the U.S. American public of the violent practices used to secure the Philippines as a colonial dependency and which was actively being suppressed by military officials, including Secretary of War Elihu Root. For example, Winslow (1908) pointed out,

The horrible methods of 'reconcentration' which continued up to a period so late as the summer of 1906, the expulsion of men, women and children from their homes, herded together under rigid surveillance, exposed to all weathers and without proper food, have been described. These Weyler methods, which contributed so largely to arouse the fiery indignation felt against the Spanish rule in Cuba, are enumerated in great detail in the League's publications (pp. 8-9).

True to the AIL's reliance on the influence of reputation, Winslow (1908) named the well-known anti-imperialists who participated in the cause including two former Presidents of the United States, Benjamin Harrison and Grover Cleveland, five former Cabinet officers, fifteen U.S. Senators, six Governors of states, eleven Congressmen, sixteen university Presidents and officials, "Ecclesiastics by hundreds" naming twenty-seven, "Chief justices of many states, judges, and lawyers" specifically naming eleven,
"more than one hundred and fifty thousand citizens of the United States" naming twenty-eight luminaries (pp. 4-5). Winslow also tallied the credit pro-imperialist supporters gave to AIL efforts including William Taft and President Roosevelt who "while encouraging the hope of Philippine independence within one generation instead of the two or three which was the former minimum limit, has exalted the Anti-Imperialists from the classification of 'traitors,' to which they were inured, to that of 'doctrinaires'—or idealists—which, despite its intent, is the best possible tribute from one who reckons himself among the 'practical men' whose scorn is so often the highest praise" (p. 5). Anti-imperialists defended themselves from being labeled "traitors" and took pains to make sure their actions could not justify the appropriateness of the word; however, it also seems some of them took comfort in knowing that certain pro-imperialists deemed them as such. But, regardless of the name-calling of pro-imperialists, Winslow wanted it to be clear anti-imperialists were not finished.

The League is now making an earnest demand for the passage of a resolution by Congress similar to the 'Teller amendment' in the Cuban settlement, promising independence to the Filipinos, so that content and good order may be established in the Philippines and hopeful and legitimate progress be made toward the goal which is pointed out to them; the only real security for the fulfillment of the pledge 'the Philippines for the Filipinos (Winslow 1908: 13).

By 1907, anti-imperialists began to notice a different portrayal of them in mainstream newspapers. It seemed the public was "surcharged with weariness and disgust toward the whole Philippine experiment" leaving anti-imperialists "more
respected" and their proposals to be more persuasive.268 "The League has circulated during the past decade, more than a million-and-a-half documents; it has promoted many public meetings and has furnished much matter to the press, and material for debates to members of the Congress and to the representatives of nearly a thousand organizations in colleges, lyceums and schools throughout the United States" (Winslow 1908: 13). In 1910 the AIL issued a Petition to the Senate and House of Representatives again to declare the "unequivocal" terms of independence for the Philippines, which included treaties to protect the Philippines such as was enjoyed by Switzerland and Norway, protection from capitalists hoping to "exploit the islands for their own pecuniary benefit," immediate adoption of measures that would "enable the Filipino people to develop their country for themselves and with their own capital." They closed their petition stating:

With race problems, labor problems, taxation problems at home, let us not remain supine while we are being committed to the creation of like problems in distant colonies, problems which will remain to be a constant source of trouble and expense until the country does what we urge it to do now; that is, leave every people free to govern themselves.269

On that note, Manuel Quezon addressed the 1919 annual anti-imperialist meeting.270 However, the messages were less clear than they had been from Filipino leaders earlier on. By 1922 the AIL had disbanded. They were unconvinced the Filipino

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270 Report of the Twentieth Annual meeting. Box 1, Anti-Imperialist League Papers, Swarthmore Peace Collection, Swarthmore College.
leadership, elected under U.S. colonial rule, had a genuine interest in independence (Zwick 2005). And they were not comfortable appealing for Filipino independence without an accompanying Filipino campaign. The AIL had been careful throughout not to appear as if they were leading the campaign for Filipino independence and were, therefore, not traitors to the U.S., but rather, patriots defending the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution. Schurz exemplified this sentiment in a letter to Erving Winslow dated February 20, 1906, stating,

I have been seriously considering what I, or any of us old anti-imperialists, might write for the Filipino [student's association] paper in California that would be of any real use to the Filipinos themselves or to anybody else. Might we tell them to hold fast to the idea of independence? It has always been our contention that the Filipinos were unanimously for independence, and would remain so, without being confirmed in their faith by us. This has been always, and is now, one of our principal points. Would it be wise now to do anything that might make it appear as if we had reason not to believe in our own contention? Will it not be much wiser to let those young men go on by themselves and to avoid the appearance as if they were in our leading-strings and as if they needed pushing from this quarter (Bancroft 1913: 443, emphasis in original).

His letter was in response to a Filipino Students Association request, authored by Felipe Buencamino, Jr., at University of California Berkeley asking to align themselves with the AIL and reaching out to gain monetary support, which the AIL provided, as well as to gain political support, which the AIL provided in personal correspondence but not in any significantly public way. This interaction demonstrates anti-imperialists' ambivalence
with regard to becoming too involved with Filipino organizations, but it also shows the interdependent relationship between anti-imperialists in the metropole and their reliance on a Filipino movement for independence in the colony.

Anti-imperialism was significantly transformed in the process of making the movement. According to Sewell (2005) "[Events] rearticulated structures, transformed cultures, were crucially shaped by local conditions, were bathed in powerful emotions, were acts of collective creativity, were punctuated by improvised rituals, and produced yet more events" (p. 257). As an "event," the Treaty of Paris and benevolent assimilation proclamation began the "cascade effect" that changed state structures to produce imperialism. Glaring U.S. imperialism spawned the nationalist anti-imperialist movement, in the abolitionist tradition, and in the metropole.

In only this respect, the fact that there was a mass movement against pro-imperialist claims in the metropole—as opposed to only an anti-colonial movement in the colony--can U.S. empire lay claim to an "exceptional" empire. U.S. political culture was transformed in the wake of rights being withheld from Filipinos as colonial subjects, with the racialized indifference of the public shaped by the spatial distance and the corresponding time lag in learning of conditions in the Philippines. Simultaneously, outraged anti-imperialists argued for Filipino rights and for the integrity of the democratic process of the U.S. Their agitation created the event of the SIAP. However, a racialized state of exception was sanctioned through the ritual nature of the SIAP and

Sewell (2005) states further, "Once again, deciding how to bound an event is necessarily a matter of judgement. One may state as a rule of thumb that how an analyst should delimit an event will depend on the structural transformation to be explained." (p. 261). The structural transformation I use to bound the limits of defining the benevolent assimilation proclamation as an event is the racial state of exception.
Both the Filipino movement for independence and the anti-imperialist movement in the metropole were nationalist, but their nationalist causes were aligned. Initially, anti-imperialists' concerns remained primarily focused on the U.S. nation-state, the form of government, and the trespasses against a sacred democratic process. In the course of the movement, anti-imperialists expanded their focus from U.S. governance to U.S. military violence against racialized subjects. This happened in cooperation with Filipinas/os, like the Lopez family, revolutionary leaders, and newspapers in Manila.

Anti-imperialist struggles opened new avenues to advocate for political, civil, and economic rights. These struggles not only creatively changed cultural practices for advocating for rights, but also internal struggles informed the development of new organizations. The leadership of the AIL believed in the morality of U.S. democratic traditions. They adhered to and preached a distinctly American democratic civil religion harkening back to the founding fathers and the abolitionist movement. Their critiques of imperialism were rooted in the past. Because of this, their creativity and inclusiveness were conservative and limited. While on the liberal end of civil society, they could not resolve their ambivalence of fully including women (Murphy 2009), Blacks, or Filipinas/os.

The deep ambivalence of the anti-imperialist movement was indicative of the various conflicts at the turn of the twentieth century. Racial ideas of progress were drowning in social Darwinism. Progressive support for the women's movement had stalled with the aging of Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and their contemporaries along with the development of the settlement movement. Much of the
AIL leadership was split in their support of labor and certainly most were averse to populism. They looked to the past as the answer to the new problems of imperialism, what Beisner (1968) called aiming for the "status quo ante bellum" (p. 120).

Limiting their vision of the future to the viability of past policies and conceptions of citizenship that limited full democratic participation to white men hindered the mass appeal for the AIL's logical allies. Many white women and Black anti-imperialists, both women and men, held conceptions of anti-imperialism tied to stopping violence and the racialization of subject peoples. The AIL leadership eventually picked up this argument in full force, but only after they had lost wide support.

For white men, by and large their generation was tantamount to their political positions. Pro-imperialist masculinities became more synonymous with young white men and the nation (Nelson 1998). Alternative anti-imperialist masculinities became less effective for organizing white men and became associated with older generations. The majority of the AIL leadership was also over 60. "Indeed the average age was over sixty, the median sixty, and the mode[...] was sixty-three. Within a decade many of the League's principal leaders would be dead, and as Moorfield Storey was later to remark, 'the young men do not take up the work.' In counter-distinction the leading advocates and publicists of imperialism averaged over fifteen years younger and were in their prime" (Tompkins 1970: 158). As Connell (1998) notes, "at the level of collective practice, masculinities are reconstituted by the remaking of gender meanings and the reshaping of the institutional contexts of practice" (p. 7). The deepening schema of the racialized and gendered "imagined" nation (Anderson 1991) as a family, with the white man tutoring his
"little brown brother" (Filipinos) in the ways of democracy (Kramer 2006), affected the composition based on social position of future organizations against imperialist violence.

With white men becoming less involved in organizing against imperialist violence in the U.S., white women were becoming more active and organized, not only within the bounds of the nation, but expanding to what they saw as a cosmopolitan "internationalism" in contrast to the provincial "patriotism" of earlier anti-imperialists. Gendered relations split actors materially and deepened the gendered bifurcation of violence and peace. Imperialists used a familiar gendered schema, the "white man's burden," of a paternal, but martial, masculinity and explicitly feminized anti-imperialist politics. This gendered process proved to be significant in limiting the expanse and influence of the AIL (Einwohner, Hallander, Olson 2000).

As martial masculinity became the dominant nationalist masculinity, the decline of white men organizing against imperialist violence opened space for white women in their prime to expand their involvement through expressly gendered organizing. The continued gendering of violence as masculine served to undercut the legitimation of anti-imperialist activism. In On Violence (1970) Hannah Arendt stated, "No one engaged in thought about history and politics can remain unaware of the enormous role violence has always played in human affairs, and it is at first glance rather surprising that violence has been singled out so seldom for special consideration[...]This shows to what an extent violence and its arbitrariness were taken for granted and therefore neglected; no one questions or examines what is obvious to all" (p. 8). But some do question. They have questioned what seemed obvious to all and the arbitrariness of violence against some

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272 "International" (actually white European and American alliances) woman's suffrage alliances incited this development, as they were organized politically for the vote.
bodies. Nonetheless, Arendt's point stands: many also have taken for granted and
neglected the question of violence in U.S. policy, to a formative extent. Further, the
taken-for-granted nature of racialized and ethnic violence is not only about neglecting to
question violence. It is also about an actively maintained repression and denial of history.

In the case of the United States, facing this history would require a new narrative
of the development of the state. It would require acknowledgements of empire and
democracy, one fortifying the other. What is missing from Arendt's analysis on the
politics of ignorance and forgetting is the materialist concern for social position. Who are
her "no one's" and "all"? They are the ones with the legitimacy enough to be considered.
Those who have questioned all along may not have been heard by those with societal
influence and legitimacy.

Racialized nationalism reifying white supremacy derogatorily feminized and
dismissed opposition to imperialist violence. And following, white women took over the
vanguard for organizing against political violence. A deepened racialization of anti-
violence activism as a white project occurred with white women at the helm, feeding
into their "internationalism" after having been excluded from the masculine nation at
home. For example, it took a lobby by the International Council of Women of the Darker
Races for WILPF to consider the U.S.'s involvement in Haiti as part of their activism.

273 I share Vron Ware's (1992) characterization of approaching white women's activism
and issues of race and gender when she states in her introduction to Beyond the Pale,
"The purpose of exploring the histories of slavery and imperialism is not to bring white
women to account for past misdeeds, nor to search for heroines whose reputations can
help to absolve the rest from guilt, but to find out how white women negotiated questions
of race and racism--as well as class and gender. In other words what we need to do is to
trace ideas that have historically constructed definitions of white womanhood and to ask
how these ideas have been formed either in conjunction with or in opposition to feminist
ideology" (p. 43).
And, in 1919, Mary Church Terrell noted that she was the only non-white person attending the WILPF meeting and because of this she felt she was "representing women of all non-white countries in the world" (Winkler-Morey 2001).274

Meanwhile, white men's activism refocused on racialized political violence but became more metropole-centered. For white men seeing the contradictions between imperialism and democracy275 opposing imperialist violence transformed from movement politics to activism with a biracial organization that included individually regarded women in the NAACP. More women, by this time, had made themselves indispensable to progressive campaigns.

Many organizations had overlapping membership with the AIL. Significant overlap between activist networks of anti-imperialists included ethical reformers and future civil rights organizations, such as the NAACP, WILPF, WTUL, and Ethical Culture and Civil Liberties Bureau activists, which later would become the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). While these organizations all became significant organizations for progressive social change, they each had a different emphasis. The significant role of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution is the nodal point around which all these organizations revolve for progressive change. The NAACP was founded in 1909, and Moorfield Storey simultaneously served as president for both the AIL and the NAACP (McPherson 1975). WILPF was founded in 1915, with Jane Addams serving

274 Winkler-Morey (2001) argues that it was only after women from Latin America and Afro-American women sought alliances with WILPF that "lessons about the realities of unequal exchange and the racism under-girding government justifications for U.S. hegemony" convinced WILPF to critique economic imperialism and forge transnational networks beyond Europe (p. 188).

275 Not as soldiers, or potentially drafted soldiers, but as white men and citizens with no potential of this violence coming to them personally.
as its first president. She also was one of the founders of NAACP (Bussey and Tims 1980) and was simultaneously a vice president of the AIL. All of these organizations focused their energies on lobbying rather than electoral politics, taking a strategy from women-led organizations (Clemens 1993). Elizabeth Glendower Evans worked with Boston anti-imperialists, especially the Warrens and Louis Brandeis, as well as the WTUL after meeting Florence Kelley in Chicago. She was a delegate for WILPF at the Hague in 1915 and became national director of the ACLU in 1920. Felix Adler, who was also an anti-imperialist in New York, founded the Ethical Culture Society, founded the National Child Labor Committee, and was involved in the Civil Liberties Bureau. The anti-imperialist movement during the Philippine-American War may have declined, but in the wake of its organizational decline rights organizations emerged.

In addition to the emergence of rights organizations, anti-imperialist activities contributed to the emergence of the first racial state of exception. The racial state of exception emerged from anti-imperialists' struggles to establish racialized violent practices stemming from imperialist advances and outside established rules of war as illegal and immoral. This was achieved in the SIAP hearings, where the military rule of law was expounded, bracketed for particular scenarios or people, and exceptions justified through the ambiguity of a racialized "civilization." However, "The structural rearticulation could only be definitive when it had been sanctioned at the pinnacle of state authority" (Sewell 2005: p. 258). The racial state of exception went from amorphous practices to a structural rearticulation when the state sanctioned ambiguous rationales for violent practices of reconcentration, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and blamed individual U.S. soldiers, and Macabebes, for torture like the "water cure."
Spatial conditions, such as distance between the metropole and the colony, contributed to the imperialist racial state of exception as well (Sewell 2005). The physical distance created a lag for obtaining information regarding what was happening in the Philippines and obstructed the timeliness of informing the U.S. public. The time lapse also allowed pro-imperialists to argue the perpetrators of violence were already out of the military and no longer a threat to Filipinas/os nor to carrying out U.S. "civilization" in the colony. Furthermore, the spatial distance between the metropole and colony allowed U.S. citizens their indifference because their daily lives seemingly remained unchanged regardless of what happened in the Philippines. The public indifference, in contrast, allowed pro-imperialists to frame the urgency of anti-imperialists as needlessly overwrought, contributing to sanctioning the dismissal of the SIAP before damage was done to the administration or their policies in the Philippines. Following immediately on the heels of the dismissed investigations came Roosevelt's declaration of the war in the Philippines over on July 4, 1902.

Ann Laura Stoler (2006) asserts investigating these legacies "is neither to claim the conceit of prediction, nor to reduce what is specific to the violences of this contemporary moment as history replayed as farce. Rather, it is to suggest that the conditions of possibility for what U.S[]. empire looks like today may be deeply embedded in the blunt and elusive nature of a broader range of historical imperial formations" (p. 93, my emphasis). Anti-imperialist activities provide a deeper understanding of racial states of exception that seemingly hiccup as historical spasms of imperialist violence, such as "exceptionalist" discourses and practices attempting to legitimate and/or confuse the legality of violent tactics on racialized subjects without protected rights. Under the
spasmodic conditions of imperialist expansions and rights contractions, this history also shows the twin development of rights organizations by "the colonizer who refuses" (to use Memmi's phrase) that began to emerge in the U.S. The significance of these twin developments lies in the contradictions of imperialism and democracy as the anti-imperialists noted at the beginning.
REFERENCES


Blount, James Henderson. 1912. The American Occupation of the Philippines, 1898-1912.


APPENDIX

Appendix A.

PRIMARY SOURCES

Archival Collections

Swarthmore Peace Collection, Swarthmore College
Jane Addams Papers
Anti-Imperialist League 1899-1919 Papers
Philippine Box

University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Bentley Historical Library
  Charles Carpenter, soldier 1900-1902
  Frank T. Corriston, soldier with pictures Philippine American War
  Anti-Imperialist League papers
  Joseph Ralston Hayden Papers: Box 21, Fiske Warren Diary
  Dean C. Worcester, An Open letter to the officers and members of the Anti-Imperialist League from Dean C. Worcester
  Earl D. Babst papers
  Jabez Thomas Sunderland papers, anti-imperialist
  Herbert Welsh Papers, anti-imperialist
Hatcher Graduate Library
  Herbert Welsh Papers
  Maria Carpio-Lanzar Papers


Massachusetts Historical Society
Edward Atkinson Papers
George S. Boutwell Papers
Mary S. Cobb Papers
George Frisbie Hoar Papers
Moorfield Storey Papers
National Party Records (Anti-Imperialist ticket) Papers
Alonzo Woodside Papers

New York Public Library
Manuscript and Archives Division, Edward Ordway Papers

Library of Congress
Moorfield Storey Papers
W.A. Croffut Papers
National Archives and Record Administration
Senate Investigation on Affairs in the Philippines

Newspapers
African-American Newspapers
Colored American
Freeman
Planet
Bee

Labor Newspapers
American Freeman/Appeal to Reason
Journal of Knights of Labor
National Labor Tribune
Social Democratic Herald
Workers' Call

Progressive White Papers
Christian Recorder
Boston Transcript
Springfield Republican

Documentary Volumes


**Primary Volumes**


Appendix B.

INCOMPLETE LIST OF ANTI-IMPERIALIST BROADSIDES BY DATE


Apacible, Galicano. 1900. *To the American People*.


1903. *Mass Meetings of Protest Against the Suppression of Truth About the Philippines."* Boston.

O'Reilly, Jas. T. 1903. *The Civilizers of the Philippines*.


Unzon, Felix, Vicente Paz Rillo, Vivencio Ramos, Vicente Almanzor. 1907. *The Calamities of Balayan, P.I. Reply To a Criticism of a Petition Made to the Taft Expedition of 1905 by the Petitioners*.


Appendix C.

BENEVOLENT ASSIMILATION PROCLAMATION AS PUBLICIZED TO THE FILIPINO PEOPLE JANUARY 4, 1899

The destruction of the Spanish fleet in the harbor of Manila by the United States naval squadron commanded by Rear-Admiral Dewey, followed by the reduction of the city and the surrender of the Spanish forces, practically effected the conquest of the Philippine Islands and the suspension of the Spanish sovereignty therein. With the signature of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain by their respective plenipotentiaries at Paris on the 10th instant, and as a result of the victories of American arms, the future control, disposition, and government of the Philippine Islands are ceded to the United States. In the fulfillment of the rights of sovereignty thus acquired and the responsible obligations of government thus assumed, the actual occupation and administration of the entire group of the Philippine Islands becomes immediately necessary, and the military government heretofore maintained by the United States in the city, harbor, and bay of Manila is to be extended with all possible despatch [sic] to the whole of the ceded territory. In performing this duty the military commander of the United States is enjoined to make known to the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands that in succeeding to the sovereignty of Spain, in severing the former political relations, and in establishing a new political power, the authority of the United States is to be exerted for the securing of the persons and property of the people of the islands and for the confirmation of all their private rights and relations. It will be the duty of the commander of the forces of occupation to announce and proclaim in the most public manner that we come, not as invaders or conquerors, but as friends, to protect the natives in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights. All persons who, either by active aid or by honest submission, co-operate with the Government of the United States to give effect to these beneficent purposes will receive the reward of its support and protection. All others will be brought within the lawful rule we have assumed, with firmness if need be, but without severity, so far as possible. Within the absolute domain of military authority, which necessarily is and must remain supreme in the ceded territory until the legislation of the United States shall otherwise provide, the municipal laws of the territory in respect to private rights and property and the repression of crime are to be considered as continuing in force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, so far as practicable. The operations of civil and municipal government are to be performed by such officers as may accept the supremacy of the United States by taking the oath of allegiance, or by officers chosen, as far as practicable, from the inhabitants of the islands. While the control of all the public property and the revenues of the state passes with the cession, and while the use and management of all public means of transportation are necessarily reserved to the authority of the United States, private property, whether belonging to individuals or corporations, is to be respected except for cause duly established. The taxes and duties heretofore payable by the inhabitants to the late government become payable to the authorities of the United States unless it be seen fit to substitute for them other reasonable rates or modes of contribution to the expenses of government, whether general or local. If private property be taken for military use, it shall be paid for when possible in cash, at a fair valuation, and when payment in cash is
not practicable, receipts are to be given. All ports and places in the Philippine Islands in
the actual possession of the land and naval forces of the United States will be opened to
the commerce of all friendly nations. All goods and wares not prohibited for military
reasons by due announcement of the military authority will be admitted upon payment of
such duties and other charges as shall be in force at the time of their importation. Finally,
it should be the earnest wish and paramount aim of the military administration to win the
confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring them
in every possible way that full measure of individual rights and liberties which is the
heritage of free peoples, and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is
one of

BENEVOLENT ASSIMILATION

substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule. In the fulfillment of this
high mission, supporting the temperate administration of affairs for the greatest good of
the governed, there must be sedulously maintained the strong arm of authority, to repress
disturbance and to overcome all obstacles to the bestowal of the blessings of good and
stable government upon the people of the Philippine Islands under the free flag of the
United States.

WILLIAM McKINLEY.
Appendix D.

TIMELINE

1823- Monroe Doctrine – European powers should no longer colonize territories in the western hemisphere or interfere in the affairs of nations in the western hemisphere

1848 – Mexican-American War

1893 – first attempt to take Hawaii as colony

1896 – Filipinos begin fighting for independence from Spain

1898 – Spanish-American War begins and Hawaii is taken as U.S. territory

June 15  First Anti-Imperialist meeting

December 10  Treaty of Paris signed, ceding Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines (for $20 million) to the United States

December 16  McKinley sends Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation by mail

December 21  McKinley wires proclamation to General Otis

1899 – Philippine-American War begins (as well as Boer War in South Africa)

January 4  Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation publicized to Filipinos

January 23  Establishment of First Filipino Republic with Emilio Aguinaldo as President and Apolinario Mabini as Prime Minister

February 4  Fighting begins between U.S. and Philippines

February 6  Treaty of Paris passes in Senate by one vote

   Anti-imperialist meeting at Faneuil Hall

April 30  Chicago Liberty Meetings

October 17  Chicago Anti-Imperialist Conference

1900 – water cure begins in the debate over war (Boxer Rebellion in China, U.S. sends troops from Philippines)

August 15  Liberty Congress of Anti-imperialist Convention endorses W.J. Bryan
November  W. J. Bryans defeated in Presidential bid

1901 – reconcentration policy uncovered

July 4    Civil Government established under William H. Taft

1902 – Senate Investigation on Affairs in the Philippines

July 4 -   End of Philippine-American War declared by President Roosevelt

1903 – "A Massachusetts Woman" reconcentration published by Wilson

    Women's Trade Union League established

1905 – habeas corpus rescinded in provinces of Philippines by Lucas Wright

    Moorfield Storey president of AIL

    H.P. Willis to Philippines

    Fiske Warren to Philippines

1906    Moro massacre

    Dr. D.J. Doherty in Philippines as representative of AIL

1907 – Philippine Assembly Established (renewed call for Independence)

    AIL begins to rely more heavily on Filipino publications, especially from El Renacimiento

1909 – investigation as to whether women should be considered full members of AIL

    National Association for the Advancement of Colored People established

1910 – women voted not to become full members of AIL

1911 – Women's International League for Peace and Freedom established

1912 – Guerilla fighting in Philippines ceases

1914 – Jones Bill passed stating Philippines should have independent government

1916 – Philippine Legislature organized

1917 – U.S. enters World War I

1920– 19th Amendment passes granting women the right to vote

1922 – AIL disbanded
Appendix E.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIL</td>
<td>Anti-Imperialist League</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAR</td>
<td>Daughters of the American Revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAACP</td>
<td>National Association for the Advancement of Colored People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIAP</td>
<td>Senate Investigation on Affairs in the Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCTU</td>
<td>Women's Christian Temperance Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>WILPF</td>
<td>Women's International League for Peace and Freedom</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTUL</td>
<td>Women's Trade Union League</td>
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ERIN LEIGH MURPHY

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EDUCATION

Ph.D. Sociology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, July, 2009.
Dissertation Committee: Moon-Kie Jung (chair), Julian Go, Anna-Maria Marshall, Winifred Poster, David Roediger

Preliminary Exam, Race, Class, Gender; Political Sociology, 2004.

M.A. Sociology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2001-2003.

Cum Laude, With Honors in Sociology

RESEARCH & TEACHING INTERESTS

Comparative Race & Ethnicity; Historical Sociology; Imperialism; Political Sociology; Race, Class, & Gender; Social Change; Violence

PUBLICATIONS


**WORKS IN PROGRESS**


"Limiting the Law of Empire: Anti-Imperialism and Imperialist State Formation during the Philippine-American War" (with Anna-Maria Marshall).


"Water Torture and the United States: Comparing the Past with the Present." (1-30).

**FELLOWSHIPS AND GRANTS**

*Graduate College Dissertation Completion Fellowship* ($17,000), University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2008-2009.

*Geisert Dissertation Fellowship* ($1,000), Department of Sociology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Spring 2008.

*University of Illinois Fellowship* ($1,000), Department of Sociology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Fall 2007.

*Center on Democracy in a Multiracial Society Fellowship* ($6,000), University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2006-2007.

*Graduate College Dissertation Travel Grant* ($2,500), University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, May-December, 2005.
AWARDS AND HONORS

Znanicki Graduate Publication Prize, Department of Sociology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, for “Women’s Anti-Imperialism, ‘The White Man’s Burden’ and the Philippine-American War: Theorizing Masculinist Ambivalence in Protest.” 2009.

Fall Conference Travel Award, University of Illinois, 2008.

Best Graduate Student Paper Award for “‘Prelude to Imperialism’: Whiteness and Chinese Exclusion in the Reimagining of the United States,” American Sociological Association, Section on Asia and Asian America, 2006.

Znaniecki Graduate Publication Prize, Department of Sociology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, for “‘Prelude to Imperialism’: Whiteness and Chinese Exclusion in the Reimagining of the United States,” 2006.

Gender & Women's Studies Feminist Scholarship Award, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2006.

List of Teachers Rated as Excellent by their Students, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2004.

PROFESSIONAL PRESENTATIONS & INVITED LECTURES

2009 "Water Torture and the United States: Comparing Debates from the Philippine-American War and the War on Terror.” Comparing the Past and Present Mini-Conference, sponsored by the Comparative-Historical Sociology Section of the American Sociological Association, August.


2007 "Liberty or Despotism': The American Anti-Imperialist League and the Chicago Liberty Meetings." Invited Lecture for "Illinois History" (HIS 273), University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, October.
"Imperialism, Democracy, and Social Position: Race, Class, Gender, and Anti-Imperialist Outrage." Poster at the Center on Democracy in a Multiracial Society Annual Reception, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, May.


"The Women of the Anti-Imperialist Movement, 1898-1910." Women and Gender Studies Feminist Scholarship Series, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, April.

2006 "Social Position and Anti-Imperialist Outrage." Center on Democracy in a Multiracial Society Fellowship Seminar, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, December.


2004 “Race, Class, and Gender: Chinese Immigrants during the Anti-Chinese Movement in California.” Graduate Symposium on Women’s and Gender History at University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, March.

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Instructor
"Political Sociology." University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Fall 2007-Spring 2008.


Graduate Teaching Assistantship


Undergraduate Teaching Assistantship
“People and Places: Understanding and Developing Community.” Illinois State University, Department of Sociology. Spring 2000.

Sociology Minor Advisor, Illinois State University, Department of Sociology. 1998-2000.

PROFESSIONAL SERVICE


Interlink Mentor for international graduate students at University of Illinois, 2008-2009.


Graduate Student Advisory Committee. Department of Sociology, University of Illinois. 2003-2005.


Graduate Student Welcoming Committee, Department of Sociology, University of Illinois. Fall 2002-Fall 2003.

PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS

American Sociological Association
Asian American Studies Association
Social Science History Association
Sociologists for Women in Society