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THE WOOD-FORBES MISSION TO THE PHILIPPINES, 1921

BY

FREDERICK G. HOYT

A Dissertation presented to the General Faculty of the Claremont Graduate School in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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PREFACE

Because of the wide variation in the use of accent marks and the tilde for Spanish words in the sources used, it has been thought advisable to eliminate these entirely from this dissertation for the sake of uniformity.

A related problem has been the variations in the spelling of Philippine place names in the sources. Here an attempt at standardization has been made by utilizing the list of geographical names in the Philippine Census for 1918 as a standard. In this official work, the Spanish diacritical marks have been almost entirely eliminated.
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CHAPTER I

WILSONIAN IDEALISM BEQUEATHS THE PHILIPPINES TO HARDING

The rapidity with which the Filipinos escaped from the oppressive rule of Spain and developed internal autonomy under American tutelage—looking toward promised eventual independence—must surely be a unique phenomenon in the history of western imperialism. A graph of Philippine nationalism would present a line moving painfully and spasmodically upward after hundreds of years of suppression under the medieval and exploitative rule of Spain, and then rising rapidly after the collapse of the native insurrection against the United States in 1901. Distinct plateaus on this graph, however, would be evident for the years 1907, 1913, 1916, 1919, and 1920.

What did the victory of the Republican Party in the election of 1920 mean to the Filipino políticos? Did it portend that dangerous days were immediately ahead for Philippine nationalism? Or would they find encouragement for their aspirations in the new administration? The fact remains that Philippine leaders were apprehensive. In assessing the situation, the políticos could not help but be influenced emotionally by the tragedy of their unsuccessful rebellion even if practically they had prospered under American rule. They remembered all too well the part played by previous Republican administrations in attempting to curb Philippine nationalism, starting with McKinley's intervention against Emilio Aguinaldo. Thus it was that the impressive, benign figure of Warren Gamaliel Harding cast such an ominous shadow westward across the Pacific.

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Because of a series of unfortunate misunderstandings between American and Filipino leaders which followed Admiral Dewey's dramatic entrance into
Manila Bay early in the morning of May 1, 1898, a Filipino rebellion against American authority erupted on the main island of Luzon early in February, 1899. Bitter fighting continued for more than two years until the capture of General Emilio Aguinaldo, the insurgent leader, who took the oath of allegiance to the United States on April 19, 1901, and issued a proclamation urging all Filipinos to cease fighting. By June, 1901, peaceful conditions had been restored sufficiently so that executive authority in the greater part of the Islands could be transferred from the army to a civil governor.¹

William Howard Taft, the first Civil Governor of the Philippines, encouraged those Filipinos who were willing to cooperate with the United States in working toward eventual statehood to form the Federal Party (Partido Federalista). The irreconcilable políticos were thus forced to take a stand in opposition by forming the Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista) which won an overwhelming victory at the polls on the slogan of "immediate independence" when elections were held in 1907 for delegates to the first Philippine Assembly.²

Under the able direction of its first Speaker, Sergio Osmeña from Cebu, this first session of the Assembly progressed smoothly to its conclusion when Osmeña himself presented a statement that the Philippines were fully prepared to receive their independence from the United States. As embodied in a formal resolution, it was passed by a vote of fifty-five to fifteen with the opposition vote being that of the Federalists (who now called themselves \"Progressives\" and within a few years would disappear by merging with the new Democratic Party (Partido Democrata). Regularly thereafter at the close of each session:


²Ibid., pp. 143-46, II, 106-08.
session of the Philippine legislature, a similar independence resolution was adopted but with the significant change that subsequent votes were always unanimous regardless of divisions on other matters. 3

From this time onward all Filipino politicians had the same platform with its single plank: INDEPENDENCE. No político dared stray from this slogan if he were serious about his election to political office, and the more vigorous his espousal of the earliest possible independence the better were his chances. Continued Filipino government under American sovereignty "implied an inferiority that Filipino leaders, clever and often well educated politicians, could not admit." 4

The Democratic Party of the United States in its platform of 1912 reaffirmed "the position thrice announced by the Democracy in National Convention assembled [1900, 1904, 1908], against a policy of imperialism and colonial exploitation in the Philippines or elsewhere." In unequivocal words the Democrats reiterated their resolve to strive for "an immediate declaration of the Nation's purpose to recognize the independence of the Philippine Islands as soon as a stable government can be established." 5

As imperialism had not been a major issue during the campaign of 1912, the victory of Woodrow Wilson stimulated much speculation both in the United States and in the Islands concerning his probable Philippine policies. The few statements which he had made were not such as to encourage the políticos.

The first major Philippine problems which confronted Wilson as Pres-


5 Forbes, Philippine Islands, II, 568-69.
ident was the selection of a new Governor General to replace William Cameron Forbes, a man of proven administrative ability (he had held this vital position since 1909) but who as a Republican appointee obviously had to be replaced. Wilson's choice for this important post, and also Philippine Resident Commissioner Manuel L. Quezon's first choice, was New York Representative Francis Burton Harrison, an undistinguished member of Tammany Hall who at that time was the ranking member of the House Ways and Means Committee. Almost immediately after his arrival in Manila, Harrison began a process of Filipinization of the Island government—which was to characterize his nearly eight years as chief executive—by reorganizing the Philippine Commission, which had served as the upper house of the legislature since 1907, giving the Filipinos a majority of five to four. 6

With both houses of the American Congress now heavily Democratic, the politicos hopefully renewed their campaign for Philippine independence. But not until August 29, 1916, was a bill concerning the future of the Philippines enacted into law by Wilson's signature. Commonly known as the "Jones Bill" among Filipinos (or, to the amusement of some Americans, as the "Bill Jones" from the Spanish heritage of having adjectives follow modified nouns), this law, authored by Congressman William Atkinson Jones of Virginia, substituted an elective Senate of twenty-four members for the Philippine Commission. The Governor General had formerly been a member of the Commission with some legislative functions, but now he became solely an executive vested with the veto power which could be overridden by a two-thirds vote of both houses. 7

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7 United States Statutes at Large, XXXIX (1916), 545-56.
But to the Filipinos the most significant feature of the law was a single sentence in the preamble which promised that the United States would "withdraw their sovereignty" and "recognize their [the Philippines'] independence as soon as a stable government can be established." Here for the first time in an act relating to the Philippines the United States gave a qualified promise of eventual political independence. Although these words were merely in the preamble and no criteria were specified to determine when a stable government had been attained, the Filipino politicos gave this statement the widest possible interpretation and regarded it as a direct and official promise of eventual American withdrawal from the Islands. "These words," one author has written, "supplied ammunition for nearly twenty years thereafter in the campaign for independence. No word has been defined and redefined more often by Filipino orators than 'stable.'"

Wilson's wartime appeal for self-determination of all peoples was enthusiastically received by the politicos. Although independence agitation was suspended during the war, the announcement of an armistice dissolved all restraints from the politicians, and almost immediately a Philippine Independence Commission was organized with the avowed purpose of promptly sending an independence mission to Washington.

After an absence of several months, this Independence Mission returned to Manila on July 2, 1919. Although they had been ably led by Senate President Quezon, generously assisted by Governor General Harrison who took accumulated leave to join the Mission in the United States, they returned with empty hands. As Wilson was absent in Europe attending the peace conference, the politicos expended a considerable sum of government funds

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8Ibid., p. 545.

without even seeing the one person who could have offered them even any definite encouragement. 10

Although the Democratic National Convention of 1920 had adopted a Philippine plank ("We favor the granting of independence without unnecessary delay to the . . . Philippine Islands."11), neither imperialism in general nor the Philippine Islands in particular was a campaign issue in this election. In spite of the dismal prospects which faced the politicos following the smashing Republican victory in the November elections—or, it may well have been, because of this—the year ended with a burst of activity related to the "Philippine Question."

Cool December is generally considered by Filipinos to be the best month of the year, and for the politicos December, 1920, was especially notable. It began auspiciously on the very first day of the month when Governor General Harrison's Annual Report to the War Department was made public in which he renewed his demand that independence be granted to the Philippines with the assertion that "the stable Government stated as a prerequisite [in the Jones Act of 1916] has already been established in the Philippines."12

Then the high point of the month for Filipinos came on December 7 when Wilson's last annual message to Congress was transmitted to the Senate and House. These two sentences from it surely were avidly read and re-read in the Islands:

11 Ibid., July 3, 1920.
12 Ibid., December 2, 1920.
Allow me to call your attention to the fact that the people of the Philippine Islands have succeeded in maintaining a stable government since the last action of the Congress in their behalf [the Jones Law, August 29, 1916], and have thus fulfilled the condition set by the Congress as precedent to a consideration of granting independence to the Islands. I respectfully submit that this condition precedent having been fulfilled, it is now our liberty and our duty to keep our promise to the people of those Islands by granting them the independence which they so honorably covet.13

Yet this apparently logical and undebatable statement was presented to a Congress whose attitude was composed of hostility and indifference, and was read by a president-elect with suspicion. Former Governor General Forbes has explained the peculiar inappropriateness of these words as viewed by Harding:

The fact that this message was addressed to Congress after the election of his successor, when both houses had a strong Republican majority, makes it clear that his urging the Republicans to do something which he himself had taken no steps to do in his eight years as President, during six of which the Democrats were in control of both houses, was directly calculated to embarrass his successor. And President-elect Harding did not hesitate to state that he felt that that was the object of the message.14

The Republican victory in 1920 almost certainly warned the politicos that their activities during the eight years of liberal Democratic administration would soon be carefully and critically scrutinized. Also, that fundamental changes likely would be made in the Philippine-American relationship following such investigations was doubtless conceded by them.


14 Forbes, *Philippine Islands*, II, 284, footnote. The following extract from a long memorandum, dated January 14, 1921, following an interview with Harding at Marion, Ohio, on the Philippine situation, would seem to indicate that Forbes may well have done the thinking for Harding on this matter: "He mentioned President Wilson's last message about the Philippines as something of a bomb and that it had troubled him. I told him the situation hadn't changed very much in the last six years, and why should Wilson make this recommendation except with the object of embarrassing his successor . . . ." Appendix No. 2, in Forbes, *Journals*, II, 321. From a carbon copy of this invaluable three volume source, deposited in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress.
Many rumors concerning their fate were nervously followed by the politicos between Harding's election and inauguration. In contrast to general American apathy toward Philippine affairs, any action by Harding that related even slightly to the Islands elicited a response from Filipinos whose campaign for independence had progressed so rapidly under Wilson, international leader in the crusade for self-determination of all peoples, whose idealism had been focused so sharply on the sins of other nations while so puzzlingly accompanied by paralysis regarding implementing his theories of self-determination for those under American rule.

For Harding, the embarrassing dilemma willfully created for him in the Philippines by Wilson demanded prompt resolution. This was but one of many urgent problems for which he needed both men and ideas. He did not long want for a plethora of both; but his difficulty was in judging the competence and suitability of the one and the validity of the other.
CHAPTER II

OF MEN AND A MISSION

Because the United States had been governing the Philippines for almost a quarter of a century, Harding fortunately had available a rather large number of administrators with experience in the Islands from whom a Governor General might be chosen. In addition to civilians, there were also many Army officers who had seen service as quasi-civil administrators, particularly in the Moro regions. Not only was the number of potential Governors General large but the quality was remarkably high, including many impressive names. Here, then, Harding had the opportunity to demonstrate his political acuity in meeting the needs of a serious problem area while free from those pressures which were to make his domestic administration so unfortunate.

On January 6, 1921, President-elect Harding took the first definite step in solving the Philippine problems which would soon he his by writing a short letter to William Cameron Forbes in Boston. Addressing him as "Governor," Harding requested the "very great favor" of his visiting Marion, Ohio.\(^1\)

"He greeted me cordially," Forbes recorded of their interview on January 14, "and told me he had decided to ask me to come on as from all directions he heard that I was the one man in the United States who could handle the Philippine situation." While Forbes mentally noted that "He evidently knows how to please his callers," Harding vigorously pressed his proposal to impress Forbes into Philippine service again.

\(^1\)Forbes, *Journals*, II, 36.
I told him that I was gratified that he felt that way and pleased to be called in to assist [Forbes began his candid response, as he remembered it later] and that he could rely on me to assist to the best of my abilities. That I was in no sense a candidate for office; that I had served my sentence of ten years in exile at hard labor and craved no more of it, but that I was first of all a soldier and would obey orders. He said he understood and appreciate [sic] that. I then explained that I found my powers greatly diminished of work and of achievement as a result of my long years of strain and of illness and that I didn't feel in justice to this work that I ought to go out there and take full charge again . . .

When Forbes suggested that the situation could be handled differently, Harding apparently misunderstood and responded that if Forbes could name the man who could handle the situation he would be sent. Forbes suggested several, including Generals John J. Pershing, Leonard Wood, and James G. Harbord; later he added a civilian, former Vice Governor General Newton Gilbert. When Harding seemed particularly interested in Pershing and Wood, Forbes remarked that if either were appointed Governor General he would automatically be eliminated from assisting "as either of those men would have to be sent off with a flying start and no interference from civilians."

Harding then candidly explained the dilemma which faced him with Wood:
"I shall have to satisfy the public demand that his abilities and standing be recognized, and I can't place him in my cabinet nor at the head of the Army--that would make trouble." Forbes's suggestion was that such "a very superlatively powerful and dominating personality" might profitably be sent to Mexico or Russia.

Then Forbes proposed the appointment of a commission to study the Philippine situation, leaving the Governorship vacant (with a Vice Governor General acting) until the group had finished their work, in order to avoid detracting from the chief executive's prestige (which Forbes considered "one of his big assets"). Offering his services for such "constructive and reconstructive" work, Forbes stipulated that he "didn't care to go out for more than a year at the outside." Harding was favorably disposed to this
new plan, indicating that he had already considered sending a congressional mission.

Forbes cautioned that "it would be the greatest mistake in the world to try to undo all the Democrats had done; that it would cause great discontent, cause friction and perhaps revolution if the concessions were to be withdrawn." He would permit retention of the external trappings and symbols of office and power while insisting on efficiency and honesty, which could be assured by a "system of inspection, American officers, agents and assistants in each office, men who could assist the Filipino chiefs." Explaining that what these men wanted was only the title and the salary, few of them being able to do the actual work, Forbes declared that by adopting this device, which Lord Cromer had employed in Egypt, the United States "could give the Filipinos a fairly good, clean government, largely of Filipinos and a measure of autonomy satisfactory to them and yet retain control enough to be sure that the government was generally creditable."

These sagacious suggestions seemed to have pleased Harding. At least Forbes noted that his smile was accompanied by what he interpreted to be "a gleam of deep comprehension."

Turning to Harding's immediate problems, Forbes cautioned that "Harrison couldn't be trusted to stay on even a day; that he was a bad actor and might make representations and appointments calculated to make the situation more difficult and embarrass his successor. . . ." Thus he suggested that someone be sent out "who could be appointed Vice Governor and Acting Governor on a minute's notice." When asked to recommend specific men for this position he mentioned Major Edward Bowditch and Colonel Frank R. McCoy.

"Senator Harding was greatly impressed with this," Forbes noted, "and asked if I would prepare a plan, pick out the right men to send and arrange with the War Department to have them detailed to the Philippine Islands, so
he could have them on hand in case of need. This I agreed to do." Forbes "gathered" that Harding wanted him "to take on the whole responsibility of seeing that we get the right men in charge of the Islands and that we had a workable plan." He promised to study the situation together "with people who are competent to have an opinion and interested in the welfare of the Islands," including "the best minds" available, and see if he could "come back at him with some constructive suggestions. . . ."

Before terminating this lengthy interview, Forbes warned Harding that the Philippines had made "very remarkable progress" under the Democrats and "cautioned him not to lend too ready an ear to the calamity howlers who were saying things had gone to the dogs." As evidence, Forbes presented some "carefully prepared data showing these things documentarily." He also left a varied collection of other documents on the Islands, which Harding promised to study "with the greatest care."

In a single sentence Forbes stated what this interview had meant to him personally: "I gathered . . . that he would be perfectly ready to have me go out as chairman of a commission to study the situation and was not inclined to insist upon my taking the position of Governor General if I didn't want to." In a letter to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge on January 22, however, he expressed the conviction that Harding would probably not accept his commission proposal but "would want to send somebody else out there to

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2The details of this meeting were carefully and extensively recorded by Forbes in a lengthy memorandum which may be seen in Appendix No. 2 ("Interview with President-elect Harding, Marion, Ohio: Friday, January 14, 1921"), Journals, II, 320-24. The visit is also briefly described in Ibid., p. 27. His record of this meeting also reveals an impressive facet of Forbes's character: "I thought it wise not to sail under false colors. I told the Senator I was not a Republican, had never joined the Republican Party, and he said he didn't care two straws about that, that . . . this wasn't a party matter but a matter of service. . . ." Ibid., p. 324.
take complete charge right away."

Promptly turning to his self-imposed duties, Forbes was able to communicate some preliminary results by January 20. Having discovered that Vice Governor General Charles E. Yeater would sail for Manila on February 5, and having consulted those who had "seen him in action," Forbes reported that he was "an earnest and patriotic man of reasonable ability," which caused him to "feel safe in recommending that he be allowed to serve as Acting Governor General until such time as you are ready to make final appointment, or, in case of sending a commission, until some representative of it shall have had time to get there and be in position to observe operations."

Unfortunately, however, a conference with General Pershing, whom Harding had asked Forbes to approach concerning the Governor Generalship, had been only partially successful. Pleading poor health from eleven years of Philippine service, Pershing was unwilling to accept but approved Forbes's investigative commission idea and agreed to serve on it.  

By February 7, Forbes had formulated a set of recommendations, with the assistance of an impressive group of advisers: former President and Philippine Governor William H. Taft; General John J. Pershing (whose eleven years in the Islands had included both military and civilian administrative responsibilities); former Secretary of War and Philippine Governor General Luke E. Wright; Dr. Richard P. Strong, Professor of Tropical Medicine; Harvard Medical School; Edward B. Bruce, president of the Pacific Development Company; Maurice F. Loewenstein, president of the Pacific Commercial Company. The last three men, Forbes explained, had been Philippine residents and prom-

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3 Appendix No. 3, in Ibid., p. 325. This was a confidential letter which summarized his visit to Harding.

4 Ibid., pp. 33-34.
inent businessmen for years. Demonstrating his reputed thoroughness, Forbes also included an extensive personal letter of comments and explanations together with copies of proposed cables and letters necessary to implement the entire program.

First it was recommended that Harrison's resignation be accepted as of March 4, to become effective upon Yeater's arrival (in his accompanying letter, Forbes reiterated that it would be "unsafe to trust the reins of government in his hands any longer than can be helped"), and that Yeater--who was described as "an honest and capable gentleman, not in sympathy with Governor Harrison, whose policies we cannot commend"--be allowed to act as Governor General pending the appointment of a new chief executive.

It was further recommended that Yeater be advised to announce that the government would be conducted on a strictly non-partisan basis with no violent change of personnel; and that it would be "unwise to undertake any general program that involves depriving the Filipinos of concessions which have been given to them in the past few years ... [but that] the best way to handle the situation [would be] for the United States to insist upon good economical administration through the agency of a thorough inspection service." (Forbes explained that this could be an extension of the Bureau of Audits, using American inspectors "to eliminate much of the graft it is feared is now going on, much waste and duplication and unnecessary cost by reason of many people on the salary list receiving unduly high wages.")

As the very heart of their recommendations, it was proposed that "a Commission of five members [be formed] whose duty it shall be to make an early visit to the Philippine Islands, and study and report upon existing conditions, administrative, legislative, political, and general, with special reference to the stability of government." Such an assignment, it was estimated, could be completed within five to eight months.
It was further recommended that this Commission (which Forbes was now privately terming a "house-cleaning commission") should be constituted "of men of such standing that their recommendations would carry national weight, and it should represent different sections of the country and different professions." Forbes, after explaining that what was needed was "the combined opinion of a number of men of independent habit of thought," specifically suggested a banker, a lawyer, a high-ranking Army officer, and "a Roman Catholic, as the majority of the people in the Islands pertain to the Catholic faith and it is appropriate that they should be properly represented."

It was also recommended that the commissioners "should be given sufficient rank to give them such standing as is necessary in case they should visit other countries, and to define their position in the Islands." A suggested salary was $7,500 each, to be paid from Philippine funds collected in the United States.

And the final recommendation was intended to free the proposed commission from unwise, premature pronouncements by Harding:

If the President cares to make any announcement as to Philippine policy before the report of this Commission shall be in his hands, that it shall be to the effect that the President proposed to proceed in any matter affecting the relations between the Philippines and the United States with great deliberation and only after having informed himself in regard to their present situation through agencies of his own choosing.

Although the formal recommendations did not specifically touch upon the fundamental reason and necessity for such a commission, Forbes in his accompanying letter pointedly supplied this lack. "As President Wilson has announced to the world that the Filipinos have established a stable government and that therefore the United States is pledged to give them independ-

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5 Ibid., p. 34.
ence," he reminded Harding, "the question arises as to the stability of the government." To resolve this issue, "The President would have ample support for accepting the finding of a commission of such men as being representative and fair." 6

Later Forbes also publicly explained the rationale of such a maneuver:

The idea was to put the Philippine governmental house in order, and to allow any odium attaching to whatever unpopular measures might be necessary in order to make the government more creditable to the United States and beneficial to the Filipino, to be charged against this mission, so that the new Governor-General could come in after this cleansing work had been done and the reforms completed, and not be compelled to incur the unpopularity which such a course would necessarily entail. 7

On his way to New Orleans and a business trip to Venezuela, Forbes stopped in Washington on February 9 to give the newly-appointed Secretary of War, Senator John W. Weeks, his report for the President. During two hours of conversation they touched upon many Philippine problems (which would come under Weeks's jurisdiction), including General Wood (for whom Weeks thought the Governor Generalship very suitable), and Forbes's proposal of a supervised Philippine Republic (to which Weeks was unresponsive, "though he was doubtful about the wisdom of our being in the Islands at all."). 8

As he left Washington for South America, Forbes should have had the satisfaction of realizing that his special assignment had been handled with thoroughness and dispatch. Yet he had heard from important individuals who frankly declared that not all of his decisions had been wise.

William Howard Taft believed that Forbes should have accepted a tem-

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porary appointment as Governor General and as chairman of an investigating mission, retiring (because of his poor health) as soon as their report had been accepted. General Emilio Aguinaldo, replying to a letter from Forbes, disagreed that his work in the Islands was ended and urged that he again accept the Governor Generalship, "not for your own sake, but for the good of the Islands and their inhabitants." And to Don Isabelo de los Reyes and Archbishop Aglipay, head of the Independent Catholic Church, who had cabled Harding urging his appointment as Governor, Forbes wrote that he found no desire within himself to return to the Islands in that capacity because of the "many sad changes" that had occurred under Harrison.

With Forbes, his first choice for providing urgently needed leadership in the Philippines, being reluctant to accept the responsibility again, and with Pershing pleading physical disability—although both were willing to accept a temporary assignment to a mission of investigation—Harding was compelled to move downward to the third man on his list, Major General Leonard Wood. But here his problems were compounded by personalities and politics of an indigenous variety intermixed with already sufficiently complicated Philippine affairs.

It was clear to the Republican leaders that Wood had to be rewarded

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9 A copy of a letter from Taft, dated February 12, 1921, in Ibid., pp. 38-39; reproduction of an article by Taft, dated February 11 at Philadelphia, from the Boston Evening Transcript, February 11, 1921, in Ibid., Appendix No. 5, pp. 327-29.

10 From the translation of part of a letter dated February 9, 1921, as reproduced in Ibid., p. 38.

11 Copy of a letter dated January 19, 1921, in Ibid., p. 32.
with an important position because of his strength at the 1920 Republican National Convention, where he had been a major contender for the presidential nomination. The League of Nations offered him the position of High Commissioner for Armenia, but this was not acceptable to Wood. Harding and his advisers then came to the rather inevitable conclusion, considering Wood's previous experience in Cuba and the Philippines, that he was their man for the Governor Generalship of the Philippines. But could Wood be convinced?°

On January 23 Wood had lunch with a Mr. Shaffer of the Chicago Evening Post who brought with him from Marion what Wood termed "a lot of news concerning the general situation and gossip about the Cabinet," and was "full of the idea" of Wood's becoming Governor General. His response to Shaffer (whom Wood described as one who "really knew nothing of the Philippines and was evidently talking under the inspiration of people who wanted him to present a pleasing picture") was succinct and decisive:

I told him that there was nothing there that required my presence; that the Government had been pretty thoroughly demoralized in the last eight years; that the political natives [sic] have been filled with the idea of immediate independence; that they knew perfectly that I felt they were not ready for independence and were not capable of self-support, and that to take away all restraints would be a very great mistake. . . .

Moreover, Wood was convinced, as he confided to his Diary, that "going to the Philippines would be simply to cut oneself off from all connection with affairs here and would be entirely out of the great reorganization work which must go on."°

Four days later, Shaffer again returned to his assigned task, reading

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13 Major General Leonard Wood, Diary, January 23, 1921, as deposited in the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
Wood a letter from Harding dated January 20, and then handing it to him, leading Wood to assume that Shaffer's previous conversation had been based upon this letter. As Wood recorded its contents in his Diary, Harding explained that Wood was a big man whom he intended to utilize, but that he could not offer the War Department because it was against his better judgment, and that he could not see his way clear to offer any other position in the Cabinet without incurring considerable personal embarrassment. The President-elect then declared that he hoped Wood would accept the most important position of Philippine Governor General, which demanded such an eminent and distinguished American as Wood.

These devious recruiting methods seemed to require of Harding an explanation; it was a lame one, not creditable to a person of his reputed political sagacity and finesse: Wood had not been given a personal invitation to come to Marion because Harding did not wish to disappoint the General by not being in a position definitely to offer him a Cabinet position.

Writing to Henry L. Stimson (who, as Taft's Secretary of War, 1911-13, had been directly responsible for Philippine affairs), Wood referred to "an interview with a representative of Mr. H-," who was "making a strong plea for me to go to the Philippine Islands as Governor General." Although recognizing that the situation was bad because of Harrison's poor administration, Wood felt that there was "comparatively little" that he could do because the Islands were "governed through the Legislative Assembly, united for immediate

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14 Ibid., January 27, 1921.

15 Memorandum, signed by Osborne C. Wood, dated January 28, 1921, and filed in the Leonard Wood Papers, Box 157, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. This document is prefaced thus by Osborne, the General's second oldest son: "As I recall it, the gist of Sen. Harding's letter dated Jan 20 and addressed to Mr. Shaffer of the Chicago Evening Post was as follows: . . ." (all sic)
independence, and the Governor has no freedom of action in the way of administrative reform." Protesting that he did not want to be unfair to Harding, Wood still believed that he "was entitled at least to a personal interview with Mr. H-, in view of his previous declarations and the work I did." Yet if Wood could be shown that there was a "real emergency" or that he could be of "special service," he was willing to go, "regardless of personal preferences or interests." But he was not convinced that either condition was then true or that Harding's offer was "wholly disinterested" with "an eye single to the public welfare."

If his knowledge and experience were of any value to the new administration, Wood reasoned that he could best serve in the War Department. But because Harding realized "that he must do something in the way of recognition of services," the Philippine line was adopted "both as a means of recognition and, what is more important, as a means of getting me out of the country and thirteen [sic] thousand miles away." "I don't like the looks of it," was Wood's final, summary evaluation before closing with a plea for a prompt reply.16

The almost immediate response was a telegram: DON'T ACCEPT SEE MY LETTER.17 Writing the same day, Stimson declared that, "To put it mildly, it [Harding's offer] irritated me strongly." "You are no longer merely material for a colonial administrator; you have become a great American character with a powerful influence for good within your own country," Stimson counseled, "and I think that you should remain here for the development and use-

16 An unsigned carbon copy, corrected in Wood's hand, at Fort Sheridan, Illinois, January 28, 1921, and addressed to Colonel H. L. Stimson, 120 E. 36th St., New York City. Wood Papers, Box 158.

17 Dated January 28, 1921, at New York City. Wood Papers, Box 158.
fulness of that influence." In consulting with Elihu Root on this matter, Stimson found him concurring heatedly at the other end of the phone line and calling the proposition a "damned insult" to Wood and an attempt to continue Wilson's side-tracking policy. "Don't you get mad, however," Stimson advised. "But preserve your usual equanimity and don't go."19 This advice, however, would seem to have been unnecessary as there is no evidence in Wood's Diary or any of his papers that he ever lost his "usual equanimity" during what must have been a peculiarly exasperating and frustrating experience.20

Quite obviously Wood was deeply disappointed at not being asked to serve at the Cabinet level. But the bigness of the man is revealed by his comments following a long talk with some of his staff: "... I said to them, one is never too prominent or too big to do any job that is of real importance to the nation, and that if I felt that the situation was an urgent one I should feel under an obligation to go."21 At that time, however, he plainly did not feel any sense of urgency or obligation toward the Philippines.

Meanwhile the first public notice that Wood had been offered the post of Philippine Governor General appeared in the press. In addition to being

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18 Root had been Secretary of War under McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt (1899-1904), Secretary of State under Theodore Roosevelt (1905-09), and was then a member of the committee of jurists at The Hague working on the Permanent Court of International Justice.

19 A letter signed by Henry L. Stimson on a letterhead of the law firm of Winthrop and Stimson, New York, dated January 31, 1921, and marked "Personal and Confidential." Wood Papers, Box 158. Because of Stimson's positive reactions to this offer for Wood, it is interesting to recall that Stimson himself later accepted this post from Coolidge (1927-29), only resigning to become Hoover's Secretary of State (1929-33).

20 But Wood's semi-official biographer makes this flat assertion: "The query angered Wood." This statement, however, is nowhere supported by any evidence. Hagedorn, Wood, II, 375.

21 Wood, Diary, February 10, 1921. The carelessness with which Hagedorn often handles quotations from Wood's Diary and papers may be seen in how he has altered this entry. See Wood, II, 377.
a recognition of Wood's "ability and constructive qualities as an administrator," it was asserted that this served "notice to the world that the Philippines are to be cleaned up and made safe for Americans," and that Japan should "watch her step . . . [and] act with circumspection so far as the interests of the United States are concerned in the Pacific." 22

The Philippine representatives in Washington, however, were reported as lacking "enthusiasm" for Wood's appointment. The Philippine Press Bureau quickly issued a statement to clarify their position and, no doubt, to discourage, if possible, Wood's appointment. Although professing "full confidence in the good intentions toward them of the President-elect," they declared that this appointment "might be construed by many Filipinos as a reversion to the old days of rule by the iron hand of militarism." Feeling that it was "well borne out by history that in colonial relations the military has always been antagonistic to the nationalistic ideals" of subject peoples, they were concerned because "The Filipino people desire their immediate independence, and would be sorely disappointed if there should be any attempt to balk the happy consummation of their efforts to secure it." 23

Although that was clear enough, the Rochester, New York, Post-Express hastened to explain why the politicos had decided openly to oppose Wood.

22 An exclusive dispatch by Robert B. Armstrong from Washington on February 15, Los Angeles Times, February 16, 1921. The head was interestingly worded: GEN. WOOD TO RULE MANILA. "An authoritative source" in St. Augustine, Florida, where a gathering of Republicans was in progress, revealed similar information to the press on the same day. New York Times, February 16, 1921. It would thus seem a resonable conclusion that Harding had deliberately allowed this information to be leaked to the press, hoping, supposedly, that public pressures would generate sufficiently to induce Wood to accept the proffered position.

23 Special dispatch by H.P.S. to the New York Evening Post, February 16, 1921. A clipping in BIA, Wood File "P". The extensive holdings in the National Archives from the files of the old Bureau of Insular Affairs of the War Department will be cited hereafter in this manner.
Describing them as "mostly Chinese half breeds with a genius for public affairs and a passionate desire to manage them to the furtherance of their own ends," the paper declared that "Wood's administrative capacity and sure-footed judgment would be very much in the way of their plans." "General Wood is too big a man, too thoroughly informed, too resolute and sagacious to be persona grata to a political group who would exploit the islands," it concluded, "hence the agitation of the Philippine Press bureau...is visible and extreme."  

This undoubtedly did not make popular reading among the politicos, although Quezon and other Spanish-Filipino mestizos who dominated the powerful Partido Nacionalista were probably mildly amused to read that Chinese half-breeds controlled insular politics.

Wood, who was attending a firing demonstration at Camp Benning, Georgia, on February 17, was finally approached by newsmen who asked if he would accept the offer. Wood's reply was simply that he could give no answer since, contrary to press reports, he had not yet been offered the position by Harding. Thus Wood summarily dismissed the unofficial "feelers"; the next move was obviously Harding's.

Actually Harding had already made his move: apparently later that day Wood received a telegram from his son Osborne stating that a letter from Harding had been received "urging you strongly to accept Philippines." Unhurriedly waiting three days until his return to Fort Sheridan, Wood even

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25 New York Times. February 18, 1921. At St. Augustine, Harding admitted to newsmen that Wood had not yet been formally offered the position but that he had been under consideration for more than two months. Boston Traveler, February 19, 1921. A clipping in BIA, Wood File "P".

26 A telegram, dated Chicago, 6:08 P.M., February 17, 1921. Wood Papers, Box 157.
then was apparently extremely casual about a letter from a President-elect, as indicated by his perfunctory Diary entry: "... Drove out to the Post, looked over telegrams and found a letter from Mr. Harding. ..." 27

After referring to a letter from Shaffer ("our mutual friend") which had indicated Wood's negative response to his indirect offer, Harding stated that he was "very anxious" for Wood to accept and that he would make this the very first appointment of his administration and even announce it "in advance of any other because of the importance of the appointment in itself and the influence it will have on our future in the Islands and our position in the Orient." Declaring that no other appointment had given him more concern, Harding continued his strong and skillful plea: "I wish very much to send an outstanding figure in American life to the Philippines, not only because I think the situation there requires our most earnest and our best attention, but because of the influence it will have respecting our influence in the Orient."

And yet there remained one thorny point which Harding had to confront; he did so with fine skill:

This proposal is not made with the thought of affording you a place in the government in lieu of another position but I am asking you to render this service because I believe you greatly to be needed and I know of no one in the United States who can give a better account of himself in a field where there is every opportunity to write a fine chapter in American history. 28

In an abrupt about face, Philippine Resident Commissioner Jaime C. de Veyra called upon Wood on February 21 to express the desire that he go to the Islands and to show telegrams from Quezon and Osmena, both of whom, Wood

27. Wood, Diary, February 20, 1921.

28. A typed letter signed by Harding on simple stationery reading, WARREN G. HARDING MARION, OHIO. Wood Papers, Box 156.
observed, "Seemed to be agreeable to my going out but are naturally afraid of any particularly strong government." Being convinced that "Down in their hearts none of these people want us to leave the Islands unless we leave with a guaranty of protection against Japan and the world at large," Wood explained that the United States "could not assume responsibility without authority," but would "cut off relations entirely" with an independent Philippines "and stand toward them as we would toward any foreign nation."

When their long talk was continued the next day, De Veyra produced a memorandum on the current organization of the Philippine government. Wood's observation, apparently only to himself, was perspicacious: "Apparently Harrison surrendered pretty much everything and lived a life of indolence so far as executive and administrative work went." Yet he had found De Veyra "full of plans for extending the already extensive Filipino control..."

Evidently Wood had not yet fully made up his own mind but was now sufficiently interested to consult his wife. Wiring her in Europe to cable her preferences as between Philadelphia (Wood had been offered the provostship of the University of Pennsylvania the previous September) and Manila, he obviously hoped for some help in making an important personal decision.

Soon the pressure was renewed when Shaffer asked that Wood call at his home on February 27, where he was handed "a number of letters from Mr. Harding showing his desire for me to go to the Philippines." Wood's response

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29 Wood, Diary, February 22, 1921. Two days later Wood wired Harding that he had been delayed in sending an answer to his letter partly because of these two conferences with De Veyra "and the consideration of certain questions which these interviews brought up." Ibid., February 24, 1921.

30 See an allusion to a meeting then with representatives of the University in Ibid., March 6, 1921.

31 Ibid., February 21, 1921. There is no record that Mrs. Wood ever responded to this cablegram, and at least part of the explanation might be the ambiguity of his wording: "... Wired Louise to cable preference as to Philadelphia or Manila; that Marion [sic] offered latter,"
was that he could make no decision until he knew the conditions under which Harding wanted him to go and the specific insular problems. 32

President-elect and Mrs. Harding arrived in Marion, Ohio, from Florida early in the morning of March 1 to spend a few hours in their old home before starting for Washington and the inauguration ceremonies. Although most of the day was occupied in visiting with old friends and settling personal matters, Harding did hold one important conference: late in the evening he personally asked General Wood to accept the Governor Generalship of the Philippines. Actually it was a series of short conferences held in an anteroom of the Masonic Hall, which were sandwiched between the degrees Harding took into the Knights Templar. 33

Although Wood judged that Harding was "very anxious" for him to go to the Philippines, his response seems to have been an evasive ploy: "Told him I could not give him any definite assurance until I hear from Mrs. Wood and determine certain conditions at home." Shifting his approach, Harding suggested the possibility of Wood's going to Cuba in some undesignated capacity. Wood was still stallingly evasive: "I told him I should be very glad to do anything I could; that I would not care, at the present time, to leave the country for a long period of time because of conditions in my own family." 34 To the press, Wood simply stated that he was taking the offer under consideration and that he might not make his decision until after another

32 Ibid., February 27, 1921.

33 New York Times, March 2, 1921. In the absence of any record of Wood having been formally invited to Marion by Harding, it is assumed that he went because of a statement by Harding in a letter to Shaffer. This interpretation is supported by the fact that their conference was an extremely unusual one as to both place and circumstances.

34 Wood, Diary, March 1, 1921. Wood was accompanied by his son Osborne.
conference with Harding, probably in Washington following the inauguration.  

Instead of softening Wood's resistance, this personal confrontation with Harding apparently still further stiffened his determination. "I am more and more convinced," he confided in his Diary the next day, "that it would be most unwise to take the Philippines detail." "If there were anything to do of an important nature . . . I should feel under an obligation to go there," he explained, "but it seems to be just a routine job." Besides being "frightfully expensive" to move his family, there would be "very little to do once across," as he was convinced that Congress would not permit "any radical change from the announced policy." And still further to bolster his resistance, he had just received a long telegram from a Trustee of the University of Pennsylvania urging him to accept their offer. Nor was he to be allowed to make his final decision without much advice from others: "Have had a great deal of mail in the last few days," he commented on March 4, "the bulk of it against going to the Philippines."  

Immediately after Harding's inauguration, Wood was summoned to Washington by the new Secretary of War.  

But before going, Wood's precise ethical standards compelled him to phone Weeks: "Told him that I did not want to go to Washington under false pretenses, that I could not accept the appointment as Governor General of the Philippines, but that I shall be glad

35New York Times, March 2, 1921. United Press staff correspondent Raymond Clapper was doubtful that Wood could be persuaded to accept even though Harding urged it as a patriotic duty. Riverside Daily Press, March 1, 1921.

36Wood, Diary, March 2, 4, 1921.

to do anything I can to help along for a short time." And another long distance phone call sustained the dual mounting pressure on the General: representatives of the University of Pennsylvania continued their urging that he become provost and arranged to meet him in Washington also.\(^{38}\)

Calling at the White House together with Weeks during the afternoon of March 7, Wood told Harding that, although he "appreciated the compliment of his offer of the Governor-Generalship," because of "existing conditions" he could not accept it. But, following Harding's rejoinder that "he wanted to do the best he could for . . . [Wood]," he made a counterproposal: "I told him I should be very glad to go out there and make a full and frank report on conditions there, a report which I think would be of great value to him and of great help ultimately." This proposal was accepted and the President's offer of the Governor Generalship was withdrawn.\(^{39}\)

Leaving the lengthy conference early, Weeks issued this statement:

The President is not unmindful of the change of policy recommended by his predecessor in dealing with the Philippines. He is anxious to settle definitely our policy and has asked General Wood, because of his extended experience there, to go to the islands and report conditions there as he may find them.\(^{40}\)

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\(^{38}\) Wood, Diary, March 6, 1921.

\(^{39}\) New York Times, March 8, 1921; Wood, Diary, March 7, 1921. Quotation taken from the latter source.

\(^{40}\) New York Times, March 8, 1921. This same statement, except for minor variations in wording, appeared in the Manila Times, March 9, 1921, and the San Francisco Chronicle, March 8, 1921. The first announcement of the Mission to appear in the Manila Times was on March 8, when this complete item was printed: "Washington, March 7. (By Associated Press)--Major General Leonard Wood has been detailed, at the request of President Harding to go to the Philippine Islands and make a study of conditions in the light of Philippine aspirations for independence." But this single sentence merited an across-the-top-of-the-front-page headline in heavy black type: HARDING DETAILS WOOD TO STUDY PHILIPPINE CONDITIONS. This same dispatch was also given front page treatment by the other two prominent English language dailies in Manila, the Manila Daily Bulletin and the Philippines Herald, but on the next day.
When a reporter asked Weeks if Wood was willing to comply with the request, his reply was simply, "General Wood is a soldier." As he left the White House, Wood was almost as brief: "I am a servant of the Republic. That is all I care to say now."41

It was recognized that the General's plans had been complicated by an attractive offer to become provost of the University of Pennsylvania (the compensation was to be $25,000 per year, $4,000 for expenses, and a house). Yet his only comment was that the offer was extremely tempting. 42

From Washington, Arthur Sears Henning reported that, according to the White House, this investigation had to begin as soon as possible. Such urgency had been created by "disquieting reports concerning the state of affairs in the Philippines" which had reached the President, and which indicated "that Governmental and economic conditions have reached a stage of virtual chaos as a result of the loosening of the reins of American authority by ... Harrison. ..." Because he had "fired the Filipinos with the confident expectation of immediate independence," and had "filled the island administration with natives," there had developed "a general let down in public sanitation, a disorganization of the finances of the government and a practical scrapping of the merit rule in the civil service."43

In even stronger terms, the New York Tribune's Washington Bureau

41 New York Times, March 8, 1921; Associated Press dispatch, Manila Times, March 10, 1921.
42 San Francisco Chronicle, March 8, 1921; Wood, Diary, March 8, 1921, reveals the generous terms offered.
43 San Francisco Chronicle, March 8, 1921. "Special by Leased Wire to The Chronicle." Henning apparently tried to give impartial coverage by concluding his dispatch with this sentence: "The truth of these charges is vigorously denied by the two Philippine resident commissioners here, who assert that the Filipinos are carrying forward such parts of the government as they have taken over with no less efficiency and honesty than their American predecessors."
reported that Harding's "decision to send a strong figure such as General Wood to the islands is expected to have its most important effect on those native leaders of the Filipinos who have resorted to sedition [sic] in their efforts to bring about independence for the little brown people." Some of the políticos, it was claimed, "are known to have dealt with the military of Japan, seeking information openly as to the treatment Nippon would accord the Filipinos when the United States evacuated the islands in accordance with the intentions of the Wilson government." 44

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It was first reported that Wood was to sail from San Francisco about March 25, accompanied by a military aide, perhaps by W. Cameron Forbes. 45 At least part of the "perhaps" qualification was caused by the fact that Forbes was then "on a steamer off the west coast of South America, and the War Department thus far has been unable to communicate with him." 46

In Washington on March 9, Weeks announced that a Governor General would not be named until Wood had returned and made his report to the President, probably some time during the summer. 47 Weeks summarized the entire situation for Acting Governor General Yeater in one cabled sentence: "... The President is sending General Wood to the islands to report on conditions there and does not contemplate at present appointment of Governor General

44 New York Tribune, March 8, 1921.
45 Ibid.
46 New York Times, March 9, 1921.
47 San Francisco Chronicle, March 10, 1921; Associated Press dispatch, Manila Times, March 11, 1921.
until midsummer.46

On March 14 it was announced in Washington that the sailing date for
the Mission had been moved ahead one week to April 2 in order that Forbes
might have time to reach San Francisco and sail with Wood.49 At Santa Marta,
Colombia, on March 11, while on a business trip for the United Fruit Company,
Forbes had received this cablegram from Weeks: "Will you go with General Wood
to east to make investigations we discussed and when can you be ready to go."
Forbes replied that he could accompany Wood if it seemed advisable following
consultations in Washington. Part of his hesitancy stemmed from another
cable received that same day from a certain Hatheway who stated that Wood
intended to complete the investigation in four months. "That means a very
different piece of work from what I had in mind," Forbes wrote in his Journal,
"which would have taken twice as long at least."50

Then there began for Forbes a dash for home which commanded all the
ingenuity of an experienced traveler and all the connections of a man of
affairs. He recounts these experiences with obvious pleasure in his Journal,
including the showing of his cable from the Secretary of War to the conductor
of a late Cuban train because he knew the potency of General Wood's name in
Cuba (but then when the train arrived at Havana on time to the minute, he was
uncertain concerning the efficacy of Wood's name because the conductor was
anxious to see his hospitalized wife), and his first airplane flight--by

48 Extract from BIA cable No. 629, March 11, 1921, Weeks to Yeater, in
BIA, Wood-Forbes Mission File. This information had also been written in a
letter on the preceding day. See summary note in BIA, W-F Mission File.
Perhaps after having written the letter, Weeks thought better of allowing
Yeater to read this news first in the local papers and sent the cablegram
the following day.


50 Forbes, Journals, II, 21, 41. Quotes from the latter page.
seaplane from Havana to Key West. 51

And throughout these days of hurried traveling, Forbes had time to ponder two offers to positions of influence. His was the privilege of choosing between temporary service in the Philippines or more permanent duty on the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations. 52

51 Ibid., pp. 22, 24-25.

52 The Associated Press dispatch telling of this offer by the League (date-lined Paris, February 26) made the front pages of both the Manila Daily Bulletin and the Philippines Herald for March 1, 1921.
CHAPTER III

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE MISSION

A sense of urgency was conveyed by the rapidity with which Harding organized an inspection of Philippine conditions following his election. And the seriousness of the situation as viewed by the new administration was also indicated by the caliber of the two men selected to conduct this work. With the extensive experience in the Islands of both Wood and Forbes, little further delay could reasonably have been anticipated for purposes of giving them instructions for the conduct of their mission or briefings on Philippine affairs.

By reason of his ingenuity and exertion, Forbes arrived in Washington in time to join Wood in conferences with Secretary of War Weeks and General Frank McIntyre, Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, on March 21. Weeks went over the details of the Mission in a broad way, and Forbes noted them in a single sentence: "Our powers are to be extremely broad, briefly, to make an investigation of conditions in the Islands and report with such recommendations as we see fit."¹

That evening the two men were guests of President and Mrs. Harding at a White House dinner together with the Secretary of War and his wife. Afterward the group—probably the men only—retired upstairs to the President's room where they were joined by Attorney General Harry Daugherty and a friend. Here a protracted discussion of Philippine affairs continued until a late hour, assisted by whiskey which Harding produced from a cupboard, although

¹Forbes, Journals, II, 41-43. Quote from p. 43.
national prohibition was in effect.\(^2\)

Specifically, this appointment had been to receive final instructions from the President; Forbes, however, observed that, "It was more in the nature of telling him conditions in the Islands than receiving instructions." Harding's last words of counsel were actually quite simple: "We were to select our own force, keep it small, accept attentions if offered by the Government of Japan, be very reserved as to what we said and let no inkling of our report or the nature of it get out till we had had a chance to go over the whole thing with the President and the Secretary of War."\(^3\)

Forbes left the White House with a very favorable estimate of the new President as revealed by these words published in 1928:

President Harding gave the impression of being a man utterly unconscious of self, wholeheartedly desiring the good of the cause to which he was at the moment devoting his attention, and interested in a proper solution of it without seeming to give thought to its political effect on himself or his party.\(^4\)

After the conference with Harding, Wood stated to the press that the President primarily wanted a detailed, unprejudiced report of actual conditions in the Islands and that he was prepared to spend several months, if

\(^2\) Los Angeles Times, March 22, 1921 ("Exclusive Dispatch" by Arthur Sears Henning); New York Times, March 22, 1921; Forbes, Philippine Islands, II, 287; Wood, Diary, March 21, 1921; Forbes, Journals, II, 47-48. The comment on whiskey and prohibition was by Forbes in a note added in 1941 (see Ibid., p. 47*).

\(^3\) Ibid.

\(^4\) Forbes, Philippine Islands, II, 287. In adding a commentary in 1941 concerning this occasion, Forbes was even more generous: "He was genial and kindly and seemed to have only one thought in his mind and that was the proper administration of the Islands and the proper treatment of their people. He laid no emphasis in all his talks on any exploitation of them or making them of use to the United States, either economically or otherwise. He merely wanted to have a good job done in the administering of the Islands...." Forbes, Journals, II, 47-48.
necessary, to fulfill this commission. 5

On the following day, Weeks announced that the specific real reason for the searching investigation to be conducted by Wood and Forbes was to determine whether the Filipinos were actually ready for independence and that their report would form the basis for the Harding administration's Philippine policy. "Former President Wilson was apparently convinced," Weeks explained, "that the Filipinos were ready for independence, and he urged Congress to grant their wishes. There seems now to be reason to doubt that the people of the Philippines are ready for entire independence. It is expected the Wood-Forbes mission will settle the question." 6

The New York Times neatly summarized the situation:

Unless they uncover facts that will materially change the situation as the members of the new Administration see it, it is not believed that independence for the Filipinos will follow. If they think the Filipinos are able to stand alone, and that they should have their independence, General Wood and Governor Forbes will not hesitate to say so in their report. But their instructions are to make a most careful study of the situation and to report recommendations, and both fully realize that upon their recommendations will depend the future of the Filipinos, and the settled policy of the American Government under President Harding toward the Philippines. 7

All of which should have made interesting, if somewhat depressing, reading for the two Philippine Resident Commissioners, Jaime C. de Veyra and Isauro Cabaldon, who had conferred with Harding regarding what they understood would be a mission by Wood to the Philippines. It was revealed by the

5 As reported by Arthur Sears Henning in the Los Angeles Times, March 22, 1921.

6 San Francisco Chronicle, March 23, 1921. An identical dispatch ("By A.P. Night Wire") made the front page of the Los Angeles Times and, with minor variations, the Manila Times; the same information was also printed by the New York Times; all on March 23.

7 Ibid.
press that the Commissioners had urged, if possible, that Wood should be
instructed to recommend a definite date for the independence of the Islands.
It is regrettable that Harding's reply is not a matter of record.8

When Wood and Forbes were in Washington on March 21, their official
letter of instructions had not yet been prepared. On the preceding day, how-
ever, the President had directed the Secretary of War to perform this duty
for him in a letter which began by quoting that part of President Wilson's
annual message to Congress of December 7, 1920, which had referred to the
Philippines as being ready to receive their independence.

The suggestion made [Harding continued] was not acted upon by that
session of Congress. Undoubtedly that non-action was due to the fact that
all of the evidence available to Congress was not of this same tenor. Based,
however, as it was, on official reports from the highest authority in the
Philippine Islands, as well as on current reports from lesser authorities
given the widest circulation in the United States, as well as in the Islands,
it cannot, with propriety, be ignored, nor yet can it, in the face of con-
flicting evidence from many sources, be accepted as the final word on so
important a subject.

Because of this situation, Harding had selected Wood and Forbes "to
go to the Philippine Islands and to make a study of the situation and to
report thereon, in order that I may have a judgment on which I can base my
action and my recommendations with a consciousness that I am dealing justly
with the Filipino people and pursuing a policy which the American people will
sanction and support." The Secretary of War was asked to provide "such
instructions as may insure to them every convenience and assistance in their
most important undertaking, and to give them such instructions as will insure

a full understanding and a frank report of the problem submitted."

Secretary of War Weeks's official letter of instruction to "Major General Leonard Wood, Chairman, Special Mission to the Philippine Islands," dated March 23, 1921, concisely stated the problem which confronted the Mission:

It is asserted with positiveness by persons who have had every reasonable opportunity to know the conditions whereof they speak that the Philippine Government is now in a position to warrant its total separation from the United States Government and that the Filipino people are in a position to continue to operate the Philippine Government without aid of any kind from the United States and that the government so conducted would be one in which the American people could take pride because of the assistance heretofore given it.

All of this is quite as positively denied by other persons having similar opportunities to study the situation and to know the exact conditions existing in the Philippine Islands.

Between these conflicting views you are to render judgment.

Then Weeks sought to emphasize the importance of this Mission and the seriousness of the consequences potentially flowing from it:

The decision of the question thus arising is of momentous importance involving, as it may, the very life of the Filipino people as a people and the reputation and credit of our own country. Even if it were possible hereafter to correct an order now made, it would be difficult to measure the cost of this correction.

Every consideration, therefore, urges us, before taking a step of importance in this matter, to satisfy ourselves that we are not acting through emotions, but are acting wisely as the facts present themselves to us after a careful, impartial study.

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9. Harding to Weeks, March 20, 1921, in BIA, W-F Mission File. This is an unsigned copy on plain paper. A script notation reads, "dictated by Gen. McIntyre," so apparently this letter was actually written by Major General McIntyre, Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs of the War Department, for President Harding. Another notation indicates that a copy of this letter was sent to Forbes on March 31. The letter of instructions from the Secretary of War to the Mission (to be discussed next above) indicates that a copy of Harding's letter was given to Wood; the original, signed by Harding on White House stationery may be seen in the Wood Papers, Box 158.
Although aware of their Philippine experience which fitted both Wood and Forbes for this task and rendered "detailed instructions superfluous if not embarrassing," Weeks nevertheless desired "to suggest briefly the doubts which I should like to have cleared up for my personal satisfaction, and these may, in a degree, indicate to you the doubts of others who are interested in the subject but whose minds have been confused by conflicting reports and rumors." But first, he helpfully indicated that there were "many points of great importance in passing on our future policy with reference to the Philippine Islands about which there is no doubt and with reference to which, therefore, there need be no detailed study." Among these were the "general characteristics of the Filipino people, their many attractive qualities, their progressive spirit, love of education, and their rapidly developing spirit of nationality. . . ."

The first area of doubt concerning which the Secretary of War desired help from the Mission was that of the financial and economic conditions of the Islands. Their study "must embrace . . . a first-hand examination of the financial condition of the Philippine Government and of the Filipino people--the present and prospective revenues of the government and the extent to which these revenues are dependent on the present relations of the Islands to the United States." He also requested their careful investigation of "the effect on the people of treating their products in the American market as those of a foreign country, as well as, on the other hand, such disadvantages as may accrue to them as the result of the free entry of American goods in their markets."

The second area of doubt was that of "the likelihood of the maintenance of a stable government in the Islands as this likelihood may be determined from evidence drawn from the operation of the existing government." After briefly reviewing the extent to which Filipinos had come to dominate
the Government during Harrison's regime, Weeks stated that it was of first importance for Wood and Forbes to determine "whether or not this government has contributed duly to the happiness, peace and prosperity of the Filipino people, and the determination of this question must necessarily depend largely on the views of those people."

The Mission was instructed to determine "whether or not the government is reasonably free from those underlying causes that result in the destruction of government." For their guidance, such causes were specifically listed:

- Is the government effectively administered; are the officials and employees reasonably faithful to the trust imposed on them; is justice impartially administered; are the elections conducted honestly so that the public will receives expression in the selection of elective officers; are the results of the elections generally acquiesced in by defeated minorities; are the civil service laws honestly administered; and are appointments to office and to employment under the government made as a result of competency?

In making this survey of governmental services, the Mission was instructed to determine if Filipinization had led to "a lowering of the standards of government and whether such lowering, if it exists, decreases with the experience of the Filipino so charged with responsibility, or if there is a steady relaxation of effort and a more marked deficiency as we recede from the previous standard." The actual results of Filipinization on such important public services as health, education, public works, and agriculture were specifically to be "noted and given due weight in a final determination of the problem submitted."

Should it seem that these tests were unreasonable, Weeks quickly cautioned that the Mission should "avoid comparison with a standard of other countries and other climates [sic] and particularly with our own idea of perfection."
It should be remembered [he also warned] that our obligations are to all of the people who inhabit the Philippine Islands, and in a particular manner, because of their relative helplessness, we are committed to look after the welfare of the backward people of the Islands—Christian, Moro and Pagan. The keeping of our faith to these people has been committed to the present Philippine Government. How has this faith thus committed been kept, and what is the outlook for the future?

Finally, Weeks turned to the third and last problem area—and perhaps the most critical of the three—that of defense from external aggression and internal subversion. After stating that because of Spanish and American control "for ages . . . [the Philippines have] been protected in the ownership of territory and potential wealth out of all proportion to that of their neighbors," he instructed the Mission concerning the importance of determining "whether reasonable plans exist for the utilization of these resources by the Filipino people in order that their unused land and resources may not continually be a source of temptation to their less fortunate, but probably stronger, neighbors," and whether after America's withdrawal "these resources would remain exclusively available to the Filipino people." "Certainly it would be a vain thing," Weeks continued in making a telling point, to free the Philippines without being reasonably assured that the Islands' resources would be preserved as the heritage of the Filipinos. "The pleasing of the Filipinos of this generation would be a minor satisfaction if it were believed that it would result in the bondage or destruction of the Filipino people for all time hereafter."

The concluding paragraph of these instructions (which Wood considered "rather long, apparently prepared with a view to being given out for popular consumption at some later day."10) must have given particular satisfaction to the General:

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Your selection by the President for this work is the best assurance of his desire that it should be impartially done, without prejudice, fear or favor. Likewise, it is an assurance that it will be undertaken and carried out with an appreciation and a delicate regard for the feelings of the Filipino people. Whether the result of your investigation may or may not be to the satisfaction of the majority of the Filipino people at this time, I am convinced that, undertaken in the spirit in which it is committed to you and in which you have undertaken it, it can not but be to the future satisfaction of the Filipinos and must, of necessity, result in their permanent well-being and progress.\textsuperscript{11}

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And what was Forbes's place in all of this? A script notation on the Bureau of Insular Affairs's copy of the Mission's instructions indicates simply that a copy was sent to him on March 31. If this treatment seems cavalier for the man who had originally proposed such an investigation commission, who had done much preparatory work on it, and who was Harding's first choice for Governor General--and, also, apparently his first choice for chairman of the mission--it must be remembered that Forbes was only an American citizen while Wood was also a recent strong contender for the presidency with an influential and vocal following still active. Hardly could it be expected that Wood could be induced to take second place to Forbes in any assignment. Forbes, however, did not prove to be an entirely cooperative second fiddle to concert master Leonard Wood.

\textsuperscript{11}BIA, W-F Mission File. This is an unsigned copy; the original, signed by Weeks, may be seen in the Wood Papers, Box 158.
CHAPTER IV

PERSONNEL AND PERSONALITIES

Undoubtedly the most important problem faced by Wood and Forbes in the expeditious preparation for their mission was the selection of competent, experienced, and reliable assistants. That they displayed uncommon wisdom in this critical area would only be demonstrated during the course of their work in the Islands. It would seem significant that no serious criticism was ever to be leveled at any of these subordinates by either Americans or Filipinos. That this was not to be true for either Forbes or Wood would seem to be a result of their known virtues rather than a result of any deficiencies possessed by either man. Undoubtedly the strength of their individual personalities also explains the difficulties which developed in adjusting the working arrangements between them. This potentially serious problem was fortunately rather nicely solved by Harding and Weeks, with generous assistance from Forbes.

Of the two leading American characters in this drama of imperialism, Major General Leonard Wood, United States Army, was undoubtedly the better known to the public, at least outside the Philippine Islands. Wood was projected onto the national scene when Theodore Roosevelt resigned as Assistant Secretary of the Navy to raise his famous "Rough Riders" for action in Cuba during the Spanish-American War and requested that Leonard Wood, a captain in the Medical Corps of the United States Army, be appointed his colonel. Wood's outstanding abilities rapidly led to successive promotions: major general of volunteers, in command of rehabilitation for the Santiago area, and finally military governor of Cuba.
After Cuba gained independence under the provisions of the Platt Amendment, Wood was rewarded for his outstanding work as a colonial administrator by promotion to major general of the regular army. In 1903 he became military governor of Mindanao and Jolo in the Philippines and subsequently the first civil governor of the newly created Moro Province. After three years of duty in this position (in which he was responsible to the Philippine Governor General for the civil administration of the province and to his army superior in Manila for military affairs), Wood became Commanding General of United States Army Forces in the Philippine Islands in which capacity he served a tour of duty in Manila for two years.

While Chief of Staff of the United States Army in 1913, Wood began those controversial activities which were to bring him again into national prominence: his agitation for increased preparedness as the war clouds in Europe grew larger and more menacing. Herein his principal contribution of an institutional nature was the Plattsburg movement for the establishment of officer training camps. Wood also toured the United States making speeches advocating increased preparedness which conditioned the public mind for the later acceptance of conscription and the sacrifices demanded by America's entrance into World War I. "To him more than to any one else is due the credit for the preliminary organization necessary for the successful participation of the United States in the war," was the generous appraisal of his colleague, William Cameron Forbes.

But these activities were not pleasing to the Wilson administration, which resented Wood's continual agitation for increased military preparedness and retaliated by refusing to send him to France after America's entrance into the war. The wartime relegation of Wood to a minor position in the United States was widely resented and was a factor in his strong contention
for the Republican presidential nomination in 1920.¹

Although William Cameron Forbes was certainly the lesser known of the two men, at least in the United States, principally because his work had been far less dramatic than Wood's, his years of experience in the Philippines clearly made him the better qualified for this assignment, although hardly an unbiased judge of Philippine affairs and personalities. From a background of extensive business experience in the family financial empire centering in Boston, Forbes entered public service in the Philippines not from any reasons of financial necessity but from a desire for greater usefulness.

Forbes served as Secretary of Commerce and Police in the Philippines from June 15, 1905, to November 10, 1909. During this time he made notable contributions, particularly in developing a modern system of communications which was to prove critically important in advancing not only more efficient police protection and general governmental administration but also in encouraging the development of commercial activities. From July 1, 1908, Forbes also served simultaneously as Vice Governor General which admirably prepared him to assume the Governor Generalship on November 11, 1909. Serving with distinction and energy in this critically important administrative post until September 1, 1913, Forbes would unquestionably have been happy to continue indefinitely as America's proconsul in the Philippines had not the Wilson administration requested his resignation to make way for someone more sympathetic to a rapid relaxation of controls over the Filipino políticos.

Returning to the family business establishment, Forbes maintained his interest in and concern for the Philippines. Inducing him to return to the Islands where he had spent so many years in profitable and pleasurable

¹This account is based upon Forbes, *Philippine Islands*, II, 18-20, 307-08, 451. The quotation is taken from p. 308.
activity apparently required little effort from Harding.  

While hurrying to Washington from South America and before he had given his consent to join in the Philippine investigation, Forbes had felt that the selection of Wood to make the report was "admirable," no one else being able to do it better; but he doubted that his own going "would add anything to it." Yet about forty years later Forbes had some long-term second thoughts:

This was, I think, over modesty on my part, and looking back I doubt if I felt exactly that way, because my familiarity with conditions in the Philippines was so much greater than General Wood's that it was inevitable that I should have added much to it. The real reason for my hesitation was because I did not know exactly in what capacity I should go, whether with an equal voice with General Wood or just go in an advisory capacity, my advice to be taken or not at General Wood's sweet will. I was very definite in my mind that I would not permit myself to be put in any such position; and the necessity for my hesitation in this matter and declining to say whether I would go or not until this doubt was cleared up was abundantly proved later, and will be shown in the story of the Wood-Forbes Mission.

When he arrived in Washington on March 20, Forbes still questioned the advisability of being associated with Wood. Dining that evening with General Pershing, Forbes discovered that he too was doubtful "about the wisdom of my going to the Philippines with General Wood."

Calling upon the Secretary of War in the morning, Forbes and Weeks "soon got down to business":

I asked him point-blank what my relation was to be to General Wood. He said "equal"; that it would be called the "Wood-Forbes Mission." Wood was to be

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2 This sketch is based upon the following sources: Dean C. Worcester, and Ralston Hayden, The Philippines Past and Present (new edition in one volume, New York, 1930), 289; Forbes, Philippine Islands, I, 7, 170-71, II, 200.

Chairman but not Chief. I would have equal voice and vote and to sign and report on existing conditions which are the result of the activities of my successor in office. I suggested that I felt that General Wood could report on that but that I could join in making recommendations for future management of the situation. The Secretary was very positive that he, the President and General Wood wanted me to go. They were all agreed on that. He didn't attach much importance to my doubts and said my recommendations and views would carry the greatest possible weight throughout the country. ... 4

Apparently while this discussion was in progress, Wood was ushered into the Secretary of War's office, accompanied by General Peyton C. March, the Chief of Staff. After shaking hands all around, Wood and Forbes went down to General McIntyre's office in the Bureau of Insular Affairs, where Forbes soon had his fears confirmed when he found "that Wood had it all planned that he was the sole commissioner and I was to be one of a number of adjuncts that trot along behind. ..." Forbes then brought Wood's attention "as unobtrusively as possible" to the fact that he also was to sign the resulting report, leaving for Weeks the touchy task of explaining their equality; "... and he did this." "I had not the least intention of having a free-for-all with General Wood in regard to my position in the Mission," Forbes added in 1941. "I told Secretary Weeks that he had got to fight that battle for me; that I simply did not propose to start off with a dispute or wrangle over how competent my voice was to be in the councils." 5

Returning to Weeks's office in the afternoon, Wood felt it necessary to inform him "that Forbes was rather worried about his position," and that "This worry seemed to have developed very suddenly." Wood then stated "that there must be one definite head of the mission; that ... a Chairman would do quite as well. [but that] There must be somebody upon whom the Government

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4Ibid., pp. 41-42. Quote from p. 42.
5Ibid., pp. 42-43.
must look as head of the mission."  

Meanwhile Forbes had called upon Pershing to supply the results of his talk with Weeks. "He said that Wood had a bad reputation," Forbes recorded, "and will crowd, crowd and crowd into making it a one-man show." Yet Wood was always a gentleman, Pershing added, "very punctilious in little courtesies, never trying to walk out first, etc." Small consolation!

Because of an inaccurate clock, Forbes was embarrassed by being late to the White House dinner. While he was hurrying to this appointment, his name came up in the conversation, raised by someone who apparently commented on possible difficulties which he might cause. "The President said that if Forbes raised any issues the best thing would be to drop him," Wood noted. Although he assured Harding that he thought this would be unnecessary, Wood added "that this curious sensitiveness had developed rather suddenly."

Forbes, at least, arrived at the dinner with his mind much more at ease than it had been in the morning when he had feared that his and Wood's fundamental ideas concerning the Philippines were so divergent that they would be forced to submit separate, dissenting reports. But during their talks throughout the day he had found their thinking to be so close together that there would probably be no difficulty.

To the press the following day Weeks carefully explained that Wood and Forbes were to hold equal position and that neither should be considered as head of the Mission. But then when the Secretary of War issued the official

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6 Wood, Diary, March 21, 1921.
7 Forbes, Journals, II, 43.
8 Ibid., p. 47; Wood, Diary, March 21, 1921.
9 Forbes, Journals, II, 43.
10 San Francisco Chronicle, March 23, 1921; Associated Press dispatch,
letter of instructions to the Mission on March 23, it was addressed to "Major General Leonard Wood, Chairman, Special Mission to the Philippine Islands," with only a copy being sent to "Mr. Forbes." 11 And in letters to the Secretary of State on March 23 and to the Acting Governor General of the Philippines on March 24, Weeks added to the confusion by explaining that, in order to avoid any questions of precedence, "the President desires that they be given their former [sic] rank as Governors General." 12 This was true of Forbes, but certainly not of Wood, who had been Governor of Moro Province and Commanding General of United States land forces in the Philippines but never Governor General.

Apparently Wood had not anticipated any difficulty concerning who was to be chairman of the Mission: as early as March 13, he was referring to himself in writing as "Chairman United States Special Commission." 13 Following his session with Weeks, Forbes seemed satisfied and always referred to Wood as the Mission's chairman and to himself as simply the "other member." 14

It should be stated here that apparently never thereafter was this ever a point of contention between the two men and that their record of teamwork was to be admirable. The title "Wood-Forbes Mission" soon became the usual designation for the group, and it would seem that any significance which might have been attached to the order of the names was definitely

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Manila Times, March 24, 1921; Manila Daily Bulletin, March 26, 1921.

11 BIA, W-F Mission File.

12 BIA, W-F Mission File; quotation taken from the letter to the Secretary of State. Forbes simply noted, "General Wood and I are to have the rank of Governor General during this trip," Journals, II, 50.

13 See a letter dated March 13, 1921, to a Mr. Edw. C. Carter of New York City, in the Wood Papers, Box 155.

14 Forbes, Philippine Islands, II, 286.
inconsequential. And Wood was consistently accepted as its chairman with Forbes his equal colleague. 15

Yet up until their sailing, Wood seemed far from happy with his colleague. In late March, Forbes was ill for several days which caused Wood to comment that he was "apparently a good deal of an invalid and very fussy, and does not seem to understand the very broad scope of the mission." Although Forbes seemed "rather impressed with the idea of tripping the Filipinos up on some minor points rather than getting a general view of the situation," Wood hoped, somewhat querulously, that this would "wear off when he gets it into his head what we want to do--to give them a fair deal and our own people a fair deal." 16

When it became known that a special investigating mission to the Philippines was forming, many persons either offered their services or suggested the names of others. Doubtless some of them, both civilians and army persons, were well qualified, having served in the Islands and even with Wood; but a definite group had no obvious qualifications except the desire for a trip and possible adventure. "Many letters piling in from people who want to go on the Philippines mission," Wood noted in his Diary on March 19. "Am giving a uniform answer, to the effect that we cannot take any additional personnel." 17

15 Wood, however, attempted to preserve the title "Special Mission to the Philippine Islands." See, for example, the typed letterhead on which he wrote an official letter to Acting Governor General Yeater at Manila on May 11, 1921, shortly after the Mission's arrival, in BIA, W-F Mission File. This was also the "correct" style as indicated to the press soon after their landing in Manila. See the Manila Daily Bulletin, May 6, 1921.

16 Wood, Diary, March 28, 30, 1921. Quote from the latter source.

17 For a typical example see a copy of Wood's letter to Frank S. Lusk
More significant was the cablegram from the president of the American Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines strongly advising the Mission to bring "legal, economical, accounting, financial, revenue experts," as they could not depend upon men there "for necessary thorough investigation." Until the eve of the Mission's sailing, the Treasury Department attempted to supply such a financial expert but without success. 18

Colonel Frank R. McCoy, General Staff Corps, who was to be the Chief of Staff for the Mission, recommended to Wood that certain persons be asked to accompany them; that the State Department be asked for an experienced diplomat who had seen service in Japan and China; that the Secretary of the Navy be asked to assign a suitable naval officer to handle "the little indefinite things that would come up in touching at ports and arranging the details of formal visits to Admirals, etc."; and, finally, that a Senator or Congressman, "preferably one from the Insular Committee of either the House or the Senate," be made a member of the group. 19 Only the last of his suggestions was not acted upon by Wood.

When the Mission reached Manila, those who were assistants to the

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of Missoula, Montana, March 19, 1921, in the Wood Papers, Box 156. Attached to it is Lusk's letter of March 16 in which this retired banker offered his services as a dollar-a-year-man (plus expenses for both himself and his wife) to help investigate banking conditions. Similar letters may be seen in this same box and in BIA, W-F Mission File where notations have been made concerning those which were placed in separate "F" files under individual names.

18 Quoted in a letter from Daniel R. Williams, Washington representative of the Chamber, to George B. Christian, Jr., Secretary to the President, March 17, 1921, in BIA, W-F Mission File. Stamped as having been received at the White House on March 18, at the War Department on March 21, and at the Bureau of Insular Affairs on March 24, 1921. A script notation indicates that Wood was supplied with a copy of the cable on March 21. See also a note concerning a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, April 4, 1921, and a telegram, Patterson of the Bureau of Insular Affairs to McCoy in care of the Admiral Line, Seattle, Washington, April 7, 1921. BIA, W-F Mission File.

19 See a memorandum, McCoy to Wood, March 18, 1921, in BIA, W-F Mission File.
Commissioners included McCoy, Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Johnston, Major Edward Bowditch, Lieutenant Osborne C. Wood, Lieutenant Commander Stewart F. Bryant, and Mr. Ray Atherton. 20 Except for Bryant and Atherton, these were all personal selections of Wood; Forbes, apparently, was not consulted. Yet this should not imply that he was ever displeased with Wood's selection as his praise of them continued high throughout the months they were together. For example, during the voyage out he referred to them as, "Our fine bunch of officers . . . a splendidly set-up group of men, won the admiration of all en route"; early in their work he wrote the Secretary of War that "the personnel that the General selected to go along has proved admirable, each man being fitted for the work expected of him"; and as their work ended he effusively referred to them as "all wonderful fellows, salt of the earth, God's own creatures, and evidence of his best handicraft." 21

Some of those associated with Wood and Forbes were undoubtedly not well known to the general public. Colonel, later General, Frank Ross McCoy, the Mission's Chief of Staff, was described by Forbes as "a man of the very first quality of ability and tact, and of long experience in many responsible positions, including several years' service in Cuba and in the Philippine Islands." His varied Philippine duty had included service "as engineer and as secretary of the Moro Province, and as governor in the absence of General Wood." 22 A cavalry officer on Wood's staff at Chicago when the Mission was proposed, he was recognized by the Manila press as one of the old-timers

20 This and subsequent lists of personnel attached to the Mission have been taken, unless otherwise indicated, from a letter, McCoy to Major General Frank McIntyre, Chief, Bureau of Insular Affairs, May 12, 1921, in BIA, W-F Mission File.


22 Forbes, Philippine Islands, II, 286, 19.
returning after long absence.  

Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Johnston, another cavalry officer, had also served with Wood in Mindanao and under his command at Chicago. Major Edward Bowditch (also often called Peter, especially by Forbes) had spent seven years in the Philippines in various civil capacities, including service as Forbes's secretary when he was Governor General, and with General John J. Pershing and Governor Frank W. Carpenter in Mindanao. His specific duties were to assist Forbes. Lieutenant Osborne C. Wood, aide-de-camp to his father, was remembered by many in the Philippines as he had spent a number of his boyhood years there, leaving when he was nine. "It will be of the greatest possible assistance to have you with me," his father had written in requesting his assistance. "I must have some one who speaks Spanish and has my entire confidence." Lieutenant Commander Stewart F. Bryant, representing the United States Navy, apparently joined the Mission in Japan. Ray Atherton, First Secretary of the Legation in Peking, joined the group in Yokohama to represent the Department of State on instructions from Washington.

Also sailing with them were Robert C. Redmayne and Army Field Clerk

27 Letter, General McIntyre to the Chief, Army Transportation Service, in BIA, W-F Mission File.
J. F. Walker, who were to be private secretaries to Forbes and Wood respectively. These, together with four other Army Field Clerks, a Mail Clerk, and a Messenger, were listed by McCoy under Office Personnel. The clerks were "to take care of the numerous communications the commissioners are receiving and aid in the filing of documents and the sending of mail." Other men who later became associated with the Mission and gave valuable assistance would include two army officers, Major A. L. F. Johnson and Captain Robert C. Candee; Professor H. Otley Beyer, an ethnologist at the University of the Philippines; and Frank W. Carpenter, whose years of service in the Islands had been climaxed as Governor of Mindanao and Sulu.

Such was the Wood-Forbes Mission, or the Special Mission to the Philippine Islands. But one hostile American described its composition much more succinctly: "The official party of the Wood-Forbes Mission consisted of seven military officers, and one Cameron Forbes, accompanied of course by a company of clerks and lesser lights."
But no critical eye detected one serious omission in the personnel of the Mission: no women were utilized in any capacity. Wood, at least, was later to regret this oversight when he discovered (or, more accurately, "rediscovered," since he should have known fully the character of the Filipina) the extreme reluctance of the women to attend official or social functions dominated by men, or to request an interview with male Mission personnel. Apparently he came to consider this problem so serious that he contemplated asking his wife and daughter to join the Mission. 33

Undoubtedly Washington was concerned with Filipino reaction to the sending of the Mission and to its personnel. Senate President Quezon, chief of the politicos and dominant member of the powerful Nacionalista Party, was pleased that Wood was coming to the Philippines on an investigating mission. At least that was the impression conveyed by the newspaper account of a speech he gave on March 12, in which he asserted that Wood's investigation undoubtedly would prove favorable for Filipino independence aspirations, and that whatever the General's decisions his report would have a decisive influence in America because he was considered to be trustworthy, unbiased, and fair. Should this be considered too optimistic, Quezon reminded his Manila audience that Wood had been military governor of Cuba when it had received independence. 34 And on March 23 Speaker Osmeña did his part by

33 See a letter, Wood to his wife (Len to Louise), Manila, May 7, 1921, in Wood Papers, Box 192.

34 Manila Times, March 13, 1921.
cabling Resident Commissioner De Veyra to inform Wood "that the people of the Philippines look upon him with confidence and we who are entrusted with its representation are ready to do our best to cooperate with him." 35

De Veyra was quoted by El Debate as having said that the Filipino people "do not fear" investigation by the Mission, and that they would not "flee from it." El Debate editorially expressed its regrets that the Mission had not been made up of the committees from both houses of the American Congress concerned with insular affairs because Congress was the high tribunal which must ultimately judge Philippine affairs. Yet this Filipino Spanish-language daily conceded that Wood was an "admirable choice," and it urged that "from now on we get ready to assist him with all sincerity in his investigation, to the end that he obtain the most exact reports and know the Philippine situation as it really is." La Defensa also urged that there be a concerted effort to make Wood's task of investigation easier. 36 La Vanguardia editorially declared that "unless God and men decide otherwise, General Wood might become the instrument of Providence for the consummation of the definite and permanent political relations of the Philippines with the American Republic," and that he "might realize in the Philippines the same mission that he did in Cuba. . . ." 37

Regardless of their private feelings, most of the politicos expressed flattered pleasure at the appointment of Wood to judge them; but concerning his colleague, whom the politicians knew well from personal experience, there

35 Wood, Diary, March 28, 1921.

36 Quoted from "General Wood's Philippine Mission," Literary Digest, LXIX (June 4, 1921), 23. These are translations from the original Spanish of these Manila newspapers.

was little attempt to hide their outraged feelings. Moreover, the first rumors to reach Manila concerning Forbes (apparently in a cablegram from Washington by De Veyra on March 17) were that he was being considered by Harding for another appointment as Governor General. The intensity of feeling which this generated can easily be seen in Quezon's cabled response. Although protesting that he did "not wish to do anything to oppose the appointment of Forbes as Governor-General, for I do not feel that I should in any way interfere with the plans of the President," Quezon none the less instructed De Veyra that he might "inform" Horace M. Towner of Iowa, chairman of the House Insular Affairs Committee, and "remind" McIntyre, Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, that before leaving the Philippines Forbes "publicly made a personal attack on me and while neither then nor thereafter have I ever answered his attack, our personal relations have not been pleasant ever since." Thus it would be "very embarrassing" for him to have to deal with Forbes as Governor General, "especially because knowing Governor Forbes as I do I fear that he would make it impossible for me to have even official relations with him." In conclusion, Quezon declared that it was his "earnest desire to be able to cooperate with and support the present administration, and its representative in the Philippines," and he sincerely hoped that he would "be given the opportunity of carrying out that wish."\[38\]

A notation on the Bureau of Insular Affairs' copy of this cablegram states that this "Confidential" document was handed by De Veyra himself to McIntyre, who later initialed a note indicating that it had been shown to Wood. And then almost certainly Forbes heard of its contents; but, unfortunately, his reaction was apparently not recorded. Neither is it known

\[38\] Cablegram, Quezon to De Veyra, March 17, 1921, in BLA, W-F Mission File.
whether Quezon was mollified when he learned that Forbes would only be a partner with Wood in a temporary mission of investigation.

And then this drama was concluded in Washington on March 21 when Forbes called upon the De Veyras while awaiting his White House dinner engagement. Finding them "quite constrained," he learned that they had "orders from Quezon that as I was personally hostile to him they were to oppose my coming to the Islands." Forbes's comments then were not recorded but we do know his thoughts: "I guess Quezon will do his best to prepare a frost for me and a welcome for Wood. I wish he could hear Wood's personal opinion of him and the President's." Mrs. De Veyra, who was thought to have considerable influence over Forbes (he states, in fact, that she had been "a constant adviser and personal friend and a visitor" while he was Governor General, and that he had once helped her out of serious financial difficulties), told Forbes that he would have a hard time as Governor because Quezon "held the Senate in the palm of his hand." But most revealing in the entire episode is a note which Forbes added in 1941:

As will appear later, Quezon was very anxious about the kind of reception I would give him and was afraid that I might publicly refuse to shake hands or something on arrival. He is a genial lovable little person; likes to be liked and wants to be liked. He happened to know that I had complete knowledge of his disloyalties and rascalities. I do not think he knew that I had in my safe a complete copy of his police record. It was lurid enough and he must have known that I was pretty well informed of it. He was not quite sure of the use I would make of it.39

39 Forbes, Journals, II, 45-46. The conclusion of this affair was a minor tragedy. Quezon later attempted to prove that he had never cast aspersions on Forbes's moral character by producing a complete set of cablegrams exchanged with De Veyra for Forbes to read, including one in which the Resident Commissioner had declared that he had "done everything possible to eliminate Forbes." To himself Forbes's comment was bitter: "This from the De Veyras who had professed undying friendship and both of whom told me at our last meeting that they hoped I'd go back as Governor." "This bit of treachery on the part of one whom I had befriended was not wholly a surprise to me," Forbes added, "but I let Mrs. De Veyra know in no uncertain terms
On March 18, Quezon thought it the better part of wisdom to halt a Filipino laborers' protest meeting against Forbes at the Manila Labor Hall. Because there was adequate reason to feel indebted to Harding for his consideration to them thus far, Quezon's letter urged that no obstacles be placed in the President's path. 40

Not all members of the Nationalista Party, however, exercised as much restraint as their leader. It was reported from Manila on March 23 that considerable opposition was developing within the party to Forbes's appointment; and an editorial from the Filipino Daily Bulletin, which was characterized as "the organ of the younger generation," was cited as proof. "What would you think of a law making your opponent in litigation the judge of the case?" was their rhetorical opening question. "This is exactly what ... Harding is doing by sending Forbes to investigate the administration of ... Harrison." Claiming that Forbes had left the Islands "a much disgusted man," (because, the story was, he had been rather summarily dismissed by Wilson) and that he would therefore "want his revenge and his pound of flesh," this editor was convinced that "the Harrison administration must be sacrificed on the alter of American politics," and be made "the football of American politics. . ." 41

Only a few days later official Philippine opposition to the Wood-Forbes Mission was out in the open when the regular "Press Bulletin," issued on March


41 New York Times, March 24, 1921. In describing the Filipinos' reaction, Walter Robb, a long-time Philippine resident and businessman, declared that because Harrison was "a saviour of their cause," the sending of Wood and "the hardminded . . . Forbes" was comparable to "Pharisees judging Christ." Walter Robb, Filipinos (Manila, 1939), p. 354.
27, of the Philippine Commission of Independence (which maintained head-
quar ters and a propaganda agency in Washington) explained the opposition of
the Nacionalista politicos. Declaring that the Filipinos would actually
welcome the investigation if it were only an impartial one, it was stated
that if the Philippine question were treated as a nonpartisan matter, "no
investigation of Filipino 'fitness' would be necessary, in view of Governor
Harrison's report that the Filipinos are ready for their badge of sov-
ereignty." Without explaining how Tammany Democrat Harrison qualified as
nonpartisan, the statement asserted that certain undesignated "political
observers" (who could have been anyone, including themselves) were declaring
"that General Wood will hand in any kind of report he is being sent to the
Philippines to obtain. . . ." Protesting that Filipinos were "loath to
place any credence in this version," while happily giving it the widest
possible undocumented publicity, these propagandists turned to "the case of
Mr. Forbes." Because his administration had not been praised as much by
Filipinos as Harrison's and because he "felt slighted" when Wilson demanded
his resignation, it was believed certain that Forbes "had it in for all the
persons responsible for his exit, one of whom is a prominent Filipino leader."
Since he obviously harbored a deep grudge, Forbes was also clearly un-qualified
to investigate Philippine conditions.

The American news service which distributed this release explained
that the "prominent Filipino leader" was doubtless Quezon, "who the War
Department believes is back of the present opposition to the Woods-Forbes
[sic] mission."42 And Quezon himself thought that he had been the person

42 Los Angeles Examiner, March 28, 1921 (Universal Service). The op-
position to Forbes by members of the Commission had been briefly reported
the day prior to the release of this bulletin. Los Angeles Times, March 27,
1921.
most instrumental in persuading Wilson to dismiss Forbes and replace him with Harrison. Thus it is quite apparent that Quezon had now changed his mind; he had become convinced that open opposition was a necessity, not only to Forbes, but also to Wood, and to the entire idea of an investigating mission.

Some Americans thought this planned attack against Forbes indicated that the políticos were fearful; and Mrs. Eleanor Egan, an American newspaperwoman in Manila, believed she knew specifically what they feared: "The truth was that they were afraid of Mr. Forbes because they were thoroughly familiar with him and his standards, whereas General Wood was an awesome kind of military figure representing powers and possibilities not to be too freely discussed." And their hurried repairs to the road system, Forbes's most highly esteemed contribution to the Islands' welfare, she felt illustrated "better than anything their attitude toward . . . [Forbes] and serves to prove that their expressed objections to him as a judge had their source in a consciousness of their own shortcomings."44

Yet through it all Forbes, who bore the brunt of the new attack by the políticos without public rejoinder, found that he had one influential Filipino friend of long standing who was not afraid to voice his convictions: General Emilio Aguinaldo, President of the short-lived first Philippine Republic, and leader of the insurgents against both the Spanish and the American forces at the turn of the century. In a press interview, Don Emilio, who had entirely withdrawn from politics after his capture in 1901, expressed his complete confidence in both Forbes and the Mission:


44 Eleanor Franklin Egan, "Do The Filipinos Want Independence?" Saturday Evening Post, CXCV (October 15, 1921), 41. For the story of these hasty road repairs see the subsequent chapter on public works.
Governor Forbes stands for a square deal for the Filipinos. He has at heart the best interests of the country. I know he is deeply interested in our future welfare, and thus I am sure that anything he does in connection with his coming visit and investigation of local conditions will have for its ultimate purpose the progress and welfare of the Filipinos. . . . He is an upright man. . . . I am sure that whatever he does will be dictated by nothing else but by justice.  

Forbes must have been pleased with this unexpected Filipino support; and the New York Times considered Aguinaldo's statement "likely to allay much of the opposition to the mission" because he was "generally regarded as first in the hearts of his countrymen. . . ." It would be, however, a definite error to give this allusion to George Washington much weight as Aguinaldo did not then nor ever in the future occupy a comparable position of respect and authority.

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45 Manila Times, April 29, 1921.

46 New York Times, May 3, 1921. From a dispatch date-lined Manila, May 2, which also presented a briefer version of Aguinaldo's statement to the Manila Times.
CHAPTER V

WASHINGTON TO MANILA: PROBLEMS SOLVED TO PROBLEMS FACED

Weeks before the expected arrival of the Mission in the Philippines active and extensive preparations were being carried out both in Washington and in Manila to aid in their work. For the Mission the ponderous wheels of the bureaucracy began to turn in the two capitals some 9,000 miles apart—in the one principally to smooth the way for the Mission's work, and in the other to assure a final report that would deal as favorably as possible with the politicos and their aspirations.

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Undoubtedly the question of competent personnel was the most serious problem faced by the Mission, but certainly there were other matters that could have been a source of great trouble had they not been handled carefully, notably the areas of transportation, finance, and housing. With the exception of an accident at sea, which was beyond his control, transportation problems were smoothly handled by McCoy. Problems of finance were seemingly adequately solved before the Mission's departure, principally at a conference held on March 28 by the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs. And the Mission's housing problems in the Philippines were largely met when Acting Governor General Yeater offered the use of Malacanan Place together with necessary automobile, railway, and sea transportation. ¹

Ultimately, the principal burden of preparing for the Mission's

¹See extensive materials on these topics in BIA, W-F Mission File.
arrival fell upon Yeater. Following instructions from both the Secretary of War and the Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, which he publicized through the insular press, Yeater urged that government officials and representatives of other groups file their views in his office (in duplicate, sealed, and addressed to the Commissioners), that all organizations select spokesmen for personal appearances and oral interviews before the Mission, and that all newspaper references to the Mission be compiled.²

Meanwhile in Washington the Secretary of War, under whose jurisdiction the Philippines came, had secured the cooperation of other government departments in the work of the Mission, including the Navy, State, and War.³ Yet there was other activity in Washington which might have made for the Mission a pointless round-trip across the Pacific: on April 11 two bills providing for Philippine independence were introduced into the House. But after being referred to the Committee on Insular Affairs, no more was heard from them, so forward with the work of the Mission!⁴

But political activity was not confined to Washington. In Manila the Legislature was formed into an Independence Commission composed of all members of both houses, with the minority Demócratas promising their complete support to the dominant Nacionalistas on all matters relating to preparations for properly receiving the Mission. And the Nacionalista Party’s National

²Letter, Weeks to Yeater, March 24, 1921; cable No. 643, McIntyre to Yeater, March 25, 1921; telegram, Patterson of the BIA to McCoy, April 7, 1921; cable No. 705, Yeater to Weeks, May 3, 1921. BIA, W-F Mission File.

³See the correspondence with these departments in Ibid.

⁴H.R. 112 by William E. Mason, and H.R. 293 by Edward J. King, both of Illinois. Congressional Record, 67th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 89, 92. A printed copy of Mason’s bill, which contained only the usual reasons for granting immediate Philippine independence and was very sketchy on the mechanics, is in BIA, Philippine Independence File.
Committee adopted two resolutions: the first reaffirmed the party's "unshakeable attitude in favor of the immediate independence of the Philippines," because of which the National Committee had instructed the party's executive officers to prepare a memorial for the Mission, "asking that the pending question of . . . [independence] be immediately decided upon"; and the second declared that the party was strongly "against any policy which would tend to make the Philippines a permanent integral part of the United States either as a territory or as a state, or in whatever form." 5

On April 2 Wood left Chicago for Seattle where he was scheduled to board the steamer Wenatchee on April 9. 6 On April 3 Forbes made this stark entry in his Journal: "Pursuant to instructions from the Secretary of War and at the request of the President, I started for the Philippines this afternoon [presumably from Boston], accompanied by only Redmayne as secretary." At Chicago they met Bowditch, McCoy, and Johnston, who joined them on the train for Seattle. Soon they were busy.

"We're at work full speed already, studying documents, discussing our program and plans, laying out our campaign and generally clearing the decks for action," Forbes noted. And, in the light of Wood's recent concern for his attitude toward their assignment, it would seem certain that these officers had been charged with an additional duty, concerning which Forbes has written with a candor that documents the essential bigness of the man:

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5 Manila Times, March 30, April 25, 26, 1921.

6 Ibid., April 4, 1921.
McCoy and Johnston were much afraid that I would approach the problem in a controversial spirit, looking for errors or ways of tripping up the Filipinos and confounding their Governor General who was my successor in office, and not in the broad, fair-minded point of view of the unprejudiced investigator. So they're here diligently at work preparing my psychology by suggestion and argument. They are both very capable fellows and they are entirely right in what they've been doing. It's been practical and sensible.  

Wood's route was via San Francisco where he addressed "a vast audience" at the Civic Auditorium on "Americanism," and an overflow crowd at the Commonwealth Club. But more important was a conference with former Secretary of State and War Elihu Root, a man of vast experience in the handling of Philippine affairs, whose counsel Wood obviously valued highly.  

When the Wenatchee sailed from Seattle on April 9 (after a delay of six hours caused by Wood's call on Root), the Mission faced the prospect of at least thirteen days on the high seas. Under ideal conditions, they soon began holding long daily sessions in the morning, and sometimes an extra afternoon session, on topics and problems related to their work. Fortunately the new insular auditor, William T. Nolting, was aboard to assist them in studying the important financial problems of the Islands; yet, for strategic reasons, Wood and Forbes chose not to consult often with him for fear it would appear that he was a member of the Mission.  

Thus it was that by April 20 Wood could write his wife that their

7 Forbes, Journals, II, 48, 50, 51.  
8 San Francisco Chronicle, April 5, 6, 7, 8, 1921; copy of a letter, Wood to Root, March 31, 1921, in Wood Papers, Box 157.  
9 Manila Times, April 12, 1921; Wood, Diary, April 11, 19, 20, 21, 23, 1921; Forbes, Journals, II, 53-54, 63-64; letter, McCoy to McIntyre, Manila, May 11, 1921, in BIA, W-F Mission File.  
10 Leaving the Mission in Japan, Nolting did not arrive in Manila until more than two weeks after them, apparently to dispel any suspicion that he was connected with the Mission. Manila Daily Bulletin, May 20, 1921.
study sessions were "gradually working out many things and giving us an opportunity to get down to fundamentals on many points." And by April 23 he concluded that their preparatory work had been well done: "We have covered pretty much all our points under discussion and, I think, are now ready to take up the work in the Philippines with our information fairly well up to date."\(^{11}\)

Apparently there was a plenitude of printed material available for their study in the many packages of documents on the Islands which had been assembled by the Bureau of Insular Affairs. There was also a library of books on the Philippines and the Far East loaned by the Library of Congress.\(^{12}\)

Wood had other problems with which to occupy himself: the challenges he would face upon "taking the veil," as he had phrased it, to become head of the University of Pennsylvania.\(^{13}\) Forbes, however, had no such burdens, although he could have had if on March 31 he had not declined the League of Nations' offer to become a member of the Permanent Commission on Mandates.\(^{14}\)

Although according to her schedule the Wenatchee should have arrived at Yokohama on April 22, because of mechanical difficulties it was not until

\(^{11}\)Letter, Wood to his wife Louise ("Len" to "Lou"), April 20, 1921, in Wood Papers, Box 192; Diary, April 23, 1921.

\(^{12}\)See the correspondence on these collections, together with lists of the specific documents, in BLA, W-F Mission File.

\(^{13}\)New York Times, April 19, 1921. Even if a radiogram was not used by the Trustees to inform Wood of their action, he doubtless would have presumed that he had been elected at this scheduled meeting as his had been the only name placed in nomination at their previous meeting. Ibid.

\(^{14}\)After consulting Secretary of War Weeks and Chief Justice Hughes, both of whom urged refusal, Forbes wrote to Sir Eric Drummond, Secretary-General of the League in Paris, on March 31, declining by using the pretext of his appointment to the Wood-Forbes Mission (actually this advice stemmed from fears that accepting would compromise the neutral position that the United States was then assiduously cultivating). Forbes, Journals, II, 43-45.
April 26 that she ended her maiden voyage by being ingloriously towed into port.\textsuperscript{15} Then, finally, the Japanese Government and hundreds of resident Americans could welcome and honor the Mission.\textsuperscript{16} And with the niceties of diplomatic protocol fulfilled, the Mission—now augmented by Ray Atherton—traveled to Nagasaki to board the waiting Army transport Warren, which weighed anchor for Manila at 11:30 P.M., April 29.\textsuperscript{17}

As they steamed toward Manila, Wood candidly commented in several letters on the task which lay before them. To his wife, he indicated their attitude toward the job ahead: "Everything is going well and we are ready for our work." After admitting to Theodore Roosevelt's widow that he had undertaken "a rather thankless task, for whatever our report may be it cannot be pleasing to everybody," he explained the basis for his pessimism:

I think that conditions in the Islands are very different from the old days, when one could do real administrative work, and do it rapidly and effectively; but now, with all the agitation for immediate independence it is very difficult to get measures of importance through, as everything has to be enacted into law by the assembly and all appropriations have to be secured through it. So in order to bring about the results which are so desirable a number of years would be required.

And to Theodore Roosevelt's sister he summarized their objectives:

\textsuperscript{15}The details of the breakdown (which both Wood and Forbes admitted could have been extremely serious if calm weather had not prevailed) may be followed in the Manila Times, the New York Times, and the San Francisco Chronicle for the period of April 24 to 30, 1921, and in Forbes, Journals, II, 55-65, and Wood, Diary, April 11, 21-24, 1921.

\textsuperscript{16}Associated Press dispatch, New York Times and San Francisco Chronicle, April 27, 1921; Manila Times, April 27, 30, 1921; Forbes, Journals, II, 56-65; Wood, Diary, April 26-29, 1921.

\textsuperscript{17}Associated Press dispatches, Manila Times, April 24, New York Times, April 23, 1921; Reuter's dispatch from Nagasaki, Manila Times, April 30, 1921.
We have a rather thankless job ahead of us in the Philippines, but we are going to do our best to make an absolutely honest, fair and frank report. We have a fine lot of men with us. I told Mr. Harding I thought the best service I could do would be to make this investigation and give him a report on which he could act with confidence, a report which would be fair and give credit for what had been done, while stating conditions as they are. . . .

As the Warren coasted the mountainous Ilocano shores of northern Luzon, Forbes "couldn't help visualizing the conditions behind the islands,—the savages I know and like so well, the trails, the progress, the hopes, the fears, the neglect." And he discovered that he "enjoyed the sensation of getting back to the tropics and watched eagerly for the first view of the Southern Cross. . . ."

But, in a way, the actual work of the Mission had already begun as Forbes had collected the first document for their files while still aboard the Warren. A certain Rhodes, a Major in the Philippine Scouts, who was filled with misgivings for the future of the Philippines, declared that there had been "a steady retrogression, morally, socially and politically, and that if the hand of the United States is withdrawn and they are left to their own devices, they'll be 'back in the trees in a few generations.'"

After supplying "a lot of very interesting information as to how things have gone," and turning in "an interesting written statement" at Forbes's request, Rhodes induced Forbes to express to himself what must have been the feelings of the entire Mission: "It's evident we are to have a very interesting time." 

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18 Letter, Wood to his wife, May 3, 1921, Wood Papers, Box 192; letter, Wood to Mrs. Theodore Roosevelt, May 2, 1921, Wood Papers, Box 157; letter, Wood to Mrs. Douglas Robinson (Mrs. Corinne Roosevelt Robinson), May 2, 1921, Wood Papers, Box 157. All three are typed carbon copies.

19 Forbes, Journals, II, 59-60.
Arriving at Manila on the morning of May 4, 1921, the Wood-Forbes Mission was welcomed by dignitaries, including Acting Governor General Charles E. Yeater, Senate President Manuel Quezon, House Speaker Sergio Osmeña, Admiral Joseph Strauss, commander in chief of the U. S. Asiatic Fleet, General Francis J. Kernan, in command of the Department of the Philippines of the U. S. Army, and General Emilio Aguinaldo.\textsuperscript{20} To the Secretary of War, Forbes stated that "in accord with our expressed request the reception was simple and dignified," that there had been "great cordiality in evidence and no unpleasant incidents," and that both Quezon and Osmeña had not only displayed no hostility but had rather been "friendly and helpful." To Harrison, however, Quezon attempted to convey the impression that the Mission had been coolly received: ". . . [The Mission] was given a purely official reception. . . . In view of my personal relations with Governor Forbes, I have only paid him official visit."\textsuperscript{21}

Shortly before noon on the day of their arrival, Wood and Forbes held their first press conference in Malacanan Palace. Each answered questions but explained that these should be considered as from both of them since they were co-commissioners with the equal rank of a Governor General. When asked if ultimate independence was the purpose of their investigation, Wood explained that they had nothing to say concerning this question which was

\textsuperscript{20} The details of the reception may be seen in these sources: Manila Times, May 4, 1921; Forbes, Journals, II, 60-62; Eleanor Franklin Egan, "Do The Filipinos Want Independence?" Saturday Evening Post, CXCI (October 15, 1921), 43-45.

\textsuperscript{21} Forbes, Journals, II, 60; letter, Forbes to Weeks, Manila, May 6, 1921, as reproduced in \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 63-65; letter, Quezon to Harrison, Manila, July 11, 1921, in Harrison Papers, Box 44.
entirely within the province of the President and Congress, their function being to provide a full and impartial report on Philippine conditions.

In conclusion, Wood and Forbes issued this joint statement:

We are coming in no hypocritical spirit. We are sincere and friendly to the Filipino people. We are here on orders of President Harding to make a thorough investigation, without fear or prejudice. We both appreciate the Filipinos and wish to see them succeed.

Our plan is to visit the whole Archipelago, from the northernmost point of Luzon to the southernmost point of Mindanao and Sulu, going by rail, trail, boat and other means of transportation. We will investigate conditions in the towns and provinces, and to accomplish our work, we invite the cordial help of the people.

We will look into the public works, education, agriculture, sanitation and other activities of the public administration of the islands as thoroughly and comprehensively as possible. Open and private hearings will be held to get into the real conditions of the country, both in Manila and provinces.

We have come with open minds, and we hope that the public will lend us its full support to enable us to reach the desired end—a full and impartial report of conditions in the Philippines. 22

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The impact created by the arrival of the Wood-Forbes Mission upon both Filipinos and Americans in the Islands has been variously described by different observers. Forbes himself later wrote that "Particularly noticeable was the relief felt by the Americans at what they looked upon as the dawning of a new era, for few of them had had reason to be happy over the course of events during the preceding eight years [the period since 1913 when Forbes had been forced to resign as Governor General by Wilson]. . . ." "There is evidence that our visit has had a very stimulating effect upon all officers of the government," Forbes wrote to Weeks on May 6, "and they are endeavoring to get things ship-shape as far as possible for inspec-

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22 Manila Times, May 4, 1921. This statement, with minor variations in wording, also was printed in the San Francisco Chronicle and the Philadelphia Public Ledger (an Associated Press dispatch), May 7, 1921.
tion." And he had also noted "a good deal of trepidation evinced in the higher Filipino quarters as to just what we are going to do..."23 "I think the leaders are very much worried by our presence," Wood wrote concisely in his Diary for May 6. "The American and conservative element are very much pleased."

The Mission's entrance into a "situation...[that] had...become intolerable..." was to resident American newspaperwoman Eleanor Egan "one of the great dramatic events in the history of American occupation in the Philippine Islands."24 Nathaniel Peffer, a correspondent for the New York Tribune, who had arrived in Manila some time before the Mission, considered their coming to be "probably the most important arrival in the Philippines since Dewey steamed into Manila Bay that May morning in 1898" for "the whole American policy in the Philippines" is said to be in a highly explosive condition, and a great deal "is likely to depend on General Wood's [sic] conclusions and recommendations."25

"Americans in the Islands are unfeignedly glad to see the Commissioners..." Philip M. Kinsley, correspondent for the Chicago Tribune, cabled the day following the Mission's arrival, "and a crowd of Filipinos sent a message to General Wood on board ship saying the investigation "means an end to graft in the Islands and the beginning of dominion law."26

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23 Forber, Philippine Islands, II, 287; reproduction of the letter in Journals, II, 63-65 (quotes from p. 64).

24 Eleanor Franklin Egan, "Do The Filipinos Want Independence?" Saturday Evening Post, CXCV (October 15, 1921), 16.

25 A quotation from Peffer in "Our Own Little Ireland In The Philippines," Literary Digest, LXX (June 4, 1921), 40. This entire article, which was based upon a report by Peffer to the Tribune, is a fine detailed analysis of Philippine conditions.

26 Extract from a cable by Kinsley, Manila, May 5, 1921, as quoted in a cable, De Veyra to Quezon, Washington, June 25, 1921, in BIA, W-F Mission
The Manila newspaper of the minority Partido Democrata, greeted the Mission and then expressed the hope that they would purge the temple steps "of the virus of corruption and of immoralities." 27

On the day following their arrival a joint statement was given to the press by Wood and Forbes, explaining that they were planning to remain in the Islands for at least three months, and longer if necessary, in order to be able to render a "full, fair and impartial report" for the President. After a short stay in Manila, they planned to move out into the provinces to inspect as many places as possible. "We might not be able to see every town in the Philippines," they explained, "but we shall do our best to accomplish our work so that no one may charge in the future that we did not see his province." 28

When the Mission had left the United States, it was not their publicized intention to stay this long in the Islands. The change in plans apparently occurred during the voyage out and originated with Wood. Forbes has described the processes behind this change for the Secretary of War, after they had been at work for some two months.

Forbes's idea was to complete their assignment in two months, including one northern and one southern trip with visits to about half of the provinces but only to the capital cities. "As General Wood thought it over...

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File. Kinsley, who had come across on the Wenatchee with the Mission, would also provide dispatches for other newspapers, including the San Francisco Chronicle. See this paper for April 7, 1921.


28 Manila Times, May 5, 1921.
he seemed to develop different ideas," Forbes explained. "He felt that there should be a very exhaustive examination made on the ground, seeing the people not only in their capital cities but in their home towns, and dropping in on isolated hamlets and places not usually reached by inspecting parties, and talking to a great variety and many classes of people." This would involve going "through each province fairly exhaustively, visiting practically all the provinces in the archipelago. . . ."

I did not undertake to oppose my views to General Wood's [Forbes admitted], as I was not at all convinced that his idea was not very much the best, although I should not have undertaken it on that basis; I felt that it might very possibly prove in the long run to be a very wise measure; I have since been inclining more to that view, impatient as I have become at the length of time it has taken. It was very important that the people should feel that we were painstakingly getting at the bottom of things. I venture to say that there has never before been such a careful scrutiny of this country, or any other country, as we have made. . . .29

Here, then, is a frank admission by Forbes that the exhaustive character of their working plans was primarily attributable to the ideas and the determination of Wood, and that Forbes himself would not have consented to the assignment had he known the time and energy that it would consume. There is, however, a decided note of pride in his claim that there had "never before been such a careful scrutiny of this country . . . as we have made. . . ."

"In return for the frank statements made by . . . [Wood and Forbes] to the press . . . regarding their desire to render a full and impartial report of conditions in the Philippines to President Harding," it was announced on May 5 that a movement had been initiated for a mammoth parade

29 Letter, Forbes to Weeks, on board the S. S. Polillo, August 6, 1921. BIA, W-F Mission File.
the following afternoon, and a manifesto called upon "all the good and loyal citizens of Manila to join in the big demonstration..." Winding its way across the heart of Manila to the grounds of Malacanan Palace, the big parade --estimated at from seven to ten thousand--was led by Quezon and Osmena and consisted of representatives from labor organizations, commercial and business firms, ordinary laborers, many government employees, and hundreds of students, with many bearing placards and banners on standards. 30

"Shouts of long live the commissioners and President Harding and the United States and the Filipinos rent the air" when the marchers saw Wood and Forbes on a palace balcony. In his address of welcome, Mayor Fernandez said that nothing would be hidden from the Commissioners and that he was convinced that their investigation would reveal the right of the Philippines to complete independence. Wood spoke briefly in Spanish, saying that they were going to investigate conditions carefully and then make a comprehensive and impartial report. Forbes stated that all their actions would be motivated by what was considered best for the Filipino people. 31

The two Filipino politicos, Manuel Luis Quezon, President of the Philippine Senate, and Sergio Osmena, Speaker of the House of Representatives, who were powerful enough to quickly stimulate such a demonstration, were well known to both Commissioners. These two mestizos were markedly different in personality but strikingly similar in their backgrounds.

It had been a long and tortuous trail which Don Manuel Luis Quezon Antonio y Molina had followed from Baler, Tayabas Province, Luzon, Philippines,


31Manila Times, May 7, 1921; San Francisco Chronicle, May 9, 1921. Quote from the Times.
to become the leading *politico* in the Islands. This Spanish-Filipino *mestizo* had been born on August 19, 1878, into a family which was moderately well off for a remote provincial village. His higher education was pursued in Manila some eighty miles from home where his legal studies at the University of Santo Tomas were interrupted by the outbreak of the revolution against Spain in 1898, forcing him to return to his native village. When the Filipinos rose against the American occupation army in 1899, Quezon joined the forces of General Aguinaldo and within a year had risen from private to major, ending the war a prisoner in Manila where he spent four months in a dungeon.

After concluding his law course, Quezon began practice in his home province of Tayabas, but soon politics lured him to the poorly paid but politically profitable position of *fiscal*, or prosecuting attorney, for Tayabas. By daring to prosecute a prominent American for fraud when it was almost unheard of for a Filipino to institute such an action, he quickly attained a national reputation after which his climb up the political ladder was rapid: 1906, governor of Tayabas Province; 1908, floor leader of the newly organized Philippine Assembly; 1909, one of the two Resident Commissioners to the United States.

Following passage of the Jones Act on August 29, 1916, Quezon resigned as Resident Commissioner to return home in triumph and be hailed as the hero who had obtained the promise of Philippine freedom. In the new Senate provided for in this law Quezon was elected without opposition to represent Tayabas and then unanimously selected as President of the first Philippine Senate.

From this position of leadership Quezon directed the steady efforts to attain internal autonomy during Harrison's administration and the fulfillment of America's promise to grant independence upon the establishment of
"stable" government. The highlight of this period was his leadership of the abortive First Independence Mission to the United States in 1919.\textsuperscript{32}

The rise to prominence of Sergio Osmeña, a Chinese-Filipino mestizo from Cebu in the central Philippines, had commenced sooner than Quezon's political career, had been slower and less spectacular, but in the opinion of many Americans was based upon firmer foundations of character, intelligence, and personality. Osmeña had been educated as a lawyer also and for a time had been a newspaper editor. In the early days of the American occupation he had been made provincial fiscal for Cebu. Within two years he was elected the first native governor of Cebu; soon thereafter he was chosen president of the convention of provincial governors thus becoming known throughout the Archipelago. With the institution of the Philippine Assembly in 1907, Osmeña was unanimously chosen to be Speaker—the biggest and most promising political position available at that time to a Filipino. He was still serving commendably in this position when the Wood-Forbes Mission arrived in the Philippines.\textsuperscript{33}

Two men and two only need be described to present the political leadership of the Filipinos in 1921. As the \textit{Nacionalista} Party overwhelmingly dominated insular politics and was in turn thoroughly dominated by Quezon and Osmeña, they had become, in the absence of effective control from the Governor General, the actual power in the Philippines.

\textsuperscript{32} This sketch is taken from Malcolm, \textit{Commonwealth of the Philippines}, pp. 388-89, and Quezon, \textit{The Good Fight}, pp. 1-132, passim.

\textsuperscript{33} This brief sketch is based on Malcolm, \textit{Commonwealth of the Philippines}, pp. 172-77, and Horn, \textit{Orphans of the Pacific}, pp. 64-67.
CHAPTER

MANILA AND MALACANAN

It was entirely natural that the Wood-Forbes Mission should have begun their work in Manila, the capital city of the Philippines, and the financial, cultural, communications, and political heart of the Archipelago. For their headquarters the Mission had the use of most of the office and residence facilities of Malacanan, the Governor General's Palace. As revealed in the Commissioners' first press conference only a few hours after their arrival, their immediate plans were to remain in Manila a few days to complete preparations for their investigative work and to receive calls from government officials and private citizens.¹

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Soon after their arrival the Mission settled down to the organized conduct of their investigation. Public announcement was made that the Commissioners would be available at Malacanan for two hours in the morning and two hours in the afternoon to receive all persons desirous of talking to them or presenting formal documents relating to any phase of Philippine affairs.² Although such activities were of course suspended when the Mission was on tour in the provinces, Wood and Forbes were usually available again on the day following their return to Manila.³

Some days, however, the Mission was compelled to reserve for other

¹Manila Times, May 4, 1921.
³For example, see the Manila Times, June 1, 1921.
pressing business: the formidable task of reading, digesting, and classifying the enormous mass of materials which flowed into their headquarters in the form of letters, petitions, memorials, resolutions, reports, etc. Yet the public was assured that every document would receive the Mission's most careful attention. 4

Little newspaper coverage was given to this rather undramatic but yet highly important phase of their work. For example, one sentence covered their conference and study activities for May 8 as reported by an American correspondent. 5

Forbes himself has described a typical day at Malacanan:

We rise early, say six or six-thirty, breakfast from seven to eight. At eight-thirty the Mission meets for an hour, takes up and discusses plans, policies, itineraries, personalities and the forms of its letters, etc. At nine-thirty, the representatives of the press come in and get their daily dope. General Wood and I both meet them and answer questions and give out information. At 10:30 the streams of daily visitors begins, some by appointment, some by application at the door, for interviews, and so it goes. One-forty-five lunch, usually with guests, and then I try to take a siesta. General Wood omits that formality. At 3:30 we begin again, either inspect bureaus or go on with interviewing again. 6

Yet despite this crowded schedule, Forbes, at least, was obviously delighted to be back at the Palace. Quickly he noted that little had changed, and even, with proprietary pride, that "The bath room is just as I fixed it up." 7

"So here we are back at Malacanan Palace with all the Oriental splendor

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4 Ibid., June 2, September 1, 2, 1921; Associated Press dispatch, San Francisco Chronicle, June 9, 1921.

5 Philip Kinsley's special cable to the San Francisco Chronicle, May 9, 1921.

6 Forbes, Journals, II, 66.

7 Ibid., p. 62.
and obsequiousness," Forbes mused to himself almost in disbelief. With his former rank of Governor General temporarily restored to provide "all the fixings and perquisites," it seemed "almost impossible" that some eight years had "flown by" since he had left Manila. "It's all like magic," a bemused man exclaimed to himself. "Aladdin and his lamp had nothing on this."\(^8\)

It would seem that a considerable proportion of Forbes's emotional response was precipitated by meeting old friends again. Yet he was no snob, responding only to the valuable friendship of the elite: one of his first Journal entries was a detailed listing of what had become of his favorite Palace servants. With evident pleasure he recorded that many of them soon demonstrated their devotion: "Pedro and Augustine, Felipe just back, Matias, and Agapito, and all came to call on me together." And he was especially pleased that two of them asked to serve him again, so that "the clothes were soon shaken out and laundered, and my shoes made white and resplendent, the hats cleaned and pressed into shape, and my old cane dug out."\(^9\)

2

On the morning following the Mission's arrival, the Ayuntamiento (the Philippine capitol) officially announced that finally an understanding had been reached between the Nacionalistas and the Demócratas concerning the memorial by the Independence Commission, composed of the entire Philippine Legislature. A sub-committee of the Commission was to be received by the Commissioners at Malacanan the next morning when a copy of this memorial would be formally presented.\(^10\)

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\(^8\)Ibid., pp. 62-63.  
\(^9\)Ibid., pp. 62, 71-72.  
\(^10\)Manila Times, May 5, 1921.
"We are not authorized to make any statement about Philippine independence," Wood abruptly declared when they were presented. "Our instructions were to come to the islands and make a full, fair and impartial report of conditions here for President Harding, and not necessarily to find any fault with the Filipino people." This was a statement which should have shortened their visit considerably! Forbes, however, stated that he and the General were pleased with the visit and at receiving their message and that they would have similar feelings toward anyone who desired to present any report or document concerning local conditions or expressing independence aspirations.

Although the memorial was not then made public, the press was informed that it reiterated the petition for their independence because the Filipinos had fully complied with the stipulated requirement in the Jones Law by establishing a stable government. Nacionalista claims that they had been responsible for achieving such stability had been eliminated at the insistence of the Democrats, and in the interests of national solidarity. Wood and Forbes stated that, at the committee's request, they would go over the memorial carefully and then decide whether or not it should be released for publication.¹¹

Preceding the committee's visit, Quezon and Osmeña had called to inform the Commissioners of the memorial. When Quezon suggested that they look it over so that anything which they disliked could be modified, Wood responded vigorously:

I told them that we did not care to even read it, at the present time, and that under no circumstances would we change it in the dotting of an "i" or the crossing of a "t", [sic] that the petition would be a matter entirely of their own creation and was something in which we would have nothing of the slightest intervention; [sic] We would take it and present it with our Report.

And, contrary to their reported statement that they would carefully go over

¹¹Ibid., May 6, 1921.
the memorial to decide whether or not it should be released for publication, Wood specifically recorded that it was "filed without reading."\textsuperscript{12}

The memorial already having been presented, the Independence Commission met the next day, analyzed it line by line, unanimously approved the work of the sub-committee, and voted that it be released for publication in the press, printed in English and Spanish, and distributed widely throughout the Islands. Thus only a day after they had asked Wood and Forbes carefully to read this document and decide whether or not it should be released for publication, the Independence Commission peremptorily took the matter into their own hands.\textsuperscript{13}

This memorial, which was reproduced by the local press in its entirety, began by welcoming the Mission and offering their "sincere and wholehearted cooperation in the performance of the great task entrusted to the Mission by the President of the United States." In order to assist, the Commission avowed their willingness to reveal "everything there is in this country and in this government."

The document then traced in a rather detailed manner the history of the Filipino struggle for independence from the revolts against Spain and the United States through the work of the First Independence Mission to the United States in 1919. The three formal documents which this Mission had presented were made a part of the memorial since these continued "to express the official attitude of the Filipino people on independence."

Because of the detailed manner in which these documents had presented the Filipinos' contentions, it was not then deemed necessary "to state anew the earnest desire of the Filipino people to have their own independent government, nor to reaffirm that there is already established here the stable

\textsuperscript{12} Wood, \textit{Diary}, May 6, 1921.

\textsuperscript{13} Manila \textit{Times}, May 7, 1921.
government that was demanded by the United States as a prerequisite to the granting of independence." They were, however, "ready and anxious to present at any time such additional testimony or evidence as may be asked of the Commission." Also, "should the Government of the United States consider it advisable to know beforehand what government would be established by the Filipino people when they are independent, the Commission feels authorized to say that the Legislature will be glad to call a constitutional convention at any time the Executive may convene the Legislature for this purpose:"

It is the belief and expectation of the Commission of Independence [the memorial hopefully concluded] that the . . . Mission . . . will note with satisfaction the conditions prevailing in the country and the progress attained by the people, and that their judgment and recommendations, after their study and investigations shall have been completed, will be in accord not only with the just and legitimate aspirations of the Filipino people, but also with the lofty and benevolent purposes and ideals of the American nation.  

Although this was the first delegation to wait upon the Mission, and obviously the most important both as to personnel and their message, there were others that made formal visits to Malacanan while the Commissioners were in residence there. Notable among these were a committee representing the veterans of the wars against Spain and the United States, and the board of directors of the National Civic League.  

At first those who called upon the Mission were either old friends or those who were merely paying their formal respects. Forbes was pleased when the "friendly callers" appeared "in swarms and we shook hands and greeted

14 Ibid., May 7, 1921.

15 Ibid., June 2, 3, 1921. These and other visits will be discussed in subsequent topical chapters.
them and enjoyed the cooling drinks on the porch over the Pasig River." Although they had arrived in the hottest month of the hot season, this delighted returnee to a second homeland passed off the stifling heat as completely unimportant: "... never mind, none of us cares." 16

Although Wood and Forbes made themselves regularly available at Malacanan for receiving visitors with anything to say or present concerning Island affairs, there is no formal and complete record of the number or the names of those who came. Faithfully respecting their promise of absolute confidence, the two Commissioners appear to have scrupulously avoided any sort of publicity for these visits.

The response to the Commissioners' public invitation for private interviews was impressive; both men refer to it as a "stream," and its volume soon necessitated the placing of Osborne Wood and Major Bowditch in charge of receiving these visitors. 17 Forbes carefully recorded the first person to be interviewed, an unnamed deputy from Iloilo who expanded in some detail on his declaration that he was "profoundly dissatisfied" with the administration of his country. 18 This steady stream of visitors soon included many of prominent rank both in the Filipino and the American communities: General Fernando Canon, a former general in Aguinaldo's army and a friend of Rizal, the greatest of Philippine heroes and martyrs; the youngest sister of Rizal; an unidentified general in Aguinaldo's army; 19 Dr. Charles McDevitt

16 Forbes, Journals, II, 63.
17 Ibid., p. 66; letter, Wood to his wife, Manila, May 7, 1921, Wood Papers, Box 192.
18 Forbes, Journals, II, 216.
19 The entry in Wood's Diary for May 10, 1921, appears thus in both the original copy and in a carbon copy filed separately: "On reaching the Malacanan I found General [blank space] waiting."
of the U. S. Public Health Service; a Mr. E. Womek, a former American soldier who had become a successful businessman; Judges Johnson, Arrellano, and Torres of the Philippine Supreme Court; Captain Seeber, formerly an Assistant Chief of Policy of Manila and at that time one of the Directors of the Philippine National Bank; and General Crame, commander of the Philippine Constabulary.  

The most dramatic and critically important of these interviews—with the dominant Filipino political leaders, Osmeña and Quezon—also received no publicity, undoubtedly to their great comfort. Only two days after the Mission's arrival, these four men first met in private and had what Wood termed "a short but very significant talk." Speaking directly to Quezon, Wood bluntly declared that there was no point in their "engaging in any indirect conversation; that we ought to speak with entire frankness, and that what I wanted to do before long was to have an absolutely frank talk with them and obtain from them a statement of exactly what they wanted; that it was no time, in these days of world unrest, to deal in indirection, and repeated that we were here to make a full and fair investigation." Wood also emphasized that they "were quite as anxious to find the good things as . . . the bad," and that they "hoped that there would be few of the latter."

Because, as Wood explained, "it was generally admitted that they were the leaders of the people, and were able to carry through whatever policy they announced; that they, very largely, represented the government, so far as effective power to do things was concerned," he counseled "that it was most important that we should deal with each other with entire frankness and candor." But the two políticos, in an uncommonly humble mood—but entirely understandable in view of conditions the details of which they knew better

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20 See entries in Wood's Diary for May 5, 6, 9, 10, 1921.
than anyone else—"depreciated their own influence with their people."  \(^21\)

Again, just four days later, the Commissioners had another "very frank talk" with Quezon and Osmeña. Wood counseled that they ought to be "thinking most prayerfully" concerning the problems facing their people, and that they must do this "with their eyes wide open and that their judgment must be not wholly of the heart but also of the head." Wood considered that they were "much perplexed," and that their "whole attitude . . . was indicative of an appreciation of the grave situation in which they find themselves." \(^22\)

Early in July the final significant recorded interviews at Malacanan occurred with these políticos, this time long conferences between just Quezon and Wood and Quezon and Forbes. At one meeting (which Forbes described as "a very interesting session"), Quezon appeared to Forbes to be "in a state of great nervousness and excitement." Having become "the storm center of a world of rumors," he "was played out" and was " Rushing to the United States for a rest," anticipating that he would return before the Mission left. \(^23\)

In addition to the documents already discussed above, and the vast flood of paper that poured in upon the Mission from their tours of the provinces, a number of other documents of varying importance were added to the voluminous files of the Wood-Forbes Mission from sources in Manila, both presented in person by callers at Malacanan and mailed to them.

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\(^21\) Ibid., May 6, 1921.

\(^22\) Ibid., May 10, 1921.

\(^23\) Ibid., July 3, 1921; Forbes, Journals, II, 104, 107-08. Osmeña made a later call on Forbes but nothing of particular significance seems to have been discussed. Ibid., pp. 166-67.
On May 7 the Mission's co-chairmen publicly announced in the local press that, regardless of the tenor of the documents submitted, all of them would be forwarded to Harding as they were not authorized to pass upon anything, but only "to investigate local conditions on instructions of the President." They promised to "closely adhere" to their orders, and to keep all documents confidential unless the writer or the sender approved their release for publication. 24

Undoubtedly the Mission's collection of documents had grown rapidly even before a single trip was made out into the provinces. It had been given a good start when, shortly after their arrival, the Acting Governor General had turned over all the confidential messages which had been entrusted to him for transmittal to the Mission. 25

It would seem fortunate if the mail service with French Indo-China had been efficient enough to allow the Mission to receive before the beginning of their formal laborers the letter of greeting and expression of approval toward independence which had been written on May 1 by six Filipinos of Hanoi, Tonkin. Their sentiments should have been easily discernible from the concluding sentences, even by those whose Spanish was halting: "... Dios la bendice en sus manos esa opinion favorable de la amad INDEPENDENCIA. Viva America! Viva el Presidente Harding! Viva la comitiva Wood-Forbes! y Viva o venga la INDEPENDENCIA Filipina." 26

Such refreshingly terse enthusiasm would doubtless have been gratefully welcomed later when the Mission floundered in a vast morass of prolixity! But in spite of this staggering task which soon confronted them, on

24 Manila Times, May 8, 1921.
25 Ibid., May 5, 1921.
26 BLA, W-F Report Exhibits.
June 2 Wood and Forbes publicly assured the Filipinos through the local press that every document would receive the most careful attention.  

At the Ayuntamiento on May 14 it was revealed that the Executive Bureau had prepared for the Mission financial data concerning the administration of towns and provinces, showing the revenues and expenditures from 1913 to 1920. No definite data was released to the press, but it was stated that there had been a rapid increase in both revenues and expenditures during the period. Similar information for the insular government and special governmental entities, such as chartered cities, was promised for a later date.

It was also revealed on the same day that the Philippine Constabulary had prepared "in two handy volumes a large number of items and comments on the most important questions printed in several Manila newspapers, including those published in the vernaculars." These items dated back several months and included a number of news stories and editorials concerning the coming of the Mission, with the items in Tagalog and Spanish having been translated into English. Both Wood and Forbes were fluent in Spanish, but they were probably not well acquainted with Tagalog, the dominant Malay dialect in the region of central Luzon adjacent to Manila, so this would have been a decided service to them.

On June 4 the Commissioners asked the insular government for complete biographies of all provincial governors so that they might determine the character of those elected to public office. Later Wood also asked Yeater for biographies of Senate President Quezon, Speaker Osmena, the members of the Philippine House and Senate, cabinet members, and other government officials.

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27 Manila Times, June 2, 1921.

28 Ibid., May 14, 1921.

29 Ibid., May 14, 1921.
officials. "In the general consideration given by the Special Mission to the Philippine government," Wood's letter explained, "it is deemed important to have a thorough knowledge of the distinguished statesmen of the Philippines, and their standing amongst their own people and their experience in civil life and as public officials." 30

The Mission lodged still another request with Yeater (whom the Commissioners, in contrast to their earlier doubts, now considered "to be all of a man, not obtrusive but straight and fair and with a nice sense of humor and entirely satisfactory so far as we are concerned. Most helpful." 31), which resulted in a considerably augmented flow of mail into Malacanan for processing. This involved a questionnaire from Colonel McCoy to be issued by the Governor General's office to a sampling of prominent Philippine citizens which asked these ten questions:

1. Is the present government satisfactory to you and does it contribute to your commercial prosperity and personal welfare? If not, please briefly specify your opinion based on personal experience.
2. From your personal observation do you think that the public money is collected and expended honestly and efficiently?
3. Is justice administered impartially?
4. Are elections carried out honestly and justly?
5. Are the civil service laws honestly complied with?
6. Are the standards of government better or worse than in the time you deem the best in the history of the Philippines? In any event state why you think so.
7. Of your personal knowledge show what you consider defective in education, public health, sanitation, public works and agriculture which might be remedied by administrative action.
8. Are the Philippine Islands economically independent at present? Under a good administration how long a time do you think they would need to become so?
9. In case the islands are separated from the United States and its protection withdrawn, do you think there would be reasonable security that the resources of the islands would continue to be the heritage of the Filipino people?

30 Associated Press dispatch, Los Angeles Times, June 5, 1921; Manila Times, June 14, 1921.
31 Forbes, Journals, II, 63.
10. What is your practical opinion upon the future relations between the United States and the Philippine Islands? For example, do you want complete and immediate separation? If not, how do you want their future relations to be?

Respondents were requested to make their answers as brief as possible and were assured that these would be considered strictly confidential. In a letter to Yeater on July 5, McCoy explained that although the Mission had already received numerous comments from politicians and the younger generation, they had not heard "from that portion more or less silent of the people ... who are proprietors of lands and have private interests to which they devote themselves." Having noted that of the 9,519 Philippine residents who had paid 1920 income taxes some 3,667 were Filipinos, the Mission requested Yeater to "send the questionnaire . . . to each twentieth name on this list, selected with the idea of obtaining the general opinion of citizens who pay taxes."^32

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^32 A translation of an article from La Vanguardia, Manila, July 11, 1921. BLA, W-F Mission File. The results of this survey will be discussed under the appropriate topical chapters that follow.
CHAPTER VII

OUT IN THE PROVINCES

When the Wood-Forbes Mission announced on May 9 that three days later they would commence a series of careful inspections of the towns and provinces of the entire Philippine Archipelago, it was apparent that this was to be no routine junket carrying out a superficial inspection. And the Commissioners even explained that they would return to any area if this proved necessary, adhering to no rigid schedule but allowing whatever time seemed necessary for a thorough inspection of the entire Philippines.

In order that the public might be well informed concerning their activities, newspapermen would accompany them representing the Spanish-Filipino papers, the American papers in the Islands, the Chicago Tribune, and the Associated Press. Wood and Forbes expressed regret that more reporters could not be accommodated because of transportation difficulties.¹

Here, then, was to be the very heart of their investigative work as envisioned by Wood and, as has been seen, somewhat reluctantly accepted by Forbes: a careful inspection of Philippine conditions in each of the provinces from capital cities to a sampling of barrios (rural or semi-rural areas somewhat like townships) and sitios (a small group of houses forming a subdivision of a barrio); and from mass meetings to informal, random interviews with all classes of people.

¹Manila Times, May 9, 1921.
their initial inspection trip. During this and three subsequent expeditions, the entire Archipelago was thoroughly inspected (the provinces near Manila were handled between the first and second provincial trips from Malacanan as a base).  

Doubtless it was a weary group which saw the familiar outline of Corregidor Island guarding the entrance to Manila Bay early in the afternoon of Thursday, September 1, 1921. By 2:30 P.M. the Mission had disembarked at Manila, apparently without any formal welcome or demonstration, and their final tour of inspection was at an end.

Transportation was seemingly never a serious problem for the Mission. According to the terrain encountered, suitable media for both land and sea travel were apparently consistently supplied by the central and local governmental units. On land these included private automobiles, an occasional truck, private trains, and saddle horses. For the sea, coast guard and naval vessels were always available plus launches, side wheel steamers, native bancas (dugout canoes), and even bamboo rafts for fording rivers.

Yet this is in no way intended to imply that the Mission's extensive and prolonged traveling about upon and between the many islands of the Phil-

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2 The movements of the Mission during these inspection trips may be quite readily followed in these sources: Los Angeles Times, Manila Times, New York Times, San Francisco Chronicle, May 9 to September 2, 1921; Forbes's Journals, II, 68ff.; Wood's Diary: "Itinerary of Wood-Forbes Mission," Wood to Orval P. Townshend, Acting Chief, Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department, Manila, September 11, 1926, in BIA, W-F Mission File (Hereafter this document will be referred to simply as "Wood's Itinerary." It was sent by Wood to the BIA years after the completion of the Mission's work in compliance with a request from Townshend. Letter, Townshend to Wood, Washington, June 25, 1926, in BIA, W-F Mission File); "DRAFT OF ITINERARY," Special Mission, G-3, Memo No. 1, May 10, 1921, in BIA, W-F Mission File (prepared by Colonel McCoy, this detailed document will henceforth be referred to simply as "McCoy's Itinerary").

3 Manila Times, September 2, 1921.
The Philippine Archipelago was accomplished with ease, in comfort, and complete safety. For Forbes chronic fatigue developed to such a degree that he approached collapse and the Mission’s plans seemed in serious jeopardy; and on several occasions catastrophe by accidents threatened to strike tragically.  

For their critically important work in the provinces, the Mission obviously needed the assistance of insular governmental entities from the central government in Manila down through the provinces, municipalities, and barrios. This, in general, was generously granted to them. Before departing on their first provincial trip, Wood wrote to Yeater enclosing a schedule and requesting that such officials as governors and mayors be informed of the Mission’s coming and urged "to invite other officials, citizens of all political parties, and representatives of all walks of life to meet us. The information which will be gained from meeting these men and women will be of the greatest value in the preparation of our report." A statement was also given to the press welcoming everyone to submit any pertinent information, either in writing or in person.

In almost all instances the Mission received fine cooperation from the various government units. In particular, they had words of praise for Yeater: Wood cabled the Secretary of War that he was "cooperating in every

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4 See the same sources as cited in footnote number 2 above.

5 Copy of a letter, Wood to Yeater, Manila, May 11, 1921, in BIA, W-F Mission File; Manila Times, May 11, 1921.

6 For example, the governor of Nueva Vizcaya received several telegrams from Manila advising him of the Mission’s visit, their route, and the length of their stay. He in turn notified all the municipalities in his province and appointed a reception committee. "Excerpt from the minutes of the special meeting of the Provincial Board of Nueva Vizcaya held at Bayombong, on Saturday, May 14, 1921." BIA, W-F Report Exhibits. In preparation for the Mis-
way possible"; McCoy wrote to the Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs that Yeater, Quezon, and Osmeña were "nicking into the ... [Mission's work] easily"; and Wood recorded in his Diary that "Governor Yeater has been extremely kind and considerate on all occasions." 7

One instance when such preparations broke down, however, occurred when Wood traveled along the remote east coast of Mindanao, stopping at a number of small towns without telegraphic communication by which they could have been notified of the Mission's coming; but their lack of preparation redounded to the benefit of the weary inspectors for they heard far fewer speeches. 8

And Forbes, too, had one day in which preparations were inadequate. In Sorsogon Province their guide was the district engineer, a relative of the local senator, who thoroughly bungled the job. Describing him as "asinine," "an utterly worthless individual, incapable of making a plan and carrying it out," "a minus quantity," and "silly and incompetent," Forbes so frightened this engineer as to have him later remark that he had passed through what were the worst hours of his life ("He'll have some worse ones yet," Forbes promised, "if we can prove, which I have reason to expect we can, his misuse of public moneys."). So thoroughly disgusted was Forbes that he recorded a harsh remark almost unique for this usually kindly person: "The engineer had fallen from his motorcycle but unfortunately broke only his wrist." 9

7 Cablegram, Wood to Secretary of War, Manila, June 13, 1921, in BIA, W-F Report Exhibits; letter, McCoy to McIntyre, Manila, May 11, 1921, in BIA, W-F Mission File; Wood, Diary, June 30, 1921.

8 San Francisco Chronicle, August 12, 1921.

Typical of the Mission's provincial activities were those of May 27 in La Union Province. Here they inspected roads, farms, cities, public buildings, and public institutions and services; conducted open meetings where they listened to many speeches and delivered some themselves; received memorials, manifestoes, petitions, and resolutions; and held private conferences with any and all who came. And then the day was climaxd with a large mass meeting at the capitol building late in the afternoon. 10

At the heart of this work was the public session, quite commonly held in the city plaza, weather permitting, or in the largest available building. On May 11 at Tarlac, the Mission's first provincial stop, the pattern was established early for such meetings. 11 That it continued, with the groups often numbering into the thousands, is indicated by a statement at the conclusion of their second provincial inspection trip that during these two weeks they had participated in more than a hundred public meetings at which all were invited to express their opinions or register their complaints in countless speeches. 12

Speeches by the Commissioners, which were an essential ingredient of all public sessions, were highly repetitious as the Mission moved from town to town (Forbes has made this comment: "... my speech and that of General

10 See documents in BIA, W-F Report Exhibits, from this province; Associated Press dispatch, New York Times, May 31, 1921; Forbes, Philippine Islands, II, 291-292; Manila Times, May 28, 1921. An unusually detailed and perceptive report of the Mission's activities in one minor city (Dolores, Samar) was made by one of the reporters with the Mission (probably Philip Kinsley). It is, unfortunately, all too rare in the newspaper coverage of the Mission's work. See the New York Times, June 28, 1921. Forbes, who conducted this inspection while Wood went fishing, has commented on it in his Journals, II, 264-65.


Wood was repeated literally hundreds of times... and a sufficient number have been recorded to provide what must be a fair sample. At first Wood and Forbes alternated in addressing the crowds in Spanish and English. But later they increasingly dropped Spanish and relied on English together with translations into local native dialects, having found that many more understood English than Spanish.

Routinely these speeches included an invitation for private interviews. That this work sometimes proved extremely onerous can readily be seen from Forbes's experiences in Mountain Province. Interviews began on the evening of his arrival at Quiangan, were resumed in the morning at seven and continued until ten that evening, during which he interviewed several hundred Pagans, often six at a time.

Wood varied these procedures by stopping here and there along the road to talk informally with people. And on one occasion, Forbes concluded

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13 Forbes, Journals, II, 213.

14 Forbes has reproduced, apparently to the last word, a long speech which Wood delivered at Vigan, Ilocos Sur, on May 25 (Ibid., pp. 227-28); one with which Wood opened the public session at Bangued, Abra, on May 26 ("... a condensed summary of his typical speeches with which he opened the sessions, and for that reason I am giving it here." Ibid., pp. 229-30); another by Wood given in Albay Province on June 24 ("... his peroration ... I quote because it is typical of the sort of thing he was passing out to the different towns;" Ibid., p. 267); and a speech which Wood delivered at Cebu on an undesignated date (Ibid., p. 271). Wood himself has recorded either a very brief speech or an excerpt from a longer one which he made at Zamboanga on August 15 in his Diary for that date. Forbes recorded three of his own speeches: at Vigan, Ilocos Sur, May 25; at Lucena, Tayabas, June 26; and at Oroquieta, Misamis, on August 8 (Ibid., pp. 228-29, 270, 200). The Lucena speech, which utilized an elaborate ship-of-state symbol, apparently pleased Forbes so much that he used its basic elements on several later occasions. "The [Oroquieta] speech ... was so typical I selected it to be included in my HISTORY OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS in describing our mission to the Islands." Ibid., p. 299 (see Volume II of this work, pp. 289-90).


16 Ibid., p. 74.

17 Manila Times, May 13, 1921; Associated Press dispatch, Los Angeles
that a private interview was simply "pure camouflage": at Sibut, Sulu, on August 22, Datu Jaapal "didn’t want to say anything, but wanted the dignity of a private interview which apparently established him with his people."18

Either before or after these public and private sessions, the Mission routinely inspected the cities, towns, and barrios where they had stopped. It is difficult to imagine the expenditure of time and energy which this entailed considering the hundreds of communities visited and the impressive variety of things which were investigated.19

As often as possible the work load was lightened by dividing the Mission into two groups—one under each Commissioner—or, more rarely, into three groups, with Colonel McCoy, the Mission’s chief of staff, usually heading the third group.20 But the largest and most important provinces were done jointly; and also, wherever possible, the most important cities in those provinces where the Mission was divided. However the Commissioners often attempted to conserve their energy by taking alternate turns in holding public

Times, May 15, 1921.

18 Forbés, Journals, II, 311-12. For some reason, perhaps because it was so unusual, Forbés made a complete record of this interview. Shorthand records of all these interviews were made by secretaries and were later written up and annotated. A generous sampling of them may be seen in Ibid., pp. 212-312, passim, and in Wood’s Diary, May 4—September 10, 1921, passim.

19 As examples, see: Manila Times, May 15, August 17, 29, 1921; New York Times, May 17, 18, 1921; San Francisco Chronicle, August 18, 1921; Forbés, Journals, II, 27-174, 212-312, passim; Wood, Diary, May 4—September 10, 1921, passim.

20 See these sources: Los Angeles Times, May 15, June 5, July 25, August 19, 1921; Manila Times, May 12, June 2, 6, 9, 10, 11, July 13, 14, 16, 21, August 8, 29, October 15, 1921; New York Times, June 25, 1921; "Wood’s Itinerary" in BIA, W-F Mission File; Forbés, Journals, II, 27-174, 212-312, passim; Wood, Diary, May 4—September 10, passim. On one occasion a small group headed by Bowditch was commissioned to inspect a section of Agusan Province. See a copy of "Memorandum for Hon. W. Cameron Forbés and General Wood regarding Agusan, August 5th, 1921," date-lined "S. S. Polillo, At Sea, August 6, 1921," in Forbés, Journals, II, 340.
Yet, in spite of such organizational economies, the work load was staggering. Forbes found these provincial inspection tours "extremely onerous, doing as we did on more than one occasion ten cities in a day, allocating an hour to each city, giving the public the right to speak, and at private interviews an opportunity to come in and present their views ... Then we were off to another city going through the same rigamarole." What this meant was "a ten to fifteen hour day, and very tense days at that."  

In his Journals Forbes made a record in some detail of the worst of these days and "the blow that killed Grandpa." Arising at five in the morning and starting at six--after "having been thirteen hours on end at the hardest kind of work" on the previous day--Forbes and his party held public and private sessions in six cities, rode horseback nearly thirty miles and were driven by auto some sixty miles before reaching the General Alava at about eleven that night.

Even when the Mission was based at Malacanan and went out into the provinces by day, their work was hard. Forbes described his inspection of nearby Bulacan and Rizal provinces as "strenuous days, all thirteen hours each. I did about ten cities a day, having had the usual public and private sessions and banquets and speeches."  

After their months of inspection work had been completed, Forbes looked back upon its beginnings for himself at Tarlac on May 11 with the comment that there "began the endless series of hearings, speeches, harangues, sessions."

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21 Ibid., pp. 68, 81, 213; Wood, Diary, July 11, 1921.

22 Forbes, Journals, II, 263-64.

23 Ibid., pp. 94-99.

24 Ibid., p. 84.
and interviews which are destined to wear me to a frazzle this summer." 25

"It was not at all unusual to have the Filipinos misunderstand the
scope and activities of the Mission," Forbes has explained, "and attribute
to it all sorts of executive powers with which we were not clothed." Because
ey had both previously been administrative officers in the Islands, Forbes
realized that "They could not disassociate us entirely from our former posi-
tions of authority." 26 At first, the Mission apparently attempted to evade
such problems entirely, with but few exceptions. 27 But when it became almost
certain that Wood was to be the next Governor General, their attitude changed
and information was compiled for his future action. 28

Someone with the Forbes party at Oroquieta, Misamis Province, appar-
tently made a transcript of all, or most of, the activities both in the public
meeting and in the private interviews held there on August 8. This rather
lengthy document constitutes a valuable and unique record of the Wood-Forbes
Mission's activities since it is not known that a comparable record was made
at any other meeting held by the Mission. 29 Consequently it would seem prof-

\[25\] Ibid., p. 68.

\[26\] Ibid., pp. 163, 216.

\[27\] At Sindangan, Zamboanga, however, the irregularities were so fla-
grant that the Commissioners sent a telegram to Acting Governor General
Yeater. Ibid., pp. 163-64.

\[28\] Later Forbes sent several dozen letters to Wood detailing specific
charges concerning abuses which had been made to him but which he had merely
recorded because the work of the Mission was not administrative. Ibid., p.
276. A similar record was made by McCoy as the Mission's chief of staff
following the final southern trip. It includes specific problems to be
checked upon their return to Manila. See a memorandum dated August 31, 1921,
marked "Gen W's personal files" in the Wood Papers, Box 157. This is a typed
copy not signed by McCoy but its contents strongly suggest that he was the
author.

\[29\] In the official "List of exhibits to Wood-Forbes Report" of the
itable to deal at length with this important material as providing the best
eexample of the detailed and exhaustive work carried out by the Mission
throughout the Philippines.

After having been introduced to the crowd by the provincial governor,
Forbes began his speech in a most gracious and politic manner:

Governor, president [probably the municipal president of Oroquieta],
ladies and gentlemen, I want to thank the people of Oroquieta for their very
cordial and beautiful reception. I am more sorry than I can tell you that
General Wood could not have had the privilege of being here this afternoon.
He asked me to express his personal regret that he was unable to assist on
this occasion. This is my second visit to Oroquieta. Some years ago I came
here and inspected your beautiful town in the late hours of the night, and
now that I have come by daylight, I see how much I have missed.

Forbes then turned to a frank and simple explanation of why the Mission
had been sent to the Philippines and what they hoped to accomplish from their
extended visit:

Our Mission has come here at the request of the President of the United
States. He wants us to get in touch with the Filipino people. He wants to
know what you are thinking about. He wants to know how your government is
functioning; whether justice is being administered impartially and promptly
and without favor; whether you are getting your land titles promptly; whether
your government costs more than it ought to; whether your officials are
promoting agriculture, education, sanitation and public works.

Then Forbes demonstrated his fine working knowledge of applied
psychology by continuing on a positive, and even a flattering note:

We have come in a most friendly spirit. We bring a message of good
will from the American people to the Filipino people. We are not trying to
find things to criticize; it gives us great pleasure to find things we can
honestly praise. I am glad to say we have found many things which we can
report to the President as having been done well. I wish we could tell him
that everything has been done well.

Bureau of Insular Affairs (22639-A-57) this document is referred to as "A-26
Specimen Notes Taken Public Session."
After praising some things they had seen in the areas of education, public order, and women's activities in this felicitous introduction, Forbes turned to the real business of his visit and of this afternoon meeting:

Now my friends I have come here hoping that if any of you have any thing to say you will feel free to speak. I am glad to hear from anybody, man or woman, workman or "principale;" anybody is welcome. My only request is that whoever speaks shall be brief, because our time is short and our work has been very hard. We have already visited nearly four hundred cities in the Islands.

Now my friends the session is open. I shall be pleased to hear anyone speak, and hope you will feel free to speak out without fear. If anybody wishes to have a private interview with me after the public session, I will give him an opportunity. 30

The first to speak was Municipal Secretary Basilio Binaoro, who welcomed the Mission and reminded the audience that Wood had been "the Liberator of Cuba and Ex-Governor Forbes built our roads and was our Governor-General for many years," as a preface to his declaration that the people of Oroquieta wanted their independence. Then Federico Apao reviewed the progress which the Philippines had made since the coming of America before declaring, "I think that we are as ready for independence as were the people of the United States when they declared independence in 1776."

After some cross-examination of these speakers by Forbes, the final and key address for the citizens of Oroquieta was delivered by Tomas Paler, a young school teacher, who welcomed the Mission and then delivered, in excellent English, an impassioned plea for Philippine independence. 31 To which Forbes replied with sharp words that probed at the very heart of the independence problem which had so captivated the Filipinos. Then taking note

30 Forbes has reproduced this speech in his Philippine Islands, II, 289-90.

31 The identification of Paler's profession and the evaluation of his English were made by Forbes in his work on the Philippines in which he quotes this speech substantially as it is given above. Ibid., p. 290.
of the inevitable signs and banners typical of a Filipino political mass meeting, Forbes commented on those concerned with a desire for artesian wells, better roads, and, of course, independence.

"Now my friends it is getting late," Forbes said in conclusion, "and I want to close this session by thanking you for your cordial reception." Thereafter, perhaps after a meal, he made himself available for private interviews of which some, at least, were recorded. In these a common plea was for the division of Misamis into two provinces with Oroquieta to become the capital of the western part. 32 Besides the expected pleas for independence, other requests concerned road improvements, improper administration of justice, financial problems, and the intervention of Forbes to obtain the removal of a political disability stemming from a prison sentence. 33

Thus concludes a unique record of the Wood-Forbes Mission, Doubtless it was considered quite typical of what happened in hundreds of Filipino cities during their inspection trips throughout the Islands, or the Commissioners would not have been so careful to reserve this document or include it in the permanent exhibits to be filed with their formal report to the President of the United States. 34

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"Governor Forbes and I and those attached to the Mission have been the

32 This province was later divided into two parts: Misamis Oriental with Cagayan as its capital, and Misamis Occidental with Oroquieta as its capital.

33 The substance of the public addresses and the private interviews will be dealt with in more detail in subsequent chapters of a topical nature; i.e., those on independence, justice, etc.

34 BIA, W-F Report Exhibits. Forbes, however, seems not to have been particularly impressed by his activities here: ". . . we went through the usual rigamarole: speeches, long private sessions . . . [until] long after dark. . . ." Journals, II, 137.
recipients in times past of the unbounded hospitality of the Filipino people," Wood explained in a letter to Yeater prior to their first provincial inspection trip, "and we regret keenly that the volume of our work and the diversity and variety of our duties are such that, much as we would like to, it is impossible for us to attend purely social functions." On the same day the Mission also issued a statement to the press pleading that no social entertainments be planned for them.\(^{35}\)

Yet surely they should have realized that such a request was virtually impossible of fulfillment in the Philippines. Actually perhaps all they hoped for was a modest reduction in such activities by a people who, with justification, pride themselves on generous hospitality as a national trait.

The very first provincial stops made by the divided Mission should have indicated what awaited them during the next four months. At Tarlac, Forbes and his group were met by the governor and escorted to the capitol by a platoon of Philippine Constabulary and a large crowd. Meanwhile the Wood section approached Gapan, Nueva Ecija Province, about noon where they were met by the provincial governor and a large crowd. Leaving his car about a mile outside the town, Wood led a parade of "several hundred cheering citizens" who discovered that "in spite of the hot sun he set a pace which . . . was exceedingly rapid." "Preceded by the American and Filipino flags, and with a band playing 'The Star Spangled Banner,'" the party entered town, followed by the residents of Gapan and a string of empty cars.\(^{36}\)

The basic elements in such receptions rather soon became almost formalized: a cheering crowd, local officials, a parade (commonly including

\(^{35}\) Copy of a letter, Wood to Yeater, Manila, May 11, 1921, in BIA, W-F Mission File; Manila Times, May 11, 1921.

\(^{36}\) Associated Press dispatch, Los Angeles Times, May 15, 1921; Manila Times, May 12, 13 (all quotes from here), 1921.
units of the Philippine Constabulary), music, flags, banners, arches, speeches of welcome, and food. But the ingenuity displayed in producing variations on these basic themes was impressive.

At Alcala, Cagayan, Wood's section was enthusiastically escorted into the town beneath flags and arches decorating the route of the parade, with one banner reading, "Our everlasting friendship to good people of America."37 At Cubat, Sorsogon, Wood received an enthusiastic reception, the town having been decorated with flags and with a dozen arches made from hemp plants or coconut trees spanning the highway. The welcoming parade had the customary banners with one reading, "Gardners Welcome The Lively Commissioners."38

Kinsley reported that the residents of Bohol Island "were so delighted to see the Americans that they decorated their homes along a hundred miles of coast and highway. Every one was dressed in his best in honor of the distinguished Americans."39 And for almost forty miles along the road between the two capitals of Iloilo and Antique provinces (Iloilo City and San Jose de Buenavista), Wood's route was decorated with flags and bunting, and nearly all the nipa huts displayed some sort of decoration even if only a piece of lace.40

That such extensive activities required considerable planning and expense must be obvious. For example, Forbes described those at Croquieta, Misamis, as involving "tremendous preparations."41

37 Associated Press dispatch, Los Angeles Times, May 26, 1921.

38 Manila Times, June 21, 1921.

39 Los Angeles Times, July 19, 1921.

40 Manila Times, July 21, 1921.

41 Forbes, Journals, II, 137.
Perhaps the most colorful receptions were the water parades. "Dozens of steamers and sailing craft covered with flags and bunting" met the Mission outside the harbor of Cebu and provided an escort to the pier.\(^{42}\) On the Cotabato River in Mindanao, they encountered one of the most spectacular of such demonstrations:

... we were met by beautifully decorated Moro floats, or boats—two vintas lashed together, a typical Moro canopy of many colors, Moslem flags, U. S. Flags [sic] and bright cloths of many colors. Across the two vintas was built a platform; in this platform were Moro women and children, beating and playing Moro musical instruments, mostly gongs of different sizes, and chanting Moro songs. The paddlers were on the outside, striking the water in unison and keeping up a regular chant. Above the awnings were tall, slim bamboos, bearing Moro Flags, streamers and various decorations. The whole thing was extremely well done. In front, under a little canopy, usually a big yellow silk umbrella, was a datu, and beside him his wife (or one of them).\(^{43}\)

But in Sorsogon Province, Forbes encountered a reception which for sustained intensity far surpassed anything he saw elsewhere. "The enthusiasm with which we were greeted was boundless," he recorded of Bulan and Bulusan, "and the crowds exceeded in proportional numbers and in enthusiasm anything we had encountered anywhere else. We rode sometimes for miles through crowds yelling at the top of their voices 'Viva Viva.'" But later as they approached Irosin, Forbes had to search for new superlatives when they "were met by a most frantic and cordial crowd, the most enthusiastic of any we have seen anywhere in the Islands. Tremendous arches had been set up in celebration of our visit." As they passed through three large barrios on the outskirts, the crowd grew to "several thousand strong, all shouting at the tops of their voices—the noise was deafening, relays of young people took up the shouting and ran alongside." To Forbes it seemed that they would never reach the

\(^{42}\) *Manila Times*, July 9, 1921.

\(^{43}\) Wood, *Diary*, August 12, 1921.
plaza while each salvo of Vivas nearly drove his horse—a "very rambunctious" stallion—"frantic with excitement" so that he "several times got nearly out of control," as thousands of "yelling maniacs" surged about them. But even so he noticed that the streets had been decorated with arches and the houses with lights, flags, and colored cloths.44

The Mission was routinely well fed, and occasionally a provincial meal even merited special mention in their records.45 At times this phase of Filipino hospitality became so generous that the Commissioners were hard put to deal with it diplomatically. On at least one occasion, Forbes claimed that he was "bodily carried" to "an elaborate banquet" even though he "was really too tired to eat." "...he had . . . numberless 'banquetes' and lunches," Wood complained after their second provincial trip, "all of which make it decidedly hard for one who has a tendency to overweight to keep within the bounds of decency and within the limits of one's clothes."46

Although the receptions were uniformly cordial and the hospitality generous in all provinces, certain areas were especially enthusiastic at seeing one particular Commissioner. For Forbes this was among the Pagan tribesmen of Mountain Province in northern Luzon, an area which had been of special interest to him. The words "marvelous," "wonderful," "colorful," and "grand" occur in his descriptions here. "All the Igorots seemed to feel I am still all powerful and can do things for them; it is quite touching to see their friendliness and confidence," he admitted.47

44Forbes, Journals, II, 257-58, 97.

45For examples, see Wood, Diary, May 17, August 12, 1921, and Forbes, Journals, II, 311.

46Ibid., p. 98; copy of a letter to Major George von L. Meyer, Hamilton, Massachusetts, June 29, 1921, in Wood Papers, Box 157.

47Forbes, Journals, II, 74, 75-76, 83.
For Wood a similar area was at the opposite end of the Archipelago, in Mindanao where he had served so many years in military and administrative capacities. "There were about two thousand Moros and three or four hundred Filipinos assembled to meet us," Wood noted at Cotabato, "the Moros turned out in their best, every color of the rainbow--many colored parasols, bright skirts, many-colored turbans, but only here and there a weapon, borne by some old dato [sic] who had been given special privileges." For the General, "The whole scene brought back days--indeed months--of campaigning in this district." Here Forbes courteously withdrew to a secondary position: "There was a grand concourse of sultans and datus to meet the General but as we're now in Moroland and the General's bailiwick, I took little part in the proceedings."48

Numerous summary statements--both public and private--indicate that Wood and Forbes were pleased with their reception throughout the Islands so that illustrations are not difficult to come by. "People have received us exceedingly well," Wood wrote to Mrs. Theodore Roosevelt before departing on their final provincial trip, "with courtesy and consideration everywhere, no sign of irritation, hospitality as free as the air and as widespread; in fact, we have been almost fed to death." But in a letter to his daughter Luisita at about the same time, Wood gave his most generous praise: "Nothing could be finer than the courtesy and hospitality of these people. They certainly can teach us much in good manners."49

Actually the only apparent unpleasantness occurred at Tabaco, Albay,

48 Wood, Diary, August 12, 1921; Forbes, Journals, II, 141.

49 Carbon copies of letters, Wood to Edith Kermit Roosevelt, Manila, July 28, 1921, in Wood Papers, Box 157, and to his daughter Luisita, Manila, July 25, 1921, in Wood Papers, Box 158.
following what Wood described as "a long and rather elaborate dinner, a very good one," and Forbes as "a marvelous reception . . . and dinner. . . ."

Forbes, it seems, precipitated things by making some severe comments on the road system, which Wood felt were "not understood, as the roads around this section are in good condition." In calling on Wood to speak, the local priest, Daminian Navato, who acted as toastmaster, made what the General considered "some rather strong political statements, rather incendiary in character; spoke of their being like birds behind golden bars, etc., and was entirely carried off his feet." Wood felt compelled to tell him, "very frankly, but kindly, . . . that his insinuations that we would not make a fair and impartial report was not only unfair but impertinent." Forbes concluded that they had "quite distressed" their "strategy board" (apparently their staff) who felt that they "hadn't been quite suave enough with our hosts." This, however, was a minor and an isolated affair. "There was no excitement, but it was absolutely necessary to turn him down a bit," Wood recorded. "This was the only unpleasant incident, I think, which has occurred for a long time."

One of the serious problems which confronted the Mission was that of restraining enthusiastic Filipino speakers in the provincial public sessions. "A great many orators were school boys, tremendously puffed up with a chance to get up and make a speech for independence," Forbes has explained, "and they usually expected to take ten to fifteen minutes of our time on a carefully prepared harangue." His solution was simple and effective: "I cut these young bantams short by telling them they could have three minutes, and I

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50 Wood, Diary, June 24, 1921; Forbes, Journals, II, 102.
stopped them at the end of that period." And he noted that their discomfiture "pleased the elders very much," even though occasionally he became "pretty sharp." Another offending group were those with political aspirations who felt that this was "the proper time to make themselves prominent. . . ."\textsuperscript{51}

At Batangas one speaker named La Joya was such a heinous offender that he earned special attention from both Commissioners. This "little damn fool," as Forbes labeled him (Wood contented himself with "The little professor . . . who seems to be half-witted on some subjects. . . ."), had infuriated the Mission not long before by abusing their visit to the Columbian Association where he delivered a long harangue on independence. "Not content with that atrocity this same little ass proposed to take all our time here, but the General and I cut him short and left him very angry and I guess somewhat humiliated."\textsuperscript{52} And on one occasion when even the governor of Albay Province could not keep the orators within bounds in spite of repeated efforts, the Mission "left thoroughly disgusted and late."\textsuperscript{53}

But Juan Buan, a university student who spoke in a public session held by Forbes at Pillila, Rizal, on June 10, demonstrated that there was a way in which the rigid time limits could be evaded with impunity. Following his usual custom, Forbes had restricted him to three minutes, because "I did not care to have students trying forensic and oratorical abilities upon me and felt that the people should get better advocates for independence than schoolboys." Yet this diplomat so generously praised Forbes's work in the Islands that the honored Commissioner felt that "it would have been ungracious for me to have stopped him." So obviously impressed was Forbes that he rec-

\textsuperscript{51}Ibid., pp. 214, 80.

\textsuperscript{52}Ibid., p. 89; Wood, Diary, June 14, 1921.

\textsuperscript{53}Forbes, Journals, II, 110.
orded this speech in its entirety—even his request for cheers for Forbes's
good road work in the Islands—and labeled it "The most telling speech of
all. . . ."54

And yet another speaker evaded Forbes's time limitations: Manuel
Corrales of Cagayan, Misamis, whom Forbes described as "About the most unmit-
igated unhung scoundrel in the Philippines, if you except Dominador Gomez."
Although this speech was no more than "his presentation of his candidacy for
senator," Forbes "did not cut him short although he thought I was going to
any minute, but I paid him scant attention," having already denounced him in
a public speech which he felt "had something to do with putting him tem-
porarily into private life."55

Yet not all Filipino public speakers were cursed with this vice of
long-windedness. One of the orators at Tigaon, Camarines Sur, gave what
Forbes described as a "rather extraordinary peroration: 'I was appointed one
of the speakers, but I am not prepared to speak intelligently on any subject.'"
Although he may have considered himself thereby disgraced in the eyes of his
compatriots, a grateful Forbes apparently elevated him to the category of
minor heroes by recording his name in the Mission's records: Gregorio
Natividad.56

But length was not the sole problem for Filipino orators. At Cagayan,
Misamis, Forbes refused to allow "one young bantam" to continue speaking
because he would not address him in English.

This young boy who wanted to make himself prominent [Forbes has explained] told me he could express the feeling of his soul only in Spanish. I told

54 Ibid., pp. 242-43.
55 Ibid., pp. 295-96.
56 Ibid., p. 253.
him that if he was not sufficiently progressive to get enough English which was going to be the official language of the Philippines he did not have enough gumption to make it worth our while to listen to him. He put on quite a little swagger as he sat down, but the crowd were rather pleased at his discomfiture.\footnote{Ibid., p. 295.}

And how it would have rankled among the would-be orators if they had known of Forbes's notation during his inspection of Albay Province: "The public meeting was addressed by several young and unwise men ... As usual the speeches of the women were better than those of the men."\footnote{Ibid., p. 269.}

When it became apparent that the Mission was growing irritated with all the aspiring schoolboy orators, another tactic was tried. In Batangas Province an old man named Manuel Guico was sent up to make a speech. "We were getting a little short with these unsuitable witnesses," Forbes has explained, "but the old laboring man did not make much of a showing as he began to flounder as soon as he was asked questions ..."\footnote{Ibid., pp. 245-46. Part of the cross-examination is recorded here.}

At Pasig, Rizal, on June 10, Forbes noticed two old men bearing signs reading "Juan de la Cruz--Be just to our Cause." "They were sleek, well-to-do persons dressed like farmers," he observed. "It was evident that these men had dressed up for the occasion. They had soft hands not used to manual labor; they were no taos or tillers of the soil. This was one of the little games of the Filipino leaders."\footnote{Ibid., p. 241.}

As the word spread that the Mission wanted to hear the views of the laboring people, "In more than one place gentlemen of leisure were dressed up to resemble field laborers," Forbes has written, "and, responding to the
request, stood up and said their part." But the Mission was not long in
devising a countermeasure to this ploy of the politicos:

In Cebu one of these play-actors made his speech and a member of the mission
stepped forward and shook him by the hand. Afterward, a senator of the
district asked why he had shaken hands with that particular orator.
When he was told that it was to feel whether or not the orator's hand was
calloused, the senator commented with a laugh, "You are not missing very
many tricks, are you?" 61

As these tactics were continued, Forbes's comments became more acid:

These well-dressed gentlemen [at Cagayan, Misamis] in silks and patent
leather shoes who advised me that they were laboring men made me sick. They
merely heard that we were trying to encourage laborers to speak. They were
agents of the caciques. 62

During his inspection of Pampanga Province, Wood noted that when he
asked the home of speakers a number of them naively replied that they were
from Manila, obviously sent out by the politicos. And most of the speeches
had been memorized so that they could be given in English. 63

So rigorous was the Mission's work that a moderation of their early
fast pace became necessary. "After two such days [of up to fifteen hours of
tense work each] we made it a practice to take one day off for a complete
rest; we would take our boat where there were few if any people and fish and
shoot birds, play chess or loll on the deck of the steamer and read," Forbes
has explained. But even so the Mission was "pretty well played out" by the

61 Forbes, Philippine Islands, II, 289.
63 Wood, Diary, June 6, 1921.
time their work was finished. Obviously, then, their program of recreation and rest was an essential element in the ultimate success of their work.

For refreshing rest, the Mission never improved upon mile-high Baguio, the "summer capital" of the Philippines, where they twice recuperated for short periods. Situated amid strangely incongruous coniferous forests in northern Luzon, this pleasant place must have provided gratefully welcome relief from the heat of the lowlands to men whose thermostats had undoubtedly become seriously maladjusted during years of absence from the tropics.

Perhaps the recreation which most nearly pleased all was fishing, and the personal records of both Wood and Forbes contain numerous accounts of such activities, including as detailed descriptions as any sportsman could want to assist in reliving his adventures. Not only was this recreation but it also added a variety of fish to the ships' menus.

Undoubtedly Forbes regretted the long absences from Manila where he could indulge his passion for polo. But the provinces offered what seems to have become an acceptable substitute in bird hunting. His Journals throughout all the provinces, but particularly for the southern islands, contain many detailed entries on this scientific hobby (the specimens were intended for Harvard and the Bureau of Science in Manila).

For Wood his return to Moroland was obviously a tonic surpassing in its benefits any ordinary rest or recreation. The Moros' enthusiastic recep-

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64 Forbes, Journals, II, 264.


66 For particularly fine descriptions see Wood, Diary, May 23, August 30, 1921, and Forbes, Journals, II, 127-28, 152-57.

tion surely was deeply appreciated by one who had devoted so many years to implementing his conception of their welfare. The climax was reached at Zamboanga where a reporter watching the crowds concluded that he was "the hero of the people of Zamboanga." 68

Clearly Wood's emotions had been deeply stirred by this return to where his headquarters had been from 1903 to 1906 as military commander of all the Philippines south of the Visayas and civil governor of southern Mindanao and Jolo. The commanding general's house was unoccupied and waiting for him. 69 After spending the night there, Wood wrote a poignantly melancholy and touching letter to his wife:

Zamboanga  Aug 17 1921

Dearest Lou:

It's a long span of years since I have written you from this dear old house - yet it seems only yesterday that we were here. The yard, the fire tree with its gl...ing [unreadable] under the constant murmur of the waves along the beach, the old yard unchanged and the Post as beautiful as ever. The palms along the canal are now a stately double line of tall coconu...trees. The house finished up inside as you saw it when last here. Scores of old friends... The place is as sweet and attractive as ever... It seems as though all ought to be here, as the place is alive with the memories of our united family and those old faithful ones Henz Conchita & Katie.

We leave for Jolo this morning.
With all my heart & love

Yours always

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As the Mission's hard driving pace continued week after week, Wood

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68 Manila Times, August 29, 1921.

69 Associated Press dispatches, Manila Times, August 16, 17, 1921.

70 Wood Papers, Box 192. This was written on plain paper in Wood's own hand which, at best, is difficult to read; thus there may be some question as to the accuracy of the above copy, but nothing has been deliberately added or subtracted for the sake of smoothness. This, however, cannot be said for Hagedorn who has taken inexcusable liberties with this document, both in additions and deletions without proper indications of editorial corrections. See his Wood, II, 391.
became increasingly concerned with Forbes's mounting fatigue and deteriorating health. The climax came with an extremely long and strenuous day devoted to inspecting Sorsogon Province which sapped his strength almost completely and, in his own words, "proved to be the blow that killed Grandpa."  

Fearing that Forbes was on the verge of a complete breakdown, Wood later ordered him away for several days of rest over the long fourth of July weekend. After considering several places, Forbes decided on Puerta Galera on nearby Mindoro Island, "an old stamping ground of mine, where there are fishing, and scenery, and sea gardens, birds, beaches, bathing and everything the heart desires, especially solitude." Following three days of this regime, he returned to Manila greatly improved in health and strength.  

Although Wood later noted that Forbes was "laid up with some infection which he got at Lake Lanao," the problem was not again a serious factor in the Mission's work. Wood seemingly never complained of any illness, no matter how minor, or of being especially fatigued, although he would occasionally remark about feeling tired after a particularly long day. Yet his record was not perfect since Forbes indicated that he "had to tour the Mountain Province alone as General Wood was not well enough to make the trip."  

It would appear that both Wood and Forbes had determined that no siz-

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71 Wood, Diary, June 19, 30, 1921; carbon copy of a letter, Wood to Henry L. Stimson, Manila, July 4, 1921, in Wood Papers, Box 158; typed copy of a letter, Wood to his wife, Manila, July 5, 1921, in Wood Papers, Box 192; letter, Wood to his wife, July 7, 1921, in Wood Papers, Box 192; Forbes, Journals, II, 94-99 (quote from p. 94).


73 Wood, Diary, August 16, 1921; Forbes, Journals, II, 220.
able segment of the Philippines or any important minority group would ever be able to fairly claim that it had been neglected during the investigations. Actually many of those encountered claimed not to have seen an American since the end of the fighting following the Spanish-American War. 74

That anyone would ever question the thoroughness of their investigative work seemed improbable; but if there should ever be such, the Commissioners were prepared for the challenge. "We feel that we are in a position to speak authoritatively on the conditions now prevailing in the Islands," they declared in a long, confidential cablegram which was encoded and transmitted to the Secretary of War on September 11. And the few sentences which preceded this statement seem to have provided ample justification for such a positive declaration: "We have examined 47 out of 48 Provinces, 75 have visited 449 municipalities, and covered 15,000 miles on foot, horseback, boat, motor car and rail. Everybody has been given an opportunity to speak. A great number of memorials have been received." 76 Seldom have so few words covered such sustained and productive effort.

74 "Exclusive Dispatch" by Philip Kinsley, Los Angeles Times, August 4, 1921; San Francisco Chronicle, August 3, 1921.

75 The province missed seems to have been the Batanes Islands off the northern coast of Luzon facing China, which, with a population of only slightly more than eight thousand, was by far the smallest of all the provinces. It was isolated and poor in natural resources with only the questionable importance of potential strategic location in the event of a Japanese invasion. Census of the Philippine Islands [1918], I (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1920), 98. The total of 48 provinces was apparently obtained by counting the two chartered cities of Baguio and Manila.

76 Cable No. 861, Yeater to Weeks, Manila, September 11, 1921. BIA, W-F Mission File. It was reported in the press that the Mission had listened to some 1,500 speeches that had been made before them in public meetings by persons from all walks of life. Manila Times, September 2, 1921.
CHAPTER VIII

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

An appreciation of the thoroughness with which the Wood-Forbes Mission investigated Philippine conditions and an adequate understanding of what they discovered can not be gained without a topical survey and analysis of their work in all parts of the Archipelago. The cumulative effect of such a study should justify the Commissioners' conviction that they had faithfully carried out their instructions from the President and the Secretary of War.

Certainly one of the major areas of interest to both Wood and Forbes and to their superiors in Washington was that of general governmental administration by Filipinos. It would, therefore, seem reasonable to commence with this critically important subject.

As professional administrators of high standing and extensive experience, both Wood and Forbes were obviously alert to evidences of administrative competence or incompetence during their provincial inspections. And such evidence was soon available when, early in their first trip, the Mission was joined by Senator Lope K. Santos, who had been appointed by Harrison for the district which included Nueva Vizcaya Province. This "sinister little rascal" and former governor of Rizal Province was no stranger to Forbes: "my teacher of Tagalog." And the former student had a scathing appraisal of his teacher:

He was about the worst appointment that could have been made. Takes no interest in the welfare of the people, a politician plain and simple, and is greatly feared up here. He is trying to make himself rich by cattle and land deals in this vicinity. Of course that can be done properly, but I rather doubt Lope.
So intimidated were his constituents that Forbes took an unprecedented step: "Senator Santos I had sent back as I told him I didn't want him with me on this trip and the air cleared as soon as he got out of sight."  

Not long after this the Wood section arrived at Aparri, Cagayan Province, the northernmost Philippine port of any importance, to find "The filthiest and worst-administered municipality up to date." The presidente, or mayor, Wood described as lacking "force and ability," being absent much of the time and allowing the city to run itself. "He has been flagrantly immoral and is generally a bad character," Wood specified. "Evidence of worst of all old-time habits of graft, corruption and inefficiency in this town."  

In Sorsogon Province Forbes noted graft and maladministration, nepotism, and abuses of authority by the presidentes and other officials, and he found neighboring Albay Province "literally seething," with a weak governor. Wood indignantly noted that the presidente of Tabaco, Albay, had been tried for several serious offenses and had served a long prison sentence. But, in Forbes's opinion, the worst province was yet to come, Misamis on Mindanao. Because the Spaniards had used it as a penal colony, he was convinced "that much of the rascality which we found existing in that region was hereditary. It lends color to the thesis that undesirables should be sterilized." While Governor General he had "unearthed a perfectly shocking

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1 Forbes, Journals, II, 72-73.

2 "NOTES" dated May 24, 1921, and inserted by Wood in his Diary along with the regular entries for May 24. This special supplement appears to be a summary of conditions found in the provinces visited by Wood up to this date.

3 Forbes, Journals, II, 260, 268.

4 Wood, Diary, June 24, 1921.
condition" here and now upon returning he found one of the ring leaders, Manuel Corrales, waiting to greet him. Bowditch, who had inspected Agusan Province on Mindanao, filed a report that wasted no words: "General Administration: Poor."

Although both Commissioners conscientiously refrained from exercising executive powers, conditions at Sindangan, Zamboanga, were so disturbing that they descended from the role of the impartial investigators. "... apparent conspiracy between Delegate Governor Martinez and local treasurer to defraud homesteaders of their land claims for their own personal interest," they telegraphed Yeater. "Recommend immediate suspension both officials and appointment especially trustworthy special investigator ... to protect homesteaders who have developed that country in good faith."

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Very few Filipinos explicitly claimed, either orally or in documents, that their government was soundly, fairly, honestly, and efficiently administered. In fact, only a single document from an obscure group in northern Luzon (the Rising Sun Literary Society of Batac, Ilocos Norte) would seem to fit this category by asserting that the government was "clean, managed by honest men not by corrupt bosses." Yet it can be argued that scores of Filipino speakers and countless memorials, resolutions, and petitions

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5 Forbes, Journals, II, 297-98.
6 See a copy of this report, dated August 6, 1921, aboard the Polillo at sea, in Ibid., p. 340.
7 Ibid., pp. 163-64. The telegram was dated August 15, 1921.
8 Unnumbered resolution, May 22, 1921, filed in BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.
implicitly so contended by claiming that a "stable" government was an ac-
tuality. 9

But those Filipinos who charged that their government was plagued by
maladministration were often vocal and quite explicit, particularly if they
were Democrats. For example, many Democrats attended a large mass meet-
ing in the Cebu city plaza and a number responded to Wood's call for speeches by
severely arraigning the Nacionalista Party. One asserted that two
Nacionalista officials suspected of misconduct had been suspended but
assured of reinstatement when the Mission had left. 10  And at Dasmarias,
Cavite, a banner which the Democrats were forbidden to carry by the
Nacionalistas in a welcoming parade demanded "a government of laws and not
of men," and ended with this flat statement: "We are tired of the Nacionalista
administration." 11

The lengthy memorial submitted by the Democrrata Party on September 9,
only the day before the Mission was to sail from the Philippines, demonstrated
why the two parties had failed to produce a common memorial after months of
futile efforts at compromise. This minority report was loaded with charges
of Nacionalista misconduct and incompetency. 12

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9 These claims will be considered in a later chapter on independence.
10 Manila Times, July 9; New York Times, July 13, 1921. Also briefly
reported in the San Francisco Chronicle, July 12, 1921. At Tagudin, Ilocos
Sur, Agustin Madrid "started a very severe drive against the government ... 
and said that the Bureau of Agriculture was a dumping ground for the polit-
ical friends of the higher-ups." Forbes, Journals, II, 224-25. Other less
explicit denunciations were made by speakers at Macabebe, Pampanga (Associated
Press dispatch, San Francisco Chronicle, June 9, 1921); a speaker at one of
six public meetings held by Forbes in Oriental Negros Province on July 12 who
complained of difficulties in obtaining land titles (Manila Times, July 14,
1921); and a speaker at Zamboanga City on August 15 who charged inefficiency
among government officials (Manila Times, August 29, 1921).
11 Ibid., October 15, 1921.
12 RESOLUCION ADOPTADA POR EL DIRECTORIO GENERAL DEL PARTIDO DEMOCRATA,
Startlingly different were the charges of F. Almeda, municipal treasurer of Dinagat, who severely indicted Filipino officials in a letter in English dated May 5, 1921, and addressed "To the Filipino People," with a copy for the Mission. "Why is it that so many of our Filipino officials are so haughty?" he daringly asked. "They walk as if they were little kings and they treat the common people as far as beneath themselves [sic]." After citing personal experiences to contrast the conduct of Filipino officials and Americans, who had treated him "with kindness and politeness," he pleaded, "Why cannot our Filipino officials act the same way?" "Surely they do not think themselves better than American officials," he continued. "And, why should a Filipino official assume a disdainful manner to one of his own fellow countrymen, who has the same blood and is of the same color as himself?"

Almeda suggested that each Filipino official hang on his office wall as a motto Jefferson's words from the Declaration of Independence that "All men are created equal." Then he made a telling point:

If we ... are aspiring to our independence, then we should try to treat our fellow men with equality; otherwise we should not ask for independence, because we say the kind of government we are wanting ... is a democracy. ... If these haughty acts of our officials cannot be abolished then ... it is better for us to remain under the American government until we have thoroughly learned democracy and to treat everybody the way the Americans do.

Also, Almeda felt that some Filipino officials were delaying independence by "carrying [out] high-handed action and tyrannical dealing towards their subordinates. ..." Hopefully, he urged the Philippine Legislature "to pass a disciplinary measure for information and guidance of those peacock

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EN SU SESION EXTRAORDINARIA CELEBRADA EN LA CIUDAD DE MANILA, I.F., EL 7 DE SEPTIEMBRE DE 1921. BLA, W-F Report Exhibits. Its contents were briefly reported in the New York Times, September 12, 1921.
Filipino officials in general as well as in particular."

Inconclusive results were obtained from a questionnaire sent to every twentieth Filipino of the 3667 who had filed an income tax return for 1920. Among the questions asked were these, together with a summary of the replies received:

(1) Is the present government satisfactory to you, contributing to your business welfare and your personal contentment? . . . [of the 47 who responded to this questionnaire, 34 replied in the affirmative and 13 in the negative]

(2) From personal observation do you believe the public money is honestly and efficiently collected and spent? [31 affirmative, 14 negative, 2 not responding]

(5) Are the Civil Service laws honestly administered? [27 affirmative, 10 negative, 10 no answer]

(6) Are the standards of Government better or worse than the period you consider the best history of the Philippines? . . . [29 affirmative, 12 negative, 6 no answer]

Some sought to mitigate the adverse effect of Filipino criticisms by explaining away charges of maladministration. The Municipal Council of Talisay, Cebu, for example, freely admitted that political corruption was a serious problem but contended that the conduct of a relatively few officials

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13 BIA, W-F Report Exhibits. Dinagat is on the island of the same name off the northeastern tip of Mindanao.

14 Apparently it was assumed that this would give the Mission a fair cross-section of the most influential Filipinos; at any rate, the results were analyzed and placed in the Exhibits to the Wood-Forbes Report. The validity of the entire survey might well have been questioned because of the relatively small percentage of respondents; if every twentieth Filipino of the 3667 who had reported to the Bureau of Internal Revenue was sent a questionnaire, 183 would have been queried; but just forty-seven responded, or only slightly more than twenty-five percent.

15 QUESTIONNAIRE SENT TO EVERY TWENTIETH FILIPINO OF THE 3667 REPORTED BY BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE AS HAVING SUBMITTED AN INCOME TAX RETURN FOR 1920, WITH ANALYSIS OF THEIR ANSWERS. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits. The questionnaire was dated July 6, 1921, at Malacanan Palace, Manila, and was signed by Colonel F. R. McCoy "For the Special Mission."
should not reflect on the capacity and honor of the entire Filipino people.  

Some Filipinos who did not care to complain against the administration of their compatriots publicly or in writing came for private interviews at Malacanan. In fact, the first interview which Forbes conducted was with an unnamed deputy from Iloilo who "was profoundly dissatisfied with the administrators..." An unidentified Filipino General told Wood "that the Government was characterized by graft and corruption and that things were going exceedingly badly; that he was quite willing to come out in the open and announce himself." He also brought a long statement devoted to "irregularities and general corruptions." Brigadier General Rafael Crame, Chief of the Philippine Constabulary, declared that "the government of the country was practically in the hands of a few men, principally Quezon and Osmeña; that there was an immense amount of graft and vast numbers of unnecessary employees everywhere..." Jose Alemany, former head of the Civil Service, used such terms as "rotten," "graft," "thieves," and "robbers" in describing the government. "He claimed that the Civil Service was utterly disorganized; he said men were railroaded into jobs without any civil service standing, and that in the Bureau of Public Works most of the money was spent on salaries rather than on work..."  

Throughout the provinces Filipinos also came privately to complain of maladministration by fellow Filipinos. In Isabela Province Wood heard strong complaints concerning delays in securing land titles, which he estimated to

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16 Resolution No. 25, Talisay Municipal Council, July 1, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

17 Forbes, Journals, II, 216.

18 Wood, Diary, May 10, 1921.

19 Forbes, Journals, II, 216-17.
be ten times worse than he had known under previous administrations. "Was told that the Bureau of Lands is very poorly handled," he recorded, "and that papers could be expedited only by free use of money." A Filipino lawyer stated that his regular fee in land cases was twenty percent of the land's value.20

In Bulacan Province, Forbes heard complaints that corruption was general, including frauds committed against land owners. At Calapan, Mindoro, the parish priest, whom Forbes called on, described conditions as "atrocious," with favoritism running riot, and with graft prevalent in all public works. "The priest was very strongly of the opinion that things were in a very bad way in the province." At Bogo, Cebu, Victorino Sinining gave Forbes "a list of specific charges of graft, going into chapter, book and verse, name of people, amounts and dates."21

In Albay Province, Forbes listened to a number of persons who said that "graft was rampant throughout the government service; that the government hemp inspection was just a source of graft and rendered no service to the people." In Libon, Albay, Jose Aitona declared that the current abuses by political leaders resembled those under Spain. Specifically, he declared that the presidente and the consejales were committing many abuses such as demanding gifts of money and chickens from the people. In his opinion, 95% of municipal and provincial officials committed these or similar abuses.22

At Putiato, Sorsogon, an elderly gentleman "was almost incoherent in the violence of his emotions," and Forbes had such difficulty in understanding

20Wood, Diary, May 20, 1921.

21Forbes, Journals, II, 236, 246-47, 276. Forbes sent this list to Wood for his use as the new Governor General.

22Ibid., pp. 268-69, 254.
him that he asked for the long string of complaints to be put in writing. "The charges were mainly to the effect that the president of the town was an utter scalawag and a man wholly without principle and without character." And at Bulan, Sorsogon, an orator took Forbes aside to state that the government was "honey-combed with graft." 23

"There were very few of the people who expressed themselves as directly contented with the government as it was," Forbes declared in a summary of all the private interviews conducted by the Mission. "A dozen or more charged the government with graft, without specifying cases. Others described the government as hopelessly inefficient, and a few got down to particulars . . ." Complaints against the inefficiencies of the Land Office were frequent and there were "a great many instances where there had been shocking abuses of the Homestead Law and the allocation of titles to the wrong people." 24

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It would seem only natural that Wood and Forbes should have placed particular value upon the opinions of American organizations, businessmen, and officials, especially when they had been prominent residents for many years. Since they were all strong in their denunciation of insular conditions, in their condemnation of the políticos, and in their conviction that the Filipinos were ill-prepared to assume control of an independent state, it is not surprising that most of their opinions were expressed privately or in confidential letters.

A few Americans were willing to talk privately about administrative conditions. Captain Seeber, a former Rough Rider who had become Chief of Police of Manila and was then a prominent businessman in the Islands, declared

"that there was a tremendous amount of graft everywhere; that offices were filled with the friends of politicians; that Quezon and Osmeña were practically the Government." Judge Ingersoll, who had been a jurist in the Philippines and was then a practicing lawyer, declared "that corruption is rampant and that a man must have political influence in order to 'arrive.'" 25

Some American businessmen and Chinese merchants revealed to McCoy a type of corruption which they termed "Governor's graft." It worked easily: the governor borrowed money and then simply failed to repay it. Often it was loaned without any expectation of repayment, in the knowledge that if any pressure were put on the governor he could and would make the conduct of their businesses almost impossible so the loans were justified as necessary protection. 26 McCoy reported "that every American with whom he has talked told the same story of the same sort of practices and the same kind of graft," and declared "that nothing can be done without money. . . ." 27

The most severe written indictments were by Herbert L. Heath, president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Manila, who was apparently obsessed with the idea that the Filipinos could never hope to have a decent, stable government because of inherent racial defects. After declaring that Malays were lacking in "character and capacity, and that four hundred years

25 Wood, Diary, May 10, June 7, 1921.

26 A certain Mooney had "loaned" his Governor 600 pesos; but this was minor compared to Louie Chapman, a road contractor at Tacloban, Leyte, who had "loaned" the Governor some 11,000 pesos; and a Chinese merchant, Ortega & Company, had "loaned" a Governor 12,000 pesos. Ibid., June 22, 1921.

27 Ibid. A more traditional type of graft was revealed to McCoy by some Chinese merchants who reported that they were paying off the hemp inspectors at from 150 to 500 pesos per month depending upon the price of hemp. The technique was beautifully simple: "The inspector has the authority to order the bales of hemp that have been packed and closed to be reopened for inspection. The payments are, really, to avoid this." Wood recognized it as "graft of the old times continued." Ibid.
of Latin civilization had added nothing to that capacity," Heath explained what had happened when Wilson had allowed these undesirable Latin-Malay characteristics to bloom:

In just the proportion that the American government lessened control of affairs and the Latin-Malay assumed control did this government resolve itself into Latin-Malayism, and graft and every form of corruption instead of direction became the principal occupation of our officials. Graft crept into every division of government from that of Justice to the administration of the smallest barrio of the smallest municipality of the smallest island of the Archipelago.\(^\text{28}\)

Heath also sent a circular letter to all Chamber members on June 28, in response to Colonel McCoy's letter of June 13, 1921 (reproduced in its entirety in the printed circular letter), which requested statements concerning insular conditions. "Probably never before have the American residents of these Islands been given such an opportunity to be heard in their own behalf," Heath stated, "and we trust that not a single member . . . will fail to make full use of it." He suggested that such letters be sent either to the Mission at Malacanang or to the Chamber's Manila office, by registered mail, and marked confidential.

As one hundred and four letters were received, it is fortunate that Lieutenant Commander Bryant prepared an analytical summary. Twenty-five stated that uncalled-for legislation had been passed, and that the general political scene was characterized by rottenness, corruption, and graft. Twenty-eight declared that Harrison's Filipinization of the government had caused inefficiency and had created injurious and disastrous conditions. Likewise the majority agreed that too much responsibility had been placed upon the Filipinos in too short a time. Specifically, the Bureau of Lands

was criticized by twenty-eight because of unnecessary delays, general inefficiency, and corrupt employees. 29

For H. B. McCoy, the Philippine representative in the Republican National Committee, the turning point had come with the implementation by Harrison of the Jones Law with "disastrous" results, including an increase of about 300% in the costs of government administration, extravagance and inefficiency in the administration of government business, "and the organization of additional governmental bureaus for the apparent purpose of providing additional places and salaries for members of the dominant political party . . . ." 30

John W. Green declared that there had been "a continual and marked deterioration in the administration of public business" which had been in direct proportion to the Filipinization of the government "and with the acquisition of power by the Nacionalista party." He explained that Filipino officials were, in general, "men of good character and fair ability who are more or less governed by the idea that it is not improper to utilize their official positions for their own benefit and that of their friends."

The native official in the performance of his duties seems to be more affected by political considerations than by a sense of right [he continued]. He seems to be incapable of judging impartially the merits of a question and acting thereon equitably. The matter in hand must be viewed in the light of personal and political advantage for himself, his friends, and his party, and decided accordingly.

29 CIRCULAR LETTER SENT OUT BY THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, MANILA, P.I., TO ALL MEMBERS IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, WITH ANALYSIS OF LETTERS RECEIVED BY THE MISSION IN COMPLIANCE THEREWITH. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

30 Letter, H. B. McCoy to Wood and Forbes, Manila, July 16, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits. McCoy listed a remarkable record of Philippine experience: an Army officer during the Spanish-American War and the Philippine Insurrection; Insular Deputy Collector of Customs (1901-1908); Insular Collector of Customs (1909-1913); and manager of a gold mine since his forced resignation in 1913.
The efforts of the higher officials seem, in large part, to have been directed towards the acquisition of increased power, and the curtailment of the power of the Governor-General. . . .

Conditions in the Bureau of Customs was the special concern of Victor C. Hall of the Robert Dollar Company and A. B. Cresap of the Luzon Brokerage Company. "... routine work is never anywhere near up to date," Hall declared, "valuable records are misplaced and sometimes entirely lost, and it is impossible to be sure in many cases just what cargo has been delivered to consignees, and it is never possible to know accurately what cargo has been landed from any particular ship." He also leveled serious charges against the government arrastre (drayage) service (mostly attributable to political influences which controlled hiring and firing), claiming "an enormous amount of gross inefficiency . . . and also a great amount of theft of cargo while on the pier."

From contacts with other bureaus Hall had concluded that their work was on a similar level, because of certain fundamental factors:

1. The years during which the Filipinos have been receiving training that would fit them to direct work of this kind and carry it on unaided have been so few that there are practically none of them capable of continuous constructive work along these lines.
2. The sense of responsibility of the ordinary Filipino employee is not yet developed to a point where he will devote his energies to a conscientious improvement in his daily routine work. . . .
3. The working of the civil service here has degenerated into a wild political scramble.
4. The one-party control of all phases of this Government is so far reaching and so iron-clad that the various Bureaus seem to be used for political purposes rather than their legitimate ones.32

31Letter, John W. Green to the Special Mission to the Philippine Islands, Manila, July 31, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

32Letter, Victor C. Hall to the Special Mission to the Philippine Islands, Manila, August 30, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits. Hall states that this was in response to a request by Colonel McCoy in a letter dated July 7.
Cresap—whose credentials included insular army service, employment in the Bureau of Customs (1903-1909), and customs brokerage work since 1909—was convinced that certain national traits accounted for the serious deficiencies of Filipino civil servants. "They will share their last crust with a stranger or even a foreigner and to a friend they will give their very soul," he explained. "This national trait and the desire to please, is their worst enemy and the greatest obstacle in the way of self-government. Under the slightest persuasion, it is almost impossible for them to say 'No.'" He also felt that they were too easily led by a small class of politicians.

"... the Filipino people have in their possession material for a wonderful government," he asserted, "but not until ... they can find patriotic men to govern them for the good of the entire people instead of ... for their individual advancement and benefit."33

Undoubtedly Wood was especially interested in a letter from A. D. Richey, who claimed to be the only remaining resident of Zamboanga who had been in government service there (as a provincial engineer) with Wood in 1904 and 1905. As secretary treasurer of the Buena Vista Plantation Company at Zamboanga, he was concerned with "the steady decline in efficiency of the Government for the past ten [sic] years ..." After citing many examples, he declared that it had been accompanied by a sharp rise in costs; in fact, the taxation on his plantation had increased 829% over the preceding year,

33 Letter, A. B. Cresap to Wood and Forbes, Manila, June 9, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits. Cresap also submitted a memorandum on conditions in the Bureau of Customs; but, as he was then a private customs broker, he requested that this report be kept strictly confidential because if it "should come into the hands of the present administration, it would certainly result in the destruction of the business now carried on by the writer." In this long and detailed survey, Cresap delineated conditions in customs ranging from inefficiency and incompetence to outright graft, all of which he claimed had developed after the Filipinization of the service begun by Harrison in 1913. Undated memorandum, A. B. Cresap to the Wood-Forbes Mission, BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.
"although the actual increase in value could not have been more than 25%." Particularly disturbing to Richey was the Filipinos' "lack of any natural inclination toward thrift, industry or the ability to assume responsibility." Although he did not dogmatically assert that they could never develop these traits, he was convinced that they could "only be acquired gradually by competition and amalgamation with the stronger races." Even if the United States granted complete independence with a protectorate to permit "an idealistic experiment in petty nationalism," he was convinced that an indefinite period would be required for the masses to be educated sufficiently to protect themselves from exploitation by their own leaders.\(^3^4\)

One of the longest documents received by the Mission (a "memorandum" of twenty-two double-spaced typewritten pages) was from J. A. Stiver, a lawyer who had served ten years in the Philippine Bureau of Audits before going into business.

"I am delivering this . . . provided that its contents will be considered confidential," he wrote in an accompanying letter, "and that my name will not be used publicly in connection with this report," fearing that otherwise he could well be ruined by a Filipino boycott. And again at the conclusion of this letter, he ordered the memorandum returned immediately by messenger or sealed mail if the Mission could not guarantee strict confidence.\(^3^5\)

"We have in the Philippine Islands more than ten million happy, peaceful, hospitable, lovable, law abiding people, more than 99% of whom I can consider absolutely loyal to the United States Government, and to the American

\(^{3^4}\) Letter, A. D. Richey to General Wood, Zamboanga, June 20, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

\(^{3^5}\) Letter, J. A. Stiver to Major Bowditch, Manila, September 2, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits. Herein Stiver explained that Bowditch had verbally requested this memorandum.
people." But, having been this generous, Stiver then identified the critical minority: "The other 1% are what may be fairly termed the caciques who represent the parasitic element in the Philippine Islands, and who live thru exploitation of their less favored neighbors." "As I see it," he continued with unrestrained words clearly demonstrating why he had been so insistent that this document be kept strictly confidential, "the whole trouble with the present government of the Philippine Islands is that representatives of the American people both in Washington and in the Philippine Islands have in some cases innocently, and in other cases criminally but always with the same result, lent the power of the great American people to this 1% of political and social parasites to aid them in exploitation or deliberate legal robbery of the other 99% who represent the best people in the Philippine Islands."

In his opinion, this had resulted in keeping "a band of criminal thieves in power . . . with authority to tax the good people of this country in any amounts they see fit, to use the money collected as they desire; squandering it on salaries for incompetent relatives and traveling expenses for lying propagandists, and false publicity. . . ."

From his ten years in the Bureau of Audits, he gave examples to "illustrate . . . wherein the American people have made such a failure in attempting to give the [Filipino] people . . . a decent government." Because his memory became so activated as he recalled specific incidents, their quantity is too great even to be summarized. But the value which the Mission placed upon this devastating and slashing document can be estimated, it would seem, from their twenty-three marginal references to specific sections of their final report.36

36 Memorandum, J. A. Stiver to the Special Mission to the Philippine Islands, Manila, August 24, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.
Justice E. Finley Johnson of the Philippine Supreme Court claimed that he was the only Justice "who has had the temerity to criticise political corruption in the Philippine Islands during the past eight years and, of course, it has brought down upon my head a feeling of bitterness on the part of the leading politicians." He attached some excerpts from a number of his opinions to indicate how he had dealt with political corruption and declared that these had been included in a circular sent out to all municipalities and provinces by the Executive Bureau. The practical results: "A few weeks [later] . . . there was a new Executive Secretary."37

4

Of all those SELECTED LETTERS FROM PROMINENT AND REPRESENTATIVE AMERICAN BUSINESS MEN THROUGHOUT THE ISLANDS, AND VERY WELL EXPRESSING THE GENERAL AMERICAN SENTIMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES, which Forbes arranged as a special collection among the many exhibits to the Mission's Report, the most lengthy (twenty-three single-spaced typewritten pages) was from one of the most respected of American "old-timers" in the Philippines, Dean C. Worcester. Twice prior to 1893 he had visited the Islands, spending four years there in scientific research. After the American conquest, he had served on the first and second Philippine Commissions (1899 to 1913), and as an outstanding Secretary of the Interior (1901 to 1913). With the arrival of Governor General Harrison, Worcester, together with many other veteran American administrators, had been forced out of office and into private business.38

Few if any of the other statements submitted to the Mission were as

37 Letter, Johnson to Wood, September 3, 1921. Wood Papers, Box 156.

38 Forbes, Philippine Islands, I, 116-19, 171.
nicely prepared or as forcefully presented—with sound reasoning, convincing arguments, mature perspective, and numerous personal illustrations—as this truly formidable document. That Wood and Forbes were impressed is evident from the forty separate references to their final report in its margins, by far the largest number for any document in the exhibits to the Wood-Forbes Report.

Worcester's statement is so detailed and comprehensive that it may fairly be considered a capsule one-man special report. Doubtless he was so devastating in his candid comments because of the Commissioners' assurance that his words would be held in strict confidence; otherwise, his extensive commercial interests (including the Agusan Coconut Company whose stationery he used) almost certainly would have suffered serious reprisals.

In his judgment, the "strict enforcement of an adequate civil service law . . . was one of the most substantial benefits accruing to the [Filipinos] . . . as the result of American rule." But what had occurred under Harrison?

. . . the civil service law and rules promptly became a mockery. Highly competent and efficient government employees were ordered to resign, and when it was charged that they had been removed in violation of civil service rules the reply was made that they had not been removed at all but had voluntarily quit. Premiums were placed on resignations of American officials. Salaries were cut to such an extent as not only to preclude the possibility of the appointment of Americans to many important positions but to make it impossible for honest Filipinos to hold them and continue to live decently. In other words, a premium was placed on dishonesty and there was in many instances a return to the condition in old Spanish days when people instead of being paid to hold certain public offices paid for the privilege of being appointed to them.

A feature of the change almost as lamentable as that of the elimination of much needed Americans . . . has been the driving out of many of the very best of the . . . [Filipinos, often] by reducing salaries below the living point, thus putting a premium on graft so that men who were not willing to practice it were forced out of the service.

. . . . .

The general reduction of salaries has not brought with it any resulting economy. On the contrary positions have been multiplied to such an extent that there has been a large increase in the cost of government.
During the early period of Harrison's regime, "graft was somewhat infrequently accepted when offered." But later it was "generally, openly and insolently demanded as a prerequisite to the performance of their duties by government officers and employes." In fact, "the ranking official of the International Banking Corporation, the ranking officer of the Standard Oil Company at Manila, and numerous other heads of important commercial enterprises told me that it had become absolutely impossible to do business in the Philippine Islands without paying graft."³⁹ After giving several personal experiences, Worcester concluded with an emphatic declaration: "The statement that the public service in these islands has become rotten with graft from the bottom to a point dangerously near the top can be fully substantiated."

In one scathing paragraph, Worcester summarized his unflattering opinions concerning the insular bureaucracy:

In general it may be said . . . that there has been a conspicuous absence of executive ability of high order; that because of this, and because of the incompetence in other ways of Bureau chiefs and of many bureau employes, much work has fallen very badly behind, has been badly performed or has been neglected; that this condition of affairs has made it possible to enforce demands for improper payments against people who imperatively needed quick action, and that conditions in these regards have been steadily and rapidly going from bad to worse.

His concluding paragraph revealed a strong personal desire to see the United States punish the culpable politicos:

. . . I am by no means of the opinion that it would be harmful to teach the [Filipinos] . . . that the mere fact that certain liberties have been extended to them does not necessarily mean that they will not be taken away if abused

³⁹ Underlined for emphasis in the original. Worcester stated that the corporations with which he had been connected had not compromised although "repeated and determined efforts have been made to compel us to pay graft. I met them in such fashion that I think their authors became convinced that it would save trouble to collect an increased amount from others and let us alone."
... it might some time be highly salutary to teach the professional politicians to say, "The United States gave, and the United States, for good and sufficient cause, hath taken away. Blessed be the name of the United States!"

On this mock pious note his impressive letter concluded. But had the thoroughly flayed politicos known of its contents, it seems unlikely that their lips would have formed such a chant to the United States. Certainly they would not have uttered "Blessed be the name of Dean C. Worcester!"\footnote{Letter, Dean C. Worcester to the Special Mission to the Philippine Islands, Manila, August 4, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits. Worcester stated that this was in reply to a letter from Wood dated July 13. It was delivered to the Mission at Malacanang on September 2 by a Mr. Yriarte. Wood, Diary, September 2, 1921. The prolonged delay between the writing and the delivery of this letter is nowhere explained.}

Yet undoubtedly this remarkable letter was gratefully received by the Commissioners. In fact, it would seem undeniable that it constituted the single most valuable document acquired by the Mission during their investigation. "This is an important paper, as it is based upon long experience in the Islands in various activities; probably no one better familiar with conditions than Worcester," was Wood's appraisal. "Moreover, he always states things as he sees them."\footnote{Ibid., September 2, 1921.}

One of the most important documents from an organization was a forty-four page memorial from the American Chamber of Commerce, which claimed that it was "fairly ... representative of the American community in the Philippine Islands." Herein was a brief but severe indictment of the politicos:

... the last few years have seen a constant deterioration in the efficiency of almost every branch of the government service with which business men come
in contact. There has been a gradual infection of graft. In many of the public offices the only way one can get attention within a reasonable time is to pay some employee, usually in the guise of "over time," to dispatch his business. In the Custom House, in particular, the fall from the high standard formerly maintained is particularly burdensome to the commercial community.

After considering increasing government costs ("at a rate comparable ... [with] its inefficiency"), this document appraised the general situation as "discouraging in the extreme." "We believe that this lamentable result is due to the fatal policy of the last administration," they explained, "under which the representatives of the United States have practically abdicated the functions of guidance and control which it was their duty to exercise."[42]

Stating that the Manila Chamber of Commerce was "purely a Commercial organization ... [with] no opinion whatever to express either on the present or past political situation in the Philippines," their fifteen-page report confined itself to "matters of very grave importance to Commercial interests ...." Among such matters, which were discussed at some length, were certain chronic problems in the administration of customs affairs:

"Losses to merchants ... are enormous. ... The handling of cargo on the piers is usually considered to be slower than at any other port in the Orient. ... Pillage on the piers is of common occurrence [sic]."[43]

In their short letter, the American Legion urged that cadastral surveys should be expedited, that the Civil Service "should be brought up to its


former high standard," and that "At all times . . . the interests of Americans and of the American Government should not be left unprotected." In order to accomplish this, they urged that many more Americans be recruited as civil servants.44

Although too late for inclusion in their report, Wood received a copy of an article by Captain H. L. Heath, president of the American Chamber of Commerce. This strongly-worded document, which was published on September 12 as the leading article in the Chamber's Journal with the Board of Directors' official approval, was reported to have "created a sensation in native circles," and to have been "the strongest and most outspoken authoritative American utterance since the occupation of the islands."

A child [the Filipino politicos] was given power too fast [Heath wrote]; it lacked maturity; it had a curiosity to see why the wheels went around; it can't put the machinery together again. The foundation of the Government is too weak to bear the load; the people lack the character and the capacity to properly choose, to throw aside the bad and accept the good; racial, tribal, family, feudal and lingual ties are so strong and so differing and customs are so strongly imbedded that the situation is hopeless unless some disinterested and fair hand can take over the guidance and initiate and institute the proper forms and teach the reasons for them. . . .45

In considering possible recommendations for a remote insular possession, the Mission must have been anxious to receive the professional opinions

44Letter, American Legion of the Philippine Islands to the Wood-Forbes Commission, Manila, September 3, 1921, signed by S. D. Rowlands, Commander, and P. D. Carman, Adjutant, of the Philippine Department. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

45New York Times, September 13, 1921, is the source for these comments and quotations from this article which may be seen in Capt. H. L. Heath, "The Territory of Malaya," American Chamber of Commerce Journal, I (September, 1921), 7-8.
of ranking American Army and Navy officers in the Far East. Surely they were not disappointed with the long, carefully written memorandum from Admiral Joseph Strauss, Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet, aboard his flagship, the USS Huron, then anchored in Manila Bay.

Strauss generously declared that he had been "rather impressed with the patriotism [of the Filipinos] . . . and the ability of a considerable proportion of them to carry on the business of government," but he doubted that this would continue at the same high level without American supervision. He foresaw their most serious internal problems as a product of the inescapable fact that their country was seriously fragmented and isolated, creating barriers which presented "serious difficulties in . . . the attainment of national unity. . . ." 46

From the United States Army Wood doubtless expected substantial assistance; he should have been pleased with their document collection for him. 47 Obviously the most important of these was a lengthy memorandum from Kernan himself in which he bluntly declared that "The laborious and slow road by which the races of mankind have achieved, in varying degree, a capacity to govern themselves has hardly been entered upon by these people," For this

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47 They were filed together with a covering paper bearing this descriptive title: THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY RELATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS TO THE UNITED STATES. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits. These documents had been assembled in obedience to a confidential cablegram (from Washington, March 23, 1921, to Major General F. J. Kernan, commanding the Philippine Department) which had relayed the wishes of the Secretary of War that studies be made "for the benefit of General Wood on all national and international issues affecting the future policy of the United States and the Philippines from the military viewpoint. . . ." Cablegram No. 1015 signed by "March" (undoubtedly General Peyton C. March who was then Chief of Staff of the United States Army). BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.
he principally blamed the *politicos*, who were "imbued with the ideas of Spanish officialdom in the conduct of governmental affairs, not with those of America," so that "The conception of public office as a public trust is almost as rare as snow in these Islands."\(^{48}\)

Appendix B of Kernan's important report was a lengthy and detailed paper by Colonel C. D. Rhodes, General Staff, Chief of Staff, at Headquarters Philippine Department. It was marked SECRET, and fortunately so for the good of Filipino-American relations, if for no other reason.

Of fundamental concern to Rhodes was "the tremendous significance of the fact that there is not,—as exists in all successful and self-governing democracies, any great and influential middle class."\(^{49}\) Instead the dominant element was "a small but influential group of *politicos*, usually landowners by inheritance or their administrators, more or less superficially educated, provincial in their opinions and viewpoints, often swallowed up in self-esteem [*sic*], and with a genius for small politics which seems inherent from childhood."

Because of the prevalent illiteracy, the large number of ethnic groups, and "such psychological characteristics in the dominating race (the Tagalogs) as lack of initiative, slothfulness, an absence of moral stamina, 

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\(^{48}\)MEMORANDUM for Major General Leonard Wood, U. S. Army. Subject: The Political and Military Relations of the Philippine Islands to the United States," by Major General F. J. Kernan, Commanding Philippine Department, Headquarters Philippine Department, Manila, P. I., April 27, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits. Marked CONFIDENTIAL; signed by Kernan. These statements by Kernan, and others by him and his subordinates which will be cited later, help to explain Quezon's bitter remarks to McCoy concerning "the attitude of the Army in recent years." Quezon "Expressed himself as thinking Gen. Kernan was a very bad influence and that his manner and attitude toward Filipinos was decidedly unpleasant, to put it mildly, to them." "Record of conversation with Mr. Manuel Quezon, President of the Senate, about July 5th," in the Frank R. McCoy Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box 28.

\(^{49}\)Underlined for emphasis in the original copy.
and a natural capacity for bribery and corruption," Rhodes was convinced that "there can be little doubt in the mind of the average American in the Islands, that the Filipinos are very far from being ready for independence." For him this was confirmed by the preceding eight years during which the Filipinos had had increasing control of their own affairs with results that had "not in the slightest degree justified the experiment. Rather the reverse."50

The first part of the paper presented by Major John P. Smith, General Staff, Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence, was marked CONFIDENTIAL; it could well have been given a higher classification considering the explosive nature of his comments. For example, the section on "Psychologic Characteristics of the Filipino" was introduced by this statement: "The intellectual sense of the average Filipino is not highly developed, and the moral or purposive element of his mentality is developed even less than the element of intelligence. The chief factor lacking is sufficiently deep purpose to work things out in detail."

Smith rated Filipinos generally as good imitators but without "initiative genius." "He is not efficient in anything," Smith asserted, "and has no attachment for any occupation in particular. He is indolent in the extreme, and his work cannot be depended upon without the closest supervision. He does not look ahead and does not know the art of saving money."

Yet the most damming indictments followed:

The native has no moral sense with respect to country or individuals. If he attains an authoritative position, he expects to graft not only on the government but on the people. He is momentarily obedient, but is averse to

subjection and is fertile in exculpatory devices. He feigns friendship, but
has no loyalty. The native is fond of gambling, lavish in his promises, but
lax in the extreme as to their fulfilment. He never admits frankly and
openly a fault, but will hide it until discovered. An act of generosity or
a voluntary concession of justice is regarded as a sign of weakness. He is
very remiss about restoring the loan of anything voluntarily. He waits for
you to ask him for it. He considers it no degradation to borrow money and
is very loose in his moral sense as to money and theft.  

Quite consistently the Mission personnel refrained from public com-
ments on their observations and conclusions. The only outstanding exception
was a press interview at Malacanan on July 1 after they had investigated
that part of the Islands containing more than half the total population.

Both Wood and Forbes emphasized the fundamental importance of a clean
and upright government, free of any taint of nepotism, an evil which they
strongly censured and which, regretably, they had found in many places. They
also had discovered a large number of governmental positions which were
purely ornamental with consequent serious effects both on the economy and
the efficiency of government. "The way to have enough money for health and
other purposes," Forbes bluntly declared, "is to dismiss from government
service all relatives of bureau chiefs, and all their family friends who are
in the government pay, but have not passed the civil service examination."  

In their private comments and confidential communications, however,
neither was at all reluctant to pass judgment upon the abilities and perform-

51 STATISTICAL DATA ON THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS AND A GENERAL STUDY OF
ISSUES AFFECTING THE FUTURE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE PHILIPPINES
FROM THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW. Signed by Major John P. Smith, General
Staff, Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence. BIA, W-F Report
Exhibits.

52 Manila Times, July 1, 1921; "Evils in Need of Remedy," North-China
Herald, CXL (July 23, 1921), 253. Based on a Reuter's dispatch date-lined
Manila, July 14, which may have contained materials from a second press
conference. Quote from the latter source.
ances of Filipino civil servants. "The remarkable part of this whole situation is the supine attitude of the public and many of the authorities who have permitted the grossest immorality and waste of public property without let or hindrance," was Wood's stern evaluation early in their work, while later he consoled himself somewhat with the thought that their visit had at least slowed up graft.53

On July 25, after an extended inspection of the central or Visayan islands, Wood used almost double the suggested number of words to cable a confidential preliminary report of the Mission's findings and conclusions to Weeks and the President. His comments on government administration seem eminently fair:

While there has been a marked falling off in efficiency in most departments and great increase in cost of government, in part due unnecessary personnel and in part to legislative form of government, et cetera, we are pleased to be able to report that many activities of government have been handled with marked ability by Filipinos. In many instances where failures have occurred, Americans in controlling positions in the government cannot escape their share of blame, as highest responsibility and power to control was theirs.

Yet on the difficulties of obtaining land titles (caused by "failure to appropriate funds, defective administration methods, [and] inefficiency"), his words were severe: "many homesteaders have been dispossessed through improper influences, and possession of titles to land will add much to stability and contentment."54

Again three days later Wood commented freely in a letter to his longstanding friend, Mrs. Theodore Roosevelt:

53 Wood, Diary, May 10, June 7, 1921.

54 Cablegram, Wood to Weeks, Manila, July 25, 1921. BIA, W-F Mission File. A copy was also filed as one of the exhibits to the Wood-Forbes Report.
They [the Filipinos] have made great progress in the twenty years they have been under our control, progress which is as creditable to them as it is complimentary to us; but the development period of peoples is long, and those great fundamental qualities or public spirit, civic courage, habit of cooperation, etc., are not matters of a few days but of long periods of time. Few people understand how vital and far-reaching is the influence of the small elements of control and how things go to pieces without them. When one speaks of a people as being ninety-eight percent officered and handled by their own people, they sometimes forget that perhaps the two percent furnish a good deal of the vital spark and the same balance which kept things going.55

And in his Diary for August 9, Wood used strong words:

The Governor's office [at Davao], which we used to run with seven or eight men, now has in the neighborhood of a hundred. It is a straight-out, unabashed administrative graft. This is apparently the dumping-ground for friends of those in power. The personnel could easily be reduced fifty percent and efficiency increased.56

To his old friend Dr. Victor Heiser (who later wrote that the Philippines "had changed sadly for the worse since I had last seen them" some seven years before) Wood remarked that governmental affairs had disintegrated so disastrously that "Only here and there could I find a few rusty streaks where the rails had been." Heiser felt that Harrison had unwisely let the Filipinos "ruin themselves" by the excesses of a small group of politicos who were "satured with power."57

On September 11 the Commissioners completed their final report, which Forbes would take to Washington, and then prepared a long, confidential cablegram summarizing their findings and recommendations for Weeks. Its comments on Filipino conduct of governmental affairs were not flattering.

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56 Wood, Diary, August 9, 1921.

"The government is not reasonably free from those underlying causes that result in the destruction of government," was their severe judgment. Although they had discovered "a gratifying number of officials of character and ability reasonably faithful to the trust imposed upon them," the Commissioners concluded "that efficiency in the public services has fallen off and that they are now relatively inefficient due to the too rapid transfer of control to officials who have not had time for proper training, and to lack of inspection and supervision." But, in all fairness, they added that many Filipinos had "marked capacity for leadership and government service, and the new generation is full of promise." They were, however, disturbed by the "marked deterioration" within the Civil Service "due to the injection of politics caused by the passage of laws creating numerous exemptions from the Civil Service, and many provisions for temporary employment."

Even though the legislature was "conducted with dignity and decorum," and "composed of representative men," Wood and Forbes were disturbed at recent trends which had shown "a strong tendency towards paternalism," and "an increased trend towards injection of politics into administration and the encroachment of the legislative on the executive. . . ."

After having cited so many failures, the Commissioners explained that they did not consider such "lack of success in administration . . . as proof of incapacity on the part of the Filipinos, but as lack of experience." They were convinced that most defects could be corrected with proper action by American officials, and they did not recommend "any essential change of policy in the employment of Filipinos in all the departments of the government." Yet they strongly felt "that legislative encroachments on the powers of the Governor-General as prescribed in the Jones Bill should be corrected," with the Filipinos themselves being given "the fullest chance to demonstrate their
capacity by remedying existing defects." 58

A severe test of Filipino administrative capacity was provided by their performance in governing the minority groups, both the various Pagans, scattered widely throughout the Archipelago, and the Moros, concentrated in the southern islands. As the Mission continued their inspection it became increasingly apparent that the Filipinos had failed this critical test.

Among the Pagan tribesmen of Mountain Province in northern Luzon, Forbes found a general desire for the elimination of Filipino administrators and the return of Americans. Forbes himself has written vividly concerning the activities of his party at Bontoc, the provincial capital, which was crowded with representatives from the tribes of this and neighboring provinces, and where for two and a half days they held public sessions throughout the day and late into the night:

• • • except for some obviously intimidated delegation [sic], [they] unanimously requested the return of American governors, teachers, doctors, and police officers, and a continuance of American rule. An old warrior, seamed, scarred, and tattooed in a way that indicated he had taken many heads in his day [Kinsley noted that he had a safety pin suspended from one ear 59], said, "When the Americans came we were like wild horses that had never been trained. They taught us the way to do things. They taught us how to live. We

58 Cable No. 861, Yeater to Weeks, Manila, September 11, 1921. BIA, W-F Mission File. These general recommendations are of particular interest when coupled with the recommendations of William Howard Taft, the first Civil Governor of the Philippines, who was convinced, as he wrote Wood, that the creation of the Senate, the placing of Filipinos as heads of departments, and the appointing of a majority of Filipinos to the Supreme Court were all great mistakes. "How much it would be safe to take back the power thus conferred I don't know," he confided. "It is a case of a bone badly set that ought to be broken again; but how far is it wise to go in such a painful and difficult operation you and Forbes on the ground can tell much better than I." Letter, Taft to Wood, April 5, 1921, Ritz Carlton Hotel, Montreal, Canada, as reproduced in Forbes, Journals, II, 334-35. These suggestions by Taft were made pursuant to a letter from Wood of March 29.

59 Exclusive dispatch, Los Angeles Times, June 8, 1921.
were just beginning to learn, we were like horses half-broken. Now we are
going back to our wild state." Another warrior said, "We were like blind
people who could not see, and the Americans came and opened our eyes and we
began to see. Do not leave us, because if you go back we shall lose all we
have gotten and be blind again.\textsuperscript{60}

"Prominent Filipinos here told the Wood-Forbes Mission that if the
United States frees the Islands there may be an uprising in this district as
well as in the other mountain provinces," Kinsley warned in a dispatch sent
to American newspapers from Baguio on May 13. After stating that these
people had not been touched by civilization, that there were no newspapers,
and that they were illiterate anyway, he cabled words that must have been
considered strictly gratuitous in the Christian and civilized lowlands: "The
people who do business with them say that they are of a higher type than the
natives in the lowlands. They say the mountain people are more honest and
dependable and the women are strictly virtuous.\textsuperscript{61}

And again he expressed his concern over the problems of this region
in a later cablegram:

The mountain province of Luzon presents one of the greatest problems
which the Wood-Forbes commission will have to solve in settling the Phil-
ippine Islands question. It is a question whether to leave the so-called
"invisible tribes" to the mercies of the Filipinos, who have shown a disposi-
tion to neglect them, or to return them to the rule of American governors,
which the hill people deeply want.\textsuperscript{62}

Worcester felt that with but few exceptions the Filipinos had taken
"no real interest in the betterment of the condition of the more backward and
wilder inhabitants of the archipelago," and that there had actually been "a

\textsuperscript{60}Forbes, \textit{Philippine Islands}, II, 296.
\textsuperscript{61}Contained in a cablegram from De Veyra to Quezon, Washington, D.C.,
June 25, 1921. BIA, W-F Mission File.
\textsuperscript{62}Los Angeles \textit{Times}, June 8, 1921.
good deal of unfortunate retrogression in the work for the non-Christian tribes." Conditions had become so bad, he declared, that he had received many messages from head-men, "begging for the elimination of Filipino officials and a return to the old regime."

In commenting on the complaints which he had heard that the Filipinos treated the mountain peoples with contempt, Forbes made this incisive observation:

This is the secret of Filipino failure to handle these people. They do despise them and look down upon them, and do not conceal it from them. The American does not; he makes friends with them and shows no signs of dislike and assumes no superiority except such as is found in his better conduct. In this last however he has to travel pretty far as these people are very trustworthy and more sure to be reliable in that particular than many Americans.

And among the Moslems of the southern islands conditions did not improve. After finding the Moros of Zamboanga "intensely unhappy and thoroughly disgusted with the Filipino administration," Wood noted that "in every province in the Moro country, [it] has been a failure, with the possible exception of Lanao, where there has been a moderate degree of success."

What Wood labeled their greatest mistake was the deliberate and "intensive Filipinization" which had resulted in practically all administrative positions being filled with "carpet-bagging Filipinos," while hardly a single Moro held even a humble position. Forbes noticed that the Filipino Gov-

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63 Letter, Dean C. Worcester to the Special Mission to the Philippine Islands, Manila, August 4, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

64 Forbes, Journals, II, 222. The Ifugaus and the Kalingas asked that both Filipinos and Americans remain as administrators, but the Igorots from Bontoc, Benguet, and Apayao refused to say anything good for the Filipinos. Ibid., pp. 74, 222.

65 Wood, Diary, August 15, 1921.

66 Ibid., August 19, 21, 1921.
ernor of Zamboanga had "thirteen deputy governors with him, all young Filipinos who give themselves airs and are apt to give offensive orders to the Sultan and Datus," while, because of the Filipinos' lack of "governing sense," the Moros were used in the government "hardly at all." 67 And sometimes it was more than "airs" which irritated them; among the Yacan Moros, Forbes discovered "a very serious condition of affairs," with every man to whom he spoke complaining that "either his cattle had been stolen without redress or he had been charged double the usual fee for some service by the revenue or forestry [sic] agent." 68

At Jolo Forbes spent a day interviewing Moros—every one of whom had a grievance against the Filipinos—after which he summed up his psychological analysis of the situation:

The Moros had fought the Americans and had been beaten by them and were ready to recognize them as the better men. They hadn't fought the Filipino and they hadn't been beaten by them and didn't think it fair they should be put over them. To rule them they'd have to fight them and if the Americans hadn't been here to maintain order they'd have fought them already... 69

But one indignant Moro analyzed their grievances even more succinctly: "Says the Mohammedans do not think it is just to be put under the Filipinos as the

67 Forbes, Journals, II, 140.
68 Ibid., p. 144.
69 Ibid., pp. 146-47. On Jolo a Moro priest declared that the Moros and Filipinos were friends; but later a delegation visited Forbes and their datu declared that he represented a thousand men all of whom wished to repudiate the priest's speech. Ibid., p. 146. An analysis similar to Forbes's was made by an American old-timer in Zamboanga, who asserted in a letter to Wood that the Moros only respected strong leadership as represented by the Americans; and that the Filipinos, who had been consistently beaten in battle by the Moros over hundreds of years, could never supply such leadership. "The Moro is satisfied with American controle [sic]," he concluded, "because it assures him of justice and no interference with his religion but... [he will never] submit to Philippino [sic] controls." Letter, A. D. Richey to Wood, Zamboanga, June 20, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.
Moros are followers of Islam and they are just Filipinos."70

In Jolo the Filipinos had made a supreme effort to befriend the Moros by enlisting the assistance of the patron saint of Philippine nationalism, Jose Rizal. But Wood was harsh in his appraisal of their effort: "A ridiculous group under the Rizal statue in Jolo shows a Christian Filipino with his arm around a Moro, apparently instructing him, and gives offense to and causes irritation among the Moros."71

Yet in the province of Lanao even the normally hostile Moros expressed satisfaction with the manner in which the Filipinos were governing them and desired that Governor Santos remain over them. "He is . . . a remarkably superior person . . . and has won the confidence of everyone and is running this province to give general satisfaction," was Forbes's generous estimate.72

In the Commissioners' report to Washington at the conclusion of their final inspection trip, unrest among the Moros and Pagans was blamed on "old animosities and sudden establishment of practically complete Filipino control and imposition of elaborate unelastic form of Provincial government upon Moros and Pagans in large undeveloped areas, as well as lack of proportionate Moro and Non-Christian representation in government." The administration here they termed "inefficient, unduly expensive, top heavy in personnel."73

In a long, confidential cablegram on September 11, which summarized the Mission's findings and recommendations after their final report had been

70 Forbes, Journals, II, 292.

71 Wood, Diary, August 19, 1921. Forbes called it "a labored effort to make out that they were together." Journals, II, 147.

72 Ibid., pp. 129-30.

73 Extract from Cable No. 852, Governor General to the Secretary of War, September 4, 1921. BIA, W-F Mission File. This cable also is one of the exhibits to the Wood-Forbes Report.
compiled, Wood and Forbes judged the record of the Filipinos in dealing with the non-Christians to be a mixed one. Not only had they "displayed a tendency to send in too many unnecessary and untrained Filipino officials," but they had "not reached out to win the affection of the people by conciliatory methods and employment of their own people where ever possible."

Although roads and other public works had been seriously neglected, they had only praise for the schools and the public health service. Yet in spite of these achievements and although Wood and Forbes considered that some of the Filipino governors in these areas had established fine records, they had discovered a general desire for the return of American officials. 74

In their final report to President Harding, Wood and Forbes allotted a generous proportion of space to an evaluation of Filipino attainments in government administration. It would seem that this alone demonstrated the importance which they attached to this phase of their work; and surely their words strongly confirm this assumption.

With the gracious statement that the Filipinos possessed "marked ability in many fields of effort," the Commissioners introduced this topic. Declaring that this ability was not as apparent as it normally would have been, they explained that the fault was America's in imposing too rapidly "all the intricacies of a highly organized representative form of government"

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which had in many instances "overtaxed the ability of the people to absorb, digest, and make efficient practical use of what it has taken other nations generations to absorb and apply...".\(^75\)

Even though there had been "a progressive transfer of government to the people of the islands," so that it was then "largely in their hands," Wood and Forbes explained that many did not realize the continuing "decisive American control that assures the maintenance of an orderly government, secure against disturbing influences from within and without." To both Americans and Filipinos they gave credit for the "extraordinary" progress which had been made during the preceding twenty-three years. "The animosities have disappeared," they explained, "and there remains a spirit of confidence and friendliness for the American people throughout the archipelago." But these heartening words were followed by a stern warning: "Much has been done, but much remains to be done."

Although the President's representatives flatly declared that there had been "retrogression in the efficiency of most departments of the government during the past few years," they did not feel "that the responsibility for this rests solely upon the Filipinos or that they should be unduly blamed for such failures as have occurred, as the ultimate responsibility for the selection of responsible officers and for the exercise of proper supervision was in the hands of the American Governor General, whose duty it was to exercise due care to appoint competent men at the heads of departments and bureaus, and, above all, to exercise proper supervision over them."

The Commissioners' recommendation for remedying this dangerous situation was not a reversal of policy, "but time for the Filipinos, under careful

\(^75\) N-F Report, pp. 19-20. Hereafter the document in the preceding footnote will be cited by using this short form.
but friendly supervision, to absorb and master what is already in their hands. We must remember that the good qualities of the people, their enthusiasm and their determination, can not take the place of experience." What this "friendly supervision" much achieve was more specifically delineated: the building up of "an informed public opinion, a stronger spirit of civic responsibility and a better appreciation of the obligations of citizenship," all leading to the creation of "a truly representative form of government" for the Islands. 

"Generally speaking, administrative departments of the Government are top-heavy in personnel and enmeshed in red tape," they declared. "There is a vast amount of paper work. The methods of the administration are purely bureaucratic. There is a lack of supervision and personal contact."

Yet such conditions had not always existed, for Wood asserted (it is presumed that Forbes would not have joined in this statement from a sense of modesty) that "The general administration of the Philippine Government in 1913 [Forbes's last year as Governor General], the period of greatest efficiency, was honest, highly efficient, and set a high standard of energy and morality. Inherited tendencies [sic] were being largely replaced by American ideals and efficiency throughout the Philippine personnel, but the time and opportunity were both too short to develop experienced leaders and direction in the new English-speaking and American-thinking generation."

How could such a fundamental change be explained? Their analysis was multi-causative: "... bad example, incompetent direction ... political infection of the services, and above all ... lack of competent supervision and inspection." More specifically, they blamed the legislature for having

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76 Ibid., pp. 20-21.
passed "laws tending to demoralize and introduce into the civil service the infection of politics," including "numerous exemptions from the requirements of the civil service and many provisions for temporary employment."  

As a specific example of these unfortunate conditions, Harding's emissaries presented the Bureau of Lands. "Serious" was their word for the land title situation. "**Nothing** is more conducive to good government than having the people secure in the ownership of their land and possessing titles guaranteed by the Government," which justified their recommendation that the Government should "push forward the cadastral survey, determine titles to land as quickly as possible, and . . . facilitate in every possible manner the acquisition of titles by homesteaders."  

Yet this dismal and disheartening portrayal of Philippine administrative retrogression did not envelop the two Commissioners in impenetrable gloom and pessimism. Their final words for this phase of their investigation were ones of good courage, faith, and optimism: "All these defects can and--unless we fail to understand the spirit of the legislature and the leaders--will be corrected in the islands."  

Even after he had been inaugurated Governor General, Wood did not moderate his opinion of Filipino administrative competence; in fact, his private statements became much harsher than those in the Mission's Report. In writing to Landon Thomas of Augusta, Georgia, Wood described Philippine conditions as "a frightful mess--rank incompetency, to an almost incredible extent . . . ."  

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77 Ibid., pp. 22-23.
79 Ibid., p. 23.
80 Copy of a letter, Wood to Thomas, Manila, October 31, 1921. Wood Papers, Box 158.
which he faced:

... there is a vast amount of work to be done to untangle one of the worst conceivable muddles and straighten out administrative confusion. For eight years the reins seem to have been thrown over the dashboard and the team has wandered at will, occasionally stopping long enough to kick things to pieces a bit. ... 81

And, as their work neared its conclusion, Forbes, from years of experience as Governor General, looked ahead to what would soon face Governor General Wood: "Well the first job is to clean up the nasty mess. ... Graft everywhere, inefficiency, multiplication of offices and division of results." 82

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81 Copy of a letter, Wood to Mrs. Roosevelt, December 10, 1921. Wood Papers, Box 157.

82 Forbes, Journals, II, 167.
CHAPTER IX

A TRIO OF MALEFACTORS

Even before their arrival in Manila, the Mission had formed some rather firm conclusions relative to the locus of administrative responsibility in the Philippines. After commenting on their study sessions aboard the Wenatchee, Forbes recorded this summary conclusion:

... we got a pretty good idea of what Harrison has been doing [from studying Philippine Government reports and digests of recent legislation], which, in straight language, has been nothing. He has left matters in Quezon's and Osmena's hands and they've been running the Government and legislation to suit themselves. Law after law has been passed taking executive control from the hands of the Governor General and placing it in the hands of one after another official who by law must be a Filipino, or, in the general run of cases, in the hands of the President of the Senate, Quezon, or in those of the Speaker [Osmena], usually of a committee of the two. Gradually it has come to pass that these two men have come to be the whole thing,—in a large measure the Governor General has abdicated.¹

Reporting to the Secretary of War immediately after their arrival, Forbes indicated that their conclusions had not been erroneous: everyone with whom they had talked so far agreed that Quezon and Osmena "have been practically in undisputed control of all activities of government the last few years... . . ."²

The responsibility for Philippine conditions as the Mission would find them would thus be principally apportioned among this triumvirate. Of this trio, one had already left the Islands when the Mission arrived; another would soon flee precipitately from the unbearable mounting tensions; and the third apparently never needed to consider flight.

¹Forbes, Journals, II, 54. Underlined for emphasis by Forbes.
²Copy of a letter, Forbes to Weeks, Manila, May 6, 1921, as recorded in Ibid., p. 64.
As Governor General, Francis Burton Harrison had conducted a rapid and thorough Filipinization of the government; it should have been expected, therefore, that many Americans would have grievances against him. But their criticisms were apparently far more fundamental than from pique at the loss of position for themselves or their friends.

An American judge named Kincaid sought out the Mission at Malacanan to declare that Harrison simply radiated corruption, that he was surrounded by corrupt people, and that he was a most demoralizing influence. "This is but another instance of the very general opinion which I find among people here and everywhere," was Wood's comment. ³ And they had been hearing comments of this sort from soon after their arrival, so examples are not difficult to find in the Commissioners' personal records.

Mr. E. Womek, an American soldier who had taken his discharge in the Philippines to go into business, sought an interview at the Palace. "He said ... that the Governor's morals were so bad, especially his tendency to follow up young girls, that he was regarded as a pervert," Wood recorded. ⁴

Captain Seeber, formerly Chief of the Manila Police and then a successful businessman, spoke of Harrison's weaknesses with reluctance, stating that he was a personal friend. Although Harrison was personally popular, Seeber felt that his government was most unfortunate and decadent because he had surrendered his executive authority to the politicians and had lost the respect of the better element among the Filipinos, and that his immorality was tolerated because he was liberal in his dealings with them and was a constant

³Wood, Diary, June 7, 1921.
⁴Ibid., May 10, 1921.
advocate of independence.  

With his extensive experience in the Philippines, William Howard Taft obviously spoke with authority in advising the Mission. Yet when he evaluated Harrison he was clearly expressing opinions that had been formed from second-hand information. "He has been a disgrace to us by his domestic and personal indecencies and has seriously affected our standing among the Filipino people," was his candid conclusion. Yet he questioned how frank the Mission should be concerning Harrison's shortcomings, although he was convinced that the President deserved to know even if such information were not published in the Mission's report. 

But it was not only Americans who complained of Harrison's flagrant indecencies. Even the Apostolic Delegate, Bishop Petreilli, although "very reserved" at a luncheon with Wood and his son Osborne, finally expressed fear that the government had suffered great decadence under Harrison and that his

5 Ibid.

6 Copy of a letter, Taft to Wood, April 5, 1921, in Forbes, Journals, II, 335. Although the Mission did not touch upon this topic in their report, Wood made a record of some of Harrison's immoral activities as revealed by Forbes, who had gathered them--either directly or indirectly--from prominent attorneys involved in the affairs (including one who had been a Vice Governor General), a former Chief of the Philippine Constabulary, and a former American cabinet officer. The story included all the requisites for melodrama: the seduction of a teen-age girl by a handsome older man in a position of authority, the invasion of the Palace at night by an outraged father--a professor at the national university--to apprehend the couple and force the Governor General at gun point to sign a statement that he would marry the girl (interestingly complicated by the fact that Harrison was still married to wife number two), and a Chief of the Constabulary who had tipped off the father because he himself had previously been cuckolded by Harrison. Wood's summary conclusion was pithy: "The Island is full of scandals concerning Burton, all of them reflecting upon his morality." Wood, Diary, June 1, 1921.

Although Wood and Forbes decided not to publicize these reprehensible activities by America's chief proconsul (wisely, it would seem, considering the ignominy which would have thereby accrued to the United States), the newspaper accounts of Harrison's marriage to the girl in the United States had been sufficiently lurid, melodramatic, and sarcastic. Forbes later confided to his Journal the details of Harrison's fourth marriage to a younger sister of wife number three. Journals, II, 509-10 (during a trip to Brazil in 1929).
leadership had been characterized by much immorality. 7

An unidentified Filipino General came to Malacanan on May 10 to declare that Harrison's life had been one of the greatest immorality. "This seems to be the general opinion," was Wood's comment at this early date, not even a week after their arrival. 8 Two prominent Filipino lawyers, former Attorney-General Araneta and Francisco Ortigas, accompanied by Supreme Court Justice E. Finley Johnson, called to talk of, among other things, Harrison's immoralities. "They were all of the opinion," Wood recorded, "that Harrison's moral character was very bad and that his effect on Filipinos has been to lower standards." 9

Quezon, for reasons that were quite obvious, was reluctant to criticize Harrison's conduct. During a long private conference with McCoy--solicited to obtain help against Wood and Forbes--Quezon was candid but uncritical:

Thought the Jones Bill had worked out well and would deplore any change in that or its preamble. He felt that Harrison had been effective because he had not only given them what they wanted but that he had deferred to Filipino leaders asking their advice not only on administrative and legislative matters but above all on questions of patronages [sic] and personnel. He felt that there would be serious difficulties in the future if any Gov. General attempted to govern without deferring to the Filipino leaders, or at least working with them in a friendly and sympathetic spirit. 10

At a previous social function (a dinner honoring the Mission at Quezon's

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7Wood, Diary, May 10, 1921.
8Ibid.
9Ibid., June 12, 1921. Apparently at least partly as a result of this interview, Wood made this macabre notation: "It appears, from the statements of all concerned, that some of the private rooms at Bilibid [the national prison housed in a grim old Spanish structure in down-town Manila] were supposed to have been used as a rendezvous by Harrison." Ibid.
10"Record of conversation with Mr. Manuel Quezon, President of the Senate, about July 5th," in the McCoy Papers, Box 28. This is a six-page
residence), Wood was seated next to Quezon and had succeeded in obtaining from him during the course of a long talk a reluctant admission: "...

[Harrison's] flagrant immorality and neglect he did not deny."¹¹

But quite in contrast were Quezon's effusively laudatory comments to Harrison in private letters. Writing a letter of appreciation on his last day as Governor General, Quezon had termed theirs to have been "the happiest association I ever had in my life," although this was "certainly a very sad day for me." Quezon declared that he had supported Harrison for the Governor Generalship because, "knowing your ideals and principles, I felt that you were the man that would meet the wishes and hopes of my people," and he declared "that the reality--your doings and achievements--has surpassed my expectations." Because of this, "The whole Filipino people will see your departure with grief in their hearts because of your devotion to their welfare and freedom." As for himself, Quezon felt that only a few words were necessary: "I love you and admire you."¹²

Some months later, as the Mission neared the completion of their work, Quezon again wrote to Harrison, assuring him that the Filipinos were still his friends, although "Those that were against you are more than ever before against you, because they think that they can win the good will of Wood and Forbes by their attitude toward you." But he quickly explained that "the people--Lincoln's people--are Harrison's friend for ever." And in concluding

single-spaced typewritten document without any signature but with the above heading and with the initials "F.R.M." typed at the end. It seems to be the original and only copy of a personal memorandum probably typed by McCoy himself (the typing is rather poor in quality).

¹¹Wood, Diary, June 4, 1921.

¹²Letter, Quezon to Harrison, Manila, March 4, 1921, in the Harrison Papers, Box 44. This was written in Quezon's own hand on the stationery of the SENADO DE FILIPINAS, MANILA.
this very lengthy letter, Quezon sought once again to reassure his compadre:

I want you to know that I have not chained [sic] a bitt [sic]. I am your friend until death. I am with you as against the world. You have served my people unselfishly [sic], devotedly and everyone of us should be eternally grateful to you—at least I am so grateful that I don’t feel that I can ever do anything which will repay what you have done for us, even in a small degree...  

But from the more stable and less volatile Osmena, there were no such effusive outpourings and little reluctance to express his frank opinions to the Mission concerning Harrison. "He has the poorest opinion of Harrison," Forbes noted after a final conference with Osmena, "thinks he's been a very poor friend of the Filipino, despite his professions. He told me very ghastly stories of his way of doing things, particularly as to how the rascal Concepcion came to be made President of the Philippine National Bank." They talked of Harrison's "very bad reputation in sex matters," and Osmena declared that he had wanted adultery changed from a crime to a misdemeanor. After a law had been prepared, Harrison "went to Osmena and told him if he would see that measure became law [Osmena was Speaker of the House] he could have his choice of any man for the appointment of President of the Philippine National Bank. Osmena got up and walked away."  

To his family and friends Wood freely wrote brutally candid comments concerning Harrison, despite warnings that the Philippine mails were not secure.  

Writing to Bishop Brent only a few days after their arrival, Wood

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13 Letter, Quezon to Harrison, no date, Vancouver, British Columbia, in the Harrison Papers, Box 44. Written in Quezon's own hand on the stationery of the Canadian Pacific Railway Hotel System, C.P.R. Hotel Vancouver; eighteen pages in length and difficult to read in places. Although it was not dated, Quezon's known movements (he was returning from a hurried trip to Washington to see Harding during the Mission's stay in the Islands) would place it early in September, 1921.  

14 Forbes, Journals, II, 166.  

15 In Japan, State Department, Army, and Navy officers "were all
was moderate in his words of appraisal:

What is evident everywhere . . . is the lack of leadership. I feel that I am not unfair is saying that whatever the present condition is in the way of failure to measure up to standards, that lack of real leadership on the part of the Governor has been as much responsible as anything done--or not done--by the Filipino people.

Real leadership depends upon respect for and confidence in the leader, and I fear there was much to be desired in this direction.16

But in another letter to Brent less than a month later, Wood declared that conditions were such as to cause "not only deep regret but a sense of shame. There has been a lack of leadership here (in the right direction) and, unless all reports are to the contrary, conditions of immorality in high office which are appalling." Thus "the best and strongest kind of leadership" was now required "to put affairs back on the road of Progress and Decency." Not only had Harrison abdicated his power and transferred much of it "to unworthy and unskilled hands," but he had "left a personal record . . . which has lowered the standing of Americans in the eyes of the Philippines, and which brings to us all a feeling of deep humiliation."17

Two days later Wood wrote William Howard Taft that one of his succes-

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17 Copy of a letter, Wood to Brent, Manila, June 9, 1921. Wood Papers, Box 155. Wood corrected and initialed this carbon copy and marked it confidential.
sors in Malacanan Palace had left behind "a most unsavory reputation, one which makes every worthy American blush with shame." And to Mrs. Whitelaw Reid on the same day Wood further explained Harrison's derelictions: "Blatant and unabashed immorality is bad enough in every-day public life, but it is infinitely worse in a position of responsibility among dependent people, especially an Oriental people who have been looking to us for upright, decent, effective leadership."

While the Mission rested over the long fourth of July weekend, Wood got off three letters which expressed his mounting indignation. "The late Governor has left a stench in the East which will endure for a long time," he wrote to Henry L. Stimson. "American prestige has been greatly lowered," "I do not think it would be unfair to characterize Harrison's administration as immoral and incompetent," Wood continued. "There was a surrender of authority to incompetent people, who exercised it apparently without observation or restraint. The mis-management passes belief." "Confidentially speaking," Wood declared to Colonel William Cooper Procter, "Harrison's administration will forever be a smudge on America's fair name. Immoral, incompetent, neglectful--are words which could be well and justly applied."

"Nothing could have been much worse than the Harrison administration,"

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18 Copy of a letter, Wood to Taft, Manila, June 11, 1921. Wood Papers, Box 158. Initialed by Wood and marked PERSONAL ... CONFIDENTIAL at the top.

19 Copy of a letter, Wood to Mrs. Whitelaw (Elizabeth M.) Reid of New York, dated June 11, 1921. Wood Papers, Box 157. This carbon copy was initialed by Wood and marked confidential.


Wood wrote to his wife. "He must have been, in some particulars, almost a degenerate, and I do not think has the respect of any American, and of very few Filipinos, and of none of those who really knew him." A few days later he indignantly wrote his wife that "conditions in many ways are much worse than we expected to find them," and that Harrison's administration would "stand as one of the most immoral known to history. He seems to me to have been a pure degenerate."  

"The late Governor General, between ourselves," Wood declared to Mrs. Theodore Roosevelt as the Mission's work neared completion, "has, as I see it, been a discredit to our country. He has lowered American standards, debauched American ideals and lowered our standing in the Orient."  

In marked contrast, Forbes engaged in no written denunciation of his successor in Malacanan Palace, much as he might have been tempted by righteous indignation. "In the course of my travels I made it a point not to ask questions about Governor General Harrison and his conduct," Forbes recorded, "as I wanted in appearance as well as in fact an investigation, not of Harrison's inefficiencies or misdeeds, but of the working of the government." He did, however, inquire how often Harrison had visited each place; and some provinces had not been visited even once during Harrison's eight years in office.  

Specifically, Harrison had never set foot on the island of Samar even

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22 Copy of a letter, Wood to his wife (Lou), Manila, July 5, 1921. Wood Papers, Box 192. Wood repeated this identical statement to his daughter Luisita. See a carbon copy of an undated letter in the Wood Papers, Box 158.  


though it was the third largest in the Archipelago; Forbes was the last Governor General to visit the important city of Naga, Camarines Sur; and Harrison had only gone through Camarines Sur Province by train without stopping. In addition, he had visited many provinces only once, and then not to make a thorough inspection, "apparently not conceiving it to be his duty to go about on inspections." "I suppose his idea of governing was to let them have their own untrammelled way," was Forbes conclusion. 26

Forbes was apparently particularly interested in Harrison's neglect of the mountain Pagans of northern Luzon, for whom Forbes had developed such a fondness. Disliking these primitive peoples, Harrison had visited the Igorots only once—in 1914, early in his administration—and then he washed with carabolic soap as soon as possible after shaking hands with any of them. Forbes's comment was malicious: "Quite close to godliness!" 27

As the Mission's work continued and it became perfectly obvious that this was to be no routine junket making a perfunctory inspection of Philippine conditions, the chief of the politicos became increasingly concerned over the case which would be developed against him personally. "I am under the impression that Mr. Quezon is very much worried over the situation and the possible outcome of the Mission's investigation," Wood noted after a dinner given by Quezon in the Mission's honor on June 4. "He told me that he was going to the United States in July and probably come back in August or early September, as he was broken-down and worn out." 28

26 Ibid., pp. 91-92, 99, 249. Quote from p. 92.
27 Ibid., pp. 77-78.
28 Wood, Diary, June 4, 1921.
As the Mission's work progressed, Forbes found Quezon "particularly upset and I had two long talks with him. He is rushing to the United States for a rest." The wild rumors that were being circulated had him "all up in the air." "He had nothing and has suddenly become very rich," Forbes explained. "Gambles heavily, winning and losing tens of thousands of dollars in a night; he is noted for his wildly immoral habits and admits his short-comings with charming frankness that is most disarming but claims to have done no governmental improprieties." Some of his financial transactions Forbes labeled as "of an undesirable nature, but hardly jailable and yet we are only just on the track of the beginnings of some huge frauds in connection with the wild waste of government money." But he freely admitted that none of them showed any "direct line" to Quezon. 29

A few days later Forbes had another "very interesting session with Quezon," whom he found "in a state of great nervousness and excitement," and "the storm center of a world of rumors." Having heard many of these, Forbes commented that "they are such that you can believe what you please." However, Quezon was president of the state-owned railway system, a known violent gambler and lavish spender, and had "just constructed himself a very splendid new house in a fashionable quarter."

A certain Francisco Ortigas had told the Mission how Quezon operated on the bare edge of legality; he had paid "P100,000 for interest in a deal, after all the risk was over, his share being P260,000." Those involved had felt it "advisable to let him in because of the harm he could do them."
Although "not necessarily unlawful," Forbes labeled it "not good ethics."

Apparently Forbes did not accept some rumors but he did record them: "Anyway he is rumored to have sent P2,000,000 to Barcelona, to have been on

29 Forbes, Journals, II, 104.
the verge of being arrested, of having been refused a passport and of having committed crimes and indiscretions too numerous to mention." Regardless of the truth of these rumors, Quezon "was played out and proposed to go to America 'for a rest,' hoping to get back before we left."

After Quezon's departure from Malacanan, Forbes recorded his thoughts on this clever and ambitious politico whom he had come to know so well:

He is a curious man. His frankness is very engaging and disarming; but he is utterly without principle and loyalty to anything but himself. He is unscrupulous enough to still try to get positions for rascals who have helped him in the past in his amours. At least I learned that he was trying to make such a rascal President of Calapan; and I put a spoke in that wheel. He objected to a certain member of the Supreme Court, an American, because of his having led an immoral life [he was reported to have a querida by whom he had had children], saying "I am not a clean man myself, but I want the judges of the Supreme Court to be clean men and this man is not fit for the position." How about him being fit himself to be President of the Philippine Senate?"30

Although Wood and Forbes rarely recorded the sources and details of the stories they heard about Quezon's questionable activities, on at least one occasion such matters did become a part of their records. When former Attorney-General Araneta and Manila attorney Francisco Ortigas, accompanied by Justice Johnson of the Supreme Court, called on the Mission at Malacanan several comments were made concerning Quezon's "grafting propensities," and on his "railroad excursions and the shameless immorality of them; of the large number of women carried on such trips and the very great cost to the Government."31

Early in July an obviously increasingly desperate Quezon sought out the Mission's chief of staff, Colonel McCoy, for help against the Commissioners, 30, Quezon feared, had not understood him and his personal life as they

30 Ibid., pp. 107-09.
31 Wood, Diary, June 12, 1921.
should. Saying that he wished to talk business, Quezon took McCoy for a
drive to his little country residence near Santa Mesa. "On the way out, he
spoke about his coming trip to America and the absurd remarks that were fly-
ing about concerning it, and remarked that he naturally was very much
concerned about the future policy of the new administration. . . ." After
arriving at the house, Quezon continued the conversation on a variety of sub-
jects, apparently for some length of time judging from the extensive notes
later made by McCoy.

Quezon "talked about the general abilities of Filipinos for filling
the higher positions and held that it was simply a question of selecting the
right man. He felt that most of cabinet officers were up to their jobs. . . ."
Then he turned to a consideration of the most important of these politicians,
Manuel Luis Quezon:

"Now as for myself" he said, "General Wood knows me and so does Gov.
Forbes and I am not afraid of the charges that are made against me. They can
say anything they damn please. I would like to talk over some of these per-
sonal charges made against me when I was fiscal [prosecuting attorney] in
Mindoro. They are always being brought up against me and they have injured
my reputation very decidedly amongst the American officials." He then went
into the details of the unsavory charges and discussed them very frankly and
in substance they were done when he was young and vigorous and full of the
"old nick," and none of them were things that he was taught, in Spanish times,
to regard as unusual for a man of his age and position to do. They were
cause for no remark and would not have affected [sic] his career under the
Spanish regime, and whose morals and habits he had been brought up in [all
sic], and besides they had been investigated by American officials and he
had been personally raked over the coals by Gov. Ide. Justice Ross was pres-
ent at the time and that, after giving him a good talking to, Gov. Ide had
dismissed him with the remark "Keep your trousers buttoned and sin no more."
Remarked that the younger generation under Americans [sic] ideals and by
American teachers had a very different point of view than he and the older
men and felt that the ideals and morals of the newer generation should [sic]
be much better. Since that time, he had been more careful and, although he
did not pose as being pure himself in his sexual relations, he had never
since, either in Washington, Manila, or anywhere else, taken women into his
own house, and had a regard for appearances.

As far as the Americans were concerned, he felt they were in a posi-
tion to set an example and should be on a good deal higher plane and that
he had respect for most of the high American business men and officials he
had known and was particularly desirous for the good of his country that
they should be kept on the highest plane, particularly those appointed to
the Supreme Court. Once more he mentioned [Philippine Supreme Court Justice George A.] Malcom [sic] and hoped he would not be permitted to come back to the islands on account of his immorality.32

With the extravagant rumors and reports so rife concerning both Harrison and Quezon, it is an amazing fact—but apparently a fact—that Osmena, the third member of the triumvirate that had ruled the Philippines for years, was seemingly completely above scandalous rumor and report. In a private letter to Harrison, Quezon did bring some accusations against Osmena, but they were in the nature of charges that an ambitious politician would hurl against a dangerous rival:

My relations with the Speaker have not improved; rather are getting worse. He is the same ambitious man who wants to rule and to have everything in his own way. You and I are responsible for this to a certain extent. This situation between the Speaker and myself increases the difficulty of the future relationship between the Governor General and ourselves. Wood may find it convenient to play one of us against the other and this I have to avoid if it will result in injury to our country's interests, no matter what may cost [sic] me personally.33

Apparently the Mission received no specific charges against Harrison, Quezon, or Osmena from a person whom they might have supposed would be eager to talk: the first president of the short-lived Philippine Republic at Malolos, General Emilio Aguinaldo, Forbes's particular long-standing friend and a potential candidate for chief political honors in an independent Philippines. They found him cautious in his statements, although he declared that the government had been expensively run with great waste. But Wood concluded that the General was not completely lacking in ideas for the future:

32"Record of conversation with Mr. Manuel Quezon, President of the Senate, about July 5th," in the McCoy Papers, Box 28.

33Letter, Quezon to Harrison, no date, Vancouver, British Columbia. Harrison Papers, Box 44.
"He is very much against the present outfit—I mean the two or three men who have been running the government, and I think that if we were out of the Islands that he and his old generals would soon get rid of some of the politicians who have been running the government."\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{34}Wood, Diary, May 30, 1921.
CHAPTER X

POLITICAL REALITIES: PARTIES AND ELECTIONS

Unfortunately Aristotle did not have the Filipinos to cite as an indisputable example for his famous dictum "that man is by nature a political animal." In a society which offered men of ability both fame and fortune through political careers with more certainty than in any other activity, it was inevitable that the talented, and sometimes even the brilliant, were active in the political arena. That Wood and Forbes were interested in the political manifestations of the Filipino character should not have been surprising; that they could have found it possible to ignore such omnipresent and pervasive activities would have been incredible.

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From external, superficial appearances it might have appeared to men less familiar with Philippine affairs than Wood and Forbes that the Islands supported a genuinely democratic, two party political system with an active opposition and toleration for political minorities. Thus in different places the Mission observed incidents which would appear to prove such a contention: throughout Cavite Province large numbers of the opposition Democrata Party greeted the Mission with banners condemning the government of the Nacionalista Party;¹ Lipa, Batangas Province, later provided the same sort of demonstration;² at Cebu the Democratas were present in large numbers to arraign their political opponents in severe terms,³ while in the

¹Associated Press dispatch, San Francisco Chronicle, June 10, 1921.
²Manila Times, June 15, 1921.
³Ibid., July 9, 1921; New York Times, July 13, 1921. An abbreviated
customary parade the Democrats sponsored a float with the inscription, "Down with Osmeñaism—Swat 'Em Hard";\textsuperscript{4} and in a similar parade at Siquijor, the principal city on Siquijor Island, the Democrata float bore the inscription, "We want independence. We are confident we can correct faults of the present administration."\textsuperscript{5} But the apparent vigor of a tolerated opposition party was perhaps best demonstrated by the severe charges against the Partido Nacionalista in the Democrata's formal memorial submitted to the Mission.\textsuperscript{6}

Yet that toleration of political opposition was not always present was dramatically demonstrated in an instance of serious repression of the Democrata's freedom of speech by the dominant Nacionalistas at Dasmarias, Cavite Province. When the Nacionalistas, who controlled the Municipal Council, had learned that the Democrats planned to carry a banner denouncing them in the welcoming parade, the Council adopted a resolution forbidding the carrying of banners judged to be detrimental to the national cause and threatened jail sentences for all violators. The Municipal President, a Democrata, had vetoed the action but it was repassed over his veto.

When the Democrats placed the matter before Wood, the Nacionalistas explained simply that they had feared violence if the banner were carried. But an unimpressed Wood declared that this violated the people's liberty of expression and that he would report it to the Governor General and to the President. The offending banner, which Wood kept, asked, among other things, version of this dispatch also appeared in the San Francisco Chronicle, July 12, 1921.

\textsuperscript{4}Manila Times, July 10, 1921.

\textsuperscript{5}San Francisco Chronicle, July 15, 1921.

\textsuperscript{6}RESOLUCION ADOPTADA POR EL DIRECTORIO GENERAL DEL PARTIDO DEMOCRATA, EN SU SESION EXTRAORDINARIA CELEBRADA EN LA CIUDAD DE MANILA, I.F., EL 7 DE SEPTIEMBRE DE 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.
for "elections to be altered for the better," for election frauds to be "investigated closely," and then concluded with a simple declaration: "We are tired of the Nacionalista administration." 7

Wood labeled this "an interesting and, I think, a rather typical situation," and "a dangerous indication of lack of respect for the popular will, and the desire of the people to express themselves freely." Forbes was enigmatically cryptic: "It was rather an amusing example of their ideas of freedom." 8

The Mission also discovered that in Bataan Province the Nacionalistas had "set up a mild form of terrorism . . . [making] it hard . . . to find real critics who will speak out in a meeting." 9 And at Cebu the Commissioners were informed that the Nacionalistas's toleration of political opposition was only a sham demonstration for their benefit, that forcible repression would otherwise have been used. Having noted certain signs carried by Democratas in the customary parade (such as "Down with Osменaism--Swat 'Em Hard!" 10), Wood inquired of a local judge (an American of German descent named Wislezenus, who had been in the Islands for fourteen years) concerning the spirit of political tolerance. "He said that if the Americans were not here that no doubt whoever had presented himself at the meeting with an anti-Osменa transparency . . . would have been floating dead in the bay before this." For Wood, "this statement expressed, as fully as anyone could,

7 Associated Press dispatch, San Francisco Chronicle, Los Angeles Times, June 10, 1921; Manila Times, October 15, 1921. The quotations are from the latter source.

8 Wood, Diary, June 8, 1921; Forbes, Journals, II, 88.

9 "Special Cable" date-lined Manila, June 19, San Francisco Chronicle and Los Angeles Times, June 20, 1921, by Philip Kinsley.

10 Manila Times, July 10, 1921.
the tremendous political peonage under which these people live and the power and influence of the political casique [sic]."  

In some areas such vexatious problems for the Nacionalistas were conveniently eliminated by the complete absence of organized political opposition. For example, the municipal government of Laoag, Ilocos Norte, made somewhat suspect its commendable claim that the local citizens were submissive to the political regime in power and exercised their political rights and duties as citizens in a spirit of complete harmony and cooperation by explaining that the "Gran Partido Nacionalista" was their only political party.  

In a long interview granted to Philip Kinsley on July 10, Quezon admitted that two strong political parties did not then exist and held out no hope for their emergence until a definite understanding had been reached on independence. "With this question out of the way, time will develop two strong parties here," he predicted.  

The apparent overwhelming dominance of El Gran Partido Nacionalista was convincingly confirmed by extensive data on the principal office holders. Only one Democrata and another Independent marred the perfect Nacionalista hold on the twenty-four man upper house, while of the eighty-six representatives eighty-four were Nacionalistas. Of the thirty-nine provincial governors on whom information was presented, but a single Democrata was

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11 Wood, Diary, July 8, 1921.  
12 Breve Relacion del Estado Politico, Economico, Sanitacion, Obras Publicas, Agricultura, Hacienda e Instruccion Habido en el Municipio de Laoag, Ilocos Norte, Islas Filipinas durante El Periodo de Mas de Ocho Anos, o Sea desde el Ano 1913 Hasta el 30 de Abril de 1921. Signed by the Municipal President. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.  
13 New York Times, July 10, 1921. This interview was also published in the San Francisco Chronicle and the Los Angeles Times, July 11, 1921.
Far from being restricted to their own observations, the Mission was generously assisted by Americans in appraising the political scene. Many were reluctant to present their opinions publicly (usually claiming—if they bothered to explain—fear of economic reprisals), prefacing their statements with elaborate requests for guarantees of secrecy. But a few Americans had the courage—or else were invulnerable to economic reprisals—publicly to state their views.

"Power has fallen into the hands of a small group of men who have stifled the opposition and created an unhealthy oligarchy," Kinsley cabled to America on June 10; and a few days later he explained that the políticos so thoroughly controlled the people that they were often afraid to speak. "This the mission considers to be discouraging," he added, "not being regarded as a sign of the peoples' ability to run a free government. . . ." On July 4 he cabled that the Mission now considered one of America's major problems to be "how to protect the masses from their own political bosses and [to?] lead them to the point of civil intelligence and ability to fight for their own rights."16

Speaking to the American Chamber of Commerce on July 13, H. B. Pond, its vice president and the general manager of the Pacific Commercial Com-


15 As quoted in a cablegram, Resident Commissioner De Veyre to Quezon, Washington, D.C., June 25, 1921. BIA, W-F Mission File.

16 Los Angeles Times, July 5, 1921.
pany, commented on the basic causes for the poor business outlook in the Islands. "The present [political] uncertainty results in endless discussion, in too much politics and too little economics in Government, and in a political system which prevents the development of political parties and policies on questions involving the economic welfare of the people," was his analysis. 17 The later views of the Chamber's president, Captain H. L. Heath, as formally approved by the Board of Directors, were even stronger: "... a great country full of possibilities lies dormant under the heel of a political oligarchy." 18

Although American military officers honored their code of ethics by refraining from public statements on politics, they were not at all reluctant in their classified documents. "About half even of the adults are wholly illiterate human animals with uncultivated minds and limited vision; not bad in general, but dim of intelligence and wholly unable to comprehend even the simple problems of government," was the unflattering appraisal of Major General F. J. Kernan, commanding the Philippine Department. Because "the average capacity and fitness for self-government is so low as to render the masses helpless as against those who shall hold over them the powers of government," he felt that "it would manifestly be a crime against humanity to withdraw our protecting supervision and leave these simple people a prey to the small oligarchy now in power and certain to perpetuate that power indefinitely." 19

17 Manila Times, July 14, 1921.

18 New York Times, September 13, 1921. The entire article from which this quotation is taken may be seen in Capt. H. L. Heath, "The Territory of Malaya," American Chamber of Commerce Journal, I (September, 1921), 7-8.

19 "MEMORANDUM for Major General Leonard Wood, U. S. Army. Subject: The Political and Military Relations of the Philippine Islands to the United
The comments of Colonel C. D. Rhodes, Kernan's Chief of Staff, were similar: "With such dense ignorance and with a yawning gulf between the upper and the lower strata of voting males, there can be small wonder that there results in some degree an involuntary form of political and industrial servitude which has come down through the centuries as the heritage from a tribal feudal system." Equally unflattering were the remarks by another member of Kernan's staff, Major John P. Smith.

In his lengthy confidential memorandum, Associate Justice Thomas A. Street of the Philippine Supreme Court asserted that history revealed one absolutely essential condition for the existence of a republican and democratic government, "an intelligent populace informed by a sound and effective public opinion." But even if one ransacked the Islands from end to end, "not one vestige will be found ... of an instructed public opinion adequate to fulfill the conditions ... essential to the perpetuation of self-government," he declared. "On the contrary, you find an ignorant, inflammable and volatile mass, exactly suited to the uses of the politician, but wholly incapable of holding the excesses of the leaders in check."

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20 Paper, OUR PRESENT AND FUTURE POLICY IN THE PHILIPPINES, by Colonel C. D. Rhodes, General Staff, Chief of Staff, Headquarters Philippine Department, Manila, P.I., April 20, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits. Underlined for emphasis in the original typescript.

21 STATISTICAL DATA ON THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS AND A GENERAL STUDY OF ISSUES AFFECTING THE FUTURE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE PHILIPPINES FROM THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW. Smith was Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

22 Undated memorandum, Thomas A. Street to the Wood-Forbes Mission. Marked "Confidential 2nd copy" and signed by Street. BIA, F-F Report Exhibits.
From among the whole range of Filipino political manifestations, Wood and Forbes seemed particularly concerned with the very heart of any democratic system, the electoral process. And in this investigation they were generously supplied with information.

One of the more common complaints received by the Mission concerned election frauds. At Taaludin, Ilocos Sur, a speaker named Agustin Madrid severely attacked the government for allowing dishonest elections, including tampering with ballots.23 Both Wood in Pampanga and Forbes in Bulacan received many such complaints, Forbes noting that complaints of election frauds were general throughout this province.24

At Cebu one Demócrata speaker declared that elections were corrupt, that no member of his party had a chance of winning, and that when evidence of corruption was presented the prosecuting attorney, a Nacionalista, always refused to lay such information before the court.25 At Catbalogan, Samar, Eduardo Feito, a former Governor of Samar, declared that electoral frauds existed and that the guilty were not punished. "He cited his own case in which his claim for a seat in the Assembly was decided four years later, on the last day of the session."26 Other charges of election frauds were made at Lipa, Batangas, at Sibulan, Oriental Negros, and at several places in

24 Associated Press dispatch, San Francisco Chronicle, June 9, 1921; Manila Times, June 7, 1921; Forbes, Journals, II, 236.
Sorsogon Province. In fact, in summarizing the Mission's work, Forbes stated that the most frequent complaint heard in hundreds of private interviews was the improper conduct of elections.  

The lengthy memorial submitted by the Democratas was filled with charges of Nacionalista malefeasance, including election frauds. But that this was a minority report is apparent from the results of a questionnaire sent to every twentieth Filipino among the 3667 who had paid income taxes for 1920. Of the forty-one who responded to the question, "Are the elections conducted honestly and fairly?" twenty-three replied affirmatively and eighteen negatively.  

Surely of particular value were the comments on the electoral system by two Filipinos with some reasonable claim to authoritativeness: Professor H. L. Noble, who held the Chair of Jurisprudence in the College of Law, University of the Philippines, and Patricio Fernandez, a young graduate of this law college who claimed to have extensively observed the conduct of elections.  

To Noble there were fundamental defects in the way the electoral law had been implemented, particularly the marking of ballots and the usual delays in settling disputed elections. Because ballots were blank, fraud was easily committed when election officials wrote in the names for the 

27 Manila Times, June 14, 15, 1921; San Francisco Chronicle, July 15, 1921; Forbes, Journals, II, 260.  
28 Ibid., p. 216.  
29 RESOLUCION ADOPTADA POR EL DIRECTORIO GENERAL DEL PARTIDO DEMOCRATA, EN SU SESION EXTRAORDINARIA CELEBRADA EN LA CIUDAD DE MANILA, I.F., EL 7 DE SEPTIEMBRE DE 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.  
seventy-five percent of illiterate voters. And many disputed election cases were not finally settled until the contested candidate had already completed his term of office.  

Fernandez supplied a letter explaining an accompanying memorandum which described some of the common ways of committing election frauds, together with possible remedies. Asserting that most Filipinos held the election law to be defective, he promised that "Any reform that will remedy the chaotic [election] conditions . . . will be greatly appreciated and applauded by the community in general."  

His lengthy memorandum concluded with some exceedingly harsh words: "About 85 percent of the members of the Philippine Congress and members of the Provincial boards in the Philippines are elected by means of fraud, and not by the vote of the electorate." Yet he was confident that the United States would "step in and put a stop to this shameful practice."  

In contrast with the abundance of material on elections provided by Filipinos, American contributions were meager. Kinsley was concise and specific: "The ballot is far from pure and election frauds are general."  

Although the American Army officers were unaccountably restrained in

31 Notes made on the opinions of Prof. H. L. Noble regarding Philippine elections, Manila, June 15, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.  
33 Memorandum on election frauds in the Philippines, undated, by Patricio Fernandez. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.  
34 From a cabled dispatch by Kinsley dated June 10 as quoted in a cablegram, De Veyra to Quezon, Washington, D.C., June 25, 1921. BIA, W-F Mission File.
volume, they compensated somewhat by their virulence. General Kernan was convinced that the level of knowledge was so low among the great majority "as to make the ballot, as a weapon of self-defense, or an instrument whereby the individual can effectively participate in his government, a mere farce."\(^{35}\)

"That bribery and corruption have existed must be recognized by all who are familiar with the workings of the political machine," declared Colonel Rhodes. "The records of the Philippine courts and the decisions of the Supreme Bench left no doubt as to the character of various election frauds," which convinced him that the existing electoral system was failing to "express the judgment of the masses of the people."\(^{36}\)

But far more damaging to the Filipino cause was a document which Rhodes had secured for the Mission, an excerpt from a circular relating to election frauds which had been sent by the Executive Bureau to provincial and municipal officials on January 11, 1919. Its words were a harsh commentary on the viability of democracy in the Philippines:

The records of this office and the several cases decided by the Supreme Court of these Islands speak loud of the contemptible role played by various election inspectors in connivance with some corrupt voters in the last general and senatorial elections. These records and cases show that not only were legal voters prevented from voting but that, in some instances, legal ballots were tampered with and destroyed after they had been cast, to such an extent that it was impossible to determine from the returns the sovereign will of the people.\(^{37}\)


\(^{36}\)\textit{Memorandum, Rhodes to McCoy, Manila, July 13, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.}

\(^{37}\)\textit{BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.}
"There has always been fraud in connection with elections in the Philippine Islands," Worcester declared in his lengthy letter, "but the situation has grown rapidly worse with the extension of greater autonomy and with filipinization of the government service." In fact, these had become "so bare-faced and rank" that after the Republican victory in 1920 the politicos, fearing a searching investigation, made "a determined effort . . . to get rid of government records deemed to be undesirable under changed conditions."

Because the Intendencia, or city hall, had contained "a fairly comprehensive record of shocking election frauds," he was convinced "that this building was deliberately set on fire [twice before it was effectively destroyed], with a view to the destruction of these and other damaging records. . . ." First, "certain important records" had disappeared, "but this was discovered and caused so much talk as to lead to the employment of more effective measures upon a larger scale."

At this point Worcester apparently became so distraught that he broke off his orderly line of development and inserted an emphatic conclusion before having reached even the half-way point in his paper: "PHILIPPINE SELF-GOVERNMENT A FARCE." 38

For his "well-considered opinion" and for official information and statistics on the election system, the Mission wrote a searching letter to Yeater, the heart of which follows:

Have these elections, and particularly the last general election, been generally fair and free and held under the provisions of the law, and, in particular, how many contested cases were reported... What was the procedure in these cases? How many of these contested cases were decided by the courts and what was the average period of time? How many were nullified by the courts for fraudulent practices? In this last general election, how many candidates of the Partida Nacionalista were elected; how many of the Partida Demócrata; and how many of other parties? In those instances where elections were nullified by the courts for fraudulent practices, have there been any candidates, whose cases were nullified by the courts, appointed or reappointed by executive action, if so, to what parties did they belong? 39

Yester promptly referred this letter to Quintin Paredes, the Secretary of Justice, for action. 40 In reply, Paredes enclosed data available in his office and indicated that some of these questions could best be answered by the Department of the Interior. The Nacionalista bureaucrats there, however, apparently thought it wiser to neglect the compilation of this sort of material; at least, it never became part of the Mission's official exhibits.

Table I from Paredes contained data on the conduct of provincial elections from 1916 to 1921. For the entire period the totals were:

Total number of complaints filed: 669
Total number of persons accused: 1204
Total number of persons convicted: 135
Total number of persons acquitted: 245
Total number of persons dismissed: 474
Total number of persons awaiting trial: 350.

Table III contained summary information on provincial and municipal


40 Letter, Yeater to Paredes, Manila, June 3, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.
election contest cases from the Courts of First Instance for the elections of 1916 and 1919. The grand totals for all provinces for these elections were:

Total number of provincial and municipal cases: 639
Total number of cases dismissed: 413
Total number of cases pending: 6
Total number of cases sustained: 87
Total number of cases declared null: 50.41

In a preliminary summary of their report, the Mission cabled their opinion that Philippine elections were "in the main honest and that the party in power represents the will of the majority of the voters." Although admitting that elections had been orderly and that the minority had usually submitted to the results, they had found "widespread dissatisfaction" with the election law and the handling of contested elections. Frequent charges of fraud had been heard and assertions that there was no certainty of obtaining court decisions on disputed elections within a reasonable time.42

In their final report to Harding, Wood and Forbes indicated the importance which they attached to the functioning of the electoral process both by their measured statements and by the comparatively generous amount of space devoted to this topic, which they described as an "important and fun-

41Letter, Paredes to Yeater, Manila, June 10, 1921, together with three enclosures. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits. Some of this information was accurately reported by the Manila Times, June 19, 1921. Table II covered provincial and municipal contested election cases filed in the Courts of First Instance after the elections of 1916 and 1919.

42Cable No. 861 from Acting Governor General Yeater to Secretary of War Weeks, Manila, September 11, 1921. BIA, W-F Mission File.
damental function of a representative government." Their severe comments, although restrained and fair, undoubtedly caused distress among the politicos.

Taking the general election of June, 1919, as the best example for their study, they made these conclusions:

Interest in the elections was widespread and election day passed without any serious disturbance. There was a general, quiet acceptance by the minority of the results of the popular vote, although the executive bureau was deluged with complaints. The courts, since that time, have been loaded with fraudulent election cases, the legal action on which has been so slow that there are still 350 cases pending in the courts, and many terms of office will be served out by people who were either fraudulently elected or, in some cases, appointed by executive order to the vacancies, even though their claims to the office had been pronounced by the courts as fraudulent. These were caused not only by the local conditions . . . but by an election law which is undoubtedly defective in providing sufficient safeguards for the ballot and which should be thoroughly revised.

Under the present election law officers known as "inspectors of election" are required to prepare the ballot for illiterate voters. This is a fruitful source of frauds. The election machinery is practically in the hands of the dominant parties and the inspectors of election are too often their tools.

In the provinces, "charges and countercharges of fraudulent practices have been widespread and intense," Wood and Forbes stated. But they hopefully added that such interest was "indicative of a certain development of public opinion which will, in the end, right the wrongs."

"It is surprising that the elections have been conducted as well as they have been," they generously declared, "in view of the fact that outside of the larger cities and principal towns the organization of society is very primitive and the people generally are unaware of their civil rights." Such social organization they described as "of a patriarchal form, characterized by a strong clan feeling and centuries of leadership by a few influential individuals known as 'caciques,' " to whom the people were generally subservient.43

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43 An earlier section of the Report had discussed "a serious lack of educated public opinion, for as yet the Philippine public is not a reading
What hope was there for the future? Wood and Forbes could see only a faint glimmer on the horizon: "The party in power is so intrenched that under the present election law it would be very difficult for the people to dislodge it if they wanted to change." 44

Public, and there is a lack of strong, independent press, although there has been a great advance in this respect during recent years, and there are several outstanding independent papers of great local influence." As the total circulation of all island papers was under 140,000, it was understandable that "in the remote Provinces people still depend upon the circulation of news by word of mouth." They were convinced that this "lack of a well-informed public opinion" explained why Filipinos were "easily swayed by their leaders." 45

44 Ibid., pp. 42-43.
CHAPTER XI

JUSTICE: VIABLE AND ABORTED

Any attempt to determine what specific area investigated by Wood and Forbes was considered of greatest importance by them would seem to be both futile and relatively unimportant. The administration of justice, however, was apparently deemed of such serious significance that they would have ranked few if any other subjects above it.

This interest should not have been unknown to any alert politico. Within a few days after their arrival and on numerous subsequent occasions, the Commissioners publicly expressed their concern with the condition of justice.

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At Cabagan, Isabela, on their first provincial investigating trip, Wood publicly stated his convictions. Labeling this phase of their work as both "important and interesting," he declared that justice "administered in a fair and impartial way, without reference to person is the bulwark of any people."1 At Laoag, Ilocos Norte, he told a large crowd that the impartial administration of justice was an essential prerequisite for any stable government.2 In Cavite Province he emphasized the importance of this civic virtue as a recurring theme in brief talks to the crowds, declaring that the poor should have the same standing as the rich in court and that all cases should be decided upon their merits without the influence of money or pol-

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Forbes was so impressed by what he considered Wood's eloquent remarks at Tacloban, Leyte, on June 21, that he recorded them:

Now we are particularly interested in the administration of justice. Unless you have a clean administration of justice you cannot have a stable government. If your courts recognize political influence, if the rich man has a better chance than the poor man, if the politician is more powerful than the man in private life, then you have not got good administration of justice; so we are looking very carefully into that; clean administration of justice is one of the guarantees of your safety, and we are giving that as much attention as we can. It is a very difficult problem.4

And at Lucena, Tayabas, on June 26, Forbes himself delivered a speech of which he was so proud that he made a record of it:

The question is whether the Philippine people are ready to be launched on the great sea of nationality. We must see that every plank in the ship of state is sound. It is very easy to be too critical and to want to find everything perfect. We find many things for instance that are being done badly; in other words this ship like every ship leaks somewhat. Our job is to make sure that the amount of water that comes in is not greater than the power of the pumps to pump it out. (Cheers). We have got to see whether these pumps are working. Perhaps the greatest pumps for freeing the ship from water are the courts, because they are the place where injustice is punished and rectified. We would be rendering a very poor service to the Philippine people if we should push them out to sea on a ship that was going to sink. . . .

The importance with which the Commissioners viewed this subject was also demonstrated by the appointment of a special attache (Major Alexander L. P. Johnson of the Forty-third Infantry) to aid in their examination of the judicial system.6

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3 Associated Press dispatch, Ibid., June 10, 1921.


5 Ibid., p. 270. Forbes used the basic elements of this speech on several later occasions.

6 Associated Press dispatch, Los Angeles Times, May 15, 1921.
As the mission moved from province to province, they encountered instances of injustice that stimulated entries—sometimes heated—in their records. "The administration of justice everywhere impresses one as unsatisfactory," Wood had concluded by June 17. "There is really no adequate protection of personal liberty or property." As the justices of the peace could have a man thrown into prison, and as some Courts of First Instance held only annual sessions, Wood explained that "unless a poor devil has friends and influence there he will lie until the court holds session. The chances are that there will be no witnesses against him and he will be released." Calling for more money to be spent on the administration of justice, Wood declared that it was "simply a travesty as at present conducted. A poor man has literally no chance, certainly none until he is finally brought to trial." 7

Such travesties on justice had already been discovered. At Tuguegarao, Cagayan, Wood had found several men in jail who had been awaiting trial for nearly two years, and two others (whom he named) who had been waiting for well over a year. The only explanation was that the Judge of the Court of First Instance, Francisco Dominguez, had been taking a vacation in Manila. "This is the most flagrant instance of gross neglect that I have found thus far," was Wood's indignant comment. 8 And a few days later in Abra Province, two men were found in the Bangued jail ("clean and orderly, but . . . in a bad state of repair") who had been imprisoned for fifteen months without a

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7 Wood, Diary, June 17, 1921. Later Wood referred to the justices of the peace as veritable kings because of their power. Ibid., June 18, 1921.

8 Ibid., May 21, 1921.
Albay Province was "literally seething, governor weak, justice of the peace courts and the court of first instance very unsatisfactory, justice late." At Malilipot, a young man named Belen "gave a very sad story of the improprieties of the local justice of the peace, a villainous looking bit of sleekness," who later pursued him with drawn revolver and threatened his life. Fleeing to Tabaco, Belen sought protection from the chief of police. Forbes, who was then in Tabaco, had them confront each other in his presence. Although the justice of the peace denied everything, Forbes was not convinced of his innocence:

... [he] has fourteen charges against him in the court; the trial took place in 1918 but no decision has yet been handed down; nor has he been suspended, and he has a license to carry a gun. He has a scoundrelly-looking face and seemed as though he might be all that Belen had told us. ... I was thoroughly disgusted with this man and had no patience with him at all. When he had the nerve to come to the party, I ordered him away and told him he could absent himself from our vicinity.

Although as the Mission's work progressed the word must surely have reached all parts of the Archipelago that they were particularly concerned over the administration of justice, there was little apparent improvement. For example, a report submitted by Bowditch on his inspection of Agusan Province on August 5, contained these statements:

Justice: I inspected the Chief of Police's office at Butuan. Books not filled out. One man in jail. All the evidences of poor administration. Inspected the Justice of the Peace office. Has been acting since March 14th. Is not a lawyer. The criminal dockets not written up. Three criminal cases pending, no civil cases pending.

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9 Ibid., May 26, 1921.
10 Forbes, Journals, II, 102, 269-70.
11 Reproduced in Ibid., p. 340.
In all parts of the Archipelago one of the distressingly common complaints by Filipinos concerned the cynical abuse of justice by their fellow countrymen. One speaker at Macabebe, Pampanga, for example, complained that justice was not being administered fairly and impartially. At Lipa, Batangas, two Democrata speakers severely criticized the administration of justice, claiming that it was impossible to obtain a fair trial in the courts; and one banner stated, "We want good judiciary not affected by politics."

But few Filipinos had the audacious temerity—or the foolhardiness—to make such complaints publicly. Of the hundreds of Filipinos who sought private interviews, Forbes summarized that of those whom he heard, "There were many complaints of failure of justice, particularly by the local justices of the peace."

Some who presented their complaints privately were obviously of minor importance with quite general charges on the inadequacies of justice. But others, such as an old chief named Madrona on the island of Romblon, had specific complaints, his involving the widow of a murdered man. Influential friends of the accused murderer had been able to prevent his coming to trial. The widow had made repeated trips to attend scheduled trials and testify only to be told of another postponement. As no expense monies were granted to the poor woman this had become a heavy burden for her. Although the chief had

12 Associated Press dispatch, San Francisco Chronicle, June 9, 1921. The town's name is spelled "Macabelon" which is apparently an error as no such town exists in this province.

13 Manila Times, June 15, 1921; Forbes, Journals, II, 244. Other general charges of this nature were made by Agustin Madrid at Tagudin, Ilocos Sur, and Ismael Tuanguin at Tayum, Abra. Ibid., pp. 224-25, 230. A banner at Dasmarias, Cavite, simply declared, "We want an independent judiciary." Manila Times, October 15, 1921.

14 Forbes, Journals, II, 216.
come secretly, the presence of the widow clearly indicated his intentions.
"Hardly had my steamer left Romblon," Forbes was later informed, "when this
man was arrested and thrown into prison on a trumped up charge." 15

Still other complaints were of more importance, such as when a Judge
of First Instance in Pangasinan Province "told a long story of legislative
interference with the operation of the Court, the local Senator having
secured the removal of one judge for having convicted his mother-in-law of
embezzlement; and he was summarily transferred." This was later confirmed
by the judge involved. 16

In addition to the lesser folk of the Islands, an impressive number of
prominent Filipinos sought out Wood and Forbes to protest against injustice
perpetrated by their fellow countrymen. Of the three Filipino Generals in
this category, one, whose name remained a blank space in Wood's records
(undoubtedly at his specific request), declared that no suit at law could be
won unless a Nacionalista lawyer were retained. General Alejandro, whom
Forbes described as "a very clear-headed, able-looking Filipino," stated that
there was no possibility of obtaining justice under the present system. And
General Aguinaldo, the most influential of all Filipino military leaders,
declared during a long talk with Wood "that justice has been permeated by
politics to a dangerous extent." 17

15 Ibid., p. 126. And at Oroquieta, Misamis, a certain A. N. Eneri
privately described for Forbes an instance of political influence being used
to thwart justice under law, while a fellow-townman, Pedro Abuton, also
privately complained about the generally unsatisfactory condition of justice.
See "Specimen Notes Taken Public Session [Oroquieta, Misamis, August 8, 1921]."
BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

16 Forbes, Journals, II, 69. This was probably Judge Nepumucena who
was referred to later by Forbes as having complained bitterly of interference
with the judiciary. Ibid., p. 219.

17 Wood, Diary, May 10, 30, 1921; Forbes, Journals, II, 234.
Justices Cayetano S. Arellano of the Philippine Supreme Court and Florentino Torres, who had recently retired because of age, had lunch with the Mission at Malacanán followed by a long talk. "I asked them, point blank," Wood recorded, "if they considered the Department of Justice was under the control of the political element to such an extent as to render insecure the protection of life, property, liberty and freedom of action within the law when political influences and interests were involved." They agreed that such was the situation and added "that the judges, especially those of the First Instance, were very much influenced by the political situation, in view of their uncertain tenure of office and the fact that their career was practically in the hands of those in active political life, especially the Senators."

They agreed that pardons were for sale, not necessarily for the payment of money but through political influence. And their comments on another touchy area were also disquieting:

Among other things which [they] . . . brought out as indicating the falling off in the efficiency of the Department of Justice and the lowering of the general tone was the fact that practically not a single case of sex crimes, such as rape, adultery, seduction, unlawful marriage, had been punished during the latter years of the Harrison regime; that the cases had either been quashed or that an immediate pardon had been forthcoming before the man had been put behind bars.

The Justices specifically referred to Quezon's influence in the corruption of the courts and the intimidation of the Justice Department. "Felipe Buencamino [Junior] . . . was mentioned to me," Wood noted, "and has also been mentioned to Forbes as the intermediary in most of these pardon negotiations, which, reports indicate, have become almost a matter of business."

"Their whole tone was very pessimistic," Wood observed, "yet they are the most respected and trusted among the members of the court, past and present." He particularly noted Torres' statement on the relationship of
justice to self-government:

He... considered the whole question of self-government dependent upon, above all things, the condition of the Judiciary; if it is independent, fearless, respected, then there is a secure foundation on which to build the State. He said that the Department of Justice and its administration was in the hands of politics and influenced by politics in the conduct of its affairs; that a condition existed which was inconsistent with a free, stable government.18

Former Attorney-General Araneta and Manila lawyer Francisco Ortigas agreed "that the courts had been seriously invaded by political influence and were no longer trustworthy, in the sense of being absolutely fearless and considering only the evidence before them." They also agreed "that pardons were regularly purchased and that there was traffic in it; that a Senator Cevara [sic] seemed to be one of the principal agencies through which pardons were obtained. Quezon is supposed to be very active in this sort of work."19

In Bulacan Province, Forbes found that "Partnership between the prosecuting officers and the court was freely charged." Judge Revilla of the local district was in Pampanga Province so could not be interviewed by Forbes; and when Wood, who was inspecting Pampanga, attempted to cross-examine him on the conduct of his court, he "professed to be suddenly taken ill..."20

Two former governors were willing to talk on injustice. Ruperto Montinola of Iloilo (who was later also a senator) "made the direct charge that obtaining pardons from the Governor General had become a racket, and that they were regularly secured for cash." Forbes added, "I heard this in other directions also." Eduardo Feito of Samar simply declared "that justice

18 Wood, Diary, May 6, 1921.
19 Ibid., June 12, 1921.
20 Forbes, Journals, II, 235-36.
was non-existent and that the political bosses held sway over everything."²¹

General Crame, Chief of the Philippine Constabulary, "said he was having great trouble in securing the support of the authorities, and that it was extremely difficult to secure the conviction of any important official; that there has been a tremendous traffic in pardons." He explained that this traffic was "controlled largely by members of the Senate; that even where a man is convicted, sentenced and imprisoned for sex crimes, immediate pardon almost always follows."²²

Quezon cleverly countered such accusations against the Filipinos by attacking a claimed weak spot in the American personnel on the Supreme Court. To Forbes he objected to Justice George A. Malcolm continuing on the Court because of his alleged immoral life; and to McCoy he became more specific, asserting that although Malcolm "was a bright fellow, a man of very decided intelligence," that he was "not of a high moral character and that his relations with a Filipina woman, (whom he has long held as his mistress) was injurious and had a very bad effect on the Filipinos."²³

"He is very anxious to turn over a new leaf here and institute substan-

²¹Ibid., pp. 233, 260-61.

²²Wood, Diary, May 10, 1921.

²³Forbes, Journals, II, 109; "Record of conversation with Mr. Manuel Quezon, President of the Senate, about July 5th," in the McCoy Papers, Box 28. Unknown to him Quezon was supported in this by Justice E. Finley Johnson, one of Malcolm's American colleagues on the Court, who reported to Wood that Malcolm was living with a native woman to whom he was not married but by whom he had had children. Because "this condition was known and has been reported," Johnson felt "that this disqualified him for holding a position on the Bench." Wood agreed with him. Wood, Diary, June 5, 1921. About a month later Johnson returned with another American on the Supreme Court, Justice Thomas A. Street, to again present the case of Malcolm's alleged immorality—claiming it to be a matter of common knowledge—and to report that his work was unsatisfactory. "Justice Street was strong in his condemnation of Malcolm's [sic] inefficiency and lack of knowledge," Wood noted. Ibid., July 5, 1921.
tial reforms in the Judiciary," was Wood's notation after a long conference with Quezon on July 3. But to McCoy two days later Quezon was far from conciliatory.

After arriving at his country home near Manila, Quezon "started in at once on the opinions of Gen. Wood and Gov. Forbes on the subject of the failure of justice and their severe criticisms, as he expressed it, of the judiciary." He contended "that they generalized too much and too severely, but that he was forced to agree with them on certain appointments and in certain criticisms of the slowness of justice, particularly in the Supreme Court." While freely discussing the Justices, Quezon labeled Johnson a "red rag" in the face of the Filipinos because of "his political activities, his apparent campaign for the appointment as Gov. General or Chief Justice, and his pronounced intollerance [sic] toward the Filipino people and their aspirations." Declaring that the criticisms of the Commissioners should not be confined solely to the Filipino personnel, Quezon turned to Malcolm's alleged immorality.

Concerning the judges of the Courts of First Instance, Quezon felt that they "were not nearly as bad as painted, although politics had entered into the appointment of some of them." And he praised Secretary of Justice Paredes as "a very able and high-minded, and independent cabinet officer, and instanced several occasions where he had absolutely refused to accept the recommendations of himself and Mr. Osmena as to the appointment of judges and assignment of judges." 25

24 Ibid., July 3, 1921.

25 "Record of conversation with Mr. Manuel Quezon, President of the Senate, about July 5th." McCoy Papers, Box 28.
Complaints by Filipinos concerning the miscarriage of justice had a cumulative effect upon Wood and Forbes sufficiently serious to elicit from them several rare public responses. After inspecting Albay, Camarines Sur, and Sorsogon provinces, both agreed that among the most numerous complaints were those on the administration of justice. In many instances they had been informed of men being held in jail on minor charges for months without a trial. Later Forbes reported similar complaints throughout Oriental Negros Province, with one speaker at Sibulan asserting that it was impossible for a Filipino to obtain justice in the courts.

This type of complaint increased until in a press interview at Manila on July 26 Forbes revealed the startling and disquieting fact that they were receiving from ten to fifty complaints a day against the administration of justice. When Dr. Victor Heiser joined the Mission at Borneo near the end of their final inspection trip, this problem was still so serious that he was saddened to observe "shocking examples of delayed justice ...." The Mission was also concerned with the institutionalization of justice as represented by penal institutions and by Filipino indifference to conditions therein. For example, considerable time was devoted to a careful inspection of San Ramon Penal Farm, the national penitentiary for Mindanao

26 Manila Times, June 21, 1921.
27 Ibid., July 14, 1921.
28 Ibid., July 26, 1921.
29 Heiser, An American Doctor's Odyssey, p. 419.
30 As an example, see Wood's comment after his inspection of Pampanga Province. Diary, June 6, 1921.
and Sulu, near Zamboanga. It was pronounced in excellent condition except for one glaring defect--the treatment of prisoner Jose Baluyot, whose case had been described to Wood by the Chief Surgeon of Bilibid, the national prison in Manila, on June 4.

A former Captain in the Philippine National Guard, Baluyot was supposedly serving a life sentence for the murder in cold blood after an argument over a woman of Governor Conrado Lerma of Bataan and for estafa (swindling). Having been prominent in Bataan politics, however, Baluyot had obtained a commutation from Harrison of the original sentence of execution by hanging. After having served a few months in Bilibid, political influence had secured Baluyot's transfer early that year to San Ramon upon Harrison's orders. Yet the Mission discovered that he had not served a single day in the prison or done any work, having been given a house more than two miles from the prison where he and his family lived with two prisoners furnished as servants. Their duties included maintaining the gardens which surrounded the house and which supplied much produce for the Baluyot family.

Shortly before the Mission's arrival, Baluyot had been summoned to the prison and placed in the hospital. When asked why this prisoner had been admitted, the doctor replied that he was running a fever. Yet an examination revealed no fever and a normal pulse. When the desperate prison physician then claimed that Baluyot had been admitted because he had eaten fish for breakfast (a quite common item in a Filipino breakfast) and needed a physic, Wood witheringly questioned if it was standard practice to administer physics to all Filipino prisoners who had eaten fish for breakfast. The doctor's reply is, regrettably, not a matter of record. Later he admitted to Forbes that Baluyot's hospital records had been falsely certified.

When Colonel William F. Lewis of the Army Medical Corps and Philip Kinsley of the Chicago Tribune returned to San Ramon the next afternoon for
further investigation of Baluyot's case, they found that he had been sent home immediately after the Mission's departure. Apparently the treatment prescribed by the prison physician had been remarkably efficacious in curing whatever his ailment had proved to be! Later the Mission promised a full investigation, including what political influences had been brought to bear on his behalf.\textsuperscript{31}

The Commissioners were told that Prison Superintendent Ramon Victorio had received confidential instructions from Manila that Baluyot, whose wife was a relative of Osmena's wife, was to receive preferential treatment. The jailer admitted that it was wrong but declared that he had to obey. No documentary evidence to indicate the source of the order in Manila was found, and Forbes subsequently stated that "Osmena knew nothing of this as later developed." "There are about 600 prisoners there," Wood angrily noted, "and they all know the outrageous favoritism with which this man has been handled. This is just one case."

Far more encouraging was Iwahig Penal Colony on Palawan Island. This unique prison had no guards, stockades, or firearms for the handling of some eleven hundred prisoners who elected their own officers, shared in the profits from their own labor (such as the cultivation of thousands of coconut trees), and by good conduct could achieve virtual freedom within this little commonwealth. Not a prisoner had attempted to escape for several years, and fewer

\textsuperscript{31}Manila Times, August 17 (Associated Press dispatch), August 29, 1921; San Francisco Chronicle, August 18, 1921; Wood, Diary, June 4, August 15, 1921, including a SUPPLEMENTARY MEMORANDUM dated August 15.

\textsuperscript{32}Forbes, Journals, II, 144 (including the note absolving Osmena which was added in 1947); Wood, Diary, August 15, 1921, and a SUPPLEMENTARY MEMORANDUM of the same date. Wood was told by Chief Surgeon Pick of Bilibid that whenever visitors came to the prison the director had instructions that the Medical Officer should keep those Filipinos who were receiving preferential treatment in the sick ward where they would not be seen. Ibid., June 4, 1921.
than a dozen had escaped since its founding in 1904. Doubtless the most interested Mission member at Iwahig was Forbes who had been its founder when he was Secretary of Commerce and Police.  

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Obviously many Filipinos were reluctant to state publicly their grievances against the administration of justice. Some of these, it has been seen, approached the Mission privately. Still others, either individually or in groups, expressed their dissatisfaction in written form.

In the questionnaire sent to every twentieth Filipino among the 3667 who had submitted a 1920 income tax return one of the questions asked was, "Is justice impartially administered?" Of the forty-seven who replied to this questionnaire, twenty-nine answered this particular question in the affirmative, fifteen in the negative, and three did not respond.

Although such a percentage of negative responses to this critically important question should certainly have constituted reasonable grounds for disquiet, the Mission's concern surely was heightened upon realizing that these wealthy Filipinos commonly had little cause for personal complaint, for

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33 Associated Press dispatch, Manila Times, September 1, and Los Angeles Times, September 2, 1921. Although Forbes noted that the colony was "very beautiful," he was most displeased with the Filipino superintendent ("a smart inadequate young man") who "had had the hardihood and supreme asavinity of cutting down all the magnificent acacia trees that shaded the main avenue. . . ." And Forbes was not mollified even when he discovered that this superintendent had named one of the streets in his honor (others were Jones, Wilson, Osmeña, Quezon, McKinley, Taft, and White). Without being specific, Forbes merely commented, "I was not entirely proud of the company in which I found myself." Thus the superintendent failed to avoid Forbes's displeasure: "I have him a very sharp expression of my opinion." After interviewing a number of disgruntled prisoners ("who told me certain disquieting facts"), Forbes concluded: "I fear they will have a mean time till we can get administrative control going." Forbes, Journals, II, 153-54.

34 Questionnaire sent to every twentieth Filipino of the 3667 reported by Bureau of Internal Revenue as having submitted an income tax return for 1920, with analysis of their answers. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.
they had the facilities—money for bribes and political connections to pull—to control the judicial system for their advantage. The dissatisfied among the lower classes, who had neither money nor influence and who consequently were the impotent victims of injustice, were quite obviously not represented.

One of the complaints received at Jolo in a long document presented in the name of the people of the Sulu Archipelago was that the Moros were denied justice in the courts. This contention was then documented and illustrated at length under two categories (with many specific cases listed with court case numbers and specific details): discrimination by Filipino officers and judges in applying fines and jail sentences for gambling with Moros being heavily dealt with while Filipinos were ignored for similar or even more serious offenses; and the many Moro prisoners who were held by the Constabulary for long periods without formal charges, trials, or hearings, and without the right of appeal after conviction.  

But far more important were the accusations brought by the leadership of the entire Democrata Party. Their formal memorial was replete with serious charges, including corrupt justice for which they held their political opponents, the Nacionalistas, directly responsible. 

"The courts are in bad shape as will be shown in the records" was the

35 PETITION TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FROM THE PEOPLE OF THE SULU ARCHIPELAGO. Signed at Jolo on June 9, 1921. Reproduced, with some deletions, in Forbes, Philippine Islands, II, 475-86. This formidable document was signed by fifty-seven men who were described by Forbes as "almost all the leading men of the region..." Ibid., p. 293. It is filed in BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

36 RESOLUCION ADOPTADA POR EL DIRECTORIO GENERAL DEL PARTIDO DEMOCRATA, EN SU SESION EXTRAORDINARIA CELEBRADA EN LA CIUDAD DE MANILA, I.F., EL 7 DE SEPTIEMBRE DE 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.
blunt statement of Philip Kinsley after the Mission had hardly begun their work. But few Americans in the Islands shared his enviable position from which to make such pronouncements; most of those who would have liked similarly to comment publicly were restrained by genuine fears of economic retaliation from the *politicos*.

Although strong words were used by Captain H. L. Heath, president of the American Chamber of Commerce of Manila, he had secured the Board of Director's approval before printing them as the leading article in the Chamber's *Journal*. Justice he considered such a travesty that "a great country full of possibilities lies dormant under the heel of a political oligarchy."  

But other Americans who wanted to speak out against injustice chose to do so in private. Calling at Malacanan on at least three occasions, Justice E. Finley Johnson of the Philippine Supreme Court supplied "much information concerning the Department of Justice, which he describes as being in a lamentably bad condition." When asked directly if the judiciary offered reasonable security for life, liberty and property, his answer was definite: "No, it does not." Filipinization of the Courts of First Instance, he felt, had had "a far-reaching and disastrous effect," as illustrated by Pangasinan Province where there were 1800 cases, exclusive of land cases, awaiting trial. This condition had been avoided on the Supreme Court because he and the minority of American judges had done some three-fourths of the Court's work.  

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37. From a June 10 cablegram quoted in a cablegram De Veyra to Quezon, Washington, D.C., June 25, 1921. BIA, W-F Mission File.


After visits from Johnson, from a Judge Ingersoll (a former judge in the Philippines who was then a practicing attorney), and from a Judge Kincaid, Wood succinctly explained the fundamental causes for the weakness of the judiciary:

The policy adopted of giving the political leaders a free hand in the appointment of Judges has greatly lowered the standard of the Judiciary and has been fatal to the administration of Justice in the Islands. ... The majority of the members of the Philippines Senate [sic] are practicing attorneys, who, in the course of their practice, appear in the Courts of First Instance, and the decisions of these Courts in the municipal election cases are final. This, combined with the power of the Senate to blight the career of the Judges, has made them very timid. Moreover, the salaries and everything is in the hands of the Legislature. Immediately after the Jones Law was passed [1916] the Philippines Legislature reorganized the Courts of First Instance and lowered the salaries of the Judges. This forced out many American judges and was followed by their replacement by Filipinos, many of them very young men without sufficient experience. 40

Other Americans agreed with these jurists. A Mr. E. Womek, who, as a businessman, had had extensive contact with the courts, declared that if prompt justice were desired in the lower courts it had to be bought and that a lawyer of the dominant political party was a necessity. 41 Another businessman who had formerly been Chief of Police of Manila, Captain Seeber, felt "that justice was being poorly administered and was largely controlled by political influence in the lower courts," that pardons were for sale, and "that it was practically impossible to try, convict and lock up an important individual. ..." 42 All of those Americans with whom McCoy talked on Leyte stated that the courts were corrupt, that the way always had to be greased with money, and that they were "worried over the facility with which the Filipinos combine to frame up a case against one of them when they make up

40 Ibid., June 7, 1921.
41 Ibid., May 10, 1921.
42 Ibid.
their minds to get him."43

In many ways the most devastating statement on traffic in pardons was by a Dr. Pick, the Chief Surgeon of Bilibid, the national penitentiary. To Wood at Malacanan Pick presented details of the most flagrant cases which he had personally observed. These included Marcelino Lontoc, a lawyer and son-in-law of Felipe Buencamino, Senior, who had been pardoned by Harrison after his conviction for bigamy and without ever having served a day of his sentence; Benito Valdez of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, who had been sentenced to death for having another man killed for fifty pesos but was pardoned by Harrison even though the Supreme Court had upheld his conviction (he made the statement while in Bilibid that the pardon had cost him 50,000 pesos, which had been paid to Quezon and to a Mr. Debildon); a swindler named Mariano Lim from Pampanga who had been pardoned by Harrison after paying, according to reports from other prisoners, 12,000 pesos to Quezon for his pardon (or, more precisely, "for his services in securing the pardon").

"I asked the Doctor whom he would pick out as the most corrupt in the Islands," was Wood's response to this recital of venality. "His first was Quezon, then Pedro Givara [sic]. Osmena, he thinks, is a somewhat better type. Felipe Buencamino's operations also well-known."44

Many Americans, however, preferred to make their comments under the protection offered by the Mission to those who submitted confidential documents. In response to a circular letter sent to its members by the American Chamber of Commerce requesting their opinions on Philippine conditions, thirty of the one hundred and four who replied complained about the administration of justice, using such unflattering terms as "rotten," "scandalous," "in-

43 Ibid., June 22, 1921.

44 Ibid., June 4, 1921.
efficient," and "corrupt." 45

The exhibits of the Wood-Forbes Report contain a brief resume of the answers from two questionnaires "addressed to Americans of high standing, familiar with the Philippine Islands, and covering entire archipelago." The majority agreed that the Filipino masses would not receive justice in an independent Philippines, principally because such activities as traffic in pardons already existed under American control. 46

George H. Fairchild's letter was undoubtedly read with care for he was one of the more powerful and influential Americans in the Islands: a wealthy sugar baron (the letterhead was that of "WELCH, FAIRCHILD & CO., INC., Sugar Factors and Exporters") and the owner-editor of a respected and important daily newspaper, the Manila Times. Because of abuses in the administration of justice, he considered it "fundamentally necessary" to place the insular judiciary under the direct control of the United States Federal Government. 47

In the opinion of Republican National Committeeman H. B. McCoy, the judiciary had been so corrupted under Harrison that it was "generally considered to be, with the exception of the Supreme Court, a part of a political machine, rather than an independent arm of the government for the administration of justice and for determining all legal questions by law." 48

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45 CIRCULAR LETTER SENT OUT BY THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, MANILA, P.I., TO ALL MEMBERS IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, WITH ANALYSIS OF LETTERS RECEIVED BY THE MISSION IN COMPLIANCE THEREWITH. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

46 CONSOLIDATION OF ANSWERS TO TWO QUESTIONNAIRES ADDRESSED TO AMERICANS OF HIGH STANDING, FAMILIAR WITH THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, AND COVERING THE ENTIRE ARCHIPELAGO. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.


The comments of Associate Justice Thomas A. Street of the Philippine Supreme Court on the judiciary in his lengthy confidential memorandum were disquieting: "Here . . . over-filipinization has had more baleful effects than perhaps in any other department. The result . . . [is] overcrowded dockets in Courts of First Instance and lack of popular confidence in the capacity and integrity of the judges."

After detailed consideration, Street concluded his appraisal of the judiciary with a harsh general judgment:

It can be stated, as an absolutely fundamental thing in nature, that the Filipino is lacking in independence of character. Therefore, he has no power to resist influence of any sort; and on the bench he is exceedingly responsive to political and other undue influences, especially the influence of pure friendship.49

"Under Spanish administration the Philippine courts were corrupt and the delays . . . interminable," Dean C. Worcester stated from personal experience. Thus one of the early challenges to America had been judicial reform to bring "speedy and substantial justice within the reach of rich and poor alike."

"The success which attended this effort was," in his opinion, "one of the greatest triumphs of American administration in the Philippine Islands." He believed that nothing else which America had done, except perhaps public education, "gave us the hold on the common people which we obtained through assuring to the common man his day in court, within reasonable time and with reasonable expectation of securing substantial justice."

But Worcester regretted to report that conditions had "undergone a very unfortunate change during the Harrison administration." Many judges

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in the Courts of First Instance he described as "extremely indolent," a "very considerable number" of them were "certainly corrupt" ("Clerks of court have in some instances sold verdicts in advance."), and there had been "a very serious falling off" in their ability and training.  

"... you can readily secure a large amount of evidence of miscarriage of justice and even of efforts to railroad men into jail," Worcester averred after having described several instances known to him personally. And such corruption had ascended even to the supreme insular tribunal: "Only the efforts of Mr. Justice Johnson have saved the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands from going to pieces."

In concluding this section of his lengthy letter, Worcester's words were bleak: "... the law's delays have again become interminable and ... life and property are not adequately protected."  

Only two important American organizations commented specifically on the condition of insular justice in formal documents. The American Chamber of Commerce expressed concern over the "unprecedented delay" in the work of the courts, with even the Supreme Court "gradually falling behind in its work. ..." The justification for this conclusion demonstrated that the Chamber had little confidence in the ability and efficiency of Filipinos even in this area where they were commonly considered to be particularly talented:

An inspection of the reported decisions of the [supreme] court shows that of the 440 reported cases, covering the period between October, 1917, and Decem-

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50 He provided one personal example: "A case involving one of our copra agents at Tacloban, Leyte, which should have been settled at the first session of court, has been delayed more than two years, tying up for this length of time some ten thousand pesos which we deposited on behalf of the agent. We have just been advised that the case is coming up for trial but that, unfortunately, the ten thousand pesos have somehow disappeared!"

51 Letter, Dean C. Worcester to the Special Mission to the Philippine Islands, Manila, August 4, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.
ber, 1920, the five American Justices wrote 340 of the opinions, or a total of seventy-seven (77%) per cent. Of the 100 reported cases in which the opinions were written by the Filipino justices, 59 were written by ex-Justice Torres. . . . In the light of this record we believe that we are warranted in our contention that the majority of the members of the court should continue to be Americans, and that the two existing vacancies should be filled by Americans. 52

In a brief letter, the American Legion simply requested that the administration of justice be improved. Their only constructive suggestion was to secure more American judges. 53

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Very rarely were Wood and Forbes induced to comment publicly on the specific observations and conclusions which they had made during their investigations. When interviewed by the press at Malacanan on July 1, however, they stressed the critical importance of the impartial administration of justice. "The people must stand and fight for a fair administration of justice, because it is the foundation of every good government," Wood declared. "They must demand it, regardless of cause, and they must support it. It is only in this way that the Philippines can expect to have a strong, clean and upright government." 54

Either at this or another press interview, the two Commissioners expressed concern with the delays in the administration of justice. In one

52 MEMORIAL SUBMITTED BY THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE to the WOOD-FORBES MISSION, MANILA, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. Dated Manila, July 14, 1921, and signed by H. L. Heath, president. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

53 Letter, American Legion of the Philippine Islands to the Wood-Forbes Commission, Manila, September 2, 1921, signed by S. D. Rowlands, Commander, and P. D. Carman, Adjutant, Philippine Department, American Legion. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

54 Manila Times, July 1, 1921.
instance a man who had been arrested in 1919 was found in prison still awaiting a preliminary hearing. 55

As the Mission pursued their investigative labors, Wood and Forbes freely apprised Washington of their observations and convictions by classified cablegrams. "Administration of justice . . . [requires] most careful inquiry," Wood cabled Weeks on June 13. "Justice is lagging and it is most important that two American vacancies on Supreme Court be filled at earliest possible date." After referring to their willingness to make recommendations for these positions, Wood summarized conditions in the judiciary: "Courts including Supreme Court, are badly clogged throughout the Islands, about 27,000 cases of all kinds awaiting trial or decision." 56 In a letter to the Secretary of War written on the same day, Wood's biting sarcasm was displayed: "[The Filipinos] . . . are secure in their persons and property, unless they get into the courts." 57

Later Wood's cabled words to Weeks were even more grim:

Administration of justice is slow and, on the whole, unsatisfactory, in part due to shortage number of judges. Over 30,000 cases reported awaiting trial before judges of the Courts of First Instance. Many are land title and probate cases, but majority are civil and criminal cases which should be promptly disposed of. 15,000 cases before justices of the peace. Supreme Court is also some hundreds of cases behind and needs full vigorous personnel as previously recommended. 58

55 "Evils in Need of Remedy," North-China Herald, CXL (July 23, 1921), 253. Based on a Reuter's dispatch date-lined Manila, July 14. It is not clear whether this dispatch was based on a single press interview on July 1, or on this plus an additional one at a subsequent date.

56 Cablegram, Wood to Secretary of War, Manila, June 13, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

57 Copy of a confidential letter, Wood to Weeks, Manila, June 13, 1921, in Wood Papers, Box 158.

And in a cablegram to Weeks summarizing their last inspection trip, the administration of justice was described as "slow and unsatisfactory" with "Too exacting application of the Filipino code to Mohammedans and Non-Christian people."^59

In their final cablegram to Weeks, Wood and Forbes summarized their four months' of strenuous work. "In too frequent instances," they declared, "justice is not administered impartially in the courts." Specifically, they had discovered an "unnecessary and inexcusable delay in many of the courts of the first instance, and generally in the courts of the Justices of the Peace, which has produced a disquieting lack of confidence on the part of the people, to a degree which constitutes a menace to the stability of the government." However, the Supreme Court enjoyed "the entire confidence of the people."^60

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As the Mission continued their investigations their reactions to the administration of justice became progressively more severe and critical, as has been seen above. When their work was completed, Wood and Forbes were moved to write extensively and scathingly in their final report about the general maladministration of justice.

"The supreme court has the respect and confidence of the Philippine people." After many previous doubts, they had ultimately come to share this unequivocal conviction. But this was the first and last unalloyed compliment

^59 Extract from Cable No. 852, the Governor General to the Secretary of War, September 4, 1921. BIA, W-F Mission File.

^60 Cable No. 861, Yeater to Weeks, Manila, September 11, 1921. BIA, W-F Mission File.
to the insular judicial system as paragraph after paragraph of withering indictment was set down.

Much of their report on this topic was an amplification and illustration of their next sentence: "The other tribunals do not enjoy an equal degree of confidence." There the administration of justice was generally "unsatisfactory, slow, and halting," with "a widespread feeling among the people that political, family, and other influences have undue weight in determining issues."

Particularly disturbing was the stupendous backlog of cases pending (approximately 50,000, including about 8,000 probate and guardianship cases) and with conditions steadily worsening. Their prediction for the future was bleak: ". . . with the present personnel and methods the dockets will never be cleared."

To describe the general condition of the critically important Courts of First Instance, Wood and Forbes deliberately chose one word: "deplorable." The serious backlog of cases in these courts was not caused simply by a shortage of personnel: "The judges in too many courts do not realize the necessity of reaching early and prompt decisions and are too ready to postpone hearings and trials." The fact that court clerks often were inexperienced or ill-trained, and that there was no uniform system of filing records compounded these deplorable conditions.

But even more disturbing were conditions in the justice of the peace courts which Wood and Forbes called "the weakest point" in the entire system, with complaints against them being numerous throughout the Archipelago. Because many of these courts were remote and isolated, supervision was unsatisfactory, resulting in many abuses.

Two specific types of legalized abuses which caused numerous complaints were cited for Washington's enlightenment. Under the provisions of Act 2098,
relating to breach of contracts for labor, employers had instituted "a kind of legalized peonage." Arrests and trials for violation of contracts and the obtaining of money and supplies under false pretenses had, during the fiscal year 1918, totalled 3,226 cases of which 1,456 had been convicted.

The second common abuse was "the initiation of proceedings resulting in the arrest and confinement at remote places of people who are unable to give bond." Often this resulted in imprisonment for months before the cases were acted upon by judges in the Courts of First Instance.

How could such appalling deterioration in the judicial system ever have occurred? The Mission listed several possible explanations: "The present condition results first, and above all, from the lack of proper inspection and prompt, corrective action where inefficiency and negligence have been shown, from an insufficient number of judges, insufficient pay and no provisions for retirement, and in some instances to lack of careful selection." They also urged more careful selection of provincial fiscals, or prosecuting attorneys.

Deplorable and disturbing as conditions were, the Commissioners were optimistic that they could be corrected "by the insular authorities." Critically important was the creation of "a strong public opinion in support of prompt, effective and impartial administration of justice." Specifically, they recommend adoption of a retirement law for judges, and they urged that "the entire administration of justice must be placed outside the scope of political and other improper influences."

"In brief," Wood and Forbes sternly warned in conclusion, "the independence and stability of the judiciary must be established. It lies at the foundation of stable government."61 Their choice of words here could not

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have been accidental. The significance of the juxtaposition of the two most used and abused words in the vocabulary of the politicos, "stable" and "independence," would not have been missed by any alert Filipino politicos or any Americans at all well informed on Philippine affairs. Their use at the conclusion of such a devastating section of the Mission's report must have seemed a most gratuitous blow to the politicos and a very clever thrust to most Americans.

Yet for Iwahig Penal Colony the Commissioners' words were kind: "... a most successful institution, far advanced in reformatory methods and results, the number of convicts returning to prison after release from the colony being extremely small." For other related aspects in the administration of justice, however, their words were harsh once again. But that their conclusions were not based upon rumors was demonstrated by the Commissioners' claim that they had not only carefully inspected the national prisons but also most of the provincial and municipal jails.

The provincial jails were described as "generally overcrowded," with "little or no provisions for taking care of the sick," and with "Marked favoritism ... often shown to prisoners with influential friends." The food was "generally good and sufficient" and the clothing "Fair," but the prison guards were "poorly trained and poorly disciplined."

The municipal jails had apparently pleased them even less for they were described as generally unsatisfactory, commonly "small, dark, usually poorly ventilated and unsanitary." The unfortunate prisoners were "poorly fed, poorly clad, and generally poorly cared for," and proper provisions for female prisoners were usually lacking.

In concluding this section, Wood and Forbes returned to a familiar theme: the delay in the administration of justice. "It was observed generally throughout the islands," they wrote, "that there were a great number
of prisoners awaiting trial for unusually long periods.\textsuperscript{62}

The lesson of it all seemed obvious: stay out of court and out of jail and prison in the Philippines unless you had money or influential friends. Wood and Forbes had not put it so bluntly; but this conclusion should have been obvious to anyone who carefully read these pages.

\textsuperscript{62} M-F Report, pp. 27-28.
CHAPTER XII

PUBLIC ORDER

That Philippine public order should have been of interest to a former Governor General and Secretary of Commerce and Police (Forbes), and to a professional soldier and colonial administrator (Wood) should not have been unexpected. Even though little interest in this critically important area was evinced by Filipinos, a number of Americans demonstrated their concern.

The residents of Laoag, Ilocos Norte, were apparently alone in feeling that the claimed existence of good public order, peace, and tranquility in their community was significant enough to be mentioned in a formal document presented to the Mission.1 At Sibulan, Oriental Negros, however, one speaker complained to Forbes that public order was wanting in their community, and that, in particular, the local police countenanced open gambling.2 Some of the leading residents of Tabaco, Albay, were also apologetic for one major national breach of public order: the scenes of violence in the legislature. But this they excused as such "did not fail to disgrace even the Houses of the nations recognized as most advanced."3

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1 BREBE RELACION DEL ESTADO POLITICO, ECONOMICO, SANITACION, OBRAS PUBLICAS, AGRICULTURA, HACIENDA E INSTRUCCION HABIDO EN EL MUNICIPIO DE LAOAG, ILOCOS NORTE, ISLAS FILIPINAS DURANTE EL PERIODO DE MAS DE OCHO ANOS, O SEA DESDE EL ANO 1913 HASTA EL 30 DE ABRIL DE 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

2 Manila Times, July 14, 1921. The Mission also had heard complaints that gambling laws were evaded in Bulacan Province. Forbes, Journals, II, 236.

Publicly, Americans seemed no more eager than Filipinos to comment on the condition of public order. Philip Kinsley limited his remarks to a single reference on the frequency of murders in primitive Mountain Province. But in private communications, Americans were more willing to comment.

Ray Atherton severely criticized a major breach in public order created by the Chinese-dominated opium traffic. Yet he condemned Filipino officials far more than the Chinese. "There is no doubt that the entry of opium into Manila is done with the connivance of certain port officials," he asserted. Convictions had become so rare, he declared, "that the Constabulary Customs Authorities . . . have lost interest in the faithful performance of their work."

After admitting that there had been "comparatively few disturbances of public order, and those which have occurred have for the most part not been serious," Dean C. Worcester described some of them. The sale of opium, he declared, was "carried on openly, and with practically no interference, in many parts of the Visayan Islands [the central group of the Philippine Islands] . . . ." "It is a matter of common knowledge in Cebu," he continued for illustration, "that the Provincial Treasurer recently held up the Provincial Governor in an opium deal. Having been given funds by the Governor to pay for opium he put them in his pocket and asked the Governor what he was going to do about it."

Turning to illegal gambling, Worcester asserted that it was being

4 Copy of a cablegram sent from Baguio on May 13 by Kinsley as quoted in a cablegram from De Veyra to Quezon, Washington, D.C., June 25, 1921. BIA, W-F Mission File.

5 Ray Atherton, Memoranda on the Chinese Problem. BIA, W-F Mission File. Captain Seeber, formerly a Manila Chief of Police, told the Mission "that opium was practically open in the city, and that it was easy to get it. . . ." Wood, Diary, May 10, 1921.
"carried on with complete openness, and Constabulary officers and men not only often refrain from efforts to stop it but even participate in it themselves." For an illustration he cited the annoyance suffered from the Constabulary gambling with the laborers at a cattle ranch in Bukidnon, Mindanao, with which he was connected.

One of the principal evils which Americans had long attempted to eliminate from among the Pagans was the taking of heads. Although the facts had been "carefully covered up," Worcester maintained that there had occurred "a considerable recrudescence of head-hunting . . ." "I am informed through the former Lieutenant-Governor of Kalinga, who has reliable sources of information," he wrote, "that in his old territory head-taking is again fairly common and that those who indulge in it have no difficulty in fixing things up with the officials for small considerations."

Worcester declared that he had repeatedly seen the illegal use of dynamite in fishing being carried out "with the utmost openness in broad daylight." Only since the Mission's arrival had any effective efforts been made to check this dangerous and wasteful practice. 6

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As their investigative work progressed, both Wood and Forbes generously praised the condition of public order and those responsible. Speaking on this topic at Oroquieta, Misamis, Forbes chose a single descriptive

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6 Letter, Dean C. Worcester to the Special Mission to the Philippine Islands, Manila, August 4, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits. When Forbes was told on Cebu that a foreman on a road project was selling dynamite illegally to fishermen, he made this comment: "If it is true that dynamite is being used, the people guilty of that are guilty of destroying the food supply of the people. If I were Governor General presidents [mayors] would be removed that allowed that to take place." Forbes, Journals, II, 277-78.
word: "admirable." Soon after their arrival in the Islands both Commissioners had publicly commended the Philippine Constabulary.

"Public order is good," Wood wrote to the Secretary of War at the conclusion of their first provincial tour. "The people seem to be contented and happy. They are secure in their persons and property, unless they get into the courts." 

"Public order excellent everywhere" was Wood's statement on July 25 in a confidential cablegram to Weeks. "Constabulary is very efficient and enjoys public confidence, although not fully up to old standards, partly on account of loss of most American officers who entered United States Army for World War." 

"Public order good with the exception of minor disturbances

7 "Specimen Notes Taken Public Session [Oroquieta, Misamis, August 8, 1921]." BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

8 Manila Times, May 31, 1921; Associated Press dispatch, San Francisco Chronicle, June 1, 1921. In a speech in Albay Province on June 24, Wood paid this tribute to the Constabulary: "We have found a fine force of Constabulary everywhere; we have found a fine condition of public order." As recorded by Forbes, Journals, II, 267.

9 Copy of a letter, Wood to Weeks, Manila, June 13, 1921, marked Confidential. Wood Papers, Box 158.

10 Cablegram, Wood to Weeks, Manila, July 25, 1921. BIA, W-F Mission File. For some reason Wood chose to ignore a situation which Forbes stumbled onto in Occidental Negros Province and recorded in some detail: "At Binalbagan a curious state of affairs developed. At the town of Isabela a prominent Filipino had whispered to me: 'Look into the matter of the death of Von Holt.' So I did, and found that he had been murdered by a policeman, who laid in wait for him in the dark and struck him on the head with a club or the butt of a revolver. No one had done anything up to a few hours of our arrival. The policeman was still on duty. Well, I read the riot act. The justice who accompanied me on the trip, Villareal, had been an attorney in the Attorney General's Office while I was Governor. He saw how the wind blew and began stirring things up. I told him, the Presidente, the justice of the peace, and later the provincial governor, what I thought of such negligence. Things began to hum. The community, especially the Americans connected with the Central were greatly stirred up over it all. They said the lives of Americans were not safe in Binalbagan after dark and that nothing was done to protect them. This is the first place where this kind of a complaint has been filed. Von Holt was an inoffensive German, if such a
in Moro districts," was the Commissioners' report to Washington at the conclusion of their final trip. 11

Although such sentiments were not unanimous among Americans, when a questionnaire was addressed to "Americans of high standing, familiar with the Philippine Islands" throughout the entire Archipelago, the majority agreed that the Constabulary officers did not abuse their power. 12 Yet among the Moros this would have been sharply contested. Wood noted that they were "one and all strong against the Constabulary," which had "a rather ugly record running back for several years." 13

In a lengthy document submitted at Jolo, fifty-seven prominent residents of the Sulu Archipelago declared that the Constabulary, which had been placed among them to maintain law and order, had utterly failed in their duty while committing "many outrages upon our people." After citing a number of specific instances, this indictment concluded with a summary:

The Constabulary patrols harass the people, loot, steal property from our houses, and take our produce, etc., without our consent; promiscuously search our houses without warrant, molest our women, and graft from our people. The officials quite frequently force the people to make gifts to them, such as good ponies, cattle, barongs [one type of Moro sword or knife], etc. They maltreat Moro prisoners, while Filipino prisoners receive the best treatment and attention, and are never sent out to work under guard.

In view of such conduct, these Moro leaders requested that American troops

being exists, and was employed on the Sugar Central." Forbes, Journals, II, 121-22.

11 Extract of Cable No. 852, Governor General of the Philippine Islands to the Secretary of War, September 4, 1921. BIA, W-F Mission File.

12 CONSOLIDATION OF ANSWERS TO TWO QUESTIONNAIRES ADDRESSED TO AMERICANS OF HIGH STANDING, FAMILIAR WITH THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, AND COVERING ENTIRE ARCHIPELAGO. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

13 Wood, Diary, August 19, 1921, at Jolo.
replace the Constabulary because "they have in the past treated us justly, they do not steal our property, and they do not mix or meddle with our women." ¹⁴

Forbes explained that the Constabulary received most of the criticism in Jolo because they had been "high-handed and domineering," although this was the only area where they were unpopular. "The trouble is the Filipino despises the Moro," he explained, "regarding him as an inferior being, and this being sensed by the Moros is naturally resented." Later he returned to this topic and attempted a fair reappraisal:

I guess there is a good deal to be said on both sides. The Moros are inveterate law breakers. There is much illicit traffic with opium and other smuggled goods. Chinese are flowing in contrary to law and generally the Constabulary have an important and difficult job. The truth is of course that the Moro and the Filipino each despises the other.

... There is one real advantage, however, since I left and that is that the country is now fairly peaceable and one can walk about safely over the island. Before you were more or less besieged in the walled city, and a trip to the interior had to be made under guard. There is, however, a very serious undercurrent of discontent. But the vigor and insistence on the part of the Moros of friendship for America was a very surprising feature of the situation. ¹⁵

Before sailing from Jolo, Wood had had an important decision to make: would he accede to requests and return to Lanao Province to investigate a deadly feud between Moros and the Constabulary which had erupted since their visit there? His decision was not to return but to continue with the final tour of inspection as scheduled. ¹⁶

¹⁴ Petition to the President of the United States of America from the People of the Sulu Archipelago. This document is almost completely reproduced in Forbes, Philippine Islands, II, 475-86. The quotations above are taken from pp. 475 and 478 respectively.


¹⁶ New York Times, August 23, 1921. An Associated Press dispatch date-
In a cablegram to Weeks on September 4 summarizing their inspection of the southern islands, Wood and Forbes evaluated this development and general conditions in Moroland. "Public order good," was their judgment, "with the exception of minor [sic] disturbances in Moro districts resulting from placing Moro children, especially girls, in school, old animosities ..." and some serious practical failures in governmental administration by Filipinos.17

In the final cabled summary of their findings and recommendations, much the same statements on the condition of public order were repeated. In addition, however, they emphasized in considerable detail the critical stabilizing influence of dominant American authority which they considered "the strong restraining influence against disorder within and aggression from without. Were the American Flag, forces, and credit withdrawn we are convinced that the stability of the government is open to grave doubt."18

"They are naturally an orderly and law-abiding people," was the encouraging generalization by Wood and Forbes in their final report to the President. A subsequent expanded statement was almost as praiseworthy:

Public order is excellent throughout the islands, with the exception of minor disturbances in the Moro regions, due principally to energetic and

lined Jolo, August 22. For the details of this feud, which claimed the lives of a number of Mores at the hands of the Philippine Constabulary, see the following references: Manila Times, August 18, 19, 22, 29, 1921; San Francisco Chronicle, August 19, 1921; Los Angeles Times, August 20, 1921.

17Extract of Cable No. 852, the Governor General to the Secretary of War, September 4, 1921. BIA, W-F Mission File.

18Cable No. 861 from Acting Governor General Yeater to Secretary of War Weeks, Manila, September 11, 1921. BIA, W-F Mission File.
sometimes overzealous efforts to hasten the placing of Moro children, especially girls, in the public schools, and to the too sudden imposition upon the disarmed Mohammedans of what amounts to an absolute control by Christian Filipinos. It is also due in part to failure to give adequate representation in local governments to Moros. 19

For the approximately 5,800 officers and men of the Constabulary who were principally responsible for public order the Commissioners chose words of high praise: "dependable and thoroughly efficient." In discipline, morale, and appearance it still bore "the strong impress of the carefully-selected officers of the United States Army who organized, trained, and developed it."

"There has been some lowering of standards," Wood and Forbes explained in moderating their praise somewhat, "due principally to the sudden loss of the bulk of the experienced American officers, who left the service to enter the World War, and to the effects of the low rate of pay which resulted in many leaving the service; also to the demoralizing, and at times intimidating, effect of political influence, the detached nature of the duties, infrequent inspections, and frequent changes of officers." Yet they concluded with generous commendation for an organization which they had previously known intimately and for which they both clearly had tremendous admiration: "But on the whole this force is a very satisfactory one and is entitled to great credit for its morale, efficiency, and orderly and effective performance of duty." 20


20 Ibid., p. 23. On the preceding page of this report the Commissioners had praised the "American commercial population and organizations" as always having been "a strong force in the support of law and order..."
CHAPTER XIII

INSULAR DEFENSE

For a problem area as potentially critical as that of national defense there appeared to be a disturbing complacency among the vast majority of Filipinos. Superficially, at least, it would seem that Wood and Forbes shared this lack of concern. Many Americans, however, were obviously deeply troubled by the dangerous potentialities of such optimistic complacency, and a number of them expressed their concern to the Mission. That Japan was vitally interested was undeniable; but her reactions were generally well hidden behind an inscrutable mask.

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When every twentieth Filipino from among the 3667 who had submitted an income tax return for 1920 was queried on this topic ("Should the Islands be separated from the United States and its protection withdrawn, do you think that there would be reasonable assurance that the resources of the Islands would remain the heritage of the Filipino people?") the replies must have caused dismay and consternation to an experienced professional soldier such as Wood. Of the forty-seven who were interested enough to return this questionnaire, thirty-five confidently replied in the affirmative, ten in the negative, and two did not answer this specific question.¹

If the obviously influential wealthy and better educated Filipinos were so self-confident, it would not seem surprising that other Filipinos had

¹QUESTIONNAIRE SENT TO EVERY TWENTIETH FILIPINO OF THE 3667 REPORTED BY BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE AS HAVING SUBMITTED AN INCOME TAX RETURN FOR 1920, WITH ANALYSIS OF THEIR ANSWERS. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.
few qualms about facing a future without American military protection. Certainly the members of the Women's Club of Guubat, Sorsogon, felt utterly secure in their homeland. A document which they had adopted on June 19, 1921, was entirely devoted to a supposedly logical demonstration of why an independent Philippines would not be in any danger from external aggression because Filipinos were united; because Japan had not interfered with the Asian possessions of such weak nations as Holland and Portugal; because the world—but particularly America—"will not allow Japan to seize the Philippines"; and "Because the conscience [sic] of all the world at this date is against conquest and favor self determination and democracy."²

Equally as confident was the "Sociedad de Jovenes 'Nueva Era'" ("'New Era' Youths' Society") of Guinobatan, Albay, which requested independence "under any form . . . whatever be it probationary, absolute or under an American protectorate." These young people, whose objectives were "the moral, material and intellectual development of their people," were unafraid of Japan because of the League of Nations and Japan's promises that she would be the first to guarantee Philippine independence.³

The Municipal Council of Talisay, Cebu, was more realistic; admitting that the Philippines were militarily unprepared, these Councilors sought to rationalize the problem away by asserting that the lack of an army and navy was insufficient grounds for denying independence because they had been denied the opportunity of handling defense problems.⁴

²BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.
⁴Resolution No. 25, Talisay Municipal Council, July 1, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.
Yet not all such optimistic, unrealistic statements were allowed to go uncontested by Filipinos with some awareness of the dangers facing them from militaristic neighboring powers. When the municipal president of Dagnolan, La Union requested independence in a public session, Forbes pressed him to be more specific. "The supposititious case was presented to him of an offer of two documents, both giving the Filipinos what they called independence," Forbes has written, "one under the protection of the United States which undertook to use ships and troops to defend the Islands, and the other giving them absolute independence with all forces of the United States withdrawn, leaving the Filipinos to fight their own battles, defend their own soil, pay their own bills, without access to United States' markets and without any privileges or preferences." When the presidente was asked point blank "which he would accept if his were the final responsibility to accept and decide for his own people," he did not equivocate: "I would take absolute independence without protection."

Immediate and dramatic was the response from a surprising source. An obviously impressed Forbes recorded this entire episode in detail:

At this a young woman jumped up; she had been trained in the girls' dormitory in Manila, was evidently a Spanish mestiza, and had not used English for so long that she spoke it somewhat haltingly. She said, "I think the presidente must be crazy." Then turning and speaking directly to the president: "I think anybody who has any sense at all knows perfectly well that we are wholly unable to protect ourselves. We have not a place where we can make a gun in the Islands and no training necessary to defend ourselves. We would be just as helpless as a child in the hands of enemies. Even the common people know this. Only yesterday a laboring man came to my house and we got talking [sic] over the independence of the Islands, and I asked him whether he thought we wanted it. He said, "Not yet; we are not ready," I asked him whether he thought we could protect ourselves against

He labeled this "one of the most striking speeches which we heard," and admitted that he borrowed her story and illustration for use himself many times thereafter. Forbes identified her only as Mrs. La Sancha. Journals, II, 231-32.
foreign aggression with bolos. She made a motion as of drawing a bolo from
its sheath and raising it high over her head—a very dramatic movement and
moment. She then turned and said she thought the president must be a little
"nervous."

Another young lady, this time a Filipino-American mestiza in Albay
Province, added her support to this heretical statement. Declaring that the
Filipinos were not yet ready for independence, she asserted that "Japan was
ready to swoop down on the islands as soon as Americans withdrew," and that
the Filipinos would not be able to defend themselves.

"When we have an army of 100,000 men and twelve warships, then we may
say that there is a stable government in the Philippine Islands," was the
realistic appraisal of Miguel Cornejo, a captain in the National Guard, in
a speech at Pasig, Rizal. "Let the higher-ups think of that." But many
Filipinos in Sorsogon Province simplified the problem greatly; when asked
how they would protect themselves after independence, their response was a
simple and trusting declaration that their senators would know how to handle
the problem. "Their instruction had evidently come from the senators who
are all-powerful here," was Forbes's reaction.

A speech by Luis Santiago at San Mateo, Rizal, so impressed Forbes
that he made this notation on his copy: "This is to my mind one of the most

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6 Forbes has added this comment in a footnote: "This illustration was
used many times during the investigation." Forbes, Philippine Islands, II,
292.

7 Ibid., pp. 291-92. When a young orator in Santo Domingo, Ilocos Sur,
asserted that fears of Japanese aggression were groundless and boasted that
the Philippines had contributed 25,000 soldiers to aid America in the World
War, Forbes personally took him to task and corrected his misstatements with
such withering sarcasm that he feared "the little bantam was pretty well

8 San Francisco Chronicle, June 28, 1921.


10 Ibid., p. 257.
powerful speeches I have heard. He is a very competent fellow." After delivering "a very eloquent appeal for independence," Santiago delineated "in no uncertain terms the danger anticipated from Japan":

It is a crime to deny us our freedom, but it would be a double crime for the United States not to protect us from foreign invasion. The United States of America is morally bound to protect the Philippines from foreign aggression. We know that a country that lies north of the Philippines is a constant menace to the Philippine Islands, and unless protected by America our independence might last for a few days. I want you to understand that, my countrymen. That we want independence but with the protection of the United States. The population of Japan is increasing rapidly. Where will she send them? Siberia is too cold. China and Korea are already thickly populated. The most attractive place for them is the Philippine Islands.

Suppose Japan does not resort to arms to get the Philippine Islands, she will resort to commercial absorption. You know the Japanese multiply, to use a slang phrase, "like white rats," and we will eventually be Japanese. The Germans treated the treaty with Belgium as a scrap of paper. What would the Germans of the Far East do without even a treaty?

In conclusion I want to assure you that the Philippines will remain faithful and loyal to the United States whatever your investigation and its results may be.11

At Cagayan, Misamis, Aurelio D. Bendijo made similar statements regarding the danger from Japan, in what Forbes labeled "quite a thoughtful speech"; but his audience found it "extremely offensive" because he had recently been convicted of swindling. "I think very possibly this whole speech was a play to make us favorably disposed towards recommending executive clemency," was Forbes's evaluation.12 And a member of the Surigao Provincial Board warned Filipinos against independence until they were prepared to defend themselves. These comments at a public session were noteworthy because John Keef was an American Negro.13

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11 Ibid., pp. 238-39.
12 Ibid., pp. 294-95.
13 Manila Daily Bulletin, August 9, 1921.
Other Filipinos resorted to documents for expressing their convictions. For example, a group of Filipinos in Tabaco, Albay, favored only the concession of "INDEPENDENCE UNDER THE AMERICAN PROTECTORATE," but under no circumstances the 'Absolute Independence' without an American protectorate, even though it be ratified by the strong foreign Nations." "This petition," they explained, "is founded on the following reasons: That if the United States concedes to us Absolute Independence without an American Protectorate, and abandons us afterward, with all certainty and without any doubt the Philippines will be carried off and dominated by the Japanese, by means of force, violence and intimidation, by right of the force which it is accustomed to use."

Japan's conduct in recent decades, which had destroyed their faith in the word of the Japanese Government, the Japanese press, or even of some Filipino politicos who stated that Japan would not interfere with the Philippines, would justify their position. 14

One resident of the remote island province of Palawan also favored independence under an American protectorate, but he was even more practical than his compatriots. For greater security, he requested the establishment of an American naval base at Malampaya Sound on the northwest coast of the island, 15 and an army camp near Puerto Princesa, the capital. 16

Other Filipinos preferred private interviews to reveal their concern

14 Unnumbered and untitled petition, adopted at Tabaco, Albay, June 24, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits. Capitalized and underlined for emphasis in the original.

15 "I had this Sound surveyed in 1906 (or 1907) as to its suitability for defense and to be made use of as a naval base," Wood wrote during the Mission's visit here. "The entrance could easily be defended both by means of mines and guns. It has anchorage enough for all the navies in the world." Wood, Diary, August 27, 1921.

over defense problems. Felix Canuto, a former **presidente** of Pili, Camarines Sur, declared that he had talked with all of Pili's more intelligent people and that they uniformly opposed independence because the Philippines lacked an army and a navy. \(^{17}\) General Fernando Canon, whom Wood described as a "former general of the Revolution and a great friend of Rizal and of Aguinaldo," was bitterly opposed to independence. Although he had fought for it before, he stated to the Mission at Malacanan that he "could not conceive of any greater disaster to the Philippine Islands than separation from the United States; that they would soon be absorbed by Japan..." Wood noted that this was "almost word for word, what was said to me by the youngest sister of Rizal."\(^{18}\)

And Quezon himself frankly admitted to Wood that "He supposed that under whatever arrangements might be made the United States would have to maintain military and naval bases in the Islands, at least two central establishments, one for the Army and one for the Navy." Wood then posed a direct question: "I asked him if he felt the Philippines are now prepared to defend themselves, and if their resources were adequate to maintain a government. He admitted, of course, that neither was the case at present."\(^{19}\)

With unanimity, all Americans who commented on defense problems agreed that without American protection the Islands would be in mortal danger, principally from Japan. Yet when a group of prominent American residents were

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\(^{17}\) *Forbes, Journals*, II, 251-52.

\(^{18}\) *Wood, Diary*, May 9, 1921.

\(^{19}\) *Ibid.*, June 4, 1921. This exchange occurred at a dinner given by Quezon on this date honoring Wood and Forbes.
asked whether the Filipinos feared the Japanese, they gave a disturbingly qualified answer: "The enlightened Filipinos do. The masses are not aware of the problem." 20

Writing from his home in Oakland, California, Harold M. Pitt, a veteran American businessman in the Philippines, flatly declared "that withdrawal by the United States would quickly be followed by real disaster to the islands. Within a year at the most there would arise dissension, then internal disorders with but one logical outcome--Japan would step in and take control."

He was convinced that they "would make the islands wonderfully prosperous--with a prosperity benefitting primarily Japan and the Japanese. The Filipinos would then learn what work really means and the choice would lie between work and starvation or reversion to the primitive state." 21

To this symposium Associate Justice Thomas A. Street of the Philippine Supreme Court added his emphatic words: "IF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE SHOULD BE MADE INDEPENDENT, THEIR NATIONAL EXISTENCE WILL NECESSARILY BE SHORT-LIVED, AND PROBABLY WITHIN A GENERATION THE COUNTRY WILL TAKE ITS PLACE ALONGSIDE OF KOREA AND FORMOSA AMONG THE OPRESSED SUBJECT NATIONS OF THE EARTH."

Refusing "to bandy words," Street asserted that "every intelligent white man in these Islands must feel [the conviction that if America abandoned the Islands] ... they will soon fall into the hands of Japan or be the cause of a great war, if other powers should undertake to maintain their independence." 22

20 Consolidation of Answers to Two Questionnaires Addressed to Americans of High Standing, Familiar with the Philippine Islands, and Covering Entire Archipelago. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.


22 Memorandum, Street to the Mission, no date. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.
Worcester was "strongly of the opinion that [American withdrawal] . . . would mean irretrievable disaster" for the Filipinos. Japanese protestations that they did not want the islands, that the climate was unsuitable, etc., he called "all talk," because "Competent Japanese spies have covered the Islands. . . ." "They do want them and they would take them if they dared." 23

Americans were not nearly so free publicly to accuse Japan of harboring aggressive, imperialistic designs against the Philippines. Yet "Captain" Robert Dollar, who was introduced as "'The Grand Old Man' of Pacific commerce" when he addressed the American Chamber of Commerce in Manila, obviously was alluding to Nippon in his statement that an independent Philippines would be in trouble within a few months. 24

This Japanese bogey was commonly held up by those Americans who opposed Philippine independence. It was hotly resented by some Japanese who considered that such Americans had private motives for desiring continued American control.

The Tokio Yorodzu, for example, compared the statement of some Americans that Japan would seize an independent Philippines to "the attitude of a thief who would say that he would not return a stolen thing, because if he does so it will be stolen by others."

Japan will never take such predatory action as America took [the Yorodzu self-righteously explained]. America had better do the right thing herself. She had better carry the Jones Bill into effect. We Japanese only recognize the justice of the Filipino demands and sympathize with them for their position. Former Governor-General Harrison is a just man, and declares that even if America gives independence to the Philippines, Japan has no ambition whatever of possessing herself with them. He knows the true Japan. So if America does not carry out her pledge on such a preposterous excuse, the


24 Manila Times, July 19, 1921.
just men of America will surely attack the wrong of their own Government, and 10,000,000 Filipinos will be indignant.

It was convinced that the Republicans were firmly determined not to grant independence, and that the Wood-Forbes Mission was simply "gathering material to support that opinion, instead of accelerating their independence." 25

Certainly Yorodzu would have been even more indignant had the comments concerning Japan of leading American naval and military officers in the Philippines been publicized. Although Wood and Forbes surely held these confidential statements in high regard, it is equally certain that their careful safeguarding prevented serious damage to both American-Japanese and American-Philippine relations. 26

To Admiral Joseph Strauss, Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet, any Philippine protectorate by America was highly inadvisable because of their great distance apart, and because they were "within easy distance on the North and West of powerful nations devoid of our compunctions respecting forced territorial aggrandizement." 27 Later he specifically declared that

25 As reproduced in "Japan And Filipino Independence," Literary Digest, LXX (July 16, 1921), 19.

26 While in Japan Wood himself had sought to alleviate tension between Japan and the United States by assuring former Minister of War General Tanaka "that we had no landgrabbing tendencies and that there was nothing whatever to be feared." Wood also declared that the United States was going to turn the Philippines "over to the Filipinos eventually, once they were able to protect themselves. . . ." Carbon copy of a memorandum made at Tokio, October 5, 1921, and headed thus: "The following is the substance of my conversation with General Tanaka, former Minister of War and probably coming Chief of Staff, known to be friendly to America and a conservative influence in checking aggressive Army policy in the Asiatic mainland and elsewhere." Wood Papers, Box 156.

27 Clearly he meant Japan as the nation to the north, but no nearby nation to the west seems to qualify.
an independent Philippines would "fall into the hands of the Japanese in a short time."

Strauss was convinced that American possession of the Philippines was "one of the facts that prevents Japan from boldly asserting her intention of finally absorbing China." Quite naturally, he declared that the only reasonable Philippine defense would have to be based upon maintaining control of the adjacent seas as protection by fortification and garrisons was "out of the question."²⁸

Major General F. J. Kernan, commanding the Philippine Department, described the Islands as "a potential military asset of great value to the United States," which would be faced by "grave danger from external sources" if the United States withdrew her protection. It was no secret, he explained, "that serious complications in this part of the world, involving possible war, are most likely to occur, if at all, between us and Japan."

The suggestion of retaining military and naval bases but abandoning sovereignty was "a sorry and inadequate substitute for a properly fortified base conjoined with control over all the Archipelago," in Kernan's opinion. "A mere base, held in a foreign country, with an alien government which might be in sympathy with our foe and able to put many straws [sic] in our path, affords a weak reliance for times of stress."²⁹

As Appendix A of his paper Kernan submitted a letter by Brigadier

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General W. R. Smith, who also was convinced that America's probable foe in the Pacific was Japan, which, he charged, was even then secretly fortifying bases in the Marshall and Caroline islands, but recently received as mandated territories under an international agreement that they would never be fortified. As a counter move, he recommended continued American retention of the Philippines as the best possible base for military and naval operations.

In conclusion, Smith asserted that if the Philippines were made independent, the United States would still have to maintain a base in Manila comparable to Hongkong. "I think further," he frankly declared, "that independence . . . would be a nuisance to us, since I believe them to be a weak and foolish people upon whose gratitude we could not depend. I do not know of any brown nation that has ever been able to maintain decent self-government."

This would certainly simplify matters for the United States and the Wood-Forbes Mission: simply determine the predominant color of any people and if it were brown they were obviously not qualified for independence then or ever in the future. And doubtless this provided a logical justification for his final sentence: "I am of the opinion that the possession of the Philippines is a military asset and that we should not give it up."  

It would seem extremely fortunate that this letter was marked SECRET and that its contents were never revealed to the public. Such comments on the entire Filipino people by an important American certainly would have been explosive and could have done nothing but serious damage to Filipino-American relations.

To Colonel C. D. Rhodes, General Staff, Chief of Staff, Headquarters Philippine Department, "control of the Philippines by a power other than the United States, is incompatible and inconsistent with our plans of defense of the Pacific Coast of the United States, with our commercial development in the Pacific, and with the altruistic and beneficent aims which we have had in mind for the inhabitants of the Islands since 1898." Specifically, he saw Japanese possession as providing her with "immense military and industrial advantages."

He predicted that possible war with Japan would become "far more a probability, if the United States abandons the Philippines and its part in the economic development of the Orient, than if it adopts a firm policy in the Far East, and insists on a just participation in the world's business." Claiming that it was "well known" then "that a large part of the Philippine population is susceptible to propaganda from Japan," he explained that "it is important that if we are to hold bases in the Islands, we should be in position to thwart and neutralize this undesirable influence." For the United States "To attempt to adequately hold military and naval bases, thousands of miles from home, in a country controlled independently by an erratic, unreliable, in a large measure ungrateful people, susceptible to influence from our country's possible adversary in war as well as in commerce," he emphasized, "would be a piece of folly utterly at variance with reasonable preparedness for the eventualities of the future."

After having reiterated that America must maintain military control of the Islands ("... the maintenance of strong bases, supported by a navy second only to that of Great Britain, are absolutely necessary to our national safety, our commercial development in the Far East, and our prestige as a world-power.".), he concluded his paper (fortunately also marked SECRET) with these emphatic words:
The abandonment or the neglect of our Far Eastern bases spells disaster and invites war. Withdrawal from the Philippines and non-insistence on equal opportunities in the Orient for all nations, great and small, means merely the postponement of a new and perhaps more terrible world-war—a misfortune which might happily be avoided by a firm and vigorous policy at the present time. 31

In that part of his impressive report entitled "ISSUES AFFECTING the Future Policy of the United States and the Philippines from a Military Point of View," Major John P. Smith, General Staff, Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence, soon made it clear that the main issue was Japanese imperialism. During the Harrison administration, he declared, Japan had "used every means of propaganda available to assist the Filipino Politicos in gaining independence..." "Japan has maintained a force of intelligence and propaganda agents in the Philippines for the purpose of keeping up to date on all military, topographic, economic, and political information," he later explained, "and for spreading independence propaganda among the natives and creating a pro-Japanese and anti-American feeling among the Filipinos."

This report (marked SECRET) estimated that war was "probable" if the United States continued to obstruct Japan's expansion in China; and that Japan would "probably attempt to seize the Philippines in order to deprive the United States of a fortified base in the Orient, which could be used for operations against Japan [including suggested raids by American airplanes against "Japan's wooden cities"])." From military intelligence information, he concluded that "the Japanese believe that our forces...could be easily taken by the landing of a large [Japanese] force." Although some of his

31 Paper, OUR PRESENT AND FUTURE POLICY IN THE PHILIPPINES by Colonel C. D. Rhodes, General Staff, Chief of Staff, Headquarters Philippine Department, Manila, P.I., April 20, 1921. BLA, W-F Report Exhibits.
predictions were wide of the mark (for instance, that Manila could hold out for from four to six months), his prediction that the most logical Japanese landing place was the Lingayen Gulf area was proven correct in 1941.

A detailed listing of American military and naval weaknesses in the Philippines together with his specific remedial recommendations concluded with this declaration:

Japan's respect for force has been clearly shown in the past, and the force best manifested by the United States in her present Far Eastern Policy, [sic] would be the possession of the preponderance of naval power in the Pacific with adequate fortified bases for operations in the East.\(^{32}\)

This is significant in light of the restrictions to which the United States soon agreed in the treaties at the Washington Conference, both upon her naval strength and upon future Philippine fortifications.

"An adequate protected base could never be maintained in the Philippines if the Filipinos were given independence," Smith flatly asserted. His explanation was a damning indictment of the Filipinos and their leaders: "Due to the disloyalty of the average Filipino and his susceptibility for bribes and propaganda, Japan would quickly undermine our position in the East by spreading propaganda among the natives. At the present time most of the political leaders of the Islands are pro-Japanese."

If America withdrew entirely, he predicted that "Japan would immediately find means to extend her sphere of influence over the Islands . . . [by] peaceful penetration, for the purpose of colonization and development of resources." Under such conditions, "The Japanese believe . . . the Islands will rightfully fall to them."

In order to prevent any possibility of misunderstanding, Smith concluded

\(^{32}\) Underlined for emphasis in the original typescript.
by reiterating some of his strongest convictions:

If the United States desires to maintain her prestige in the East, and to protect her present and future commercial interests, our military and naval strength in the Islands must be maintained, and a government must be established in the Islands which can always be relied upon to support our military and naval forces in the event of hostilities. 33

An analysis similar to those prepared by Army and Navy officers was presented by Ray Atherton, Secretary of the Legation at Peking. From a total of eight memoranda, two are relevant to this discussion. 34

His memorandum on the Japanese stated that despite their relatively small number—probably never in excess of 12,000—"the Filipinos almost universally in every island have a deep suspicion and fear of Japan." This fear was "one of the reasons why many Filipinos do not desire their independence except given under the protection of the United States."

His analysis of the multiple origins for this Japanophobia was penetrating:

This fear of Japanese by the Filipinos is based, first, on the influence of the Roman Catholic Church, which naturally will be unsympathetic to any possible control of the islands by non-Christian influence; second, to the treatment the Japanese give to their women folk, which is markedly in contrast to the respect and courtesy of Philippine tradition (It is noted here that the Japanese Consul, perhaps conscious of this, had all the Japanese women deported from the red light district of Manila some two years ago);

33 Underlined for emphasis in the original typescript. STATISTICAL DATA ON THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS AND A GENERAL STUDY OF ISSUES AFFECTING THE FUTURE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE PHILIPPINES FROM THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW. Signed by Major John P. Smith, General Staff, Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

34 See a letter from Atherton to the Secretary of State, Peking, November 15, 1921, and a letter from the Secretary of State to the Secretary of War, Washington, February 7, 1922, in BIA, W-F Mission File.
third, to the Japanese policy of colonial administration, as, in this connection, reports of Japanese government in Korea and Formosa have found their way to the Philippine Islands; fourth, the constant dread of a Japanese invasion, either economically or for conquest, especially if the United States should withdraw from the Philippine Islands; and, lastly, to the anti-Japanese influence of the Chinese in the islands. Furthermore, the individual Japanese is not sympathetic to the individual Filipino. . . .

In another memorandum (DATA REGARDING FOREIGNERS AND FOREIGN CAPITAL AND GENERAL CONCLUSIONS), Atherton asserted that extensive Japanese fishing activities in the Islands were the subject of suspicion. "Their fishing . . . with large power schooners," he declared, "is sometimes considered to be camouflage for commercial, military and naval intelligence under the guise of an innocent occupation." Such a statement would have come as no surprise to the Mission.

On the trip from Japan, Wood had thought of having the Warren stop at the Batan Islands, bits of Philippine territory off the northern coast of Luzon near Japanese-controlled Formosa; but he had given it up, explaining that "as we shall have to go through Aparri later on . . . [we can] then take in the Batans if necessary." They had, however, seen these islands, "away on our left, our first far view of the northernmost of the Philippine Islands, a little high island of the Batanes group," as Forbes described the event, even admitting--undoubtedly with regret--that he had never visited them.

During their first provincial trip, Wood, with the assistance of

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35 BIA, W-F Mission File.

36 Ibid. Specific examples then followed and this section concluded by stating that further corroboration could be obtained from Military and Naval Intelligence files.

37 Wood, Diary, May 2, 1921.

38 Forbes, Journals, II, 59.
Commander Bryant, inspected the Babuyan Islands—located just south of the Batans—and particularly the fine anchorage at Fuga Island, for the purpose, in Wood's words, of "learning what we can about the alleged visits of the Japanese."39 "Any one of the three passages in and out has water enough for any ship," he noted. "Would be an excellent rendezvous for submarines, destroyers or light cruisers." But after a day of investigation, his conclusions were calm:

The Japanese activities here appear to be simply in the line of fishing. They seldom come to this Island but are frequently at the Bataans [sic], where they are reported to take great quantities of fish and run them over to Formosa. It is a run of about 180 miles. Their fishing boats are generally motor boats of about fifty tons. Well supplied with ice, and apparently get their fish over in very good shape. They have evidently made a thorough reconnaissance of the islands. No evidence of any propaganda to amount to anything.40

"It is also interesting to see by the itinerary of General Wood that he is headed for the Fuga Island [sic] and the Batanes," the Philippines Herald, a Filipino daily, observed before smearing on some editorial sarcasm. "Perhaps the local conditions there [these islands were used by the Filipinos almost solely for cattle raising] would have a good deal to do with the stability of the Philippine government—hence they must be visited?"41

Later this paper (which was generally considered to be Quezon's principal journalistic mouthpiece) featured an article by Professor Austin Craig of the

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39 Wood, Diary, May 22, 1921.

40 Ibid., May 23, 1921. "The Japanese have evidently been looking things over but nothing of any importance had transpired," was Wood's summation in a separate memorandum. See an unsigned carbon copy marked Confidential of what seems to be a memorandum on the Mission's first provincial trip, dated May 29, 1921, at Baguio. Wood Papers, Box 158. The stories of excellent fishing here were obviously not fabrications as Wood made many entries on the superb sport which he enjoyed. Wood, Diary, May 23, 1921.

41 Editorial, "Fuga Island," Philippines Herald, May 12, 1921.
University of the Philippines on the military significance of these islands. Given the most important spot on the front page and with a big head (GEN. WOOD'S TRIP TO FUGA ISLAND HAS BEARING ON FORTIFICATION OF P.I.), the article surely must have disappointed its readers as Craig contented himself with making some routine academic "guesses" (his word) on the relationship of these islands to the defense of the Philippines against the Japanese.\textsuperscript{42}

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Surprising and apparently inexplicable is the fact that no references to Philippine defense problems were made by either Wood or Forbes in any of their preliminary reports to the Secretary of War and the President. Almost as puzzling are the references to this serious and fundamental problem in their final report—only two brief, almost allusive, comments.

"There is no adequate local organization of the Philippine people for defense of the islands against aggression," they declared after having commented on the excellent peacetime police protection by the Constabulary.

"The American Government should at once take the necessary steps to organize, train, and equip such a force."\textsuperscript{43} Their estimate of basic Filipino military abilities was encouraging: "They make brave soldiers, and under good leaders make excellent troops."\textsuperscript{44}

Such seemingly casual treatment would appear to indicate that Philippine national defense problems were considered relatively unimportant by the Wood-Forbes Mission. Yet this judgment is apparently invalid. Actually it would

\textsuperscript{42}Ibid., May 13, 1921.

\textsuperscript{43}H-F Report, p. 23.

\textsuperscript{44}Ibid., p. 18.
seem that both Wood and Forbes refused to entertain the possibility of a completely independent Philippines turned loose in an anarchic world without American military protection so the problems of insular military defense were no more than academic questions for Filipinos. In the future as far as these two men could see into it, problems of Philippine defense would continue to be faced and adequately solved, as they were at that very time, by professional American soldiers and sailors.45

45 A single statement by Wood indicates that he submitted a separate military report to Secretary of War John W. Weeks which was not published along with the Mission's formal report. "I am sending home a copy of the Report with Governor Forbes," Wood wrote to Weeks. "The military report, which will be more or less confidential, will be sent forward in a separate report and will go directly to you. I do not think it should be entered into the official files of the Department [sic] it was a Bureau of Insular Affairs, as it deals with many questions entirely foreign to that department [sic]." See an unsigned carbon copy of a letter dated thus: "Enroute. Kobe, Japan. October 8, 1921." Wood Papers, Box 158.

A personal search in the National Archives failed to uncover this document. A letter for assistance on October 9, 1962, produced a reply dated October 23, 1962, from Victor Gondos, Jr., Chief, Army and Air Corps Branch, National Archives and Records Service, which stated: "A careful examination of the War Department records in our custody failed to disclose a military report submitted by General Leonard Wood, Chairman, Special Mission to the Philippine Islands, to Secretary of War John W. Weeks. We have forwarded a copy of your letter to our Social and Economic Branch for further search; a reply will be made if pertinent information is located." At this date (January 24, 1963) no reply has been received; it is assumed, therefore, that this document was either never sent by Wood or that it has been misfiled in the National Archives.
CHAPTER XIV

CIVIL LIBERTIES AND MINORITY RIGHTS

For representatives of the United States not to have been concerned with those civil liberties and minority rights which had been transplanted from America to the Philippines would indeed have been strange. Their concern for this priceless heritage was often demonstrated, and their distress when this patrimony was abused evoked words as severe as any Wood and Forbes used during their months in the Islands. That the tao, the Pagan tribesman, the Moro, and any member of a minority group however insignificant now possessed able tribunes for their defense was soon obvious.

Not long after the Mission's arrival, Wood became seriously concerned over abuses against the fundamental liberty of free speech. In a memorandum on June 2, he set down a damning indictment of the entire Filipino people and their political leadership which must have been prompted by numerous observed or reported incidents: "No one has shown the slightest interest in safeguarding liberty. ... There is a general lack of civic courage ... the willingness to come out and speak frankly before a crowd on subjects which may not meet with popular approval."¹

In a statement at a public session in Bangued, Abra, on May 26, Wood had urged the people to speak freely. "When there is such a state of affairs that the people cannot talk freely and openly there is not a stable

¹ Memorandum in Wood, Diary, June 2, 1921. In his Diary for June 6 Wood again noted: "No one has shown the slightest interest in safeguarding liberty."
government," was his telling declaration. 2

"One of the characteristics of a people who are fit for government is civic courage, the kind of courage that enables the poor man to come out and talk freely in the presence of senators and rich men," Wood declared in a forceful speech at Catmon, Cebu, on July 9. "They are humans, after all, who wear pants and eat food, plain, every-day, common human beings. They are not to be afraid of."

"Until you speak frankly and bravely in the face of your superiors you are not able to run a stable government," Wood reiterated three days later at Tagbilaran, Bohol. "People tell me things in private that they do not dare to say in public," he explained. "It is a bad sign. If you cannot speak frankly now, when are you going to?" 3

The Commissioners obviously became deeply disturbed by the many charges of reprisals against Filipinos who had expressed their opinions and convictions on insular conditions. Both strongly condemned such invasions of the right of free speech in forthright public statements.

Citing a number of instances where Filipinos had been immediately prosecuted or thrown into jail and required to post heavy bonds because of their complaints before the Mission, Forbes bitterly condemned such practices to the press at Manila on July 25. "If that's the way certain authorities here regard the freedom of speech," he warned, "it will be so recorded and embodied in the report of the mission to Washington. Our report will be

2 Forbes described this speech as typical. Journals, II, 229-30.

3 Wood, Diary, July 9, 12, 1921. This furnishes a particularly glaring example of the liberties which Hagedorn took with his sources in writing a biography of Wood. He has chosen elements from both speeches, intermixed them to his satisfaction, and then presented them in this composite form as a single speech with a footnote reference that would indicate that the same speech was delivered at both places on July 9 and 12. See his Wood, II, 388.
based strictly on facts, nothing but facts,"  

"The mission wants it to be generally known that it proposes to use all the power and influence it has to protect such persons as have spoken to it or any of its members," began an official statement handed to the press the next morning by Wood and Forbes. "These persons can feel confident that we shall ask all the forces of law in the islands to assist us in their protection. We shall back it up with whatever influence we have in Washington, and therefore, anybody who interferes with these persons does so at his peril."

To reporters Wood warned that this situation would "be a determining factor" in their report. "We want to know if freedom of speech is earnest and honest or fake," he explained. "I am sure the people will not stand for any abridgement of this right of theirs, and that any attempt to jeopardize it will be duly protested against by the people and they will demand that it be guaranteed and duly protected." Forbes added that all their power and influence would be used both in the Islands and in Washington to protect those who came with complaints.  

In the records kept by both Commissioners, many entries concerning actual or potential violations of freedom of speech provide background for such public statements. For example, at Bangar, Ilocos Sur, on May 27, Juan Paces was forced from the hall where a public session was being conducted, subjected to violence and his clothes torn because he had spoken against independence, maintaining that the Filipinos were not intelligent enough to run their own government.  

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4 Manila Times, July 25, 1921.  
5 Ibid., July 26, 1921.  
6 Forbes, Journals, II, 231.
when men were called up from the audience to speak, as was his custom, they "came up timidly and seemed literally afraid to talk with any frankness." Others had privately explained that they would not speak openly for fear of violence, including danger to their jobs, their interests, their property, and even their lives. Felix Canuto, former presidente of Pili, Camarines Sur, contributed what Forbes termed "one of the most striking interviews we had. The old gentleman was decidely [sic] in earnest, talked low and seemed afraid of his life." His fears stemmed from his opposition to independencia.

Yet the Mission's public statements did not immediately solve this serious problem. On July 28 a report reached them of a Filipino being pursued by a justice of the peace with pistol in hand because he had told the Mission that he did not consider his people ready for complete independence. Also, constabulary officers who had reported certain crimes and irregularities to the Mission had been subjected to charges and lawsuits for their indiscretions. And as late as August 6, Forbes had to caution the people at a public session in Cagayan, Misamis, to respect freedom of speech.

Rather early in their work, Forbes noticed a problem related to both freedom of speech and of assembly which was directly traceable to the police themselves. "Instances now begin to appear of very obvious interference by the police who were always endeavoring to attend the public session," Forbes noted after they had been at work about a month. At Iriga, Camarines Sur, 

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7 Wood, Diary, June 6, 1921.
8 Ibid., July 14, 1921; Forbes, Journals, II, 80, 94, 217, 254, 285.
9 Ibid., pp. 251-52.
10 Wood, Diary, July 28, 1921; Forbes, Journals, II, 295.
on June 18, a policeman stood at the head of the stairs and selected those who could attend the public meeting, allowing only the well-dressed to enter until Forbes instructed him to allow all to enter. "It was quite common for policemen to hand pick our audience, letting in the illustrados and keeping out the rabble," Forbes noted on this occasion. "I had to take a very vigorous stand on that a good many times."\textsuperscript{11}

Forbes, however, was no man to be challenged by Filipino policemen with impunity. "In one place, I had all the policemen called before me and then marched to the Presidente's office and kept there till the meeting was over," he noted with some show of pride. "They soon got onto the fact that when I said the meeting was free it has to be just that--FREE." At Alang Alang, Leyte, on June 21, he had another bout with the police in which he used a different maneuver to outwit them. When the policemen stood on the stairs and would not allow the populace to enter, Forbes stopped the meeting, had the children come to the front and sit on the floor, and then ordered the police away so that the vacant spaces could be filled by all who desired to enter. "... I regret that I have to request the municipal police to keep away from the doors because they seem to have the idea that they can choose who is to come in," Forbes stated to the people of Jaro, Leyte, when the same difficulty again developed. "The Filipino people have been talking to us a great deal of liberty and this is one form of liberty that we are trying to give to the people."\textsuperscript{12}

But the Filipino record in respecting the fundamental freedoms was not all this poor. After someone in a private interview at Malolos, Bulacan,

\textsuperscript{11}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 253.

\textsuperscript{12}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 120, 262.
on June 6 had complained of interference with his religion, Forbes entered this comment (obviously amplified after their work was concluded): "This was the only case in all our travels through the Islands where any complaint in regard to religious worship of any sort was made, excepting the fear of the Moros as to what would happen to their religion with general education."\[13\]

Although there was no official reply to these serious charges, a statement was given to the press at the Ayuntamiento (the Philippine capitol) on July 28 by Representative Leuterio, who was described as "one of the influential members of the house." "The Philippines have been governed by law and not by influence," he asserted. "Freedom of speech has always been respected in our country." The best proof of this, he claimed, was "the toleration given to the opposition and its press organ, especially the latter which every day comes out with insults against the nacionalista [sic] party and its members, decorating them with all kinds of epithets." For their future guidance, he had this advice for all Filipinos: "I strongly maintain that so long as the nacionalista party remain in power and is trusted by the people, so long will the law and freedom of speech be held sacred and respected."\[14\]

"The right of free speech does not exist."\[15\] Such was the blunt testimony of H. B. McCoy, an American long resident in the Philippines. "Any person, be he American or Filipino, who ventures to criticize the Government in its conduct of public business or its public policies, or an officer of the Government, or ventures to express an opinion on the question

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\[13\] Ibid., p. 235.

\[14\] Manila Times, July 28, 1921.

\[15\] Underlined for emphasis by McCoy.
of 'Independence' contrary to that announced by the leaders of the dominant political party," he explained, "does so at his peril and is liable to boycott by the officers and agents of the Government as now constituted, and are believed by many to be in danger both as to person and property."  

In reporting to the President on this fundamentally important topic, the Commissioners' words were few, their language was restrained, but their meaning was clear:

Too often there has been a marked disinclination on the part of individuals, especially Filipinos not in sympathy with immediate or absolute independence, to state their opinion openly, for the reason that they feared loss of standing or persecution if they did so. Their fears were genuine and, unhappily, there is evidence that their apprehensions were well grounded.  

One of the more serious invasions of personal liberty involved peonage, or what Forbes simply labeled "slavery." Apparently it was particularly serious in Sorsogon Province where Forbes described conditions in one barrio as "a horrible state of affairs." Two cases involving young girls at different barrios which Forbes personally investigated he bluntly described as "A clear case of slavery," and "another clear case of slavery."  

On August 9 at Dapitan, Zamboanga, one young orator foolishly sought to counter such charges in a speech to Forbes:

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17 W-F Report, p. 11.

18 Forbes, Journals, II, 95, 97.
One poor little boy representing the "rising generation" incurred my displeasure by telling me the Filipinos didn't want to continue in slavery. I made him repeat his words, and then thundered at him that I resented any such description of what America had done for the Philippines. I told him that for three consecutive years the Assembly had declined to approve a law penalizing slavery on the ground that it didn't exist in the Islands. I explained what slavery meant, told of our efforts to cure the Filipinos of the practice of making virtual slaves of some of their servants. I told him that his characterization of the present condition of the Filipinos as slaves was an insult to the American Government and to the Filipino people. I demanded that he withdraw his words and apologize for using them. This he did, wiping the sweat from his face, and then proceeded lamely with what remained of his speech.19

It was in Sorsogon and neighboring Albay Province that the Commissioners found "caciqueism," a condition wherein a powerful local political boss ruled virtually a feudal domain, particularly serious. Wood described it as "rather dominant" in Albay, and Forbes noted that Sorsogon had "caciqueism in its most aggravating form." Not only was peonage more common in such areas but also obvious intimidation which kept the people from coming to the Mission's public sessions when the caciques appeared.20

As the Mission moved into the rugged mountain regions of northern Luzon to inspect the Pagan mountain tribesmen, Forbes was in an area and among a people long familiar to him. To assist in this work, the Mission called upon Professor H. Otley Beyer of the University of the Philippines, who had made a special study of these peoples.21

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19 Ibid., p. 138. "This was an enthusiastic little fool and I was very harsh with him." Forbes added in a note. "I was a little sorry afterwards to have ridden so roughshod over so young a person. His speech received no applause and the public felt he had blundered heavily." Ibid., p. 302.


21 Los Angeles Times, May 15, 1921.
At Bontoc, capital of Mountain Province, a delegation of tribesmen complained to Forbes that their taxes were higher than in the lowlands and that they were forced to work on the roads ten days a year while the Christians at lower elevations had to work but five days. They also complained that they were being made into virtual slaves and forced to carry heavy cargoes on their heads over the mountain trails. Whatever their problems, however, they were apparently fully confident that Forbes would remedy them. "The high taxes are supposed to be part of a plot to drive these people out of the mountains," Philip Kinsley cabled, "as they constitute a difficult problem for the Filipinos." 22

"Among other unpleasing innovations," which Forbes heard about in private interviews at Tulubin, Mountain Province, "the savages here are compelled to carry the loads of the Filipino merchants, failing which they are punished by the local presidente by making them do a day's work—farm or municipal cleaning or improvements." Forbes's comment was cryptic: "A fine idea of liberty theirs." 23

The Mission also discovered that freedom of speech for these Pagans had been seriously compromised. A delegation of Igorots at Bontoc and of Ifugaos at Payawan, an investigation revealed, had both been told what to say to the Mission by Filipino políticos who had used threats to secure compliance. 24

Another of the Pagan tribes inspected were the Negritos, those small,
negroid, nomadic aborigines of the Philippine forests whose weapons were the bow and arrow. A Negrito woman confined to the old Spanish prison at Batangas for infanticide drew the sympathetic attention of the Mission but their investigation was inconclusive.  

When the Mission began their investigation among the Moros in the southern islands members of this minority group were strangely hesitant in freely speaking their minds, even to Wood whom they had learned to trust and respect during his years of service among them. And this reluctance to speak openly was to continue, with some dramatic exceptions, throughout Moroland, based upon the fear that they would be punished by the Filipinos.  

But at Jolo, Moro criticism of Filipino mistreatment reached a peak. Arolas Tulawi, one of the leading Moros of the area, declared in a public meeting that during the last eight years they had been treated worse than dogs. And on the following day Forbes held a conference with three pango-limas, those second in importance to the datus, who declared that the Moros had been unfairly treated by the Filipinos.  

In a petition to the President of the United States through the Mission, fifty-seven of the most prominent men of Jolo complained that "The Philippine Legislature has failed to legislate any laws for the benefit of the Moro people." Specifically, they charged that a lack of proper legislation in the realm of religion and marriage had made their wives concubines and their children illegitimate.  

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25 Exclusive dispatch by Philip Kinsley, Los Angeles Times, June 17, 1921.

26 Forbes, Journals, II, 139.

27 Associated Press dispatches, Manila Times, August 20, 21, 1921.

Following the Mission's visit to Lanao Province, a deadly feud broke out between Moros and the Constabulary. The first news of this had reached Manila in a telegram dated August 17, and sent from Iligan, Lanao, to Yeater by an S. Lyon, identified only as an American oil prospector in Mindanao. Declaring that Datu Ami Benaning together with three of his men and one woman and a girl had been killed and others had been wounded by the Constabulary on August 13, that on the following day the Constabulary had beaten up six Moros "without cause," that other prominent datus of Lanao Province were in fear of their lives because they had made complaints to Wood, the telegram explained that a Constabulary officer had told the datus that all who complained to the Mission would be killed. The Moros requested that Yeater telegraph the Governor of Lanao and the Constabulary not to kill them and also send an American to investigate. "Please take action at once otherwise we will all be killed without cause," was their plea. Also, "Notify General Wood."  

Investigation followed by Constabulary officers upon orders from their chief, General Crame. "The apparent cause of the agitation is against Filipino officials and schools," a preliminary report from an officer in Lanao explained.  

When notified of these events, the Mission searched their records and discovered that Benaning had been one of the datus who had so enthusiastically demonstrated against the Filipino government and for continued American sovereignty at Camp Keithley. The Mindanao Herald observed that "if rumors

29 Manila Times, August 18, 1921. A brief, rough summary of this telegram was printed by the San Francisco Chronicle, August 19, 1921.

30 Manila Times, August 18, 19, 1921. Quote taken from the latter source.

31 Associated Press dispatches, Manila Times, August 22, 1921, New York
are true, it might have been better for Amai Binaning [sic] to have made his complaints secretly instead of openly as he did. He might be alive now." 32

Although Wood decided not to return to Lanao to investigate this incident and the various conflicting charges, Forbes rejected the Filipinos' justification of the Constabulary's action: "The story sounds fishy to me. I believe they wanted to make an example of him to show that the Filipinos were still in the saddle." 33 In another private comment, Forbes was even more emphatic: "[He] . . . was murdered almost immediately after an interview, on a trumped-up charge . . . ." 34

Of all the minority groups in the Philippines, the Chinese certainly least needed help in maintaining their rights; in fact, some Filipinos claimed that they occupied a favored position. 35 The Chinese were, however, seriously concerned with one recent law which was obviously discriminatory and a serious handicap in the conduct of their business.

The Chinese Chamber of Commerce strongly urged the Mission's intervention to secure the repeal of Act No. 2972 which had been passed by the

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32 Reprinted in the Manila Times, August 29, 1921.

33 Forbes, Journals, II, 291-92. Forbes states that it was Datu Amai Nanabiling who was killed. For additional on these incidents, and particularly on the replies of the responsible Filipinos involved, see more material in the above references and in the following: Associated Press dispatch, New York Times, August 23; Los Angeles Times; August 20, 1921.

34 Forbes, Journals, II, 215.

35 For example, see comments by Pedro Abaton at Oroquieta, Misamis, August 8, 1921, in "Specimen Notes Taken Public Session." BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.
Philippine Legislature the preceding February. This "Bookkeeping Law" required all merchants to keep their accounts in English, Spanish, or a native dialect.

"There are upwards of 15,000 Chinese merchants in the Philippine Islands," they claimed, "for the most part retail merchants located in practically every town and village in the country. They and their predecessors have been so conducting business in this country for three centuries and upwards." An admission that few spoke any language but Chinese and that they conducted between seventy-five and eighty-five percent of the Islands' internal and external commerce undoubtedly went far to explain the Filipinos' antagonism. Thus their conclusion seems entirely reasonable: "They [the Filipinos] desire [by this law] to drive him [the Chinese merchant] from the country for the sole reason that his industry, thrift and commercial skill have been rewarded, while the usual result has attended those who toil not."36

Ray Atherton's comments surely would have received a mixed reception from both Filipinos and Chinese. After repeating the truism that the Chinese controlled business in the Islands (because "the native Filipino . . . lacks business ability"), he concluded with this summary comment:

The present number of Chinese . . . cannot be considered a menace and are unusually well thought of. Unlimited immigration, however, should be rendered impossible as they are parasites in the Islands and make a livelihood only through the native Filipino's poor business ability; furthermore, a large Chinese community in any Filipino town tends to create an immoral, unhealthy atmosphere to which the native is very susceptible and by which the Chinese is apt to profit.37

36 Copy of a letter, Chinese Chamber of Commerce to Wood and Forbes, Manila, April 29, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits. At Calbayog, Samar, which had a large Chinese community, the Mission received a written protest against this law which asserted that they would be forced to leave the country unless it were repealed. New York Times, June 25, 1921. For some reason this petition apparently did not become a part of the Mission's permanent exhibits.

37 BIA, W-F Mission File.
Ignoring such aspects of the "Chinese problem" in their final report, Wood and Forbes mentioned this minority but once, and then almost as an aside. "Racially, the mass of the Filipino population is of Malayan stock . . .," they explained. "Chinese and Spanish race mixtures are common among the wealthy and better-educated classes, this mixture seeming to strengthen the native stock."\(^{38}\) Hardly could they have made a more gratuitous comment for Filipinos than this observation on the superiority of Chinese blood over native Malay.

CHAPTER XV

PUBLIC EDUCATION

Although Wood had been selected as head of the University of Pennsylvania before leaving for the Philippines and Forbes had been a member of the Board of Visitors of the University of the Philippines during his years as Governor General, and although both men were well educated (Wood had received an M.D. degree from Harvard Medical School and Forbes a B.A. from Harvard College), their investigation of the Philippine educational system would appear to have been somewhat cursory. Not being professional educators, however, they may have felt unqualified and therefore reluctant to probe beneath the academic surface. But in other specialized fields they had obtained expert assistance in their work. Why they should not also have done this for education is puzzling.

Yet their comments on the insular school system, both as to structure and function, would indicate that they were aware of educational conditions throughout their months in the Islands, particularly competency in the use of English. Their words leave no doubt that they considered educational attainments to constitute one of the principal avenues leading toward the goal of an independent nationality for the Filipino people.

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The vast majority of the Mission's inspections of Philippine education, it would seem, received little or no publicity. 1 It is a matter of record, however, that both Commissioners visited the two most important universities

1References to such general inspection activities may be seen in the following: Manila Times, July 10, 1921; Associated Press dispatch, Ibid., August 23, 1921.
in the Manila area. Wood delivered an address at the University of Santo Tomas, conducted by the Dominican Order since 1611 and thus the oldest university under the American flag.\(^2\) Forbes followed suit by speaking at the University of the Philippines, the national, public university which had been established in 1908.\(^3\)

Also of interest to the Mission were teachers' institutes, some of which even merited the unusual concession of an address by one of the Commissioners. On May 15, they visited a school teachers' summer camp near Baguio where some two hundred American and four hundred Filipino teachers heard Wood declare that "the work of the teachers is one of the most important features in the upbuilding of the Filipino people."\(^4\) That evening about thirty American district superintendents of public schools from all parts of the Archipelago held a conference at Mansion House, the summer residence of the Governor General, with both Wood and Forbes.\(^5\)

A few days later they addressed some six hundred teachers from the northern provinces of Luzon at a normal institute in Laoag, Ilocos Norte. "You should instruct your pupils in something more than figures and the lines in books," Wood urged. "You should teach them to realize their obligations to the Government, to society, and to respect the dignity of labor and to apply themselves to agriculture, for the wealth of the Philippines is in the soil."\(^6\)

\(^2\)San Francisco Chronicle, July 7, 1921. Wood also attended the formal ceremonies marking the opening of the new school year at the University of the Philippines on July 1. Manila Daily Bulletin, July 2, 1921.

\(^3\)New York Times, September 13, 1921.

\(^4\)Ibid., May 17, 1921.

\(^5\)Manila Times, May 16, 1921.

\(^6\)Associated Press dispatch, New York Times, Los Angeles Times, San
At Vigan, Ilocos Sur, they again spoke to more than six hundred teachers. Here at the Vigan Normal Institute the academic response was doubtless somewhat difficult to categorize and file; three cheers for the United States, Harding, and for Wood and Forbes. 7

That Filipinos should generally have been proud of the rapid advance of their public educational system is understandable. But some were rather inordinate in their praise, such as the members of the Rising Sun Literary Society who asserted that their "splendid system of education . . . [was] even superior to that in vogue in the United States and most other [sic] countries of Europe." 8

Also obviously proud of their school system were the teachers at a Normal Institute in Malolos, Bulacan, who asked for "IMMEDIATE INDEPENDENCE at an early date," in a nicely typed document in exceptionally good English signed by 366 pedagogs. They emphasized that "The opposition to . . . independence, based upon the lack of common language, has already been upset by the fact that thruout [sic] the Islands English is serving as a common tongue. . . ." 9

Two municipalities cited school attendance figures to impress the

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Commissioners with the effectiveness of their educational systems. Badoc, Ilocos Norte, claimed that 847 boys and 433 girls out of a population of 13,040 were attending their twelve public schools. 10 Bauang, La Union, declared that out of a population of some thirteen thousand people 2,054 students had been enrolled in the elementary and intermediate grades during the preceding school year. Some 139 high school students were also enrolled, principally in the Provincial High School, and eighteen college students were claimed—eight in the universities of Manila, and quite surprisingly, ten in the United States. This doubtless explains the high rate of literacy claimed for Bauang: from 80 to 90 percent in a nation which, they declared, only averaged 65 percent. 11

Yet not all Filipinos were so confident that their public schools had adequately prepared them for independence. A remarkable petition (dated March 24, 1921, at Kabayan, Benguet, located some sixty kilometers northeast of Baguio, in one of the wildest sections of Luzon, and reached largely by mountain trail), was signed by fourteen "principales" who declared that they were not yet ready for independence but "that more insular aid for the construction and maintenance of schools, better chances for Igorots who have been to school, better facilities of transportation will improve our intellec-


11 A petition, nicely typed in English, in the form of a long letter dated May 27, 1921, prepared by the residents of the municipality of Bauang, the Bauang Civic Club, and the local Women's Club and signed by 324 persons. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits. Unfortunately, official statistics do not substantiate Bauang's fine claim as to literacy levels, but indicate a combined literacy rate for all Filipino residents of Bauang ten years of age or older, both males and females, of 56.6%. Table No 26, "Literacy and illiteracy, according to sex, by municipalities," Census of the Philippine Islands [1918], II (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1921), 788.
tual, economic and social conditions sooner than anything else." And a parish priest at Calapan, Mindoro, made very serious charges against the local public school system to Forbes: "[He] . . . said that favoritism ran riot. A school teacher in the town of Pola had seduced three or four of his students and had been caught in the act; he had been whitewashed by the Division Superintendent. He said immorality prevailed in the schools. . . ."  

In the seven towns of Iloilo Province at which Wood held public meetings on July 19, the chief topic of the speakers was education in preparation for independence. At Arevalo one speaker did not ask for independence but for further education of the Filipino people as the surest road to the attainment of independence. Thousands of school children greeted the Mission during this day, and at Oton each grade carried a banner demanding English as the only official Philippine language.  

Certainly the Mission concurred in this concern for adequate training in English. In an address on Bohol Island, Wood urged his audience to "Build for solidarity by studying the English language hard. Then begin to think and work alive." Forbes encouraged the study of English by refusing to allow one young man to address a public session at Cagayan, Misamis, who could speak only Spanish. And even Quezon admitted to Wood that much of the English

12 BIA, W-F Report Exhibits. Someone has written a note on this document: "This was written and circulated by one of the leading Igorote [sic] school boys of the Province." The quality of the English used and the excellence of the typing would seem to indicate that he was either a remarkably superior student or else he had received help with this project. The correct spelling for the Pagan tribe is either the Americanized "Igorot" or the Spanish "Igorot," but variations are common.

13 Forbes, Journals, II, 246.

14 Manila Times, July 21, 1921.

15 Los Angeles Times, July 19, 1921.

16 Forbes, Journals, II, 295.
being taught was nearly unintelligible and that additional American teachers were urgently needed.17

Among the Moros education had been a mixed force with some fearing that the public schools were destroying the religious foundations of their society which had led to serious breaches in public order.18 Yet an entirely different picture of education in Moroland was portrayed by Philip Kinsley in depicting what Forbes encountered in Misamis Province, Mindanao, where farm schools were slowly transforming the primitive living conditions.19

Knowing the Moros and their problems intimately, Wood attempted to impress them in all his talks with "the necessity for education, in order that they may be able to fill most of the official positions in their own land."20 And he promised that the public schools would never interfere with their religion.21

Although Wood was tremendously stirred by Moro loyalty to America, he fully realized that their future lay with the Filipinos, as equals bearing their share of the privileges and burdens of government. In a great room of a native house at Marahui on the shores of Lake Lanao, he gathered the leading men of the area on August 4 to explain his concept of their future. "It was a wonderful picture," he wrote in his Diary, "the house with its chests, inlaid metal jars, etc., representing just such booty as might have been found

17 Wood, Diary, June 4, 1921.

18 Such complaints were heard by the Mission from datus at a public meeting held at Dulawan, Cotabato Province, on August 12, and from one of the leading Moros of Jolo at a public meeting on August 19. Manila Times, August 17, 21, 1921.

19 See a special dispatch by leased wire to the San Francisco Chronicle, August 14, 1921.

20 Wood, Diary, August 19, 1921.

21 Ibid., August 12, 1921.
in the capture of an Arab chief or a Moors' stronghold a thousand years ago...

Explained to them how education would always prevail over ignorance [Wood summarized in his Diary]. . . . Told them that they and the Filipinos were of the same blood and came from the same primitive stock, the great Malay stock, which covered a great empire and represented hundreds of millions of people; how they, an isolated Mohammedan group, could only be preserved by being educated and having their own men in the legislature of the Islands, developing their own teachers; in other words, preparing themselves to fight for their rights in the great civil contests which mark the lives of all civilized peoples.22

One Moslem priest protested to Forbes that the boys who attended the public schools neglected the study of the Koran. "We soon saw the trouble," Forbes explained, "as a group of boys from the Agricultural School came aboard, progressive young Moros, who talked English well, who remarked easily: 'There's nothing to the Koran. We're learning how to live and take care of animals and grow crops.' No wonder the old fellows protested." But Forbes assured the priest that there would be no interference with their religion and that they could do as the Christians and teach religion outside the school hours.23

Yet the Mission saw evidence that the opposition of the Moro leaders to public education was disappearing. The influential Sultan of Sulu, for example, had been travelling around the Islands urging that children be sent to school and the datu had followed his lead.24 And Wood praised the Moro

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22 Ibid., August 4, 1921.

23 Forbes, Journals, II, 130.

24 Ibid., p. 309. Forbes observed that "His interest in schools has extended to taking away a fifteen-year old girl from school and making her his wife, which he did a month ago. He introduced me to this young lady and she told me the rest, she speaking English very nicely and well." Ibid., p. 310. Forbes also commented favorably on educational advances among the Moros in Ibid., pp. 149-50.
women at Zamboanga for their interest in education, declaring that they excelled the men in supporting the schools. 25

"Good progress" was the Commissioners' terse cabled judgment to Weeks in the realm of Moro public education. In agriculture they noted "great improvement," undoubtedly attributable, at least in part, to the work of the schools. 26

"The Filipino teachers are earnest in many places and have made good records but they do not have sufficient knowledge themselves of the English language to teach it well and more Americans are needed," was Kinsley's early conclusion. "The buildings are poor and ramshackle," he continued. "The natives have failed to improve what the Americans started. The people of the barrios are indolent naturally unprogressive and have no initiative." 27 But few other Americans were willing publicly to make such caustically critical comments.

In the opinion of Captain H. L. Heath, president of the American Chamber of Commerce of Manila, the Filipinos had not prepared themselves for an independent national existence through a good educational system. He also felt that "A universal language must be learned before any sort of national character and capacity has a chance to predominate among the people and become the foundation whereupon a self-government institution can be erected." 28

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25 Supplementary Memorandum in Wood, Diary, August 15, 1921.

26 Extract of Cable No. 852 from the Governor General of the Philippine Islands to the Secretary of War, September 4, 1921. BIA, W-F Mission File.

27 Cablegram by Kinsley from Baguio as quoted in a cablegram, De Veyra to Quezon, Washington, D.C., June 25, 1921. BIA, W-F Mission File.

28 New York Times, September 13, 1921.
Only from behind a mask of anonymity were other American residents willing to comment. Of the prominent Americans interrogated by questionnaire, the majority agreed that following independence the use of English would die out or disintegrate into a patois. So, apparently, these men were certain that the educational attainments of the American-instituted public schools were distinctly transitory in their impact.

To the American Legion, continuance of this educational system was of prime importance. In order to accomplish this, they were convinced that many more American teachers should be recruited.

Although American Army officers were concerned only incidentally with the insular educational system, their appraisals of its accomplishments were uniformly harsh. "About half even of the adults are wholly illiterate human animals with uncultivated minds and limited vision [and] . . . dim of intelligence," was the unflattering appraisal of General Kernan. Colonel Rhodes was concerned with the high illiteracy rate, the small percentage of well educated Filipinos, and the "dense ignorance and . . . yawning gulf between the upper and the lower" strata of society. "The intellectual sense of

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29 CONSOLIDATION OF ANSWERS TO TWO QUESTIONNAIRES ADDRESSED TO AMERICANS OF HIGH STANDING, FAMILIAR WITH THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, AND COVERING ENTIRED ARCHIPELAGO. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

30 Letter, American Legion of the Philippine Islands to the Wood-Forbes Commission, Manila, September 3, 1921, signed by S. D. Rowlands, Commander, and P. D. Carman, Adjutant, Philippine Department, American Legion. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.


32 Paper, OUR PRESENT AND FUTURE POLICY IN THE PHILIPPINES by Colonel C. D. Rhodes, General Staff, Chief of Staff, Headquarters Philippine Department, Manila, P.I., April 20, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.
the average Filipino is not highly developed, and the moral or purposive element of his mentality is developed even less than the element of intelligence," was Major Smith's harsh conclusion.\(^{33}\) It would seem fortunate that these severe indictments were carefully restricted by the Mission.\(^ {34}\)

Among the prominent American civilians who communicated with the Mission, H. B. McCoy was concerned with the deterioration of the public school system, primarily because of the depleted American teaching force, with one of the principal results being a lowering of the level of instruction in English until it was "in a large proportion of schools of such a variety as to be unintelligible." This in turn had retarded the use of English by the government in such activities as the legislature and the court system.\(^ {35}\)

In Worcester's opinion the Filipinos took "more interest in the maintenance and development of the educational system than in any other one thing. . . ." Yet he was convinced that its apex, the University of the Philippines, including the medical and nursing schools, had "deteriorated and is no longer a creditable institution."

The principal troubles with the public school system, he felt, were insufficient buildings and teachers, and the loss of many American teachers who had been replaced with "relatively incompetent" Filipinos. Yet in spite

\(^{33}\) STATISTICAL DATA ON THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS AND A GENERAL STUDY OF ISSUES AFFECTING THE FUTURE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE PHILIPPINES FROM THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW. Signed by Major John P. Smith, General Staff, Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

\(^{34}\) These Army documents were filed together with others under a cover bearing this title: THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY RELATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS TO THE UNITED STATES. The cover was also stamped "CONFIDENTIAL 'B' File" with a notation that they were declassified August 13, 1932. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

\(^{35}\) Letter, McCoy to Wood and Forbes, Manila, July 16, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.
of such serious defects, Worcester believed that the public elementary school system constituted "about the best job that the present government has done." 36

Probably because they were more pleased with the progress in education than in most other areas, the Mission was somewhat freer in their public comments on this topic. With the addition of their periodic and confidential interim reports to Washington, it is possible to reconstruct their reactions as their inspection progressed.

Near the conclusion of their first provincial inspection trip, both Wood and Forbes stated to the press that they had been favorably impressed with the schools. They asserted, however, that there was a need for at least two thousand American teachers, instead of the fewer than four hundred then present, in order to spread the use of English and thus develop a common language throughout the Archipelago. 37 Wood had been particularly impressed by the Nueva Ecija Agricultural High School at Munoz, which had about 800 students from all parts of the Islands. He judged it to be "well conceived and well carried out," and generally "an admirable institution and one which should be developed in several places in the Islands." "Agriculture is almost the sole source of wealth here," he noted before offering some advice to Filipinos, "and if they divide the crop of lawyers and so-called [sic] doctors by about five and have them study agriculture, we should be much

36 Letter, Dean C. Worcester to the Special Mission to the Philippine Islands, Manila, August 5, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

37 Manila Times, May 31, 1921; Associated Press dispatch, San Francisco Chronicle, June 1, 1921.
better off."

After having covered that part of the Philippines which contained more than half the total population, the Mission still expressed much satisfaction with public education, which one of them characterized as "the brightest spot in the Philippines." Both Wood and Forbes added their continuing praise but again stated that the most urgent need was for more American teachers.

"Keen interest everywhere in public schools, which are overflowing," Wood cabled Washington shortly before departing on their final inspection trip.

"English not going forward as it should due to shortage American teachers needed to teach English, especially in high and normal schools, which are turning out native teachers."%40

In a speech at Oroquieta, Misamis, Forbes generously praised the educational system. "We are glad to see the great interest in the public schools," he said. "There has been a fine development in that connection since I left eight years ago."%41

In a long, confidential cablegram of September 11 summarizing their findings and recommendations after they had completed their final report, the Commissioners were lavish in their commendation. "We can not say too much in praise of the enthusiasm and progress which the Filipinos have made," they stated, "and the sacrifices they are ready to incur in behalf of educa-

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38 Wood, Diary, May 16, 1921.

39 New York Times, San Francisco Chronicle, June 30, 1921. In his notes, Forbes recorded that Pangasinan Province had "very good schools," and that Dolores, Samar, had citizens whose "record of public spirit in the matter of aiding the schools was admirable." Journals, II, 219, 265.

40 Cablegram, Wood to Weeks, Manila, July 25, 1921. BIA, W-F Mission File.

41 "Specimen Notes Taken Public Session [Oroquieta, Misamis, August 8, 1921]." BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.
tion of their children." After having noted the marked advancement that had been made with more than a million students in school, the Commissioners asserted that it was doubtful "if any people ever made such great progress in so limited a time." In particular, they praised the Filipino record in establishing schools, especially agricultural ones, for the non-Christian minority groups.

Yet Wood and Forbes apparently held the school system responsible, at least indirectly, for the virtual non-existence of an "instructed public opinion" largely because of "the lack of a common language and a widely read daily press." They were "glad to note, however, great enthusiasm for acquiring English as a common language."42

During their more than four months in the Islands, the Mission's enthusiasm for Philippine public education quite obviously steadily increased. By the time they wrote their final report, the most appropriate phrase which came to their minds for describing Filipino endeavors in this area was, "beyond praise," which they used twice within a few pages.

"Their [the Filipinos'] support and aid in the building up of public education is beyond praise," Wood and Forbes declared in a section on "The Philippine People." "They have sacrificed much that their children might be able to go to school, and the interests of an entire family are often subordinated to sending the selected member to a higher school or university," they explained. "Schoolhouses are often constructed by voluntary contributions of labor, money, and material."43

42 Cable No. 861, Yeater to Weeks, Manila, September 11, 1921. BIA, W-F Mission File.
43 W-F Report, p. 18.
"The Filipinos are deeply interested in public education. Their enthusiasm, their keenness to secure education for their children is beyond praise," the Commissioners declared once again in a section on education. "The progressive development of the school system has been phenomenal." Yet, despite this generous praise, they admitted that "enthusiasm has at times outrun prudence, and expansion has taken place so rapidly that efficiency has not been able to keep pace." Any mistakes, however, had "resulted from enthusiasm in a noble cause—the education of the youth of the islands."

"One of the principal objects of the schools is to teach the children to speak English, so that it may become the language of the people," they declared. "This is of vital importance, as it will form a bond of union for the numerous and more or less distinct language groups and establish a common medium of communication, which will make for efficiency in government and tend to build up a spirit of solidarity."

But having established the critical importance of instruction in English, the Commissioners admitted that serious problems were hampering this program. Not only was there "a great shortage of English-speaking teachers," but, even more distressing, "many of the Filipino teachers who are instructing in English are themselves far from proficient in it." To remedy this acute problem, they recommended a sharp increase in the number of American teachers to about one thousand (a table gives only 316 for 1920) "if instruction in English is to be rapidly and successfully pushed forward," together with "an intensive course in English for the native teachers during the summer months."

Concerning technical and professional education, the Mission concluded that the needs of the country were not being met. "The University of the Philippines is an institution full of promise," they declared of the single most important element in this deficiency, "but is not meeting the demands
upon it in as satisfactory a manner as could reasonably be expected." As specific suggestions, they listed the "urgent need of Americans of high standing and capacity for the heads of some departments," and an "urgently necessary" general reorganization, including the unsound area of business management. Specific criticisms were also leveled at a number of individual schools within the university: the medical school, the college of agriculture, the veterinary college, and the college of education.

Ending their discussion on a positive note, Wood and Forbes praised two specific emphases in the overall educational program. "A serious effort has been made ... to impress upon the children the dignity of labor," they wrote, "and we are glad to say that good progress has been made." In particular, they expressed pleasure at the strong programs in agricultural and industrial training for boys throughout the entire school system and domestic science and hygiene for the girls. They also were encouraged by the "strong interest in athletics throughout the public-school system and in the university." This, they noted, had "received the strong encouragement of the Philippine people." 44

Thus ended the formal evaluation of Philippine educational attainments by the Wood-Forbes Mission. Their pleasure at what they had discovered was obvious—and progressive as their work had proceeded. Surely both Wood and Forbes, as well as the políticos, would have been pleased if many more areas had produced conclusions and recommendations as pleasant and as positive as these.

44 Ibid., pp. 28-30. The disturbances in Moro regions caused by public education policies were apparently considered more deficiencies in public administration than in the realm of educational policies and administration. At least this was discussed in the final report under public order rather than education.
CHAPTER XVI

PUBLIC HEALTH

Quite commonly it was forgotten that General Leonard Wood was also Dr. Wood, with an M.D. degree from esteemed Harvard Medical School, because his fame had been earned principally as a soldier and colonial administrator in Cuba rather than as a physician. Yet if any of the politicōs, either through ignorance or presumption, assumed that the medical and public health phases of the Mission's work would be treated rather cursorily, they were certainly in error.

Although little publicity was given to the Mission's routine inspection activities in this area,1 glaring defects—such as the incompetent administration of the prison hospital at San Ramon Penal Farm2—or outstanding achievements—such as Culion Leper Colony3—were well publicized.

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Yet the lack of publicity for the Mission's public health inspections should not be interpreted to mean that this important area was therefore neglected. Certainly the many entries made in their personal records would indicate otherwise.

"It is a remarkable thing that while there have been some general

1 For example, Wood's inspection of the provincial hospital at Cebu, which he declared was being competently run, is a very uncommon reference to this type of activity in the press. Manila Times, July 10, 1921.

2 For this shocking story—which, it must be admitted, was primarily an indictment against the impartial administration of justice rather than the maladministration of a medical facility—see the prior chapter on justice.

3 See a discussion later in this chapter.
complaints on some features of government," Wood noted during the first provincial inspection trip, "there has been nowhere the slightest interest shown in the death rate or the securing of medicines or the building up of a better system for the care of the people; no single request for a hospital, no single request for facilities for handling the insane." "No hospitals, maternity wards or anything of this kind anywhere along this coast [Ilocos area] or in Abra [Province]," was his pained notation the next day. "Strangely enough, there has not yet been a single request for hospitals," he incredulously observed. "They simply die like sheep." His indignation may be understood better from a statistic noted for this area: "Infant mortality about forty percent a year." And Wood's incredulity continued during the second phase of their provincial inspections. "Up to date," he noted on June 6, "there has been, with one exception, no argument for hospitals or better sanitation."4

During their first provincial trip, the Mission discovered that even though hospitals had been built their facilities were not always available to the needy populace. At Cervantes, Ilocos Sur, a hospital had been recently built but had never been opened; in fact, for some unexplained reason, the district doctors and nurses had even been taken away and the free distribution of quinine, which the natives had depended upon for forty years, had been discontinued, so that children were coming to school shivering with malaria.5

After inspecting a hospital in Albay Province, Forbes made this reluctant entry: "I am sorry to say that the hospital was in bad shape."6

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4Wood, Diary, May 25, 26, June 6, 1921.
5Forbes, Journals, II, 78.
6Ibid., p. 101.
And Bowditch reported that Butuan, Agusan, had a model but unpopular hospital which had never been adequately staffed or supplied with medicines, particularly for the poor who could not pay.\(^7\)

At Iwahig Penal Colony the doctor was judged by Forbes to be "utterly worthless and malaria raging," largely because the Department of Health had been miserly in providing medicine and money. Wood was "pretty mad" upon finding that all the men in the hospital were "dressed in full working uniform with blankets over them to conceal the fact."\(^8\)

Similar indignation was provoked by conditions at the large leper colony on Culion Island, which Forbes judged to be "in bad shape, the people underfed and the Americans not well treated. The whole thing looked slipshod." The facilities were not adequate for the some five thousand inmates and careless administration allowed healthy children to live among the lepers. "The worst thing about it all," Forbes felt, "is that they have now found a treatment that bids fair to cure many lepers but the government won't supply this and the lepers are getting worse and dying as before." The official excuse of insufficient funds Forbes dismissed contemptuously.\(^9\)

And conditions were found to be no better in the capital city of Manila. Apparently having been strongly impressed by his visit that day to the insane asylum and the facilities for lepers, tubercular patients, and


\(^9\)*Ibid.*, pp. 157-58. Some 300 lepers were receiving injections of chaulmoogra oil, a recent development then being publicized by American doctors in Hawaii. It was claimed that these had shown remarkable improvement and that only lack of funds prevented all from being similarly treated. The three physicians in the group (General Wood, Dr. Victor Heiser, and Colonel W. F. Lewis) "left a silver lining to the dark clouds hovering over the unfortunate inhabitants": Dr. Heiser, "one of the world's greatest specialists on leprosy," and Dr. Lewis of the Army Health Service, assured the lepers
those with venereal diseases, Wood utilized the social occasion of a dinner
given by Quezon bluntly to tell the chief político that what he had observed
constituted the strongest indictment so far of the Filipino people.10 To
his wife, Wood was more specific: "The insane hospital here [San Lazaro]
would be a disgrace to the middle ages. . . ."11 And an important related
institution, the Bureau of Science, was also severely judged: "... one of
the most efficient American establishments in the Far East has been prac-
tically wiped out."12

Yet when the Mission found good public health conditions they were
not reluctant to note them. In Cebu, for example, Wood inspected what he
termed "a very good little general hospital." But, unfortunately for the
políticos, he gave most of the credit to an interested American, a certain
Major Pond.13 And late in their work of inspection, Wood found "a very
good" hospital at Cotabato, Mindanao, which he judged to be "in excellent
condition." "This province [Cotabato], together with Davao," Wood noted,
"is the only one where we found any systematic attention being paid to the
necessities of the sick."14

For particular distinction in public health maladministration, the

that the latest experiments with this oil gave them a fair chance for recov-
ery; and Wood promised that he would do all in his power to get sufficient
funds so that all could have the treatment. Los Angeles Times, Manila Times,
San Francisco Chronicle, September 2, 1921. All quotations from the Los
Angeles Times.

10Wood, Diary, June 4, 1921.

11Letter, Len to Lou, Manila, July 1, 1921, in Wood Papers, Box 192.

12Wood, Diary, June 9, 1921.

13Ibid., July 8, 1921.

14Ibid., August 12, 1921.
Commissioners singled out a city and a class of public officers. Aparri, Cagayan, merited the highly dubious distinction of being classified as "the filthiest and worst-administered municipality" of major size. Wood described it as "indescribably filthy," showing an "absolute lack of individual and public interest in the welfare of the town." Just before the Mission arrived, "notices were circulated begging the people to clean up for two days; that at the end of this time they could revert to usual conditions." And here occurred that rare instance when Wood was more severe with resident Americans than with Filipinos: "The houses of the Americans... were filthy and absolutely without sanitary advantages of a decent character. On the whole... far behind the Filipino houses...."\(^\text{15}\)

The officials who were especially singled out for numerous indignant comments, particularly by Wood, were the local sanitary officers, or inspectors. During the first provincial inspection trip, Wood almost routinely asked these men for infant mortality figures (the death rate among children during the first year) or the death rate per thousand among older children and adults; he practically never got an intelligent, informed response. Commonly Wood's notations were concerned with their ignorance, their lack of training and experience, and an invidious comparison with some menial laborer such as a street sweeper.\(^\text{16}\) Typical of many such entries was the one

\(^{15}\text{Ibid., May 21, 1921; a special supplement simply labeled "NOTES," dated May 24, 1921, and inserted along with the regular entries for this day. It was reported that a special squad had been busy for several days before the Mission's arrival "catching stray pigs that ordinarily have the run of the town," although the town's dogs, "mangy, starved, homeless, worthless curs," were still running loose and making the night "hideous with their howling and snarling." The clean-up circular, which asked cooperation in keeping Aparri's streets and yards clean from May 18 to May 22, enjoining this not in the name of public health or sanitation but in the name of patriotism. Manila Daily Bulletin, May 25, 1921.}\)

\(^{16}\text{For example, see those for Santa Maria and Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, in Wood, Diary, May 26, 1921.}\)
for Palo, Leyte:

The Sanitary Inspector . . . was a young man by the name of Catalino Gempes, who was also in charge of the Dispensary. I found that he was practically without any instruction. His medicines consisted of some liver powders, sodium carbonates, a few tablets and practically no dressings. There are no hospitals and no surgical instruments here. There are no doctors and no nurses. This young man stated he was the only one who is look-
ed to to attend wounded or sick people.17

Only rarely in the many documents of all categories which flooded the Mission did the topic of public health merit even superficial recognition. The municipal government of Bauan, Batangas, for example, provided a rare example of such interest by stating that with a population of 27,727 persons she enjoyed an average monthly increase of births over deaths of about twenty-five percent. And for those who had to die, moreover, there was some comfort to be found in the declaration that the municipal cemetery was in "mejoradas condiciones higienicas" ("improved hygienic conditions").18

From the documents collected by the Mission it might appear that government public health activities were overshadowed by those of women's clubs. The most widely publicized were those of the Cebu Women's Club, which presented several documents to describe their work, including various charitable, civic, and humanitarian activities. The most significant were associated with a remarkable institution known as "La Gota de Leche" (literally, "The Drop of Milk"), which conducted a clinic for poor children

17 Ibid., June 21, 1921. The population of this municipality (near the capital city of Tacloban) was 20,518. Census of the Philippine Islands [1918], II, 648.

18 "MEMORANDUM del Municipio de BAUAN," Provincia de Batangas. No date. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.
(with an average daily attendance of sixty) and a small hospital, provided free milk to needy children, and instructed mothers in child care and domestic sanitation.¹⁹

The Woman's (sic) Club of Dumanjug, Cebu, presented a lengthy document which was a form used in raising money for the erecting and equipping of a Hospital of Maternity and Infants. This was part of their organized campaign against infant mortality, described as "one of the true social evils in the Philippines," which had caused them to blush in confessing "that the real and principal cause is the IGNORANCE OF OUR MOTHERS TO CARE FOR THEIR BABIES."²⁰

Two other women's clubs (both in Iloilo Province on Panay) were also concerned with similar problems. The women of San Joaquin listed the purposes of their club and described some of their activities (which had included a baby contest for which twelve cans of condensed milk were the prizes), while the Board of Directors of the Women's Club of Tigbauan desired the appointment of a nurse and a midwife to each municipality to reduce the high death and infant mortality rates.²¹

¹⁹ These women apparently seriously attempted to justify their club motto: "Salvando a los Ninos, hacemos Patria" ("Saving the Children we produce the Fatherland"), which appears on the covering letter accompanying the four documents prepared for the Mission. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

²⁰ BIA, W-F Report Exhibits. No information is available concerning the success of this campaign, but one stroke of genius in their strategy would seem to have promised favorable results: "We would kindly request you that when you send in your donation please enclosed [sic] your own picture. It is the idea of the Club to decorate the parlors of the proposed Hospital of the pictures of all her Benefactors [sic]." The Mission was also given a sheet headed PROPOSED MATERNITY AND FIRST INFANCY HOSPITAL which gave an itemized list of the expected expenses of erecting, equipping, and operating this twenty bed hospital; a donation form; and a copy of the club's constitution.

²¹ Unnumbered Memorial, Woman's Club of San Joaquin, Iloilo, June 3, 1921, signed by Agustina Laratan, Acting President, Board of Directors; Resolution No. 1, Tigbauan Women's Club, July 17, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.
At least fifty-seven prominent men of the Sulu Archipelago agreed with the women's clubs that the problems of public health were not being adequately met. The document which they signed at Jolo on June 9, 1921, declared that the Legislature had not appropriated "sufficient money for ... the preservation of our health ... altho draining our treasury of the taxes paid by our people, and appropriating the money for their own purposes in the northern provinces." 22

From among those Americans who were disturbed by public health conditions, Philip Kinsley, as in other instances, stood alone in his willingness to express frank, public criticisms, while his fellow Americans hid behind the protection offered by the Mission. "The health situation is poor, the mortality rate being high," he cabled after but a few weeks. "There are practically no hospitals and the doctors of the Nationalist party which runs the government have things pretty well organized." 23

Of the one hundred and four members of the American Chamber of Commerce who wrote to the Mission, thirty-one complained of the serious shortage of doctors and sanitary officers, with the majority agreeing that the latter were not competent. 24 The American Legion agreed that "modern sanitary and

22Forbes, Philippine Islands, II, 476. The complaint by Gregorio Meliton in a private interview at Tigaon, Camarines Sur, that Filipino doctors and nurses had ill-treated him compared to Americans in these professions was so uncommon as to warrant being considered insignificant. Forbes, Journals, II, 253.

23Cablegram date-lined Baguio, June 11, 1921, as quoted in a cablegram, De Veyra to Quezon, Washington, D.C., June 25, 1921. BIA, W-F Mission File.

24CIRCULAR LETTER SENT OUT BY THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, MANILA, P.I., TO ALL MEMBERS IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, WITH ANALYSIS OF LETTERS RECEIVED BY THE MISSION IN COMPLIANCE THEREWITH. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.
medical necessities" were not being provided, which called for many more American nurses and physicians.25

Two American "old-timers" were sufficiently disturbed by public health conditions to denounce this service in unequivocal terms. One of the "disastrous" consequences of Harrison's regime, in the opinion of H. B. McCoy, was the "complete demoralization" of the public health service until it was "no longer a material factor for good in the daily life of the people."26

The "utter collapse" of the public health service Worcester judged to be "one of the most lamentable" of the developments under Harrison. The deterioration of conditions at the Philippine General Hospital he called "very distressing" and declared that he was "well within the truth in saying that there are but two decently conducted government provincial hospitals in the islands."

In warning of perils thus created, he cited recent conditions:

The sending out of inert vaccine virus by the Bureau of Health and the abandonment of vaccination of young children in many regions have led to the recrudescence of smallpox throughout wide areas. Statistics have been falsified, but in point of fact there were more deaths in the towns of Paranaque and Las Pinas [both located only a few miles from Manila] alone within the space of a few months than occurred throughout the Philippine Archipelago during the last administrative year of the old regime. At this time during a short evening drive through the streets of Cebu I saw five victims of this disease just at the stage when it is most readily communicable mingling with the crowds in the public streets.

"There no longer exists any organization capable of dealing with a serious outbreak of dangerous communicable disease," was his startling dec-

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25 Letter, American Legion of the Philippine Islands to the Wood-Forbes Commission, Manila, September 3, 1921, as signed by S. D. Rowlands, Commander, and P. D. Carman, Adjutant, Philippine Department, American Legion. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

laration after chronicling other similar incidents. "Should a virulent type of cholera be introduced the resulting epidemic would sweep the islands from end to end."

As if this were not enough, Worcester then annihilated the Bureau of Science with one sweeping sentence. Although its public health services and research in tropical diseases had "attracted world wide attention," it had "been very completely wrecked." 27

When Dr. Charles McDevitt of the U. S. Public Health Service called on the Mission he added similar comments. In his opinion, general sanitary conditions had "fallen off very much," the Bureau of Science had already "ceased to be the great scientific institution which it used to be," the Philippine General Hospital had declined to "far below par," and general public health conditions were "sliding backwards." 28

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To the press at the conclusion of their first provincial trip both Commissioners thoroughly condemned the condition of sanitation and public health at almost every place inspected. They had discovered a great scarcity of hospitals with nearly all municipalities and many provinces being entirely without proper medical facilities. In one province three municipalities with a total population of 25,000 had no hospitals of any kind and were entirely dependent upon a single doctor. 29

27 Letter, Dean C. Worcester to the Special Mission to the Philippine Islands, Manila, August 4, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

28 Wood, Diary, May 10, 1921.

29 Manila Times, May 31, 1921; Associated Press dispatch, San Francisco Chronicle, June 1, 1921.
Their next inspection trips produced no better report. Both men criticized sanitary conditions and urged the people to begin immediate work on establishing hospitals. They had discovered some areas where infant mortality during the first year of life was as high as thirty-two percent.30

After having carefully inspected that part of the Archipelago containing more than half the total population, Wood and Forbes were still dissatisfied, particularly with the shortage of experienced nurses for instruction in proper infant care. To those who blamed lack of money, Forbes bluntly offered a solution: "The way to have enough money for health and other purposes is to dismiss from government service all relatives of bureau chiefs, and all their family friends who are in the government pay, but have not passed the civil service examination."31

When their investigations were completed, excepting the southern islands, Wood and Forbes continued publicly to express great dissatisfaction with insular health conditions.32 In a confidential cablegram to Washington, Wood summarized their observations in one sentence: "Sanitation, hospital facilities, dispensaries, nurses, medical supplies, and sanitary establishment generally inadequate and poor."33 But following their inspection of the southern islands, the Commissioners offered a better report to Washington, having found public health conditions among these predominantly Moslem peo-

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30 Manila Times, June 7, 1921; Associated Press dispatch, San Francisco Chronicle, June 9, 1921.


32 Manila Times, July 24, 1921.

33 Cablegram, Wood to Weeks, Manila, July 25, 1921. BIA, W-F Mission File.
ple better than in the northern "civilized" areas.\textsuperscript{34}

The one commendatory note struck by Wood and Forbes was praise for the activities of women's organizations in behalf of women and children. For example, after telling the residents of Zamboanga that the Filipina was "the best man in the Philippine Islands" ("She raises the family, saves the money, takes care of the house, mends the clothes and helps out on the gambling debt."), Wood commended them for organizing women's clubs throughout the Islands to combat the "frightful loss" in infant mortality ("One-third of all the children die in the first year of their life.").\textsuperscript{35} But however much the politicos may have chafed under such gratuitous remarks, they cleverly turned the situation to their benefit: "They [the politicos] listened to our speeches carefully and if we praised the women's clubs they would have one organized in the next town by the time we got there."\textsuperscript{36}

In a long, confidential final cablegram to Weeks summarizing their findings and recommendations, Wood and Forbes declared the sanitation and public health situation to be "generally unsatisfactory," with a "great lack of hospitals, doctors, nurses, dispensaries, drugs, et cetera." "The framework of the preceding excellent system remains," they explained, "but it has become inert, and the service is generally perfunctory." One praiseworthy exception was the public health services among the non-Christians, which they judged to be superior to the Christian provinces.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{34} Extract of Cable No. 852 from the Governor General of the Philippine Islands to the Secretary of War, September 4, 1921. BIA, W-F Mission File.

\textsuperscript{35} Wood, SUPPLEMENTARY MEMORANDUM, Diary, August 15, 1921. In a letter to Theodore Roosevelt's widow he remarked on these activities and stated that "They really are the backbone of the people." Copy of a letter, Wood to Mrs. Theodore Roosevelt, Manila, July 28, 1921, in Wood Papers, Box 157.

\textsuperscript{36} Forbes, Journals, II, 241.

\textsuperscript{37} Cable No. 861 from Acting Governor General Yeater to Secretary of
In their final, formal report for Harding, the space which Wood and Forbes devoted to health problems is indeed surprising, even in view of their previous caustic comments and Wood's obvious interest in this subject. Quite apparently, then, these men were agreed that here was a critical and complex problem which demanded full and careful delineation.

"It can be said, without fear of successful contradiction, that the average Filipino is born, lives, and dies without medical attendance or nursing," was the shockingly brutal opening sentence of this section. "There is a great lack of hospitals and dispensaries," they continued. "The excellent health service which previously existed has become largely inert. Much of the personnel remains, but it has lost the zeal and vigor which formerly characterized it."

After citing inadequate appropriations, the Commissioners demonstrated by statistics that there had been in recent years a steady increase in the number of preventable diseases, particularly typhoid, malaria, beriberi, and tuberculosis. Other contributing factors were administrative defects (health activities were scattered throughout several agencies without central coordination); the shortage of hospitals ("Outside of the largest towns hospitals are so few and far between that they are a negligible quantity."); and a serious shortage of trained personnel ("There are about 930 nurses for a population of ten and one-half million.").

Concerning the care of lepers at Culion ("the largest single leper

War Weeks, Manila, September 11, 1921. BIA, W-F Mission File.

38 W-F Report, p. 31.
colony in the world"), there were words of uncommon praise ("Excellent work...
and the efforts and results are entitled to much credit..."), tempered with words of advice ("The lepers are too congested. There should be a segregation of those who have become negative and of the children who are born free from the disease."). "Recent discoveries render it almost certain that a large percentage of lepers can be cured," was the optimistic statement preceding an explanation that these happy results had not yet been achieved because of insufficient funds.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 32.}

To describe the care of the insane the Commissioners chose a single, damningly descriptive word: "medieval." "The present institution lacks practically every feature which should characterize a hospital for the insane, and possesses many which can be guaranteed to turn those who are balancing between sanity and insanity in the wrong direction," was their explanation. "... conditions are, from the standpoint of proper treatment, exceedingly bad and should have been corrected long ago.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 32-33.}"

Comments on the treatment of defective children (the deaf, dumb, or blind) were limited to a restrained, largely statistical, statement. Although between 5,000 and 10,000 such children were then alive, "So far the Government has provided for the care of only 65 of these defectives, to whom it owes a particular duty.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 33.}" After declaring that the Bureau of Science "was probably the most important single institution in the Philippines," which for years had rendered vitally important service not only to the Philippine Government ...
but also to the world at large," thus attaining "a position of great eminence and credit," the Commissioners declared that this was no longer true. To remedy this unfortunate condition (in an institution whose work they judged to be "of inestimable value to the Philippines and to the world at large"), they urged increased financial support, the appointment of additional qualified personnel, and a complete reorganization.\textsuperscript{42}

Such were the careful, studied conclusions of Harding's investigators on the condition of a vitally important segment of Philippine society. Thus regardless of the condition of the Filipino body politic as a whole, it was painfully apparent that the essential public health organ was so seriously diseased as drastically to affect its vital functioning.

\textsuperscript{42}Ibid., p. 31.
CHAPTER XVII

PUBLIC WORKS

The concern shown by Wood for public health conditions is understandable in view of his professional medical background. Likewise, a special concern for the broad area of public works and especially the system of modern roads, which was manifested by Forbes, should not have come as a surprise to anyone acquainted with his record as Secretary of Commerce and Police and Governor General. There had been almost an inevitability in the popular, seemingly spontaneous, transformation of his name from Cameron to "Caminero" (road worker). An element of humor may be recognizable in this, but also sincere tribute for his devotion to an invaluable cause, that of developing a first class road system which he had initiated as a departmental secretary and continued to encourage as chief executive.

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Early in their first inspection trip it was reported that Forbes had chosen a route so that he could inspect the roads.1 Between Bontoc and Tagudin via Cervantes, Forbes noted that the road maintenance sections had been reduced from about nine to less than four miles each, and that over each a high-priced foreman had been placed "whose salary exhausted the funds, so that there was practically no money left for laborers and the trail was rapidly going to pieces."2 "One fat, slick, unctuous individual was receiving much higher pay than his neighbor, who had the best section, and nat-

1 Associated Press dispatch, Los Angeles Times, May 15, 1921.
2 Forbes, Philippine Islands, II, 282.
urally enough his section was the worst," Forbes noticed, "so I asked, "What is your relationship to the Governor?" His reply was simple and ingenuous: "I married his niece." 3 When they were reunited at Laoag, Ilocos Norte, after having inspected the northern provinces of Luzon, both Wood and Forbes agreed that speakers had been primarily concerned with roads and improved means of communication to the outside world. 4 

Yet in a press interview after this trip, Forbes declared that in general he was pleased with the condition of the roads and the progress which had been made in building up a good road system. 5 His private records, however, contain a fuller and more specific account of his observations and reactions to the condition of his beloved "caminos." The roads in Pangasinan Province he described as "in most creditable shape"; the Benguet Road to Baguio as "in perfect shape"; the roads in Baguio as "in magnificent shape"; and the road northward from Manila as having "received more attention than almost any main road in the archipelago." 6

Although he did not present his unfavorable reactions to the press, Forbes had noted some specific problems. One was that maintenance was spotty, with some few roads being admirably maintained while others were seriously neglected. The claimed great increase in first-class roads proved to be somewhat illusory: "... in some instances it was accomplished by lowering the standard of first-class requirements by transferring on the books what I

3 Forbes, Journals, II, 78.


5 Manila Times, May 31, 1921; Associated Press dispatch, San Francisco Chronicle, June 1, 1921.

should still call second-class roads into the first-class category, thus making an apparent but not a real advance."

Forbes seemed particularly incensed at the forced labor by Ifugaos used to construct the Santa Fe Road through Nueva Ecija and Nueva Visayas provinces. A corrupt foreman had pocketed the laborers' pay, many had died from influenza, and others had taken the epidemic back into the hills. "The whole thing was most unfortunate and unsatisfactory," was his appraisal. And in another area in these mountains (Cervantes, Ilocos Sur), he indignantly noted that "their road, their one means of communication with the world, [was] dropping to pieces before their very eyes, the maintenance money given to pay the salaries of incompetent Filipino foremen instead of Igorot laborers who are willing to work." 7

When the Mission turned next to the provinces near Manila, Forbes realized "how much damage had been done by mal-administration." For example, he described the so-called first class road from Silang, Cavite, to Manila as "in miserable shape, having been fearfully neglected," and the roads between Mendez Munoz and Silang as "execrable excuses for roads with deep muddy holes. . . ." In general, he considered Cavite's roads to be "the worst of any I have seen in any province. The surface is washed off, and there was no sign of maintenance." 8

In southern Luzon and adjacent islands, Forbes continued to be disturbed by improper road maintenance. While describing the proposed Albay-Sorsogon interprovincial road ("Partly done, when the money ran out, wasted grossly, people intimidated."), he displayed great and mounting indignation. The road connecting Barcelona and Bulusan, Sorsogon, he labeled "criminally

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neglected" ("The iron bridges had not been chipped or painted and were literally rusting away. The grass had grown over the roads and in some places the road was almost washed away."). And in general, Sorsogon Province rated Forbes's most severe criticism: throughout the province they had found "utter and gross neglect" of the roads; in fact, in no other province had they "seen the road system so utterly neglected," with evidence of graft and maladministration in road administration, maintenance, and construction. 9

The Commissioners generally were quite favorable in their comments on the roads of the central Philippines—and especially those of Cebu, Bohol, and Iloilo, which they termed excellent—but in Occidental Negros they had found the roads in extremely poor condition with several sections rapidly deteriorating because of heavy truck traffic. 10 Their enthusiasm for the excellent paved road system in the city of Cebu and vicinity was undoubtedly seriously dampened by an explanation for such comparative progress. Osmena's home and many of his business interests were here so he used his power in the Legislature to obtain sizable public works appropriations. 11

"There is general interest in public work, especially irrigation and roads," Wood stated in a preliminary report cabled to Washington when their work was completed except for the southern islands. "Roads are generally in fair condition and in some provinces excellent; in others maintenance not kept up. Telephones, posts, and telegraphs [these were Government-operated

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10 *Manila Times*, July 25, 1921. Wood recorded uncommon praise for a stretch of road between the city of Cebu and Bogo on the island of Cebu: "The road along the beach and over the cliffs is one of the most attractive drives I have seen anywhere in the world. It is perfectly beautiful, and is in splendid condition." *Diary*, July 9, 1921.

11 Exclusive cabled dispatch date-lined Cebu, July 15, in the *Los Angeles Times*, July 16, 1921.
monopolies] fair."

At the unique public and private sessions at Oroquieta, Misamis, Forbes spoke at greater length and with more frankness on the subject of public works than on any other recorded occasion. After commenting upon the signs and banners in the audience expressing a desire for artesian wells and promising to take this up with the Director of Public Works, Forbes turned to a topic dear to his heart—roads:

Now to my friends the farmers, I would like to say that I sympathize entirely with their desires for good roads. The building of roads and their maintenance was my special care during the ten years I served the Filipino people. Now I have found on my return here that the roads are not properly maintained. Some of them are still good, and some excellent; but the majority of them have fallen off in condition. And one reason for it I have found is that there is a tendency to increase the number of capataces [foremen] and decrease the number of laborers. On one road I inspected they had three times as many capataces as before and no laborers. All of the capataces were sitting on the road watching it go to pieces; they used up all the money for road maintenance and left nothing for labor.

Urging the people to insist that this be remedied and "the roads kept in good shape," Forbes gave advice on how this could be done which was simple, practical, and in the democratic tradition: "by proper use of the ballot."

If every governor and every presidente and all the municipal boards and provincial boards knew they could not get elected if the roads got worse when they were in office [Forbes explained in his down-to-earth lecture on applied politics] they would be pretty sure to keep them in condition. So you people have the cure for this evil in your own hands. Every man who sees a road going by his place going to pieces should write to his representative and tell him he will lose his vote if it is not remedied. That is the way to express public opinion. That is what is meant by Democracy. That is what is meant by Independence. Every independent citizen can express himself with the ballot."

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13 "Specimen Notes Taken Public Session [Oroquieta, Misamis, August 8, 1921]." BIA, W-F Report Exhibits. Forbes also recorded this speech in his Journals, II, 300.
Forbes made the following note at this time: "This reply of mine to the complaint that the roads were neglected in that region was very well received. They nudged each other and smiled, and it evidently went home."\(^{14}\)

In a cablegram to Weeks summarizing their trip to the southern islands, Wood and Forbes appraised public works with a single, adequately descriptive word: "slight."\(^{15}\) After completing their final report, they summarized their findings in another confidential cablegram which again utilized one key word to describe public works in the areas inhabited by the non-Christian tribes: "neglected."\(^{16}\)

Occasionally an individual Filipino or a group would neglect independence agitation long enough to comment on some phase of public works. In fact, in the first private interview conducted by the Mission in Manila a deputy from Iloilo complained that the roads throughout the Islands were deteriorating.\(^{17}\) In a remarkable petition from Kabayan, Benguet, which had been signed by fourteen "principales" of this sub-province on March 24, 1921, one of their requests was for "better facilities of transportation."\(^{18}\) As this village was located in one of the wildest sections of the island, and reached largely by mountain trails, their concern is understandable.

\(^{14}\)Ibid., pp. 300-01.

\(^{15}\)Extract of Cable No. 852, Governor General to the Secretary of War, September 4, 1921. BIA, W-F Mission File.

\(^{16}\)Cable No. 861, Yeater to Weeks, Manila, September 11, 1921. BIA, W-F Mission File.

\(^{17}\)Forbes, Journals, II, 216.

\(^{18}\)BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.
In a private conference at Tagudin, Ilocos Sur, Forbes was told that the people were not so anxious about independence (of which various local orators had spoken feelingly at a public meeting in the town hall) as good trade conditions and good roads, which they considered "really important." And the parish priest at Calapan, Mindoro, told Forbes that graft prevailed in public works so that a local nine kilometer road had finally cost $200,000 and required ten years to build.

A lengthy resolution from the Municipal Council of San Marcelino, Zambales, contained a rather routine plea for independence; but while awaiting action on this, these practical councilmen desired consideration of another important matter:

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that in the meantime the independence of the Philippine [sic] is not being granted, this municipal council respectfully asks to the Members of said Commission to work for the pecuniary help of the Secretary of Navy [sic] in the construction of the interprovincial road between Subic, Zambales and Dinalupihan, Bataan, one road that puts an easy communication of the province of Zambales and the Naval Reservation Olangoag [sic], with Manila, the capital of the Philippine Archipelago [sic]. . . .

Three other municipalities also included much the same statement in their resolutions. All of these towns were located along the highway which, if extended as requested, would remove them from a position of relative isolation on the west coast of Luzon and place them in good communication with

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19 Kinsley’s cable from Bangued, June 6, quoted in De Veyra’s cablegram to Quezon, Washington, D.C., June 25, 1921. BIA, W-F Mission File.

20 Forbes, Journals, II, 246.


Manila and the surrounding area.

At Oroquieta, Misamis, a number of persons sought private interviews with Forbes, one of whom complained of the poor roads in his section of the province.\(^{23}\) Had he listened carefully to Forbes's public address delivered before the interviews, he would have known how to remedy this. And in a document signed at Jolo on June 9, 1921, fifty-seven leading men also complained that the Legislature had "failed to appropriate sufficient money for the maintenance and construction of roads . . . altho draining our treasury of the taxes paid by our people, and appropriating the money for their own purposes in the northern provinces."\(^{24}\)

A resolution from Tanauan, Batangas, was refreshingly different. Although asking the expected in requesting "la independencia," the Municipal Council graciously stated that the economic development which had so benefitted the people had largely resulted from Forbes's road system.\(^{25}\)

Documents from two American organizations, the American Chamber of Commerce and the American Legion, touched upon public works. "Since the arrival of the Commission a feverish activity in the repair of streets and highways has been displayed," was the Chamber's comment. "We have seen more

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\(^{23}\) "Specimen Notes Taken Public Session [Oroquieta, Misamis, August 8, 1921]." BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

\(^{24}\) Forbes, *Philippine Islands*, II, 476.

\(^{25}\) Unnumbered resolution, Tanauan, Batangas Municipal Council, no date. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits. Poorly typed in Spanish making it difficult to read. Forbes amusingly recorded that a young man named Juan Buan greatly exceeded the usual three minute time limit in a speech at Palilla, Rizal, on June 10, because it would have been "ungracious" for Forbes to have stopped him when he was praising his road work so generously and calling upon the crowd to respond with cheers. Forbes, *Journals*, II, 243.
road material along our highways during the few weeks since the Commission arrived than we have in as many years before." Not only had results been sharply diminished in recent years but costs had become excessive, principally because the Government had abandoned competitive bidding. The American Legion merely urged that more Americans were needed in the public works program.

Yet undoubtedly of far greater value were the confidential reports from three long-resident Americans. A. D. Richey of Zamboanga, Mindanao, was particularly concerned with "the steady decline in efficiency," particularly in road building and maintenance, accompanied by a rise in costs (one of many illustrations was that the taxation on his plantation for that year had increased 829% over the preceding year "although the actual increase in value could not have been more than 25").

Drawing upon ten years experience in the Bureau of Audits, J. A. Stiver recited several examples to "illustrate . . . wherein the American people have made such a failure in attempting to give [the Filipinos] . . . a decent government." One illustration cited from personal experience concerned the road building work of Harrison's Tarlac district engineer. When this work had been under an American engineer, principal roads were built at an average cost of $6,000 per kilometer; but after Filipinization the

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26 MEMORIAL SUBMITTED BY THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE to the WOOD-FORBES MISSION, MANILA, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. Dated Manila, July 14, 1921, and signed by H. L. Heath, president. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

27 Letter, American Legion of the Philippine Islands to the Wood-Forbes Commission, Manila, September 3, 1921, signed by S. D. Rowlands, Commander, and P. D. Carman, Adjutant, Philippine Department, American Legion. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

costs for inferior road construction jumped to the astounding figure of #29,000.

When Stiver reported this to higher authorities in Manila, he was informed that the Filipino engineer's father was a very potent *político* and thus nothing could be done. Moreover, this engineer was later appointed by the Director of Public Works to be his assistant in Manila.  

In common with other Americans, Dean C. Worcester complained of the poor road maintenance work during Harrison's administration. He held out little hope for improvement, however, unless fundamental changes were made. "The Bureau of Public Works is very short-handed," he explained, "as most of the American engineers have been driven out of the service and there are not enough Filipino engineers, good, bad or indifferent, to do the urgently needed work."  

As has been seen, road maintenance deteriorated during Harrison’s administration; that is, until it was known that former Governor General William "Caminero" Forbes was coming on an official inspection trip for the President. But Forbes was certainly not deceived by the precipitate activities to make his beloved "caminos" more presentable. For example, during a dinner at Tabaco, Albay, he told the Filipinos that he "wasn't the least bit

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29 Memorandum, Stiver to the Special Mission to the Philippine Islands, Manila, August 24, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.  

30 Letter, Worcester to the Mission, Manila, August 4, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits. He also discussed deterioration of the telegraph, telephone, postal, and light-house services (all government monopolies). His principal dissatisfaction with the first three was not so much their known and serious slowness and unreliability, but the constant failure of employees to respect the privacy of communications when a profit could thereby be made.
fooled by the frantic efforts to put on an appearance of road repair that had been put in effect just in time to make the best showing as we passed."

And Wood, at least on one occasion, even seemed to be amused by their masquerade: "One of the rather amusing things [in Cebu] was the presence, immediately in front of the provincial building, of three large steam-rollers, two hand-rollers, all working on one short section of street." 31

Forbes's technique for discovering when road work had been resumed was the essence of simplicity: he simply talked to the workers, who, in their naivete, told the truth. For example, between Cervantes and Tagudin in Ilocos Sur, he asked each foreman, "When did you get your orders to begin fixing the road up?" All answered that it had been within the preceding two weeks. Forbes's response in his personal records was that "the haste to make a showing for us was frantic and pathetic." Similar inquiry on Siquijor Island revealed that the hurried repair work had begun only a few days before. 32

After it was known that the Mission was on its way, the politicos, according to Worcester, made "a tremendous effort . . . to get the more important roads back into shape." Making his charge more specific, Worcester described conditions along one of the principal roads of Luzon:

Prior to your advent one could make the trip from Manila to Baguio without seeing a single caminero [road worker] on the job; the depositories for road material were mostly empty and in many of them bushes and even small trees were growing. Considerable stretches of this road were so rough as to make slow running necessary. I was interested and amused on the occasion of the trip in which I met you at Baguio to find the road smooth and hard all the way, the depositories brimming with repair material and huge heaps of it scattered between depositories and in regions where no depositories existed,

31 Forbes, Journals, II, 102; Wood, Diary, July 8, 1921.

while the landscape fairly gleamed with camineros in new scarlet cotton suits which had not yet gone through their first shower. When I returned you were in the south, and I give you my word that I did not see a single caminero between Baguio and the Manila city limits.\textsuperscript{33}

"Unquestionably the islands have experienced a great indirect benefit from the coming of the Mission through the resulting effort to make the roads present the best possible appearance," was Worcester's opinion. Wood agreed: "They [the Filipinos] must feel that whatever else happens, the visit of the Mission has led to an immense amount of good work being done on the roads ..." And Forbes recorded a corroborative incident at Isabela, Occidental Negros, on July 14, when he judged the testimony of one Filipino to be among "the most amusing of our episodes." After having been informed that the local road had been impassable for six months and that frantic efforts had recently been made to make it passable, the Mission heard Gil Montilla welcome them and as an assemblyman-elect express his thanks for the fact that their coming had resulted in great improvement of the road which they had previously been unsuccessful in having repaired.\textsuperscript{34}

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A phase of public works which also interested the Mission was the insular railroad system that had been purchased by the government during Harrison's regime. As their work began, Forbes noted that "loud are the complaints against its management, condition and the service." During the

\textsuperscript{33}Letter, Worcester to the Mission, Manila, August 4, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

\textsuperscript{34}Ibid.; Wood, Diary, June 28, 1921; Forbes, Journals, II, 283. A resident American newspaperwoman has also described in interesting detail how the roads around Manila were hastily repaired just before Forbes's return. See Eleanor Franklin Egan, "Do the Filipinos Want Independence?" Saturday Evening Post, CXCIV (October 15, 1921), 41.
first provincial tour, the Mission utilized a private train provided by the railroad (accompanied, at least for a while, by the manager whom Forbes identified simply as "a fat man named Westerhouse") and thus they could observe conditions personally. At its conclusion, Wood summarized its condition:

The railroads . . . are indifferently kept up. There is a general slackness in the appearance of stations, terminals, roadbed and sidings . . . Appearance of cars, very dirty. Reports of those who traveled in the cars show them to be filthy; little evidence of sanitary care or ordinary cleanliness. There is almost no indication of upkeep in the way of painting, varnishing, etc., etc. The service is careless and indifferent. Care of track, indifferent.36

Soon thereafter a preliminary report was made by a Colonel Scott, one of a group of Army engineers who had been detailed to this work. Wood summed up Scott's unflattering comments: "... railroad management rotten, trains dirty, service inefficient, excessive amount of employes, management amateurish; new engines ... altogether too heavy for the traffic and unnecessarily expensive ... [and] there was graft in their purchase."37

35 Forbes, Journals, II, 68.
36 Wood, Diary, June 2, 1921. In a letter to his wife he was more succinct: "... R.R. cars are filthy beyond words and Roads badly handled." Letter, Len to Lou, Baguio, June 14, 1921, in Wood Papers, Box 192. In a personal letter to Harrison, Westerhouse complained that the Commissioners "gave very little of their own time to the Railroad," that they made only "two so-called inspection trips over the road" (Manila to Dagupan and Hondagua to Manila), that the expenses to the company were 4,000 pesos, that "no attention was given the road-bed, rolling stock or traffic conditions," and that "neither improvements nor shortcomings were noted." Letter, Ernest J. Westerhouse to Harrison, Berkeley, California, May 20, 1922, in Harrison Papers, Box 45.
37 Wood, Diary, June 29, 1921. The final report on the railroad was handed to the Mission on September 3, just before they sailed from Manila. Ibid., September 3, 1921. Westerhouse attempted to deprecate this report by stating that Yeater had referred to it as "the worst lot of piffle I ever read," and to Scott as "nothing but a drunken bum." Letter, Westerhouse to Harrison, Berkeley, California, May 20, 1922, in Harrison Papers, Box 45. Westerhouse had apparently settled in California after having been forced to resign the management of the railroad when Wood became Governor General.
Prominent Filipinos also came privately to complain that the políticos were abusing the government ownership of the railroad and that Quezon, its president, was particularly shameless in his personal use of its facilities for pleasure trips on which large numbers of women were carried in a display of "shameless immorality." Also, when the secretary-treasurer of the railway, a certain Sevilla, was caught by a surprise audit with 12,000 pesos misappropriated from company funds, he apparently spared Quezon by assuming the entire responsibility and suffering imprisonment for embezzlement.

In their final report, Wood and Forbes noted that although large appropriations had been made for public works, this had been accompanied by an undue increase in the cost of public works," and by "a deterioration in the quality of the work performed . . . [and] a lack of competent supervision." Yet, in an obvious attempt to be scrupulously fair, they explained that "there has been a great deal of excellent work done," and that the Filipino director was "a man of unusual capacity and foresight," who had "impressed

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39. Letter, Westerhouse to Harrison, Berkeley, California, May 20, 1922, in Harrison Papers, Box 45. Westerhouse's further comments to Harrison rather clearly demonstrated that Sevilla protected Quezon: "He [Sevilla] did not take the stand in his own defense, although after he was sentenced he showed me documentary evidence that would place the blame on a higher official of the road. Mr. Recto, his attorney, and Judge Ortigas are in possession of the facts, and the general public understands the situation. . . . I would not hesitate to give you the facts by word of mouth, but feel that under the circumstances it would be unwise to put it in writing. On the whole, Quezon's popularity is waning, and his only chance for a come-back is to war on Governor-General Wood and his administration, which he is doing. . . ." Ibid. In writing to Harrison concerning this, Quezon was brief: "Sevilla the Secretary of the Railroad did something very foolish and we [sic!] had to prosecute him. He has just been convicted, I am informed by cable this morning." Letter, Quezon to Harrison (Manuel to "My dear Governor Harrison"), Vancouver, British Columbia, no date (but probably early in September, 1921), in Harrison Papers, Box 44.
the members of the mission most favorably."

The Commissioners cited with approval the "notable progress" in the construction of critically important irrigations systems. "Many more projects are under consideration and are awaiting the availability of funds," they explained.

Following some encouraging statistics on the road system, they added that the standards of the first class roads had been lowered. After reviewing the system of road construction and repair prior to Harrison's regime ("... the road service reached a high degree of perfection, comparing favorably with the roads of any other country and much better than most roads in America"), they considered the current situation.

"... the roads are falling into disrepair, some are impassable and the system of maintenance is carried on spasmodically," was their summary judgment. Much of this unfortunate deterioration was attributed to the large increase in heavy trucks and busses. In the non-Christian provinces, however, they had found that maintenance had been neglected because of improper organization.

On several occasions the Mission had been informed of the precipitate road repair activities just prior to their arrival so that "Caminero" Forbes would not be wrathful upon seeing his beloved "caminos" again. A simple, declaratory sentence in their report indicates that Forbes could not resist letting the politicos know that he completely understood: "There was an earnest effort made by the Government to hurry through deferred repairs in order to prepare the roads for inspection."40

40 W-F Report, pp. 40-42.
CHAPTER XVIII

INSULAR FINANCES

Although Wood and Forbes had certainly been alerted, at least in a general way, concerning the chaotic Philippine financial conditions (their disintegration was public knowledge in the Islands and at least some information concerning this had been transmitted to the United States\(^1\)), the full details of this distressing situation were only revealed to them as their investigation progressed. To men of their personal reputation for integrity and their experience in major administrative responsibilities, this revelation of a blatantly cynical disregard for fundamental ethical standards and a brazen contempt for the obligations of public office must have been enormously painful.

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During the voyage out, the Mission began their investigation of insular fiscal conditions. "We have been giving special attention to the condition of the Philippine National Bank," Wood wrote, "which seems to be almost hopeless and indicates a tremendous amount of absolutely bad management, not only bad but management and transactions which are very reprehensible in some of their aspects."\(^2\) William T. Nolting, the new insular auditor, was also busy, studying a statement on the Philippine National Bank,

\(^1\)For example, as early as November 14, 1920, Harrison had informed the chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs that the Philippine financial situation was "worse at the present moment than it has ever been before," and that both the Bank of the Philippines and the Philippine National Bank had conducted their affairs in an "extravagant and foolish manner." Copy of a letter, Harrison to McIntyre, Manila, November 14, 1920, in Harrison Papers, Box 44.

\(^2\)Wood, Diary, April 19, 1921.
which he described to Wood "as being as bad as it could possibly be." "He feels that the Insular treasury has been played with by men who are about as inexpert as children," was Wood's summation, "and that the situation now is one of insolvency and will take a long period to straighten out, and will result in heavy losses to the Government."³

Apparently after returning from their first provincial tour of inspection, Wood and Forbes became fully aware of the genuinely critical condition of the Philippine National Bank. "The situation here is one of very great gravity," Wood wrote to his friend Bishop Brent on June 9. Insular finances had been "wrecked by gross incompetency and improper handling," he declared, and "the vital interests of ten and one-half million people are at stake, as well as the honor and reputation of our own country, at least in all which stands for character, leadership and efficiency." And it was Harrison whom he held "largely responsible for the financial breakdown..."⁴

Obviously deeply concerned, Wood and Forbes jointly cabled these forthright words to Weeks the next day:

After examination and conference with [Acting] Governor-General, auditor, and manager National Bank, we find that the bank is practically insolvent. The government cannot purchase exchange, even to meet current running expenses payable in United States, and has had to ask other local banks not to present its circulating notes for redemption. Cash reserves are now about ten per cent of legal requirements. If bank should fail, it would mean practical bankruptcy of insular government... besides bankrupting many provinces and municipalities which have been required by law to deposit all funds with the bank. We feel the faith of United States is pledged in support of solvency of this government, and situation is so critical that we

³Ibid., April 20, 1921.

⁴Copy of a letter, Wood to Bishop C. H. Brent of Buffalo, New York, dated June 9, 1921, at Manila. Wood Papers, Box 155. Underlined for emphasis by Wood. Similar sentiments were expressed by Wood in letters written at Manila, at Manila on July 4 to Colonel William Cooper Procter and Colonel Henry L. Stimson; both unsigned carbon copies in Wood Papers, Boxes 157, 158.
concur in urging immediate relief measures on general lines recommended by Governor-General in extending debt-making power of government. Unnecessary publicity might precipitate crisis here.  

For some reason Weeks ignored the advice on avoiding unnecessary publicity and on June 17 released this cable to the press in its entirety, excepting the first and last sentences. Quite naturally, this was widely publicized in the press with one paper featuring the story on its front page under headlines reading, "FRUITS OF DEMOCRACY. Philippines About Bankrupt, Need Millions to Aid Business."  

Weeks also informed Congress (apparently the press release was his actual message to Congress) of a message from Yeater which declared that the "situation was getting worse," and a similar message from George H. Fairchild, American businessman and newspaper publisher in Manila. Weeks stated that, in view of this disastrous situation, the House Insular Affairs Committee had favorably reported a bill to increase the Insular Government's legal debt limit to $30,000,000.  

A number of American editors welcomed this news. "THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT: It Appears to Be Just on the Point of Going Dead Broke," was above an editorial in the San Francisco Chronicle which asserted that until there was a satisfactory explanation for this debacle "the fitness of the  

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5 Cable, Wood and Forbes to SECWAR, Manila, June 10, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.  
6 Los Angeles Times, June 18, 1921.  
7 Los Angeles Times, New York Times, San Francisco Chronicle, June 18, 1921. Quote from the New York Times. Also see EXTENDING LIMIT OF INDEBTEDNESS OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, House Reports, No. 55, 67th Congress, 1st Session, in which this committee declared on May 9 that this measure was "most urgently needed," and concluded with the statement that "your committee believe this bill should be considered as an emergency measure and recommend its early passage."
Filipinos for self-government will remain to be proved.\textsuperscript{8}

"Unlimited freedom where a people is not prepared for it means unlimited license," was the editorial reaction of the Los Angeles \textit{Times}. "It is one of the most destructive forces known to civilization."\textsuperscript{9}

The Newark \textit{Evening News} saw "no good reason" why Washington should seem surprised by such news because "the facts have been known for months in commercial circles." The New York \textit{Tribune} editorially reviewed the case for independence ("never convincing") which now had been "wrecked by the developments under the Harrison Administration," while "painfully" forecasting what an independent Philippine Government would be.

"Were the inhabitants capable of conducting an efficient government, and were they disposed toward honest administration," commented the Pittsburgh \textit{Gazette Times}, "the United States would be well rid of them, but therein is the whole question." The introduction of "another Mexico into the family of nations would be a calamity for which the United States would be responsible were we too precipitate in granting independence."\textsuperscript{10}

Writing some years later, Nicholas Roosevelt recalled that the notes and drafts of the Philippine National Bank were refused in the British colonies and in Japan. One member of the Philippine House, after having told Roosevelt that the \textit{políticos} had discredited the Filipinos in the eyes of the world, continued with a damming indictment of his fellow countrymen (and, no doubt, his political opponents):

\textsuperscript{8} San Francisco \textit{Chronicle}, June 20, 1921.

\textsuperscript{9} Editorial, "The Philippine Situation," Los Angeles \textit{Times}, July 6, 1921.

\textsuperscript{10} All editorial quotations taken from "Philippine Bankruptcy," \textit{Literary Digest}, LXX (July 2, 1921), 15.
They plundered the National Bank, and the impartial historian of the future will brand that unfortunate episode in our national life with the stigma of infamy. They monopolized all the power within the reach of their legal and illegal means, creating a sort of oligarchy for the enhancement of their power, and the promotion of their personal ambitions. They made business out of politics, and disgraced the administration of justice. Incompetents were appointed to important public offices, as a reward for past political service. The government invaded the field of business, about which it knew little or nothing, and as a result of which the taxpaying public lost millions.\footnote{Roosevelt, The Philippines, p. 24.}

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On June 24 a sensational development occurred in Manila where General Vancio Concepcion, former president of the Philippine National Bank, was arrested for violating the National Banking Law. Stating that he had requested the preferment of charges after having examined the bank’s affairs, William T. Nolting, the new insular auditor, explained that Concepcion had improperly borrowed \$375,000 which the bank had previously loaned to a sugar estate.\footnote{San Francisco Chronicle, New York Times, June 25, 1921. Quote from the Chronicle. Nolting’s credentials for this position were impressive, having been employed by the insular government from March 1, 1899, until July 26, 1914, during which he occupied a number of positions, beginning with that of a clerk in the bureau of posts and eventually becoming collector of internal revenue and director of posts. In recent years he had been associated with Forbes in the family business enterprises, particularly railroads in Brazil. Manila Daily Bulletin, April 5, 1921.} But this should have come as no surprise to the politicos in Manila; as early as June 3, E. J. Westerhouse, general manager of the Manila Railroad Company, had written to Harrison, "I shudder to think what their [the Mission’s] report on the Philippine National Bank will be. Concepcion’s record will read like the reminiscences of a drunken sailor."\footnote{Letter, Westerhouse to Harrison, Manila, June 3, 1921, in Harrison Papers, Box 43.}
These revelations concerning the financial chicanery of their political opponents had by now infuriated the *Democrat*. *La Nación*, their newspaper mouthpiece in Manila, urged on June 27 that Harrison be arrested and returned to Manila from Scotland to stand trial with Quezon and Osmeña (this trio had constituted the bank's former board of control) for illegal bank management. 14

"Such corrupt incompetent management I have never seen or heard of," a similarly indignant Wood wrote to his wife on July 1. "Losses run into the many tens of millions... [This] financial embarrassment and collapse... is entirely unnecessary. How the Insular Bureau failed to observe what was going on is a mystery." And then he promptly volunteered the solution to this mystery: "Of course the little incompetent Baker [Newton D., Wilson's Secretary of War] could be counted on to know nothing and do nothing." 15

But Wood and Forbes, apparently determined that the new Secretary of War, John W. Weeks, should have no excuse for ignorance, detailed John F. Forbes, who had been working with Nolting for about two months, to travel to Washington and explain insular financial conditions to Weeks personally and in detail. "Governor Forbes and I feel that the situation here is so critical," Wood explained in a letter to be presented to Weeks by John F. Forbes, "and his information concerning it so complete, that he should have a personal interview with you, and that you might desire him to see the President." 16

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14 *Sacramento Star*, June 27, 1921.
15 Letter, Len to Lou, Manila, July 1, 1921, in Wood Papers, Box 192.
16 Copy of a letter, Wood to Weeks, Manila, June 28, 1921, in Wood
Before this emissary sailed, the Commissioners had a long talk with him and Nolting. The results were summed up by Wood in a single sentence: "They feel that the financial situation is much worse than reported; that it will take great measures and rigid economy to straighten things out." 17

Although not publicized then, George H. Fairchild had cabled Harding late in June to offer his solution. Because of Wood's knowledge of the serious financial situation and judging from a conversation with him, Fairchild was convinced that he would accept the Governorship, "if urged as a patriotic duty." "Community overwhelmingly in favor of his appointment," he declared, and urged his immediate appointment as essential, "with full powers to restore sovereignty rightful place." He closed by citing La Vanguardia, a Manila Spanish-language newspaper: "... [it] admits Government facing bankruptcy, which only God, United States Government and united patriotism of all Filipinos can avert." 18

Apparently sensing the urgency of Philippine financial conditions, the United States Congress adopted H. R. 5756 (EXTENDING LIMIT OF INDEBTEDNESS OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS) on July 21, 1921, following only the minimal several weeks of wrangling between the two houses. By authorizing an increase from $15,000,000 to $30,000,000 of the limit of their legal indebtedness, Public No. 42 apparently saved the Philippines from bankruptcy and international disgrace. 19

Papers, Box 158. Forbes was returning to San Francisco to rejoin this branch of the firm of Haskins and Sells of New York, public accountants.

17Wood, Diary, June 28, 1921.

18Cablegram from Fairchild in Manila as quoted in a letter to the President from Charles J. Welch, president of Welch, Fairchild & Co., Inc., New York, June 29, 1921. BIA, Wood File "F." Stamped as having been received by the White House on June 30, 1921, and by the War Department on July 8, 1921.

19For further details see these sources: New York Times, June 21, 23,
This activity inspired some overly-clever editorial comments in American newspapers which betrayed a greater predilection for seizing any opportunity to display rhetorical ingenuity than for presenting cogent, or even accurate, comments on the day's news. Three short, untitled editorials are submitted without further comment:

The Philippines have asked for a bigger debt limit, probably just to demonstrate their advanced status as a civilized people.20

The Philippines ask freedom and $15,000,000 [sic]. Where will this divorce and alimony craze stop?21

In their divorce suit against Uncle Sam the Philippines can't claim non-support.22

What had been Senate President Quezon's public reaction to these disgraceful developments? Apparently the humility and bewilderment which he had displayed before the mission soon after their arrival were ephemeral.

Early in July in a long interview with Philip Kinsley, Quezon spoke with at least the appearance of extreme frankness. Admitting to "many shortcomings" and "many mistakes," Quezon declared that his people would "agree to financial guidance by the United States experts, for they admit they have

24, 25, July 7, 1921; San Francisco Chronicle, June 24, July 9, 1921; Congressional Record, 67th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 2765-66, 2873, 3977; EXTENDING LIMIT OF INDEBTEDNESS OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Senate Reports, No. 181, 67th Congress, 1st Session; POLITICAL STATUS OF THE FILIPINOS, House Reports, No. 260, 67th Congress, 1st Session. The law itself, Public No. 42, may be seen in Statutes at Large of the United States, XLII (1921), 145-46.

20 New York Morning Telegraph as quoted in "Topics in Brief," Pomona (California) Progress, August 15, 1921.


22 Sacramento Star, August 13, 1921.
made a mess of national finance and need help," and that they would accept American help in other areas "where it is recognized there is a lack of efficiency." "We are a peaceful people and easily led," Quezon stated in condensing into one sentence his advice to America, "and we will take our medicine from you now, but you must not push us too far, and you must keep your promises." 23

Quezon had another opportunity to present his views on Philippine affairs,—and to give a public explanation for his apparently hurried departure while the presence of the Mission seemed to demand that he remain in the Islands—when he spoke on July 10 to nearly five hundred Filipinos at a farewell banquet (a despedida) in honor of himself and Resident Commissioner Gabaldon, who were soon to sail for the United States. Mayor Fernandez of Manila introduced Quezon, the only speaker of the evening, as the one who was being blamed for all the wrongs and blunders that had been committed in the Islands.

Rising to this challenge, Quezon began his speech, given in Spanish and interrupted often with "long rounds of applause," with a bitterly sarcastic and elaborately evasive explanation for his trip to an audience sworn to a mock secrecy. First he explained to those in his supposed confidence that he had been planning this trip since it became known that an investigating mission was coming so that he might escape the inevitable investigation of his personal affairs, "in view of my having appropriated large sums from the National Bank and having received fabulous amounts from Filipino millionaires, and from great American and foreign companies . . .

23 New York Times, July 10, 1921. A shorter account of this interview was published in the San Francisco Chronicle (which gave it prominent coverage on the front page), July 11, 1921 ("By Philip Kinsley. Special Cable to The Chronicle."); and in the Los Angeles Times, July 11, 1921.
[and because of fear] that my tricks in the railroad would be discovered."

After having sent "uncounted millions" to a bank in Spain, he had attempted to flee but was refused a passport. Now, however, he was leaving secretly and illegally before he could be arrested, knowing that he would never be able to "return to my country which I have exploited so much, and here my wife and two daughters alone and abandoned shall remain while I shall enjoy elsewhere to my heart's content the millions I have in Barcelona."24

In Shanghai on July 19, the local press found Quezon in a confident mood. "The Wood-Forbes Mission is welcomed by the Filipinos," he firmly declared. "We have no fear of an unfavourable report, but every young nation makes mistakes and learns by mistakes." The current financial mess he called "an excellent lesson, although expensive, and we now know how to manage somewhat better."25

Following his conference with Harding on August 26 at the White House, Quezon apparently still retained his self-confidence. "I also told the president that the financial situation in the islands was not as bad as it had been pictured," he informed reporters.26

And in a letter to the New York Times written at Chicago on September 9, Quezon demonstrated that he had completely regained his composure. By

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24Manila Times, July 11, 1921. From an official translated version handed to the press the following day. It was also reported in its entirety in the Manila Daily Bulletin, July 11, and in a very condensed form in the San Francisco Chronicle, July 12, 1921. Apparently quite proud of this speech, Quezon mailed a copy to Harrison in London (Letter, Quezon to Harrison, Manila, July 11, 1921, in Harrison Papers, Box 44) and to Wood in Manila (enclosed with a letter in Spanish on Senate stationery, dated July 12, 1921, in Wood Papers, Box 157).


26Associated Press dispatch, Manila Times, August 29, 1921.
then he refused to admit that any fiscal defects existed: "The Philippine Government seems to be, in this respect, ahead of other Governments more experienced and for centuries absolutely free and independent." 27

Much of this, however, was the elaborate facade created by a consummate politician. What were Quezon's real attitudes, opinions, and thoughts? At least partial insight is available through some of his actions and words that were not then publicized.

Following Concepcion's arrest, Quezon called Nolting and requested an interview at which he offered to reimburse some 30,000 pesos which he had spent while in the United States with the Independence Commission in 1919 ("for the good of the cause," as he phrased it), if there were any question concerning how this had been handled. "They realize now that there is no turning aside from the investigation and no special pull to stop rigid looking into expenditures," was Wood's comment when Nolting related the incident. 28

And a few days later Quezon attempted to clear the record with an astonished Forbes by offering to repay an old loan of 2,000 pesos with interest compounded at 8%, or a total of some 6,000 pesos. "I told him I wasn't loaning at high rates, nor as an investment," was Forbes's rejoinder. "As a matter of fact I'd forgotten the transaction, so I figured out what the interest at 4% would be, without compounding." The resulting 3,050 pesos Forbes found "very convenient for me to have as I started out without much money in my pockets," Thus the loan must have been made more than thirteen years before in 1908 when Forbes was not yet Governor General. 29

27 New York Times, September 14, 1921.
28 Wood, Diary, June 28, 1921.
29 Forbes, Journals, II, 108.
As early as June 4, Quezon had freely admitted to Wood that Philippine fiscal conditions were "a great blow to the hopes of the people," but that the responsibility "must be shared between themselves and Governor Harrison, who neglected to use his prerogatives as Governor..." In a long private interview with McCoy, Quezon contended that there were honest and capable Filipinos for all positions of responsibility in the government—with the exception of finance. Here he admitted that they had to have American financial experts until capable Filipinos could be developed by experience. But he refused to assign much blame to himself, declaring that the awful banking mess had been largely caused by Osmeña's thinking that Concepcion was qualified. Regarding Secretary of Finance Alberto Barreto, Quezon explained that he was of the old school (he had been in Aguinaldo's Malolos cabinet) and was doing his best (Forbes was less kind, or more brutally candid: "[He]... knew nothing about the National Bank and did not know anything about government finances, and he was a sorry and pitiable case.").

"The Philippine National Bank is in a very bad shape [sic] and I think it is the only institution of this government for which we can be properly criticized," was Quezon's forthright comment in a confidential letter to Harrison on July 11. "Had it not been for the Bank your administration would have been unassailable," he unrealistically wrote later. "As it is, they find it easy to criticize us, and because of the bank it is difficult to answer them completely. You and I saw that the bank would be our

30. Wood, Diary, June 4, 1921; "Record of conversation with Mr. Manuel Quezon, President of the Senate, about July 5th," in McCoy Papers, Box 28; Forbes, Journals, II, 216. In an address at Lucena, Tayabas, on June 26, Forbes presumed to express Quezon's thoughts on insular financial conditions: ". . . I think that Mr. Quezon would be the first to tell you that until the present financial situation is fixed up the Philippine ship of state would have great difficulty in navigating the waters of nationality." Ibid., p. 270.
Even with the passage of the emergency measure by Congress, Wood was not optimistic concerning the financial crisis. "Important that funds ... for the relief of Bank be made available as rapidly as possible," he cabled to Weeks on July 25. By now he was thoroughly convinced of one thing: "Economically, the Filipino people are unable to maintain an independent government under present conditions."\(^{32}\)

Yet Philip Kinsley felt that one further critical problem remained: the urgent "necessity for the speedy appointment of a new Governor," as a vital factor in restoring insular fiscal stability. He was particularly concerned that a new Governor General be in office before the Philippine Legislature met to appropriate the millions of dollars which had just been made available, "Otherwise the politicians may get their hands on the money and squander it."\(^{33}\)

That this legislation did not immediately solve all financial problems is revealed by the record of Forbes's private conference with a Filipino merchant at Oroquieta, Misamis:

Pedro Aboton: Merchant: Wants Governor Forbes to do all he can to help business.

Governor Forbes: "We are trying to do all we can."

\(^{31}\)Letter, Quezon to Harrison, Manila, July 11, 1921, in Harrison Papers, Box 44; letter, Manuel to "My dear Governor Harrison," Vancouver, British Columbia, no date (but probably early in September, 1921), in Harrison Papers, Box 44.

\(^{32}\)Cablegram, Wood to Weeks, Manila, July 25, 1921. BIA, W-F Mission File.

\(^{33}\)Los Angeles Times, July 28, 1921. An exclusive Dispatch by cable copyrighted by the Chicago Tribune Co.
Senator Aboton: "It is very hard to get a loan from the National Bank."

Governor Forbes: "Yes, they have no money."

Aboton: Says he is not influential enough to get money from the bank, even if the bank had money. . . .

And neither was there an end to embarrassing scandals. On September 1 the National Bank's general manager announced that the secretary had been forced to resign because of irregularities in his work, that the manager of the Cebu branch had also resigned, and that the Shanghai branch had been closed.

All of which obviously influenced the Commissioners' comments on insular fiscal conditions in their cablegram of September 11 summarizing for Washington their findings and final recommendations. They expressed concern at "undue interference with business," the involving of "the government in unsuccessful enterprises," "particularly disastrous" financial legislation, rampant speculation, chaos, heavy losses, and virtual bankruptcy. "The credit of the Philippine Government has become impaired throughout the Orient," declared their severely worded conclusion, "the currency has depreciated and only the support of the United States government prevents its collapse. This situation demonstrates the need of continued American supervision and assistance in financial matters."

34 "Specimen Notes Taken Public Session [Oroquieta, Misamis, August 8, 1921]." BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

35 San Francisco Chronicle, September 2, 1921.

36 Cable No. 861, Yeater to Weeks, Manila, September 11, 1921. BIA, W-F Mission File.
Although financial scandals were a dramatic development, most Filipinos who appeared before the Mission or sent documents acted as though this had occurred in another world. However, the first interview conducted by Forbes in Manila with a Filipino (a deputy from Iloilo) produced a general comment "on the bad condition of the banks."

37 At Lipa, Batangas, the Democrata Party came out in force carrying banners which denounced the Nacionalistas and asked for an investigation of the government's finances. 38

At Saravia, Occidental Negros, a farmer "made a plea for putting the National Bank on its feet, in order that it might extend aid to the farmers." Wood noted that he was one of the first Filipinos to refer to the bank's collapse. 39

Any many others of those who spoke before the Mission in this province emphasized the financial situation and particularly their difficulty in obtaining money to handle the sugar crop. 40 Yet such reactions were surprisingly rare as most Filipinos seemed far more concerned with independencia or other complaints.

Among the numerically much smaller American community, however, a much larger percentage were apparently deeply disturbed by the chaotic financial conditions and were willing to complain to the Mission. Some who would not have responded personally were willing to join a group response that

37 Forbes, Journals, II, 216.

38 Manila Times, June 15, 1921. Two of the banners read: "We want rigid examination of bad handling of Philippine National Bank"; and "We want rigid economy." Forbes, Journals, II, 245.

39 Wood, Diary, July 14, 1921.

40 Associated Press dispatch, Los Angeles Times, July 25, 1921.
provided the protection of numbers and anonymity. After listing in detail the recent disastrous history of the Philippine Government's business ventures, the memorial of the American Chamber of Commerce contended that such activities tended "inevitably to disaster, because they are operated by men appointed for political reasons rather than because of their business ability . . . [and because] their losses are made good by the taxpayers they can do 'business' on terms impossible to the people who are taxed to support them." 41 One hundred and four members of the Chamber also wrote letters, at the Mission's specific request, concerning insular conditions of which twenty-two entirely blamed Filipino mismanagement for the current financial difficulties. 42

The Manila Chamber of Commerce presented a fifteen-page report on "matters of very grave importance to Commercial interests." Among those which were discussed at some length were deficiencies in telegraphic, postal, and cable services; excessive inter-island freight rates; problems of the hemp trade, particularly inadequate government inspection; "chaotic" conditions of the exchange rates with the United States; certain chronic difficulties at the Customs House; and other problems which were judged to have seriously affected the welfare of the business community. 43

41 MEMORIAL SUBMITTED BY THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE to the WOOD-FORBES MISSION, MANILA, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. Dated Manila, July 14, 1921, and signed by H. L. Heath, President. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

42 CIRCULAR LETTER SENT OUT BY THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, MANILA, P.I., TO ALL MEMBERS IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, WITH ANALYSIS OF LETTERS RECEIVED BY THE MISSION IN COMPLIANCE THEREWITH. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

43 REPORT OF THE MANILA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SHOWING CONDITIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES, dated Manila, June 27, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits. The American Legion also submitted an official communication which touched upon economic conditions and urged that insular finances be placed on a sounder basis with the Philippine National Bank becoming a part of the Federal Reserve System. Letter, American Legion of the Philippine Islands to the Wood-Forbes Commission, Manila, September 3, 1921, signed by S. D. Rowlands,
It would appear strange that of the military men who presented many
lengthy and caustically analytical documents not a single one discussed the
financial crisis. The only comments related to economic affairs were those
by Major John P. Smith of Military Intelligence who drew some uncomplimentary
conclusions on Filipino workmen: "Labor in the Philippines is very inferior
in quality to European, American or Chinese labor. The laboring class of
Filipinos are very indifferent and the younger generation of Filipinos have
a great aversion for the fields and for all manual labor after leaving
school." To be rated inferior to the despised Chinese--how that would
have rankled had it been publicized!

Yet there seemed to be no reluctance among the American old-timers
to comment on the local economy and the Filipino handling of fiscal matters.
As most of them had at one time been in government service in the Philippines
and had then turned to business ventures, they obviously were acutely
concerned with such matters and needed little urging to pour forth their
burden of grievances.

George H. Fairchild declared that, "because of the experience of the
last eight years," insular finances should be controlled directly by the
United States Federal Government. In the opinion of H. B. McCoy, these
years had been "disastrous," and the resulting increased governmental costs,
extravagance, and inefficiency now compelled an overhaul of unsound finan-

Commander, and P. D. Carman, Adjutant, Philippine Department, American Le-
gen. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

44 Statistical Data on the Philippine Islands and a General Study of
Issues Affecting the Future Policy of the United States and the Philippines
From the Military Point of View. Signed by Major Smith, General Staff,
Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

45 Letter, Fairchild to Wood and Forbes, Manila, June 28, 1921. BIA,
W-F Report Exhibits.
cial practices. A. D. Richey was also concerned with the great increases in governmental expenses and the Filipinos' "lack of any natural inclination toward thrift, industry or the ability to assume responsibility." He was not dogmatic in asserting that these desirable and essential traits could never be developed by Filipinos, but he was convinced that they could "only be acquired gradually by competition and amalgamation with the stronger races."

Written on the stationery of the Pacific Commercial Company and labeled "CONFIDENTIAL," a detailed discussion seven single-spaced typewritten pages in length concerning the insular currency system together with suggestions for its improvement was presented by H. B. Pond. This system "met admirably the requirements of trade for a great many years," he stated, "and had it not been tinkered with and wrongly manipulated it would probably have continued to meet those requirements. . . ."

Drawing upon his ten years in the Bureau of Audits, J. A. Stiver recounted several personally observed incidents to illustrate his contention that decent government no longer existed. One amazing development occurred in the office of the insular auditor a few months after Harrison's arrival:

I walked casually to the Insular Division and happened to notice one of the clerks posting in the 1913 accounts transactions which were dated in 1914. I asked him why these postings were being made to the previous years' accounts. He gave me a knowing look and smile. He then said that orders had come from the office of the Governor General to keep the Auditor's books for the year 1913 open and crowd those books as much as possible so as to make it appear

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that the last year of the Forbes administration had been extremely expensive, and that expenses during the first year of Harrison's administration had been extremely low. It is a fact that the so-called economies under the Harrison administration and the extravagance under the Forbes administration was at that time being considerably advertised by the executive branch. . . . 

Yet once again the most valuable document by an American on this topic, it would seem, was Dean C. Worcester's. After introducing his discussion by stating that "Economic independence is certainly an indispensable prerequisite to the maintenance of a separate and independent national existence," Worcester bluntly declared that "the financial administration of the country has become both incompetent and rotten." He then proceeded to document this declaration:

The presidency of the Philippine National Bank was ultimately given to a man who for years sought in vain to have me appoint him Lieutenant-Governor of Apayao at a salary of three hundred pesos per month. He was about as competent for the position as my chauffeur would have been. Even Mr. Harrison balked at giving him the place but finally yielded to very strong political pressure brought to bear by Speaker Osmeña. A true history of the workings of the loan department of this bank under his administration

49 Memorandum, Stiver to the Mission, Manila, August 24, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits. Someone, probably Forbes, has drawn a heavy line down the left-hand margin of this document beside this account together with large exclamation marks. Forbes, who did most of the editing of these documents, would quite naturally have been greatly interested in this incident.

50 This evaluation is made by considering the official report of the new insular auditor, William T. Nolting, on the Philippine Government to be in a separate category. Nolting had been assisted by expert public accountants who had been secured by John W. Forbes of the San Francisco office from the Shanghai office of the American firm of Haskins and Sells. Information secured from an interview with Forbes upon his return to San Francisco, July 29, 1921. San Francisco Chronicle, September 6, July 30, 1921. Nolting also submitted an impressive two volume report to the Mission with this title: FINANCIAL INFORMATION PREPARED BY THE BUREAU OF AUDITS UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF WILLIAM T. NOLTING, INSULAR AUDITOR, FOR THE SPECIAL MISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. The copy presented to Wood (in the Wood Papers, Box 218) was bound in red leather with the title and his name lettered in gold. They contain tremendous detail on all phases of the insular economy and finances for the period 1903 to 1920 inclusive with numerous charts, graphs, tables, etc. They were dated at Manila, September 20, 1921, which is after the Mission's departure, so less formally prepared materials were obviously utilized for their final report.
would embody some of the most surprising episodes ever unearthed in connection with such an institution. . . . a comprehensive investigation into the present financial status of the provinces and municipalities . . . taken in conjunction with the one now being made into the affairs of the Philippine National Bank and into insular finances will conclusively demonstrate the very great present unfitness of the Filipinos to take charge of the financial administration of their country. 51

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"We are pleased to note and record many evidences of progressive development in the islands," the Mission's final report declared in opening a discussion of general economic conditions. This "shows how rapidly the Philippine people respond to improved conditions of transportation, finance, public order, and markets, brought about since the American occupation." After an analysis of the duty free trade between the Philippines and the United States ("Roughly speaking, two-thirds of the business of the country . . . [and proportionately] steadily increasing."), Wood and Forbes stated that if this free trade were closed it "would be very sharply felt." 52

Following a criticism of the Government's accounting system ("... [it] makes analysis difficult and exact comparison impossible. The books are so kept that... an analysis of governmental accounts... [would entail] prohibitive expense."), the Commissioners stated that "Certain figures, however, stand out so boldly that they can not be questioned." Among such were the rate of taxation ("sharply advanced... an increase of 124 per cent."), and government expenditures ("a still greater proportion of growth."), "This increase in the general cost of government," they explained, "has not been accompanied by a proportionate increase in efficiency; on the


52 W-F Report, pp. 33-35.
contrary, as has been noted elsewhere, there has been a general falling off in efficiency."

Although the rate of taxation had more than doubled (from $1.32 per capita in 1913 to $2.50 in 1920), further figures demonstrated that the tax burden actually fell very lightly upon Filipinos compared to other peoples (for example, the per capita rate of taxation in Great Britain for 1914-15 was $23.78 and in the United States $9.92). This was possible because the United States had "borne all costs of military and naval establishments necessary for the defense of the islands, and other expenses incident to the maintenance of sovereignty, including international, diplomatic, and consular representation." Also the bonded indebtedness was remarkably low (only $1.81 per capita compared with $237.07 in the United States, $853 in England, and $1,159 in France). 53

But when they considered insular banking the picture became bleak indeed: "The story of the Philippine National Bank is one of the most unfortunate and darkest pages in Philippine history." After supplying many details, the Commissioners made this devastating conclusion: "The result of all this has been a series of banking losses, estimated by the insular auditor to reach the severe total of $22,500,000. A partner of Messrs. Haskins & Sells, certified public accountants of New York, after a careful examination of the bank, makes the following comment:

Our examination thus far reveals the fact that the bank has been operated during almost the entire period of its existence [it had been founded in 1916 during Harrison's era] . . . in violation of every principle which prudence, intelligence, or even honesty, dictate."

Improper operating policies, which were illustrated, had created dismal

53 Ibid., pp. 35-37.
results:

... the bank has allowed its reserves to run down much lower than required by law, is unable to meet its current obligations, has had to ask other banks not to press for redemption of its notes, and has further had to ask time for the payment of its obligations to many banks in Shanghai representing many countries, a list of which is among the exhibits, to whom it owes large sums of money as a result of losses incurred in speculation in exchange transactions.

Untrained Filipinos had been placed in charge of the bank's branches and agencies throughout the Islands, the Report depressingly continued, with the result that "without exception these branches have been mismanaged."

Criminal charges had been preferred against the managers of all four branches where examinations had been completed. 54

And in another critical area the Report was equally as severe with a damning one-sentence summation: "The currency is now practically a fiat currency." Preceding this judgment had been a brief description of how this had developed, followed by an explanation of why the Philippine Government could continue to have any international financial standing: "... its principal support now is ... the confidence on the part of the public that the United States will not permit these things to happen again."

Yet in spite of such a bleak fiscal picture, Wood and Forbes did not conclude on a pessimistic note:

In view of the good earnings, moderate expenses, inherent wealth, a small public debt, and backed by the credit of the United States, the problem of rehabilitating the credit of the Philippine Islands should be an easy one. The lesson has been a bitter one for the Filipinos and the gravity of the

54 Ibid., pp. 38-39. For a detailed summary of conditions in the Philippine National Bank when it was investigated, the trials of many of its officers, and reports on a number of other financial and business ventures of the Philippine Government, see a long letter from E. W. Wilson, the bank's general manager, to Harrison in London, dated Manila, July 14, 1922, in Harrison Papers, Box 45.
mistake is generally appreciated.\textsuperscript{55}

After citing several disastrous business ventures by the Government, the Commissioners advised that "the Government should as far as possible get out of and keep out of such business."\textsuperscript{56} In marked contrast was their generously favorable opinion on the contributions of American business. Not only had they "contributed greatly to the betterment of conditions," but they had "always been a strong force in the support of law and order, intensely American in sentiment and, on the whole, a good, stabilizing, and helpful influence."\textsuperscript{57}

In their General Conclusions, Wood and Forbes returned again to economic and financial conditions. Even though they had discovered the Filipinos to be "in the main prosperous," it was their conclusion that "the people are not organized economically . . . to maintain an independent government."\textsuperscript{58} Thus if independencia had been dealt a single most decisively fatal blow at this time, it certainly would appear that its origins had been in the imprudent, if not actually criminally dishonest, conduct of the politicos with the financial resources of their own country.

\textsuperscript{55} W-F Report, p. 39.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., p. 42.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., p. 22.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., p. 45.
For two veteran Philippine administrators such as Wood and Forbes, the pervasiveness of independence agitation must have been anticipated, although it had reached its peak after World War I when both men had been absent from the Islands for a number of years. Some of their early public statements appear to have been attempts to discourage such activities by emphasizing other phases of their investigation. Yet they soon recognized the obvious futility of such a campaign and resignedly braced themselves against the flood tide of memorials, petitions, resolutions, letters, and all other manner of documents plus a persistent spray of spoken words advocating independence. Surely Canute had more chance for success in controlling the tide than the Commissioners had in restricting the multitudinous and persistent manifestations of the Filipinos's devotion to independence.

As has been seen, as early as March 22 Secretary of War Weeks specifically stated that the real reason for the Wood-Forbes Mission was to determine whether the Filipinos were actually ready for independence. And in his official letter of instruction to the Mission Weeks concisely stated this fundamental problem confronting them.¹

Yet when asked if ultimate Philippine independence were the purpose of their investigation, Wood explained during their first Manila press conference that they had nothing to say concerning this question which was entirely within the province of the President and Congress, their function

¹For a full discussion see chapter III.
being to provide a full and impartial report on insular conditions. Just two days later this point was re-emphasized by Wood when a sub-committee of the Independence Commission called at Malacanán to present a memorial requesting Philippine independence. "Forbes and I had a very frank talk with Mr. Osmena and Mr. Quezon this morning," Wood wrote on May 10, "and gave them very clearly to understand that we had nothing to do with the question of independence..."

Even though such public statements were widely circulated by the press, the Commissioners found it necessary to repeat these words again and again. For example, Wood gave the following speech at Vigan, Ilocos Sur:

"We are here as friends of the Filipino people. We are not here in a spirit of criticism, but simply to make a fair, honest and absolutely fearless report on conditions as they exist today in the Islands...

We are charged with a very solemn responsibility, and that is, the responsibility for a report which will be of very considerable importance to the President in forming his opinion of the situation. We are not here to decide upon Independence; that is a matter which is to be left to the Congress. We are here simply to make this report upon what you are doing, how you have been doing it and what the conditions are."

Such repeated attempts to lessen the importance of the Mission's work relative to independencia seem strange in light of the clear statement by

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2 Manila Times, May 4, 1921.

3 Ibid., May 6, 1921. At a public session in Cebu Wood declared that they did not even want to hear about Filipino desires for independence. Forbes commented that this "was so contrary to what we had been ordered to do, and were doing, that it was an extraordinary lapse on the part of a man who made very few." Journals, II, 271. In a previous reference to this speech, Forbes had condensed their instructions into a single sentence: "... to determine the readiness of the Filipinos for independence." And, "in view of our instructions and the nature of our inquiries, there was no doubt at all that the populace were convinced we were there for that definite purpose." Ibid., p. 214.

4 Wood, Diary, May 10, 1921.

5 Ibid., May 25, 1921. This provides perhaps one of the most glaring examples of the carelessness or the inexcusable liberties taken by Hagedorn with his sources. See his Wood, II, 386.
Weeks on March 22, which was printed by the Manila Times and almost certainly all other major insular newspapers. Any hopes of dampening independence agitation were certainly illusory. The politicos appear to have been convinced that the Mission's investigation was critical for their future. That their activities were diminished by the Commissioners' somewhat naive tactics would appear extremely doubtful; rather the opposite would seem true.

2

The typical reception accorded the Mission throughout the Archipelago included the parade so dearly loved by Filipinos, almost inevitably with banners, placards, flags, and streamers inscribed with messages of welcome and pleas for independence and with similar devices also usually marking the line of march. On the placards and banners carried in Manila's welcoming parade such messages as these had been written in large colored letters:

We have faith in the justice of our cause.
The stable government which we now have makes us confident of the triumph of our cause.
We have faith that the congress of the United States will comply without delay with the promise made in the Jones Law.
We want independence.⁶

In the provinces the theme was commonly the same although often restricted by limited resources. At San Jose, Nueva Ecija, for example, the large welcoming crowd had simply strung a banner across the road reading, "Welcome General Wood, Governor Forbes, precursors of our independence."⁷

Yet even in some remote provincial areas the welcoming parades were impressive and the appeals for independence eye-catching.⁸ Perhaps the most

⁶Manila Times, May 7, 1921.
⁸For examples, see "'Our Own Little Ireland' In The Philippines,"
effective of these was staged by Lopez, Tayabas, where some thousand school children each carried a white flag inscribed with an appeal for independence. 9

Some inscriptions demonstrated an uncomfortable knowledge of American inconsistency. One banner in the parade at Vigan, Ilocos Sur, read, "Will the Philippines become America's Irish question?" And a banner at the pier in Zamboanga asked, "Must the heart of America beat only for the freedom of Ireland, Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, and not for the independence of the Philippines?" 10

Almost routinely such parades led to a public meeting with its inevitable speeches, of which the Mission heard the staggering total of some 1,500. 11 Delivered by both men and women, in English, Spanish, and native dialects, these speeches, addresses, and orations embodied great diversity in detail but, with few exceptions, were primarily concerned with some aspect of independencia.

It would appear from the newspaper record that the request of speakers at Santiago, Ilocos Sur, was most commonly heard from the Christian Filipinos: independence under an American protectorate. 12 But a number of variations

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9 San Francisco Chronicle, June 28, 1921.


11 Ibid., September 2, 1921.

12 Associated Press Dispatch, Los Angeles Times, May 31, New York Times, June 1, 1921. Numerous other examples may be seen throughout the Manila Times and the personal records of the Commissioners, particularly Forbes's Journals, II.
were also presented, including independence without specifying its form, independence in any form, immediate independence, independence at a fixed date in the future, and, as one speaker at Bacacay, Albay, interestingly phrased it, "under the conditions which he has stated, the conditions being the United States should be jolly well sure that they are ready for it."\(^\text{13}\)

Once in Cebu Province manly tears by a young orator named Banio formed an emotional overtone to probably an otherwise routine plea for independence. "Later it was found he was a lawyer, who had exhibited similar emotion while pleading a case on the location of an artesian well."\(^\text{14}\)

On rare occasions a few rugged individualists from among the Christian Filipinos had the temerity publicly to oppose independencia in any form. In Ilocos Sur Province a realistic farmer at Santa Maria, fearing that independence would triple his taxes, declared that a large part of the population wanted no change, two laborers at Santiago asserted that an independent Philippines would not be able to support a government, and at Bangar's "very dramatic session ... Juan Paces opposed independence on the ground that the people didn't have enough intelligence."\(^\text{15}\) And a farmer at Calapan, Mindoro, strongly spoke against independence and severely criticized the insular government.\(^\text{16}\)

At Saravia, Negros Occidental, the remarks of a farmer that the Fil-

\(^\text{13}\) These may be seen scattered throughout the sources cited above. The quotation is from Ibid., p. 268.

\(^\text{14}\) Exclusive cabled dispatch, Los Angeles Times, July 16, 1921.

\(^\text{15}\) Associated Press dispatch, Los Angeles Times, May 31, and New York Times, June 1, 1921; Forbes, Journals, II, 231 (Paces' remarks were "greatly resented by the crowd," Forbes noted, which roughly ejected him from the meeting to shouts claiming that he was drunk or insane.).

\(^\text{16}\) Manila Times, June 16, 1921. Forbes describes other instances of opposition to independence in public speeches in his Journals, II, 81, 134, 295.
ipinos wanted independence but were not ready for it, "that he believed, in their hearts, 80 percent of them were of this opinion but were afraid to say it in public," caused an uproar. Two other speakers refuted his statements, but he reiterated them. "We had a very animated little discussion," Wood noted. "The Presidente was on his feet, waving his arms and yelling. I finally had to ask him, peremptorily, to sit down, which he did with prompt obedience." This was "one of the few places where a man has come out ... and said the people are not ready for Independence," Wood recorded. They were "few and far between" as the people "were afraid to come out in the open." 17

Yet these few were obviously relatively unimportant Filipinos from the lower classes who could be ignored by the politicos. But a provincial governor was obviously an entirely different matter.

In an open meeting under a spreading acacia tree at Santiago, Isabela, Governor Pascual Paguirigan declared that his people were satisfied with American rule, were not worrying about independence, were prosperous and contented, and were willing to remain under American sovereignty until the United States was ready to grant independence. 18 Coming from an influential Filipino, this must have severely shaken the politicos. His seditious statements were unique from a Christian Filipino of importance; and, to compound their perniciousness, his words were widely publicized in the press. Surely such insubordination would be swiftly crushed. 19

17 Wood, Diary, July 14, 1921.


19 The consequences which flowed from the Governor's rash words will be discussed later in this chapter.
Forbes has explained that public opposition to _independencia_ was so rare because speakers "were afraid of being thought unpatriotic or of being subjected to personal violence if opposed to independence."²⁰ "In the main there was a sameness in the presentation of the desire for independence," he summarized at the conclusion of their work, "which indicated that instructions had been sent out as to just what was to be said and how it was to be said."²¹ At Catbalogan, Samar, former Governor Eduardo Feito and two Spanish priests declared that at a meeting the previous night the governor had stated that the "mission was carrying independence with it and distributing it about," and that many provinces had already been given _independencia_. Using "threatening tones," he "called upon them to demand independence immediately..."²²

And if coercion failed, mistranslation was always available. When Forbes objected to a college boy in Capiz Province speaking for the working class (he icily asked "if there was any one there representing the working class who didn't wear silk socks."), three _taos_ dressed in "traje del pais" (country garb, or "camisa" outside the trousers) were pushed forward. The first one declared that "he didn't know about independence but that he had been told to come and ask for it." This the provincial governor translated, "making him say that he didn't know much about independence but that he was sure it was the desire of all the people."²³

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²⁰ Forbes, _Journals_, II, 217. Wood had another explanation: "Everybody feels in honor bound to support the movement for independence, publicly at least, but there is a very strong dominant _note_ of doubt everywhere as to their being ready for it at the present time, and there is an entire lack of real enthusiasm." _Diary_, July 8, 1921.

²¹ Forbes, _Journals_, II, 213. "It seemed almost as if instructions had been sent out in a circular letter," Forbes observed after listening to speeches for independence in Siquijor Province containing "the usual stock phrases." _Ibid._, p. 282.

²² _Ibid._, p. 260.

²³ _Ibid._, p. 125. "A curious thing" was discovered in Bais, Oriental
"It is noticeable that there where they are least fit for independence they shout for it most vigorously," Forbes wryly observed, "and where they are most fitted for it they demand it least." And he was convinced that the average Filipino who plead for independencia did not know clearly what it was but it had been "borne in upon him that he will be as good as anybody then and need not look upon the white man as a master." "There seems to be no real spontaneity in this movement," Wood concluded as early as June 6, "but rather as though the people are doing in a perfunctory way what they think ought to be done, as a matter of racial pride. They want their own government, but in their hearts many of them feel that they are not yet ready for it." 24

Although Quezon, that peerless orator among the politicos, was strangely silent following the Mission's arrival, he did deliver one address which touched upon independencia. Speaking on July 10 at a farewell banquet (a despedida) in Manila prior to sailing for the United States, Quezon delivered a long speech in Spanish which was often interrupted by the nearly five hundred Filipinos present with "long rounds of applause." After an elaborate and evasive explanation for his trip which involved confusing references to the chaotic insular financial conditions, 25 Quezon inevitably turned to a consideration of independencia.

Following Harding's announcement of the Wood-Forbes Mission, "a feeling of uncertainty crept into the hearts of the people," he declared. Claim-

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24 Ibid., pp. 259, 237; Wood, Diary, June 6, 1921.
25 For this discussion see the chapter on insular finance.
ing competence to express Filipino aspirations, he asserted that "The Filipino people desire their independence and believe sincerely that the day has come when they should be granted that independence."

Quzon then shifted to the Jones Law, which the Filipinos considered as binding America "irrevocably and solemnly to grant them their independence," and of greater force even than a treaty because of the House's additional approval. "And this promise of independence . . . is all the more sacred, affects the good name of America all the more," he continued, "inasmuch as its fulfillment is only guaranteed by her pledged national honor, since being a weak nation, we can not compel her by force to redeem her promise."

Finally, after commenting upon a number of other topics, Quzon closed this speech on a note of confident hope:

I share in the anxiety of our people regarding the immediate result upon our cause, of the investigation, which the mission is making; but I entertain no fear regarding the final triumph of our demand. Ultimately America will give us independence if we are constant in desiring it and asking for it. Let us therefore have faith in the future. The history of America in the Philippines is a book written with acts of sincerity, of justice, of altruism and of affection for the Filipino people, and our conduct toward America has at all times demonstrated appreciation, gratitude and love for the benefits received. Heaven grant that at the end of our journey we may truthfully say that the coming of the mission has shortened the way.26

The Manila Times, which had often been rather harshly critical of Quzon, now generously praised this speech, calling it "courageous," "sensible," and "one of those few speeches in the world that really should have been made." They hopefully wished "that he would write his speeches out oftener."

26 Manila Times, July 11, 1921. This was an official translation given to the press. See also a very condensed version in the San Francisco Chronicle, July 12, 1921.

The Pagan tribesmen of northern Luzon spoke both for and against independence. At Bontoc, Forbes listened to representatives from several tribes request continued American control. Yet here there were also Igorot head-men who declared for Filipino rule. Later Forbes discovered that they actually wanted American control as they distrusted the Filipinos but that a Filipino mission had been sent into the hills to intimidate them.

When Forbes met the Ifugao leaders at Payawan, he wondered what had been the activities of their appointed Tagalog senator who was with them. Soon he was enlightened when the first chieftain asked for independence, followed by many more with similar requests. "This was a curious reversal of form," Forbes has explained, "as they had always been known to be heartily desirous of the continuance of American rule. . . ." His conclusion was unequivocal: "It was obvious that the orators had been told what they were to say and threatened in some way if they did not do as told." And the private interviews (as well as later investigations) confirmed his suspicions:

. . . the first person who came in was asked, "When was the meeting held?" He answered, "Last night." "And who was it told you what to say?" "I prefer not to answer that question," was the reply. "Very well," he was told, "you have answered completely enough." This same series of questions put to succeeding chieftains elicited pretty much the same story, until finally one appeared who was willing to tell who had given the orders and what they were told to say. There was no need for further evidence. In fact, the uniformity of the replies and the nature of them, so foreign to the Ifugao's own desires and to their usual attitude, made it very easy to deduce the exact sequence of events even had it not been told.

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28 See the chapter on public administration.

29 Kinsley's cablegram, Bontoc, May 28, as quoted in De Veyra's cable to Quezon, Washington, D.C., June 25, 1921. BIA, W-F Mission File.

30 Forbes, Philippine Islands, II, 295. Replying to Forbes's request for both the instructions given to the cabacillas at this meeting and their source, Governor W. E. Dossier of the subprovince of Ifugao wrote from Kiangan on July 1, 1921. Upon questioning a number of chieftains who were present at this meeting, Dossier found "that they had received instructions from the
The Pagans and Moslems of the southern islands also stood with their fellow non-Christians of Luzon in opposition to independencia. 31 At both Davao and Jolo the Mission heard many Moros publicly express their enthusiasm for continued American sovereignty, despite threats by Christian Filipinos if they did not openly embrace independencia. 32

Particularly in a large meeting at the Constabulary's Camp Keithley, the Mission finally saw the Moros shed their restraint and freely demonstrate their feelings. When Wood asked who favored continued American sovereignty, virtually every hand in the shouting and dancing audience was raised, and some of the leaders jumped up and hugged the Commissioners. "Pandemonium broke loose," Wood recorded. "Old hadjis [those respected Moros who had made a pilgrimage to Mecca] threw up their turbans and came dancing down the long room to the front like madmen. There was a perfectly deafening roar."

Kinsley was also watching this "remarkable demonstration," but his trained

Representative of Ifugao [the senator], who acted as interpreter at the meeting, that when questioned they would state that they desired independence. As to whether or not the Representative was acting upon the instructions received by him from higher authority I leave to your own good judgment." Dosser's closing comment was a request that his letter "be treated with strictest confidence." Reproduced in Forbes, Journals, II, 337. A Lieutenant of Constabulary also testified that he had overheard Ifugao talking of how they had been instructed to ask for independence by the Filipino who acted as their interpreter before the Mission the next day. Ibid., p. 220.

31 An exception were the Negritos of Luzon, some of whom told the Mission that they wanted independence. Further questioning revealed that they had never heard of the United States or of the Mission before that day, and that what they actually desired was independence from the provincial officers who came to their villages and bothered them. "Life is easy," one chief said, "let us alone." Apparently the Filipinos who had supplied them with new clothes for their visit to town ("of which they appeared as proud as children") had also instructed them to ask for independence. Los Angeles Times, June 17, 1921.

32 Associated Press dispatches, Manila Times, August 12, 21, 1921. In Bukidnon Province former Governor Fortich, an American who was then engaged in ranching in this area, told Forbes "that the Filipinos had passed the word that anyone who opposed independence would be deported to [of all places!] Hawaii." Forbes, Journals, II, 135.
eye caught something else: "A few Filipinos who were present stood with
folded arms in silence."\textsuperscript{33}

When the Mission inspected cities in which both Moros and Christian
Filipinos lived, public sessions commonly were bifurcated. At a public meet-
ing in Zamboanga's Plaza Pershing, for example, all Filipino speakers who
mentioned independencia desired it with or without an American protectorate,
and all Moro speakers were unanimously for continued American sovereignty.\textsuperscript{34}

One of the English speaking Moros succinctly set forth their platform:

1. The Moros do not want independence for the Philippines.
2. The Moros do not want to mix with the Filipinos.
3. The Moros want Mindanao separated from the remainder of the
   Philippines.
4. The Moros wish to be annexed as a territory of the United States.
5. The Moros want American officials in order to avoid trouble.\textsuperscript{35}

To most of the hundreds of speeches delivered before them, Wood and
Forbes apparently listened patiently without significant reply. But occa-
sionally they were stimulated into a rejoinder, and often provocative
speeches on independencia were the cause.

Characterizing the Filipinos as no better than slaves and declaring
that he was willing to fight to obtain their freedom, Vicente Salumbides (a
Filipino veteran who had fought with American forces in France and was the
principal speaker at Lopez, Tayabas) demanded immediate independence. In his
brief reply, Wood termed the reference to slavery an insult to the Filipino

\textsuperscript{33} Associated Press dispatch, Manila Times, August 12, 1921; Wood, Di
dary, August 3, 1921; San Francisco Chronicle, August 14, 1921.

\textsuperscript{34} Manila Times, August 29, 1921.

\textsuperscript{35} San Francisco Chronicle, August 18, 1921.
people. 36

At Patnongon, Antique, Wood was moved to reply after hearing "the usual Filipino town orator" make "a stereotyped plea for independence. . . ." Declaring "that America had spent hundreds of millions of dollars on the Philippine Islands," he promised that "it was going to do what was best for the people." 37

An American (identified only as an ex-judge and resident of Zamboanga) is the source of a revealing anecdote concerning Wood's inspection of Davao Province:

I was with General Wood . . . when he visited Melita [Malita?] . . . We were sitting on a veranda there when along came a young Filipino, followed by a whole crowd of other natives. The young fellow started a speech for independence; it was in excellent English and it was a good speech, and at appropriate moments the other natives would cheer. But Wood knew perfectly well that half of those natives couldn't understand a word of the speech, and he just called the speaker to him. "Young man," he said, "your address is splendid, but I wish you'd tell your friend behind that cocoanut palm to stop signaling to the others when it's time to cheer." 38

Forbes also participated in these public rejoinders, beginning on their first day in the provinces when a local attorney at Tarlac, Tarlac, made a strong plea for independence, stressing Wilson's statement in his last annual message to Congress that the Philippines had qualified for their independence. "Mr. Wilson made little effort to grant independence to the Philippines," Forbes bluntly replied, "although the Democrats controlled both houses of Congress during six years of his term of office." 39

36 Manila Times, October 15, 1921; San Francisco Chronicle, June 28, 1921.

37 "Exclusive Dispatch" by Philip Kinsley in the Los Angeles Times, August 4, 1921.


39 Manila Times, May 13, 1921.
Again at Balacan, La Union, Forbes was goaded into a rebuttal when
"one silly schoolboy undertook to get off a prepared speech in which he told
about Rizal being an advocate of independence and demanded independence 'for
which Rizal had shed his life's blood.'" Forbes "suggested that if he read
the life of Rizal, and his writings, he would find that he never advocated
or mentioned independence." He also was provoked to public replies when
orators claimed that it was the unanimous desire of all Filipinos to have
independencia, and that the Philippine Government was then stable.

The most important of these limited speeches would seem to be those
by both Commissioners on June 8 as guests of the Columbian Association of
Manila. "I have never criticised the Filipinos for desiring their independ-
ence," Forbes declared. "I have never discouraged the demand for Philippine
independence, and I have never encouraged it. What I've hoped has been that
this desire for freedom will prove the stimulus for you to do those things
which make you capable of nationality, to get your country into shape for
it." "Stable government means liberty within the law and respect for law," he explained, "legislation for all and not for a special class, respect for
persons and property and courts before which rich and poor are treated alike
and into which political influence does not enter."

To Kinsley this speech signified a turning point in the Mission's
work. "There will be no immediate independence for the Philippine Islands
if the policy of the Harding Administration depends upon the report to be

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40 Forbes, Journals, II, 231. Wood agreed: "Rizal never talked of In-
dependence to the Philippines, but always of education and development; not
of revolution but of evolution." Diary, July 7, 1921.

41 Forbes, Journals, II, 277, 288, 139.

42 Associated Press dispatch, Los Angeles Times, June 10, 1921.
submitted by the Wood-Forbes Mission," he declared. "That much may be said to have been settled now." "That the investigation has proven already that there is no stable government in the sense contemplated by Congress as being prerequisite to giving the Filipinos complete self-government" was clearly indicated to him by the Commissioners' speeches. 43 He explained that they had "decided to speak frankly to try and lead this best class of Filipinos into a safe road and to show them which way the wind was blowing, so they began to curb the insistent talk for independence." Consequently they told these well-educated Filipinos "their ideas on a stable government and said the only interpretation possible at present was that the Filipinos could not match the ideal at any vital point." 44

Fortunately the Mission occasionally publicly summarized the trends observed in the numerous independencia speeches so that the politicos could ascertain how effective their campaign had been among their constituents.

Thus Wood declared that the average Filipino in Isabela Province was content with the status quo, although many officials had asked for independence with an American protectorate. 45 At the conclusion of their first provincial

43 Note that Kinsley refers to a speech by Wood also. In the Associated Press dispatch of this event cited above no mention was made of any speech except by Forbes.

44 Cablegram by Philip Kinsley, date-lined Manila, June 9, 1921, as quoted in a cablegram De Veyra to Quezon, Washington, D.C., June 25, 1921. BIA, W-F Mission File.

45 "Our Own Little Ireland" In The Philippines," Literary Digest, LXIX (June 4, 1921), 44. Based on an Associated Press dispatch from Ilagan, Isabela. Wood noted that the almost universal desire for independence was always independence under an American protectorate, and that a priest and a native Methodist missionary had told him they heard little about independence except from the politicos. Wood, Diary, May 19, 1921.
tour, Wood and Forbes reported that almost all Christian Filipino speakers had favored independence under an American protectorate, a few had favored absolute independence, and an occasional speaker had opposed independence in any form at that time. Among non-Christians they had found the warmest friendship for the United States and had heard the strongest opposition to independence.46

In Laguna, Wood reported less talk of independence than in any other province visited thus far. Forbes, however, had heard a number of speeches in Rizal Province that same day asking for independence either under a protectorate or in any form.47 In Bataan and Zambales provinces Colonel Gordon Johnston found a general demand for independence under a protectorate, with many wanting independence of any kind while an occasional speaker including several women--opposed independence completely.48

Although speakers in Camarines Sur, Albay, and Sorsogon provinces continued to express strong desires for independence, it was almost always accompanied by a request for an American protectorate.49 And after two weeks in southern Luzon and adjacent islands, Wood and Forbes reported virtually all speakers advocating independence in some form, with many favoring a protectorate.50

46 Manila Times, May 31, 1921; Associated Press dispatch, San Francisco Chronicle, June 1, 1921. At the conclusion of this trip, Wood confided some observations to a memorandum: "There has been a very general propaganda on the subject of Independence, and to the common people it has been held out as something which will bring lower taxes, higher wages and less work. There is little understanding of the benefits of free trade with the United States, or the effect upon insular credit of the loss of the support of the United States." Diary, June 2, 1921.

47 Manila Times, June 10, 11, 1921.

48 Ibid., June 12, 1921.

49 Ibid., June 21, 1921.

In many ways the most valuable of all these summary public statements was Forbes's speech at Oroquieta, Misamis, during their last trip. Following the final oration on independence, Forbes probed at the very heart of the problem:

Throughout the Islands we have met with a very general desire for independence, but it is not universal. A good many careful and prudent people have told us that the time is not yet ripe, and most of the careful and prudent people have asked us for a protectorate. I think that a very great majority of the Filipino people feel that the Islands will need protection. It is fortunate for them that this is so, because there is no doubt that the Filipino people need to take a good many important steps before they can maintain their nationality against strong opponents; and it speaks well for their intelligence that they recognize this fact. We have found a great many Filipinos who have asked for independence without specifying that what they really wanted was a protectorate. I wish they had been more prudent, because it would make me feel more confident in their knowledge of the world situation.\(^\text{51}\)

In addition to those Filipinos who delivered public speeches which touched upon independence, others were sufficiently influential to have their comments reported by the press. Prominent among these was Resident Commissioner Isauro Gabaldon who, after his return from the United States on May 17, declared that he was "very optimistic about the outlook of the Philippine question in the United States," because he and Resident Commissioner De Veyra had been "assured" by Harding "that he would solve the question of our independence within . . . four years. . . ." But Harding had explained that any action would largely depend upon the report by Wood and Forbes, in whom Gabaldon expressed "absolute faith and confidence."\(^\text{52}\)

But one of Gabaldon's colleagues in Washington, J. P. Melencio,

\(^{51}\)"Specimen Notes Taken Public Session [Oroquieta, Misamis, August 8, 1921.]." BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

\(^{52}\)Manila Times, May 17, 1921.
director of the Philippine Press Bureau, did not share his confidence. "The Filipinos hope that General Wood will rather live up to the standards of democracy and justice set by such great Americans as Washington, Jefferson and Lincoln," he declared. Because Lincoln had said, "no man is good enough to govern another without that man's consent," and "those who deny freedom to others deserve it not for themselves," the Filipinos felt that they knew what Lincoln would do if he were in Wood's place. 53

As chief of the politicos, Quezon had been remarkably quiet as hundreds of speeches were delivered before the Mission. Yet shortly before sailing for the United States, and during his absence from the Islands, he partially compensated for his previous silence by being normally vocal to reporters.

"If independence is not given us now it will be necessary . . . to set a date when we may expect it," Quezon bluntly told Kinsley during a luncheon interview at his fine new home in Pasay on Manila Bay. "It will be impossible to go back on this promise forever. That would cause a revolution. They will accept a delay of ten or twelve years, but no longer."

"The people realize they [sic] have many shortcomings and that many mistakes have been made," he admitted, and thus they would "accept a delay if their present self-government is not taken away from them." American guidance would also be accepted in areas of inefficiency but he warned that "the Jones law must not be changed materially or there will be trouble."

"If it could be explained to our people that they cannot have independence now because of the complicated international situation in the Pacific they would accept that," he hopefully continued, seeking a face-saving

53 From an article by Melencio, "General Wood and Mr. Forbes," Independent [Manila], May 21, 1921. It is not clear why Melencio should have ignored Forbes in this challenge.
solution. "They hate to have their [sic] mistakes held up to the world. Their national and racial pride is involved. . . ."

"If America gives us friendship it will win the eternal gratitude of our people," he promised, shifting tactics. "If war with Japan were to come, which I do not think likely, the Filipinos would fight on the side of America. If you hold us against our will and war comes we might not fight for you."

"What is necessary is to have a definite understanding as to when we can have independence," he reiterated, "so that we can go to work with a true heart at solving problems." After this, he assured Americans, "The people will begin to scrutinize the Government and take steps to correct any evils."

In conclusion, Quezon condensed his advice to America into one sentence: "We are a peaceful people and easily led, and we will take our medicine from you now, but you must not push us too far, and you must keep your promises." 54

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54 New York Times, July 10, 1921. A condensed version of this interview was also printed by the San Francisco Chronicle (which gave it a prominent spot on the front page with a picture of Quezon and the head ISLAND LEADER FEARS UPRISING), July 11, 1921; and in the Los Angeles Times, July 11, 1921.

When the New York Times described Quezon's statements as an admission that his people were not ready for independence, he was stirred to action. (See an editorial, "Wood's Task In The Philippines," September 5, 1921.) At Chicago on September 9 he wrote to the editor of the Times flatly declaring "that I did not make the statements attributed to me, as if they were secured in an interview, and quoted in your editorial, and naturally your conclusions regarding my attitude on the Philippine question are erroneous." Furthermore, "It is not true that I admit the time for independence is not ripe; quite the contrary. . . ." "I believe, in common with the rest of my countrymen," he concluded, "that the time has arrived when the United States should fulfill its pledge to grant the Filipinos their independence. Everything is now ready for that great event. . . ." New York Times, September 14, 1921.

It seems strange that Quezon did not write sooner since the interview had been printed on July 10, and he had arrived in Washington on August 15. Probably he had now found his statements to have become a personal political liability.

In partial explanation of his contention that he had been misquoted,
At Shanghai, Quezon was still in a talkative mood. "The Filipinos prefer independence with an American protectorate, rather than absolute independence," he startlingly asserted. Not only had the Mission been welcomed, but Filipinos had "no fear of an unfavourable report," only asking for "a chance."55

To reporters in Tokio, Quezon denied that his trip was for counteracting the Mission's influence, as he intended "to urge the passage of legislation granting independence at this time." He hoped that the conference called by Harding on Far Eastern affairs (the Washington Conference) might prove an opportune time for this.56

Following a conference with Harding at the White House on August 26, Quezon told reporters that the President had refused to discuss independence until he had received the Wood-Forbes Report, although he had promised that there would be no backward step in Philippine policies. He informed Harding that Filipinos earnestly wanted independence and believed that it would "be granted at an early date."57

It should be said that the Times editorial did not quote him exactly as they had on July 10. There was, however, no distortion of his basic ideas. But this could have been sufficient grounds for Quezon to have claimed that he had been misquoted. It was a device which he had used many times before and would use often in the future.


56 Manila Times, August 20, 1921.

57 Associated Press dispatch, Ibid., August 29, 1921. See also Los Angeles Times, August 27, 1921. A statement of the substance of Harding's remarks as prepared by Judge Horace M. Towner of Iowa, chairman of the House Insular Affairs Committee, who was apparently present at the interview, gives a much more complete picture. See MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD, August 30, 1921, initialed by General Frank McIntyre, Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, to which was attached a photocopy of a "statement of the substance of the declaration of the President in an interview with Mr. Quezon on August 19 [sic], 1921." BIA, Philippine Independence File.
Routinely the Mission extended invitations to private conferences of which the general substance, at least among Christian Filipinos, differed markedly from the usual speeches that regularly preceded them. For example, at Tagudin, Ilocos Sur, several orators spoke feelingly and loudly for independence and then privately opposed it, even presenting signed statements giving their reasons. Ambrosio Mino, the principal speaker, told Forbes that he had to speak thus as a candidate for the legislature because otherwise no one had a chance of election. A group of young men also came in private, declaring that they had wanted to speak against independence publicly but that they "had been persuaded not to by the older men." They "spoke very strongly against independence, giving excellent reasons." 58

And along the road to Tagudin, Forbes had held impromptu interviews with highway foremen. When questioned on why he had asked for independence, one capataz gave an ingenuous reply: "Because that's what the big people in the town told us to say." Another gave a succinct justification for his opposition: "Mucho combate, poco dinero" ("Much fighting, little money"). "I can't imagine a briefer summing up of the true inwardness of the situation than that," was Forbes's reaction. 59

That such blatant hypocrisy disturbed Wood is evident from his speech of the same day at San Fernando, La Union:

58 Forbes, Journals, II, 79, 224 (here Forbes has reproduced Mino's speech); Kinsley's cable from Bangued, June 6, 1921, as quoted in De Veyra's cablegram to Quezon, Washington, D.C., June 25, 1921, in BIA, W-F Mission File. An equally good example from Oriental Negros may be seen in Forbes, Journals, II, 279-81.

59 Ibid., p. 78.
We want, above all, for you to give us your frank and honest, unafraid opinions of affairs as they are. One of the characteristics of a race capable of self-government is the willingness to speak frankly, regardless of the feelings of friends or enemies, on occasions of great national importance... We want you to talk frankly, speak from your heads as well as your hearts... We are asking you today to come out and speak like men, without fear of your political future or anything else.

Following their first provincial trip, Wood and Forbes reported that many Filipinos, and especially property owners, had privately asked for indefinite continuation of the political status quo. Even in Ilocos Norte, where they had found "great independence enthusiasm," most of those who spoke in private were opposed. And at Laoag, the capital, "a big crowd waiting for private interviews" impressed Forbes that they wanted "some sort of independence under an American protectorate. They want the shell of independence and care little or nothing for the substance of it." And in neighboring Ilocos Sur the Mission got "a good deal of a surprise" when some fifty university students at Vigan, the capital, "came and all declared against independence."

Later in southern Luzon this pattern persisted. "Although everybody spoke loudly for independence" in Albay Province, "many spoke quietly against it." These "earnestly... begged that they be protected against independence, and especially against it being known that they had spoken so." In adjoining Camarines Sur and Sorsogon provinces there was no change. Those who privately asked for independence in Sorsogon ("there has been very active propaganda here," Forbes observed, "... all of the people having been

60 Wood, Diary, May 27, 1921. Wood and Forbes commented on this phenomenon to reporters at the conclusion of their first provincial inspection trip. Manila Times, May 31, 1921; Associated Press dispatch, San Francisco Chronicle, June 1, 1921.

61 Manila Times, May 31, 1921; Associated Press dispatch, San Francisco Chronicle, June 1, 1921.

62 Forbes, Journals, II, 80-81.
coached up to make a great deal of independence noise." routinely followed their formal requests with explanations of why it should not be granted. "It is obvious to me that the reason for this is that they want to be able to say truthfully that they made the request for independence and be in a position to get it supported by evidence on my part in case they are persecuted for what they said," Forbes explained. "They usually declare for independence and then say that certain things must be done before it is granted, things that take a long time to achieve." 63

And in the Visayas, the problem continued from day to day and from barrio to barrio. At private interviews on July 11 when the divided Mission listened to numerous speeches for independencia at many public meetings, "a number of Filipinos prominent in business and politics . . . [declared] that while their aspirations were for independence, they believed the Philippines were unprepared to assume full control of the government under present financial conditions." 64 On Samar those who privately opposed independence included two former Governors, Eduardo Feito and a Mr. Jasminas, "who said they would not be ready for independence for fifty years; they wanted peace and tranquility." But on Siquijor, Forbes collected opposition statements from more humble Filipinos: a school teacher, San Juan's presidente, and his chauffeur. 65

This problem persisted to the end of their work as seen in Forbes's record for Oroquieta, Misamis, Mindanao. "We have a situation where we are all asking for independence, but how can we maintain it," Elias Rivera asked

63Ibid., pp. 269, 94, 251-54, 259-60.

64Manila Times, July 13, 1921. See also the San Francisco Chronicle, July 15, 1921.

65Forbes, Journals, II, 100, 260-61, 282.
privately. When he wondered if independence would be delayed more than ten
years, Forbes's reply was blunt: "I am no prophet. I shall make my report.
to the President and not to my individual friends here." Rivera responded
that it would come only when the present politicians had been replaced by
university men. Three other Filipinos here (Basilio Binaoro, Benito Filoteo,
and A. N. Enerio) privately favored independence under a protectorate.66

To some who privately asked for independence, Forbes had clever
rejoinders which he carefully recorded. Thus when Santiago Ricacho of
Carigara, Leyte, asked for complete independence, Forbes responded that "he
hoped he would lead a pleasant life under the Japanese." When a young man
in a barrio in Sorsogon plead that "he wanted independence for the honor of
it," and "that sometimes he woke up in the night and cried because they didn't
have it," Forbes suggested that he make a start by giving independence to a
girl he held in virtual slavery; but this "didn't register" and he only
"stared blankly" at Forbes. And when Forbes privately told Ramon Campomanes,
who had asked for independence in a speech at Dolores, Samar, that the United
States "might possibly take them at their word and pull out," he "seemed much
distressed . . . said they were too weak to handle things." Forbes's reply
was "that he should not ask for things he did not want."67

Among the most significant of those who privately opposed independence
(Forbes indicates that about fifty "had the courage to come out and say defi-
initely that they did not want independence," but that "almost all of these
revealed this in private sessions"68) had visited Wood and Forbes soon after

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66"Specimen Notes Taken Public Session [Oroquieta, Misamis, August 8,
1921]." BIA, W-F Report Exhibits. At Cagayan, Misamis, Forbes "had a long
session with a lot of private interviews, many of them against independence;
all in favor of a protectorate." Journals, II, 134.

67 Ibid., pp. 263, 97, 265.

68 Ibid., p. 215.
their arrival. General Fernando Canon, who had served under Aguinaldo during the Revolution and who was also a close friend of Rizal, called on May 9 and "announced himself as being bitterly opposed to independence; said that he had fought for it, but could not conceive of any greater disaster to the Philippine Islands than separation from the United States; that they would soon be absorbed by Japan; that there were ... [insufficient evidences] of governmental capacity ... that while everybody naturally wanted independence in their hearts, their heads counselled them to go slowly, as it is a matter not of the present but of some future time; nations are not made overnight, etc." Wood added that this was, "almost word for word, what was said to me by the youngest sister of Rizal." On the following day another Filipino General, whose name Wood left blank in his records, came to declare that he was "openly against independence." Later General Aguinaldo himself was cautious in speaking to Wood of independence, "but he did admit that it was a question of time." Wood responded that they had found "a general desire for Independence," but that "it was not unlike the desire of all of us for a happy existence after death--that while we wanted it we were not quite ready to enter upon it." Aguinaldo's reaction was, unhappily, not recorded by Wood. 69

Other Filipinos of lesser stature also came quietly to Malacanan to register their opposition to independencia. General Crame of the Constabulary stated that "although a native-born Filipino and devoted to ... ultimate independence," he was opposed to immediate and absolute independence, being convinced "that things would go to pieces very promptly." Feeling thus, he declared that "he would leave the country at once," if the United States withdrew immediately and completely. Recently retired Justice

69 Wood, Diary, May 9, 10, 30, 1921.
Torres of the Supreme Court declared "that the country was not ready for independence, and that the real feeling of the people was not for it." But Forbes seems to have been pleased that none of his former servants wanted independence, feeling that "the poor man wouldn't get a ghost of a chance." But the two chief politicos were undoubtedly greeted by the Commissioners with the greatest interest and expectation. When they called on May 10 and insisted on talking about independence, Wood "told them that they ought to be thinking—and thinking most prayerfully—over the problem which confronted the Filipino people, and that they must look at it with their eyes wide open and that their judgment must be not wholly of the heart but also of the head." To Wood it seemed "evident" that both men were "much perplexed over the situation," realizing "the universal desire of the people for independence," but also realizing "the uselessness of independence unless the people are prepared to maintain it." As they were leaving Malacanan, Osmena explained "that the big problem now is to handle the situation so that the people would appreciate and understand it without having their preconceived ideas and ambitions upset too suddenly." Osmena "seemed to realize that a grave decision was approaching," Wood concluded, "and I think both he and Quezon are mortally afraid of complete separation from the United States."

At a long conference before leaving for the United States, Quezon agreed with Wood "that the real difficulty of the situation is due to racial prejudice and racial instinct; also that much has got to be done to prepare the people before they are ready for self-government and self-protection."

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70 Ibid., May 10, 6, 1921.
71 Forbes, Journals, II, 71.
72 Wood, Diary, May 10, 1921.
73 Ibid., July 3, 1921.
But two days later he talked more freely and confidently to McCoy:

He intimated in the report of the Commissioners it was of the utmost importance as to the form in which the recommendations were put, as it would cause an uproar if they recommended that independence be indefinitely deferred or deferred for a long period of years. Said most Filipinos had the aspiration of seeing the country independent before they died and if the Mission stated they were not fitted for independence now or would not be fitted for 75 or 100 years, it would give grounds for wild fellows to stir the people up and possibly eventually start an insurrection. He, in no way, intimated that the present leaders would take much part; in fact, he stated that if the recommendations were such that he could not possibly stand for them and work sympathetically along the lines indicated he would leave public life entirely. 74

And the attitudes of the Filipino leaders were not entirely kept from the public for as early as June 19 Kinsley reported that while Quezon was publicly preaching absolute independence, he was declaring "in private to responsible Americans that he did not think the country was ready for independence." He explained that such "insincerity, multiplied a thousandfold among the young political class, makes the situation peculiarly difficult for the American mission," and that the Mission had obtained "frank confessions from provincial leaders, who were crying for liberty, that they had been told what to say from Manila." 75

In a questionnaire sent to every twentieth Filipino from the 3667 who had submitted an income tax return for the year 1920, two questions pertained to independencia:

(10) What form of Government do you consider most desirable for the Philippine people?
(11) What is your practical opinion as to the future relations between the United States and the Philippine Islands, for example do you wish complete and immediate separation? If not, what do you wish to be the future relations?

74 "Record of conversation with Mr. Manuel Quezon, President of the Senate, about July 5th." McCoy Papers, Box 28.
75 Exclusive cabled dispatch, Los Angeles Times, June 20, 1921.
Ten different answers were given to the tenth question with "Republic" being chosen by twenty-three of the respondents and "Protectorate" by twelve. Other choices receiving scattered votes were "Present Government" (three), "Dominion" (one), "Probational Independence" (one), and "Independence in any form" (one). Quite surprisingly, only two Filipinos from this select group favored a territorial form of government and two desired that the Islands become a state.\footnote{76}

For informing the Mission concerning Filipino desires, a wide variety of documents were prepared and presented by the hundreds, almost all of which requested independence. The majority of these documents (resolutions, petitions, memorials, letters, reports, etc., most of which may be seen in the exhibits to the Wood-Forbes Report as prepared principally by Forbes) were in Spanish with English a close second and an occasional one in a native dialect. The great majority had been typed, with the quality varying widely. In length, they ranged from a remarkably restrained single sentence to many pages.\footnote{77}

As would be expected, the language competency varied widely, from high

\footnote{76} QUESTIONNAIRE SENT TO EVERY TWENTIETH FILIPINO OF THE 3667 REPORTED BY BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE AS HAVING SUBMITTED AN INCOME TAX RETURN FOR 1920, WITH ANALYSIS OF THEIR ANSWERS. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

\footnote{77} The extremely variant responses to question eleven, which would appear almost synonymous with ten, seem to indicate some confusion. Here twenty-one of forty-seven favored "Protectorate" and six others indicated "Protectorate if possible," whereas only twelve had selected "Protectorate" in question ten. Five selected "Absolute Independence," four desired "Incorporation in U.S.," and three wanted "Continuance of Present Govt." Scattered single votes were give to "Govt. prior to 1912," "Dominion," "Autonomy under U.S. (With Filipino Vice Governor)," and "Probational Independence." For the shortest document see unnumbered resolution, typed in Tagalog, by a popular assembly at San Mateo, Rizal, no date. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.
skill and proficiency to faltering attempts at expression by those obviously little used to the language in which they wrote. Not surprisingly, some of the most skillful use of English was in the Philippine Independence Commission's memorial. Also to be expected was the competence demonstrated by the public school teachers in the Islands. 78

Yet surely pleasantly surprising was the fine command of English demonstrated by minor entities out in the provinces. For example, the residents of Bauang, La Union, concluded their long petition (in the form of a letter dated May 27, 1921) with an impressive and cogent plea for independence, followed by 324 signatures of those who concurred. 79

Some of these documents demonstrated such a weak knowledge of written English that it would have been better had a more familiar language been used, such as Spanish or one of the local dialects which could then have been translated by qualified personnel. 80 But some of the phraseology may well have unintentionally lightened the Mission's burdens with a touch of comic relief. Thus in a letter dated April 29, 1921, Bibiano E. Figueras of Santo Domingo, Ilocos Sur, identified himself as one who desired "the granting of our luscious [sic] INDEPENDENCE," which would make all Filipinos "exuberant with infinite ecstasy," even though this lead "our sweet Philippines . . .

78 For example, see the document, nicely typed in exceptionally good English, which was signed by 366 teachers assembled at a Normal Institute in Malolos, Bulacan. RESOLUTION OF THE 1921 NORMAL INSTITUTE HELD AT MALOLOS, REQUESTING THE WOOD FORBES COMMISSION TO INCLUDE IN THEIR REPORT THE GRANTING OF IMMEDIATE INDEPENDENCE TO THE FILIPINO PEOPLE, May 31, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

79 BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

80 For example, see Resolution No. 244, Camarines Norte Provincial Board, Daet, June 9, 1921. Almost as confusing may have been Resolution No. 32, San Jose, Nueva Ecija, Municipal Council, May 16, 1921, and the resolution of May 22, 1921, by "The Government of the Northern Hope Society," of Bangui, Ilocos Norte. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.
... to a myriad [sic] infernal situation."  

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The sources for these documents represented great diversity, from major political units to minor clubs and solitary individuals. Among political organizations the range was from hundreds of Municipal Councils through the Municipal Board of the chartered city of Manila, many Provincial Boards (the provincial governor plus two elected members), to the leadership of the two major political parties, the Democratas and the Nacionalistas, and the Independence Commission (composed of all members of both houses of the Legislature).

A related phenomenon was the local mass meeting (junta magna or junta popular), usually called and directed by the political leadership in a municipality. Judging from the number of signatures affixed to some documents approved at such meetings (324 at Bauang, La Union, and 389 at Morong, Rizal), enthusiasm must often have run high.  

Yet an impressive variety of apparently non-political organizations were also prolific in producing documents. In a country with a largely pre-industrial, predominantly agricultural and extractive economy, it is rather surprising that so many documents requesting independence were received from labor organizations.  

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81 BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

82 The petition from Bauang, La Union, was in the form of a long letter dated May 27, 1921; unnumbered resolution, Morong, Rizal, May 1, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

83 Unnumbered resolution, Gremio Obrero de Calbayog, Calbayog, Samar, June 13, 1921; Resolution No. 30, Union de Agricultores y Obreros, Guinobatan, Albay, June 22, 1921; unnumbered resolution, Union Obrera, Legazpi, Albay, June 24, 1921; unnumbered memorial, Labor Federation of Mindanao, August 6, 1921; "MEMORIAL DEL CONGRESO OBRERO DE FILIPINAS A LA MISION INVESTIGADORA
formal concern with independencia. In a predominantly Christian country where matters of religion had often become highly controversial national questions, it would not seem surprising that religious groups presented documents on independencia. For example, the Nagcarlan Catholic League in Laguna Province, rather than the customary municipal government, claimed to speak for the independence desires of this city. And from a variety of organizations which can apparently be reasonably grouped together—associations, clubs, leagues, and societies—the Mission received documents requesting independence.

In a country where education had been so strongly emphasized and so generously supported by the United States, in which a college degree was the surest guarantee of social mobility upwards, and in which the greatest rewards—

ENVIADA POR EL PRESIDENTE DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS A ESTAS ISLAS, EN 1921, Manila, 4 de Julio, 1921." BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

84 Unnumbered resolution, Asociacion Agricola de Talahib, Calbayog, Samar, June 19, 1921; ACTA DE LA REUNION DE LOS AGRICULTORES VECINOS DE ESTE MUNICIPIO DE LIBOG DE LA PROVINCIA DE ALBAY, I.F. EN SESION ESPECIAL DE LOS MISMOS DEL 18 DE JUNIO DE 1921; unnumbered "ACTA" adopted by "los Agricultores y demas vecinos" ("the Farmers and other tenants") of Ligao, Albay, June 9, 1921; RESOLUCION HECHA POR LA UNION DE AGRICULTORES VECINOS DEL MUNICIPIO DE MALILIPOT, PROVINCIA DE ALBAY, I.F., June 7, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits. The number of persons who signed these petitions ranged from thirty-three and fifty-seven for Malilipot and Libog respectively, to a remarkable two hundred and thirty-five for Ligao.

85 Unnumbered and undated resolution in Spanish of the Catholic League of Nagcarlan, Laguna, signed by forty-one residents. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

86 Memorial, Veterans of the Philippine Revolution, Manila, May 30, 1921; resolution, Philippine Columbian Association, Manila, September 2, 1921; petition in the form of a letter dated May 27, 1921, prepared by the residents of Bauang, La Union, the Bauang Civic Club, and the local Woman's Club; unnumbered resolution adopted on May 15, 1921, during a joint session of the Bogo Liberty Club and the Bogo Redeemers' Society held at Bogo, Cebu; unnumbered and undated RESOLUCION CONJUNTA APROBADA POR EL COMITE DE CONFERENCIA DE LOS PARTIDOS "LOS CABALLEROS DE NIJACA" Y "LA LIGA DE CALBAYOG" of Calbayog, Samar; unnumbered resolution, Batac, Ilocos Norte, Rising Sun Literary Society, May 22, 1921; undated and unnumbered document from the Diamond Society of Sarrat, Ilocos Norte. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.
both financially and in prestige—went to politicians, it is not surprising that various student groups took formal action expressing their convictions on *independencia*. Although the names of some of these entities demonstrated fascinating linguistic virtuosity, the contents of their formal documents were, in the main, not nearly so impressive. 87

With students so well represented, it would have been shameful indeed had teachers been derelict in their patriotic duty. Although they submitted considerably fewer documents, the pedagogs partially compensated by the superior quality of their English and by the impressive number of signers. 88

Other organizations more difficult to categorize also contributed to the Mission's voluminous file of documents with requests for *independencia*. And still other Filipinos who were not members of organized groups were not to be frustrated in their efforts to convince America of their desire for independence by joining in an overwhelming deluge of documents. 89

Although the overwhelming majority of documents from Filipinos asked

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87 Resolution No. 6, Batac Juvenile Progress Seekers, Batac, Ilocos Norte, May 24, 1921; INDEPENDENCE RESOLUTION from "The Government of the Northern Hope Society," Bangui, Ilocos Norte, May 22, 1921; Resolution No. 1, Fifth Junior House of Representatives, First Period of Session, University of the Philippines, August 20, 1921; RESOLUTION APPROVED BY THE LIGA JUVENIL BULUSENA PETITIONING FOR INDEPENDENCE, Bulusan, Sorsogon, June 18, 1921; RESOLUCION DE LA SOCIEDAD DE JOVENES "NUEVA ERA" DEL PUEBLO DE GUINOBATAN, ALBAY, I.F., June 23, 1921; Resolution No. 7, Ang Madaitong Taga Amihan, Cebu, April 30, 1921 (apparently a regional club of some sort composed of young men and women in the northern section of Cebu). BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

88 RESOLUTION OF THE 1921 NORMAL INSTITUTE HELD AT MALOLOS [Bulacan], REQUESTING THE WOOD FORBES COMMISSION TO INCLUDE IN THEIR REPORT THE GRANTING OF IMMEDIATE INDEPENDENCE TO THE FILIPINO PEOPLE, May 31, 1921, as signed by 366 teachers; untitled and unnumbered resolution, signed by 186 teachers at the Division Normal Institute, Naujan, Mindoro, June 10, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

89 See a letter, Bibiano E. Figueras to Acting Governor General Yeater,
for independencia, there was far from unanimity concerning precisely what form they would have it take. From an analysis of these 265 documents, the types of independence requested in order of the frequency of their occurrence were as follows:

1. Independence without qualifications (126)
2. Immediate independence without further qualifications (69)
3. Immediate independence with or without a protectorate (34)
4. Immediate and absolute independence (17)
5. Independence at the discretion of the United States Government or Congress (12)
6. Independence under an American protectorate (11)
7. Independence under an American protectorate or an international guarantee (5)

As has been noted, such requests were commonly justified by claims—documented and otherwise—that all conditions precedent as established by America, and particularly in the Jones Bill, had been fulfilled. Yet an

Santo Domingo, Ilocos Sur, April 29, 1921; and a letter, Lubo Biteng to the Mission, Sevilla, Santa Cruz, Ilocos Sur, May 24, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

90. Single petitions also asked for independence guaranteed by an international agreement, only a definition of future status, and no independence for the present. See a MEMORANDUM in the form of a chart filed under this cover: CLASSIFICATION OF FORMAL PETITIONS (265 in number), FOR PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE, PRESENTED BY PROVINCIAL BOARDS, MUNICIPAL COUNCILS, WOMEN'S CLUBS, AND MISCELLANEOUS, TO THE SPECIAL MISSION. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits. In a separate document under this cover as prepared by Forbes (FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE RESOLUTIONS FROM MUNICIPAL COUNCILS, BY W.C.F.) it is stated that of the 227 petitions received from 212 municipalities, 196 asked for independence in some form. Further breakdowns from this document, as well as from the preceding chart, would seem to be of little significance here. That the grand totals in these documents add up to a larger number than the total of petitions received is undoubtedly explainable by the fact that in a number of instances documents requested independence in two or more forms.

91. Forbes indicates that 90 of the 196 petitions from municipalities that asked for independence specifically mentioned the Jones Bill, "usually referring directly to the preamble." Ibid.
amazingly diversified variety of other justifications were also proffered.

Not only was Wilson's last annual message to Congress often cited—usually coupled with Harrison's last annual report as Governor General—but Wilson's policy of self-determination for all peoples was shamelessly wrenched from its European habitat for application to an American situation in Asia. The support of other former Presidents was also enlisted in the cause of independencia, as in this quotation from Lincoln: "... we sincerely hope and believe that, when your sacred mission shall have been finished, and the truth arrived at with justice, 'with malice toward none and charity for all', your finding will not only be in harmony with our aspiration as a people, but with the principles of American liberty, democracy and justice."

and the advice that "Uncle Sam . . . follow Washington's immortal precept 'Observe good faith and justice to all nations.'" Surprisingly, Monroe and his Doctrine were called upon to provide a buttress for the politicos by one Provincial Board which requested independence "under the belief of attempting to respect the precepts of the Monroe Doctrine which the United States has never violated its provisions before

92 "We were constantly being confronted," Forbes complained, "... by the fact that President Wilson has before going out taken it upon himself to declare that the Philippines had now fulfilled the required conditions and were ready for independence." Journals, II, 242.

93 Of the 196 petitions from municipalities that asked for independence, 19 directly referred to Wilson's message and 20 referred to Harrison's declaration. See Forbes's FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE RESOLUTIONS FROM MUNICIPAL COUNCILS in BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

94 See, for example, Resolution No. 46, Ilagan, Isabela, Municipal Council, May 23, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

95 Petition in the form of a letter dated May 27, 1921, by the residents of Bauang, the Bauang Civic Club, and the Bauang Women's Club, La Union. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

the Universe." 97 And some municipal councilmen in Iloilo Province asserted that "Monroe on establishing an American and exclusive doctrine with regard to the other nations toward the American continent has established at the same time his opposition with the colonial and expansionistic policy of the people of the United States." 98

American sympathy for the oppressed Irish was also embarrassingly capitalized upon by the politicos. The Manila Municipal Board declared that "the sense of justice and international equity" demanded that the United States demonstrate as much sympathy for Filipino independence aspirations as they had often previously shown for the Irish, "because the situation of both countries presents similar cases. . . ." 99

If all else failed, there always remained an appeal to natural law. Surprisingly, a labor organization in Davao based their petition for immediate independence upon the justice of their cause "as derived from 'the laws of God and Nature' and sustained by the moral force of the promises solemnly made by the United States. . . ." 100

And then there was the possibility of appealing to American economic self-interest. The Manila Municipal Board supported their request for immediate independence by arguing that the Islands had become an excessive

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97 Resolution No. 244, Camarines Norte Provincial Board, Daet, June 9, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.


99 A resolution adopted by the Municipal Board of Manila on September 9, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

100 Memorial dated August 6, 1921, at Davao, Davao, and signed by S. T. Generoso, president, for the Executive Committee of the Labor Federation of Mindanao. See also the INDEPENDENCE RESOLUTION from "The Government of the Northern Hope Society" of Bangui, Ilocos Norte, May 22, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.
economic burden to the United States. 101

Yet some of the most effective non-routine arguments in these documents were based in turn upon an early and famous American document: the Declaration of Independence. In the opinion of the Municipal Board of Manila, it contained principles that were "propositions which the American people cannot ignore, disregard and trample upon, because they form the foundation of its own existence and of its development in all the spheres of human activities. . . ." 102

Among several references to the Declaration in the resolution of an isolated municipality on Panay Island, one asserted that because it declared that all men were born equal, "as a legitimate consequence nations equally have equal rights to enjoy life free and independent in the concert of the other nations for the attainment of their happiness and well-being. . . ." 103 A group of taos (laborers) in Davao agreed that the granting of independence would constitute "but a logical sequence of the immortal principles of the Declaration of Independence of 1776." 104

And the Municipal Council of isolated Zumarraga, the only city on Buad Island, declared they were fully capable of exercising their "inalienable rights, among which they count life, liberty and the investigation [sic] of happiness." 105

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101 Resolution adopted by the Municipal Board of Manila on September 9, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

102 Ibid.


104 Memorial, Labor Federation of Mindanao, Davao, Davao, August 6, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

Yet the most striking utilization of the immortal Declaration would seem to be either that by a minor club in northern Luzon (the Northern Hope Society of Bangui, Ilocos Norte), or by the women of Imus, Cavite, who presented a letter of welcome which concluded with a peroration that should have elicited the politicos' admiration:

America, your wise and benevolent country, the land of progress and civilization, when she asked for her freedom from the iron hands of England, wrote down, through the golden pen of Jefferson, the beautiful tidings "THAT ALL MEN ARE CREATED EQUAL; THAT THEY ARE ENDOWED BY THEIR CREATOR WITH CERTAIN INALIENABLE [sic] RIGHTS: THAT AMONG THESE ARE LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS."

That is also our belief. 107

There is no record of a single document from Christian Filipinos which opposed the granting of independence, although a few neglected to mention the subject. Usually these were formal resolutions of welcome which were commonly paired with a resolution on independence. 108 Also independence was apparently neglected in some instances because of overwhelming concern with other problems--usually of a local nature--such as the resolution from Patnongon, Antique, which sought the Mission's aid in recovering the town plaza from

106Their formidably impressive INDEPENDENCE RESOLUTION, dated May 22, 1921, was extensively and ingeniously based upon the Declaration of Independence. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

107From the translation filed with the original Tagalog document, an undated letter from Eugenia de Guzman, president of the Imus, Cavite, Women's Club to "Hon. Leonard Wood, William C. Forbes and company [sic]." BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

108For example, see Resolution No. 88, Batac, Ilocos Norte, Municipal Council, May 21, 1921, which was simply one of cordial welcome to the Mission; and their Resolution No. 89 of the same date which earnestly requested "through the favorable recommendation of Wood-Forbes Commission, to grant us, the Filipino people, the IMMEDIATE INDEPENDENCE, our national ideal." BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.
the Catholic Church, which had controlled it since 1912. 109

Although the Pagan mountain tribesmen of northern Luzon almost unanimously opposed independence, they preferred to express this opposition in speeches or private interviews rather than in permanent documents. The only exception would seem to be a document dated March 24, 1921, at Kabayan, Benguet Subprovince of Mountain Province, and signed by fourteen "principales" of the region, which took a firm stand on independencia: "We do not believe that we are ready for independence for which our representatives and senators are clamoring. We, the Igorots, as a people are not without any desire for independence, but we believe the time to ask for it has not yet come." This they were convinced expressed "the opinion and wish of the majority of the inhabitants of the Mountain Province." 110

Likewise among the Moros there was an obvious reluctance to place in writing their almost unanimous opposition to independencia. In fact, their closest approach to this was in a lengthy petition from those claiming to represent the Sulu Archipelago which was signed by fifty-seven men described by Forbes as "almost all the leading men of the region except the Sultan of Sulu..." 111 "Whether or not independence is granted... to the northern provinces of the Philippines," their first article began, "it is the desire

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109 Resolution No. 118, Patnongon, Antique, Municipal Council, August 1, 1921, accompanied by Resolution No. 117 of the same day which was an innocuous formal welcome to the Mission. This local dispute probably had developed because members of the Aglipayan Church (the Philippine Independent Church, a nationalistic organization which had split from the Roman Catholic Church shortly after the American occupation) outnumbered Roman Catholics in Patnongon. Table No. 14, "Religion and sex, by municipalities," Census of the Philippine Islands [1918], II, 400.

110 BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

111 Forbes, Philippine Islands, II, 293. Forbes adds that in 1927 the Sultan of Sulu told him that the islands should be annexed to America, thus finally joining with his colleagues in the major request of this document.
of the people of Sulu that the Sulu Archipelago be made permanent American territory. 

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Just as regularly as the documents from Christian Filipinos requested independencia such statements also declared that these had been unanimously approved ("aprobada por unanimidad"). So stereotyped did this form become that the Mission must have been startled--albeit pleasantly--when one of the rare variations was encountered.

Desiring to represent a united national front for independencia, some minor politicos allowed their enthusiasm to create the patently ridiculous by recording that their documents had not only been unanimously approved but also unanimously seconded.113 One Municipal Council even enthusiastically explained that its resolution had been unanimously approved without discussion!114

Not a single document was collected by the Mission from any organization which indicated that even one solitary Christian Filipino ever dissented from the inevitable requests for independencia, although on rare occasions one failed to indicate--undoubtedly as an oversight--whether the approval

112 "Petition To The President Of The United States Of America From The People Of The Sulu Archipelago," Jolo, Sulu, June 9, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits. This is reproduced, with some deletions, in Forbes, Philippine Islands, II, 475-86.

113 Resolution No. 44, Oquendo, Samar, Municipal Council, June 15, 1921; Resolution No. 37, Zumarraga, Samar, Municipal Council, June 18, 1921; Resolution No. 70, Pavia, Iloilo, Municipal Council, April 12, 1921; unnumbered resolution, Tigbauan, Iloilo, Municipal Council, June 2, 1921; Resolution No. 10, Ivisan, Capiz, Municipal Council, May 20, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

had been unanimous or not. 115 There were, however, two independence resolutions from municipalities which had not been unanimously approved, but the dissenters had obviously American names. 116 Although one of these atypical resolutions (Iligan's) was marked "Aprobada por unanimidad," Councilman W. W. Swaim had voted for territorial government under an American protectorate. Forbes "called attention to this anomaly," but the document was not corrected. "The prevalent practice was to write a resolution in the body of which it was stated that it was passed unanimously, and then calling for a unanimous vote," Forbes explained concerning this "amusing experience." Such "bullyragging of the opposition" convinced him "that most of these unanimous votes were put through under compulsion." 117

At Pasig, Rizal, Forbes had observed this technique when "a young candidate for Governor by the name of Serbande Angeles undertook to have the meeting pass a resolution 'unanimously' calling for a show of hands." But Forbes forbade this "because it was not the object of the meeting," and rather brusquely stated that they "were asked to come and greet me and not to pass on resolutions." Referring to the words "passed unanimously," he explained that "Those are words which should be placed after and not before the vote is taken. And so ... this resolution should not be offered to this meeting." Forbes observed that they "seemed to enjoy the discomfiture of Mr. Angeles,

115 For example, Resolution No. 49, Mexico, Pampanga, Municipal Council, May 31, 1921, merely indicated "Aprobado" without the usual "por unanimidad." BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

116 Unnumbered resolution, Iligan, Lanao, Municipal Council, November 22, 1918; Resolution No. 79, Jolo Municipal Council, May 31, 1921, in Resolution No. 198, Sulu Provincial Board, Jolo, June 9, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits. Councilmen Young and Gebert "reserved their votes" at Jolo so the motion was only "carried by majority votes."

and tittered, particularly as he is a candidate for governor.\textsuperscript{118}

In a speech to the Normal Institute at Naga, Camarines Sur, Forbes returned to this problem. "We are receiving petitions for the independence of the Philippine Islands," he declared, "... signed by everyone in the room unanimously. It is a curious thing that there should be so many people in one room without a difference of opinion."\textsuperscript{119}

Certainly the monolithic \textit{independencia} front created by the Christian Filipinos with their imposing array of formal documents impressively demonstrated either a unified national sentiment or a remarkably pervasive and efficient political organization. The former obviously was the \textit{politicos}' goal, but the latter undoubtedly gained credence as the Mission's files steadily expanded. Certainly one of the important factors in creating the impression of political manipulation must have been the instances where spontaneity had obviously been replaced by collusion in the production of such documents.

Some such instances were obviously the innocent fruitage of naivete, limited imagination, and inadequate linguistic resources. For instance, the independence resolution adopted by a popular assembly at Solsona, Ilocos Norte, was used as a model, with only minor variations, for the resolution of the local Woman's Club.\textsuperscript{120}

Six apparently related organizations of indeterminate type in Tayabas

\textsuperscript{118} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 241.

\textsuperscript{119} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 250-51.

\textsuperscript{120} \textbf{EXTRACTO DEL ACTA DE LA JUNTA POPULAR DEL MUNICIPIO DE SOLSONA, PROVINCIA DE ILOCOS NORTE, ISLAS FILIPINAS EN 22 DE MAYO DE 1921 BAJO LA PRESIDENCIA DEL PRESIDENTE MUNICIPAL; EXTRACTO DEL ACTA DE LA JUNTA DEL CLUB DE MUJERES DEL MUNICIPIO DE SOLSONA DE LA PROVINCIA DE ILOCOS NORTE, ISLAS FILIPINAS EL DIA 22 DE MAYO DE 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.}
Province adopted identical resolutions expressing "the vehement desires of the Filipino people to enjoy Independence within the most immediate possible time and under any form whatever." Here uniformity of response obviously resulted from communication among related groups. And a resolution adopted by the Municipal Council of Carles, Iloilo, was widely distributed by them, with at least two other towns in the province being so impressed that they adopted practically identical resolutions.

Impressive as was the flood of documents from the Christian Filipinos almost unanimously demanding independence, the effectiveness of this demonstration was seriously impaired by incontrovertible evidence that the politicos had employed coercion to achieve this facade of monolithic national unity. Forbes flatly declared that "One interesting feature of these resolutions [from municipalities] is revealed by the fact that a very large proportion— it is probable that it is more than half—are passed as a result of orders of the provincial governors." He particularly designated these provinces as glaring offenders: Isabela, Sorsogon, Oriental Negros, Capiz, and Ilocos Norte. And surely this chain reaction had been triggered at a

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121 The names of these organizations, the cities in which they were located (all relatively close together in southeastern Tayabas), the number of members claimed for whom the Boards of Directors spoke in each instance, and the dates of adoption were as follows: Agdangan Mutual and Political Party No. 2, Agdangan, 120 members, June 11, 1921; Calawag Mutual and Political Party No. 4, Calauag (Calawag), 250 members, June 10, 1921; Guinayangan Mutual and Political Party No. 5, Guinayangan, 250 members, June 15, 1921; Kabataan Mutual and Political Party No. 3, Gumaca, 800 members, June 5, 1921; Kabataan Mutual and Political Party No. 1, Lopez, 1,700 members, June 12, 1921; Unisan Mutual and Political Party No. 8, Unisan, 200 members, June 1, 1921. All were unnumbered resolutions, typed in Spanish. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

122 Resolution No. 56, Carles Municipal Council, April 30, 1921; Resolution No. 98, Santa Barbara Municipal Council, July 2, 1921; Resolution No. 55, Maasin Municipal Council, May 24, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

123 FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE RESOLUTIONS FROM MUNICIPAL COUNCILS, BY W.C.F. as filed under CLASSIFICATION OF FORMAL PETITIONS (265 in number),
higher level.

In Isabela Province, where the Mission had found general contentment and lack of interest in independence as certified by the governor himself, the Commissioners obviously were not surprised when only two documents were received, but one of which mentioned independencia. This disinterest evidently displeased the politicos in Manila as evidenced by a circular order of June 3 from the governor to his municipalities recommending the adoption of a resolution asking for independence by reason of a stable government having been established. These were to be dispatched "directly and immediately to the Honorable Wood-Forbes Commission," with copies for the Philippine House and Senate. From Governor Paguirigan's statement to Wood, it would seem obvious that he would not have issued such an order unless pressure had been applied from above and that such pressure from Manila had been generated by his remarks under the spreading acacia tree at Santiago.

The governor's action was revealed in a resolution complying with his orders adopted unanimously by Naguilian. That the significance of this revelation was not lost on the Mission is evidenced by the three vertical lines in the margin beside the statement concerning the governor's order. Also, a notation was made that the circular order had not been attached to the res-

FOR PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE, PRESENTED BY PROVINCIAL BOARDS, MUNICIPAL COUNCILS, WOMEN'S CLUBS, AND MISCELLANEOUS, TO THE SPECIAL MISSION. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

124 See supra pp. 328-29.

125 One was a copy of a nine-page annual statistical report from the Provincial Governor (MEMORIA ANUAL CORRESPONDIENTE AL ANO ECONOMICO DE 1920, DEL GOBERNADOR PROVINCIAL DE ISABELA, ISLAS FILIPINAS), and the other was Resolution No. 171, Isabela Provincial Board, May 14, 1921, which asked for "the concession of the national aspiration of the Philippine Archipelago which is its independence. . . ." BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.
olution as stated.  

Ilagan, the provincial capital, had wisely framed an appropriate resolution entitled *RECABANDO DE LA COMISION WOOD-FORBES LA CONCESION INMEDIATA DE LA INDEPENDENCIA POLITICA* ("Entreating from the Wood-Forbes Commission the immediate concession of political independence") before the governor had issued his circular order, but, unfortunately, only after the Mission had been gone from their city for a number of days. Following issuance of the governor's order on June 3, however, six other municipalities adopted suitable resolutions demanding independence.  

There was also ample documentary evidence that the *politicos* had utilized coercion to secure a formidable front of unanimity for *independencia* even some weeks before the Mission's arrival. Of the thirteen resolutions from municipalities in Sorsogon Province which requested independence, one was adopted at a Municipal Council session held on April 13, three on April 15, one on April 16, five on April 18, two on April 19, and one out-of-step municipality procrastinated until April 28. Such relatively concerted action creates the suspicion that there had been a common external stimulus, which Matnog pointed out—undoubtedly in all innocency: "Whereas, the telegram of the Hon. Provincial Governor of Sorsogon dated April 13, 1921 instructing that this Council should adopt resolution to wellcome [sic] Hon. Wood and


128 Resolution No. 47, Angadanan Municipal Council, June 24, 1921; Resolution No. 38, Cabagan Municipal Council, June 15, 1921; Resolution No. 71, Cauayan Municipal Council, June 30, 1921; Resolution 55, Echague Municipal Council, June 15, 1921; Resolution No. 27, Reina Mercedes Municipal Council, June 15, 1921; Resolution No. 47, Santa Maria Municipal Council, June 15, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.
Hon. Forbes and same time inform them that the Filipino People wish their independence and fit to maintain it."\[129\]

That this information was not lost on the Mission is indicated by someone having marked the paragraph about the governor's telegram. Apparently all municipalities in the province were sent similar telegrams; but, besides Matnog, only the resolution from Gubat mentioned it.

In order fully to ensure that their duty had been performed, fourteen municipal presidents from Sorsogon (only two were listed as absent from the entire province) assembled later in the capital city of Sorsogon—presumably at the governor's command. Their dutifully adopted resolution welcomed the Mission and stated that it was "the unanimous conviction of all the inhabitants of their respective municipalities to be already deserving of their independence. . . ."\[130\]

Again, the explanation for why seven of the eight municipal governments in Oriental Negros Province submitted resolutions that were either identical, or such close parallels as to be unmistakable, was provided by Siquijor's resolution: "Submitted the order of the Honorable Representative of the Second District, Oriental Negros, dated May 9, 1921, recommending in order that it request the HONORABLE WOOD-FORBES COMMISSION, to make clear in its record, that this Council requests immediate independence for the Philippines." From the adoption dates of these resolutions it is readily seen that all followed the May 9 date of this order quite closely (five


within a week), and all were adopted before the end of May. 131 Forbes simply declares that "It is evident that . . . [the governor of Oriental Negros] sent a proposed form to the different municipalities, because almost all of the resolutions passed by the municipalities of that province are in exactly the same words." 132

Any yet again, a check of the dates when independence resolutions were adopted by twenty-two Municipal Councils in Capiz Province on Panay Island reveals that fifteen were adopted in May, four during the first half of June, and the remaining two relatively early in July. 133 The explanation for this surprisingly premature action (the Mission did not arrive on Panay until July 16, nor in their province until July 19) was revealed by Calivo’s resolution: "Cave reading to the communication from the Honorable Provincial Governor, dated May 9, 1921, informing of the arrival in the Philippines of the Wood-Forbes Investigating Commission, and suggesting that the municipal councils of this province adopt resolutions demanding absolute and immediate independence of the Philippine Islands. . . ." The resolutions from Balete, Iuisan, Panay, and Tapaz also mentioned this letter and doubtless it had been sent to all parts of the province.

Another aspect of coercion was the techniques used on the local level

131 See resolutions from Dumaguete, Luzuriaga, and Tolong in Oriental Negros Province proper; and from Larena, Maria, San Juan, and Siquijor in the subprovince of Siquijor, Oriental Negros Province. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

132 FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE RESOLUTIONS FROM MUNICIPAL COUNCILS, BY W.C.F. as filed under CLASSIFICATION OF FORMAL PETITIONS (265 in number), FOR PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE, PRESENTED BY PROVINCIAL BOARDS, MUNICIPAL COUNCILS, WOMEN’S CLUBS, AND MISCELLANEOUS, TO THE SPECIAL MISSION. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

to obtain the desired pro-independence documents. For example, the resolution from Ligao, Albay, had been passed after some difficulty in obtaining the attendance of councilmen because, as the interim municipal president complained, some councilmen took little interest in municipal affairs even when they were as urgent as this matter. The summons to the second meeting of the council ("Convocatoria") contained a stern warning from the interim municipal president: if the councilmen continued to ignore these summons, in spite of the fact that the orders received from the governor demanded much urgency, the minority of the council would feel themselves under the sad necessity of invoking Article 2221 of the Revised Administrative Code which would compel attendance by the erring members. A quorum was obtained by such tactics, but three of eleven councilmen did not attend the session at which the desired independence resolution was "Aprobado por unanimidad." 134

13

Only rarely did the resident Americans publicly express their opinions on independencia during the Mission's investigation, generally fearing that any intrusion into insular nationalism would almost inevitably stimulate economic reprisals. Yet there were notable exceptions.

As a member of the Surigao Provincial Board, John Keef warned the Filipinos in a public session against independence at that time because they were unprepared to defend themselves. His remarks were notable because he was an American Negro. 135

"We must hold the Philippines," boldly declared Henry B. McCoy at the


135 Associated Press dispatch, date-lined Surigao, August 8, in the Manila Daily Bulletin, August 9, 1921.
American Chamber of Commerce's meeting in Manila on July 6 at which Wood was the honored guest. "We must remain here for the benefit of the Filipino people," he continued. "If we leave, the Far East will become a Japanese province." Although he favored "the greatest local autonomy and self-govern-ernment," he was convinced that "America must remain the sovereign nation. Either that, or we must get out absolutely, not only of the Philippines, but out of the Orient, and we might as well burn our shipping." His dramatic speech was unanimously endorsed by the Chamber as being the sense of the American community. 136

At the Chamber's July 19 luncheon meeting, "Captain" Robert Dollar urged that America adopt a fixed Philippine policy, announce this to the world, and then stick by it. In a reference to that hoary American dream of vast potential Oriental commerce, he asserted that the Islands must be kept to maintain necessary American prestige in the Far East if we were to exploit this tremendous commercial potential. 137

The Chamber also spearheaded the printed opposition to independencia. A leading article in its Journal by Captain H. L. Heath, their president, reportedly "created a sensation in native circles" with its outlined plan, approved by the Board of Directors, for a "Territory of Malaya." After declaring that a change in the form of the Philippine government was absolutely necessary (not only "to save the face of the sovereignty that is morally responsible for the condition [the United States]," but also "to save the common people of these islands from the autocracy of their leaders."), Heath flatly asserted that the Filipino had adequately demonstrated "his complete

137 Manila Times, July 19, 1921.
incapacity for independence."

Only two alternatives were presented: a territorial government under American sovereignty, or "complete, unprotected independence." "Independence means that the jungle will take the country and the people," he explained.

"Territorial Government means a well-defined future, fair play in Government and business and a continuation of the Latin Malay race instead of its absorp-
tion by the stronger people of Asia."\textsuperscript{138}

Surprisingly, only a few resident Americans were willing to comment on independencia even behind the anonymity of a confidential questionnaire from the Mission. The majority who returned the questionnaire did not respond to the question on independence, but those who did believed that it was inadvis-
able then and that the Filipinos of intelligence and property, excepting the politicos, did not want it.\textsuperscript{139}

Captain Seeber, formerly Chief of Manila's police, privately told Wood "that there was a general desire for independence from the sentimental side, but that the people who stopped to think were all rather afraid of it.

He doubted if they really were willing to accept the responsibility." If absolute independence were granted, he felt that "things would go immediately to pieces; that he should hope to have time enough to get out in advance of such action."\textsuperscript{140}

\textsuperscript{138}Probably the most shocking proposals to the Filipinos were Heath's recommendations that the revered Jones Law be replaced with a new charter which would declare the sovereignty of the United States without ambiguity or evasion, and that the Philippine Senate be replaced by the Governor General's Cabinet. The New York Times, September 13, 1921, is the source for the above comments and quotations from this article which may be seen in Capt. H. L. Heath, "The Territory of Malaya," American Chamber of Commerce Journal, I (September, 1921), 7-8.

\textsuperscript{139}CONSOLIDATION OF ANSWERS TO TWO QUESTIONNAIRES ADDRESSED TO AMERICANS OF HIGH STANDING, FAMILIAR WITH THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, AND COVER-
ING ENTIRE ARCHIPELAGO. BIA, H-P Report Exhibits.

\textsuperscript{140}Wood, Diary, May 10, 1921.
while the Mission was at work a number of American newspaper columnists, editors, and correspondents commented on *independencia*. Arthur Brisbane was opposed to independence since "General Wood ... [and] everybody else, with common sense, including Filipinos," was opposed, primarily because a free Philippines would inevitably mean war with Japan. The Los Angeles Times declared that only "a few ambitious native politicians who covet power and office" really desired independence. A San Francisco editor concluded that by early June the Mission had already proved that neither a Filipino nation nor true national feeling existed, and that "the heterogeneous and backward majority scattered over some 1600 islands" lacked the elements of civilization except a nominal Christianity. The New York Tribune declared that the misconduct of the *políticos* under Harrison had completely wrecked their unconvincing case for independence by "painfully" forecasting what an independent Filipino government would be like.

Yet the most scathing attack on *independencia* came in a long, incisive editorial in that American newspaper which seemed most consistently concerned with Philippine problems. After asserting that neither public opinion nor national consciousness existed or ever could exist where the masses were "removed little, a large part of it not at all, from barbarism," the San

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141 From his daily column "Today" in the Los Angeles *Examiner*, June 10, 1921.


143 Editorial, "FILIPINO INDEPENDENCE: A Major Difficulty Resides in the Absence of a Filipino Nation," San Francisco *Chronicle*, June 4, 1921. Two days later, apparently as a wry afterthought, the *Chronicle* printed this untitled one-sentence editorial: "In one sense the Filipinos are already freer than the people of the United States, since the Eighteenth Amendment does not run in the Philippines."

144 Quoted in "Philippine Bankruptcy," *Literary Digest*, LXX (July 2, 1921), 15.
Francisco *Chronicle* asserted that the *politicos*, who equated politics with intrigue, all wanted independence "in order to give full play to their personal ambitions ... without much regard to or even thought of what it may mean for the future of the islands."\(^{145}\)

Occasionally Philip Kinsley's observations on *independencia* were printed in America. Although he detected "no real public opinion as conceived in the United States," he averred soon after arriving that there was "a deep-seated sentiment or emotion which, if a plebiscite were held, would probably result in the people choosing independent government, no matter what pitfalls might be in the way."\(^{146}\) "The Filipinos' head says hold on to America's apron strings and patch up the holes and weaknesses in the government," he observed later, "but their heart cries for a land of their own rule, with the superior white man barred from sovereignty."\(^{147}\) But by early June, he flatly predicted "no immediate independence ... if the policy of the Harding Administration depends upon the report to be submitted by the Wood-Forbes Mission."\(^{148}\)

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Of the two American organizations which presented documents related to independence, the American Chamber of Commerce clearly contributed the more valuable ones. Their forty-four page memorial explained in detail the political relationships which they desired established between the two countries. Because of the undesirable features of the *Jones Law*, the failure

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146 *Special dispatch date-lined Manila, May 11, in *Ibid.*, May 12, 1921.*


148 *From a dispatch date-lined Manila, June 9, 1921, as quoted in a*
of the políticos to attain governmental stability, and the unwise conduct of Harrison, these American businessmen as early as August 14, 1920, had formally gone on record favoring a territorial government under American sovereignty, the advantages of which—to both Americans and Filipinos—this memorial reiterated. "A permanent strong government of these Islands as a Territory of the United States is we believe the only solution of the present problem," they affirmed, "and a cure for the ills from which we are now suffering as the result of the purposeless drifting of the past few years." 149

From the one hundred and four letters written by Chamber members in response to a circular letter, a majority stated that most Filipinos did not really want independence, that the masses were satisfied with American control, and that only the políticos were fomenting independence agitation, largely for personal advantage rather than the welfare of their people. The majority agreed that the Filipinos were then unfit for independence although all were willing to concede ultimate freedom after twenty-five to fifty years. 150

"It would neither be a wise nor a safe policy nor for the best interests of the Filipino people for the American Government to withdraw sovereignty from these Islands at any time in the near future," declared the


149 MEMORIAL SUBMITTED BY THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE to the WOOD-FORBES MISSION, MANILA, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. Dated at Manila, July 14, 1921, and signed by H. L. Heath, president. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits. A list of ten specific recommendations was appended which they believed would "tend to establish political stability and to restore confidence and efficiency. . . ."

150 CIRCULAR LETTER SENT OUT BY THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, MANILA, P.I., TO ALL MEMBERS IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, WITH ANALYSIS OF LETTERS RECEIVED BY THE MISSION IN COMPLIANCE THEREWITH. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.
American Legion of the Philippine Islands. Their recommendation was that independence be decided by a referendum in 1946. 151

In the opinion of Admiral Joseph Strauss, Commander in Chief of the U. S. Asiatic Fleet, it was principally the politicos who were clamoring for independence with "a large class—the substantial people, planters, businessmen, non-politicians; those upon whom the prosperity of the country must depend..." openly or secretly in favor of maintaining existing conditions," although many of them were publicly silent for fear of reprisals. He was convinced that the politicians actually desired "absolute independence covered by a guarantee... against foreign aggression." Yet from the standpoint of practical defense strategy, he considered this strictly inadvisable. Barely could he discern the possibility of an independent Philippines when future conditions in the Pacific might become more ideal. 152

Because "the average capacity and fitness for self-government [was]... so low as to render the masses helpless" against the politicos, Major General F. J. Kennan, commanding the Philippine Department, declared that "it would manifestly be a crime against humanity to withdraw our protecting supervision and leave these simple people a prey to the small oligarchy now in power and certain to perpetuate that power indefinitely." For both the individual Filipino and the entire race, independence offered "no promise of betterment," but threatened "individual welfare and arrested progress at home

151 Letter, American Legion of the Philippine Islands to the Wood-Forbes Commission, Manila, September 3, 1921, as signed by S. D. Rowlands, Commander, and F. D. Carman, Adjutant, Philippine Department, American Legion, BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

and grave danger from external sources." "It would . . . be an act of extraordinary folly," he concluded, "for the United States at any time, but especially now in view of world conditions, to hand over the unrestricted guidance of a New Philippine Ship of State to hands certainly inexperienced if not fundamentally incompetent, while promising to salvage the outfit when it ran upon the rocks." 153

Although the letters of George H. Fairchild, Herbert L. Heath, and H. B. McCoy differed in many particulars, they agreed that the only solution for the Philippine problem was territorial government. Being convinced that "the main cause of the unsatisfactory conditions" was the preamble to the Jones Law, Fairchild urged its annulment together with "all other statements which might be construed as obligatory promises with reference to independ- ence; leaving the advisability of the granting of independence to be decided by the American people unhampered by any obligatory promises to a time when the Filipino people in numbers, resources, experience and ability are capable of maintaining their independence against external as well as internal foes. . . ." Until then the Islands should be administered "under territorial (colonial) government properly safeguarded against a repetition of the mistakes of the last administration." 154

Because of widespread graft and corruption, Heath was convinced that "a complete and radical change in the form of government was absolutely ne- cessary, not only "to save the face of the Sovereignty responsible for this


condition of corruption," but also "to save the common people from the autocracy of their halfbreeds."\textsuperscript{155}

Denying that a stable Philippine government existed, McCoy recommended repealing the distasteful preamble to the Jones Law and incorporating the Islands "into the territorial possessions of the United States . . . with the ultimate end in view of complete autonomy under American sovereignty, or ultimate statehood."\textsuperscript{156}

Both John W. Green and Harold M. Pitt opposed a territorial government but agreed that independence should be deferred for some years. Pitt urged the United States to issue a proclamation "that for a period of not less than twenty five years the question of independence . . . shall not be considered," so that the Islands would have "full opportunity to develop economically, freed of the irritation caused by a constant political agitation and of the uncertainty as to their status which such agitation of necessity creates . . . ."\textsuperscript{157} Because Green found it "difficult to imagine a greater evil to the Filipino people" than immediate independence, he would have had the United States refuse to consider it for at least thirty years. "Unquestioning and unswerving allegiance to American sovereignty should be exacted," he recommended, "and the passage of any law derogatory to the said sovereignty or discriminating against citizens of the United States prohibited."\textsuperscript{158}

\textsuperscript{155}Letter, Herbert L. Heath to the Wood-Forbes Mission, Manila, July 25, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits. The governmental structure for his proposed Territory of Malaya was sketched by Heath in this letter.

\textsuperscript{156}Letter, H. B. McCoy to Wood and Forbes, Manila, July 16, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

\textsuperscript{157}Letter, Harold M. Pitt to Wood, Oakland, California, May 16, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

\textsuperscript{158}Letter, John W. Green to the Mission, Manila, July 31, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.
Although conditions in the customs service especially troubled Victor C. Hall and A. B. Cresap, they also commented on *independencia*. Hall believed "that the best interests of the United States, the Philippine Islands, and the neighboring countries of the Orient demand that the United States retain a permanent sovereignty over the Philippine Islands," and "that a clear-cut statement of this policy, announced promptly, and a comprehensive outline of the way in which it will be carried out is the only thing that can bring stability to commercial activities here."\(^{159}\) Cresap was convinced "that the Filipino people should not be granted independence more than they have at the present time," and "that the intelligent Filipinos did not want absolute independence. . . ."\(^{160}\)

Associate Justice Thomas A. Street of the Philippine Supreme Court made his position on independence crystal clear: THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS NOT READY FOR INDEPENDENCE. Later he justified this statement:


But this did not mean that he held out absolutely no hope for ultimate independence. If only an ideal world would allow the Filipinos "to work out the problem of their national existence, receiving only the good which the external world has to offer by friendly contact," it was possible that "in

\(^{159}\) Letter, Victor C. Hall to the Mission, Manila, August 30, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

the course of a few hundred [sic!] years" they might "attain to a stable and orderly government over the rocky road of dissension and internal strife - though . . . they might conceivably also . . . revert to their former state."

Then, after pages of detailed exposition and analysis and slashing comments, he concluded this brief as succinctly as any judge could have desired from a prosecuting attorney: "speedy independence means speedy destruction. . . ."\textsuperscript{161}

In the opinion of J. A. Stiver, the politicos had taught the Filipinos to ask for independencia "exactly the same way as we would teach a parrot to say 'Polly wants a cracker.'" Based upon "private conversations with hundreds of . . . [Filipinos] I have never yet found a single . . . [one] who would be dissatisfied [sic] with territorial government," he declared, "and I have found very few [later fixed at less than one percent] who desire separation from the American Government."\textsuperscript{162}

"Personally I hope that the American flag will never be pulled down in the Philippine Islands," Dean C. Worcester declared, "and believe that it is to the best interest of . . . [both Filipinos and Americans] that the islands should permanently remain a part of the territory of the United States." Furthermore, he felt that the Filipinos "should be frankly told the granting of complete independence cannot be seriously considered for many years to come."

"What the vast majority of the Filipino politicians really want," he asserted, "is 'independence under a protectorate,' by which they mean that they should be allowed to do what they please and the United States should

\textsuperscript{161} Memorandum, Thomas A. Street to the Wood-Forbes Mission, no date. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.

\textsuperscript{162} Memorandum, J. A. Stiver to the Mission, Manila, August 24, 1921. BIA, W-F Report Exhibits.
stand by, helping them pay their bills when they run hopelessly into debt and fighting for them should other countries wish to discipline them for misconduct or to occupy and ultimately annex their territory." But such a relationship he considered "inconceivable." 163

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From the day of their arrival in Manila, both Wood and Forbes consistently refused to comment publicly concerning their personal views and conclusions on the ubiquitous topic of independencia. Any such statements prior to the issuance of their formal report by Washington were contained in confidential cablegrams to the Secretary of War.

Quite extensive was the commentary on this subject in what was supposed to have been a brief preliminary report to the President on July 25:

We find desire for ultimate independence general. We are constantly confronted with the statement that the preamble of Jones Bill promises independence, that high American authorities, President Wilson and Governor Harrison, announced to world officially that the condition precedent, namely, establishment of stable government, has been fulfilled. The request is generally for independence under the protection of United States. Though few come out openly against independence, most leaders recognize Filipino people not strong enough to maintain independent nationality... There have been no threats as to what course the Filipino people would pursue if request for independence not granted. ...

... ...

The struggle in the minds of the people is between their aspirations for independence and their judgment. There is a substantial body of citizens of all classes, men and women, who are opposed to any separation from the United States. There is strong feeling of appreciation of what the United States has done. People as a whole are contented and happy and living with more freedom, less taxation and less responsibility than the great majority of peoples on earth. 164


At the conclusion of their final inspection trip, Wood and Forbes had little to add to this preliminary report. "Christian Filipinos are generally for ultimate independence, under the protection of the United States," they cabled, with the Moros "a unit in desiring American control and in case of independence in requesting that Moro Territory be separated from the Northern Islands and held by the United States." Likewise, they had found Americans to be "a unit against independence," and in favor of American control of Moros and Non-Christians. 165

Turning immediately to independencia in the cabled summary of their final report to Harding, they flatly stated, "We find everywhere among Christian Filipinos a desire for independence." Yet some nine-tenths desired it under American protection, with "a substantial minority against independence in any form," including Moros and Non-Christians. They were convinced that no open opponent of independence could be elected to public office, and that there was "a general appreciation among the more enlightened classes that the people are not organized to maintain independence neither economically nor from the standpoint of preparation for national defense." They recommended that the great contributions of Americans—who were "unanimously against independence"—to the development and prosperity of the Islands be considered, "Their interests . . . protected and their enterprise encouraged."

Then the Mission presented their final conclusions concerning independencia in unequivocal words that scarcely could have been misunderstood in Washington—or Manila:

It would be a betrayal of the Filipino people, a misfortune to the American people, a distinct step backward in the path of progress, and a discreditable neglect of our National duty, were we to withdraw from the Islands and

165 Extract of Cable No. 852 from the Governor General of the Philippine Islands to the Secretary of War, September 4, 1921. BIA, W-F Mission File.
terminate our relationships here without giving the Filipinos the best chance possible to have an orderly and permanently stable government. With all their many excellent qualities the experience of the past eight years, during which they have had practical autonomy, has not been such as to justify the people of the United States in relinquishing supervision of the government of the Philippine Islands, withdrawing their Army and Navy and leaving the Islands a prey to any powerful nation coveting their rich soil and potential commercial advantages. 166

Although no new convictions concerning independencia are apparent in the final report, Wood and Forbes had obviously carefully re-thought and re-phrased their ideas and observations. In the main body, they concisely delineated the characteristics of Philippine nationalism:

The great bulk of the Christian Filipinos have a very natural desire for independence; most of them desire independence under the protection of the United States; a very small percentage desire immediate independence with separation from the United States; a very substantial element is opposed to independence, especially at this time. The Moros are a unit against independence and are united for continuance of American control and, in case of separation of the Philippines from the United States, desire their portion of the islands to be retained as American territory under American control. The pagans and non-Christians, constituting about 10 per cent of the population, are for continued American control. They want peace and security. These the Americans have given them.

The Americans in the islands are practically a unit for the continuance of American control.

The people, as a whole, are appreciative of the peace and order which prevail throughout the islands. Many do not understand what independence means, or its responsibilities. They are living under the best conditions they have ever known. It is not generally realized that the American Government cannot be expected to assume responsibility for the results of internal disorders, particularly as they affect the nationals of other powers, the treatment of foreign capital, and external political relations, unless the United States retains a certain measure of control. 167

"We find the people happy, peaceful, and in the main prosperous, and keenly appreciative of the benefits of American rule." Thus the Commissioners opened that summary section of their final report labeled General Conclusions.

166 Cable No. 861 from Acting Governor General Yeater to Secretary of War Weeks, Manila, September 11, 1921. BIA, W-F Mission File.

Yet one acute observation was new: "We find a general failure to appreciate the fact that independence under the protection of another nation is not true independence."168 And the final two sentences carefully summarized their conclusions in order to avoid, it would seem, any possibility of misunderstanding in either Washington or Manila:

We feel that with all their many excellent qualities, the experience of the past eight years, during which they have had practical autonomy, has not been such as to justify the people of the United States relinquishing supervision of the Government of the Philippine Islands, withdrawing their army and navy, and leaving the islands a prey to any powerful nation coveting their rich soil and potential commercial advantages.

In conclusion we are convinced that it would be a betrayal of the Philippine people, a misfortune to the American people, a distinct step backward in the path of progress, and a discreditable neglect of our national duty were we to withdraw from the islands and terminate our relationship there without giving the Filipinos the best chance possible to have an orderly and permanently stable government.169

Four specific recommendations relative to the immediate and future relationships between the United States and the Philippines concluded the entire report:

FIRST--We recommend that the present general status of the Philippine Islands continue until the people have had time to absorb and thoroughly master the powers already in their hands.

SECOND--We recommend that the responsible representative of the United States, the Governor General, have authority commensurate with the responsibilities of his position. In case of failure to secure the necessary corrective action by the Philippine Legislature we recommend that Congress declare null and void legislation which has been enacted diminishing, limiting or dividing the authority granted, the governor general, under . . . the Jones bill.

THIRD--We recommend that in case of a deadlock between the Governor General and the Philippine Senate in the confirmation of appointments that the President of the United States be authorized to make and render final decision.

FOURTH--We recommend that under no circumstances should the American Government permit to be established in the Philippine Islands a situation

168 **Ibid.**, p. 45.
169 **Ibid.**, p. 46.
which would leave the United States in a position of responsibility without authority.170

Certainly these words meant that the momentum which the independencia campaign had generated under the leadership of the politicos—ably assisted and encouraged by Harrison—would now be severely retarded. What the future would hold was then, of course, only a matter for speculation. But it would seem obvious that if independencia were merely based upon a pseudo-nationalism as created, nurtured, and manipulated by Filipino demagogues, the Wood-Forbes Mission had dealt it a mortal blow. If, however, Philippine nationalism were solidly based upon truly national sentiments, ideals, and a widely shared historical heritage, then these investigations with the resulting analysis, description, conclusions, and recommendations by the Mission could clearly provide but little more than a temporary check to the growth and eventual flowering of independencia.

170 Ibid., p. 46. These recommendations will take on added significance when it is remembered that Wood himself had accepted Harding's offer to become the Governor General even before the Mission had completed their work.
CHAPTER XX

FINALE AND OVERTURE

It would seem fitting that the last formal speech for the Mission should have been delivered by Forbes, who would not be returning to the Philippines following the Mission's official visits to Hong Kong, China, Korea, and Japan. Speaking at the University of the Philippines on the morning of their departure, he did not encourage the politicos to feel that they would be pleased with the still secret report. He was convinced that the Islands lacked sufficient resources to maintain a separate, unprotected government, yet he held out the insubstantial hope that it was contrary to traditional American policy to keep an alien people permanently in subjugation against their will.¹

Yet his words of farewell to his second homeland revealed that Forbes's judgments in the Mission's report would be those of a loving, if stern, parent: "I leave the Philippines—perhaps never to return—with a portion of myself left here. My heart, my memories, and my sympathies are with you."

"No one could have portrayed better the real and sincere attitude of W. Cameron Forbes," Quezon's Philippines Herald graciously responded. "A friend of the Filipinos, and a frank critic of misgovernment and inefficiency, Governor Forbes is at heart a well-wisher of this country."²

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After appropriate despedida ceremonies, the Mission sailed from Manila on September 10 aboard the Korea Maru. "Too tired to sleep," Forbes

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¹ New York Times, September 13, 1921.

tossed on his bed, musing on the queer coincidence of being aboard the same ship that had first brought him to the Philippines in 1903, and of even having the same stateroom. 3

The extreme fatigue which overwhelmed Forbes is quite understandable from the Mission's activities during the final week in Manila, which he called "hectic" and "something fierce," averaging only four hours sleep a night. Particularly time-consuming were the visits from Filipinos who "swarmed in past the guards day and night."

"It was hard . . . to keep any cosmos to our last days," Forbes admitted. "I frankly gave up trying to do any real work on the detailed report," which would have required "a week off somewhere by ourselves with our papers all about us. . . ." But this he refused to consider as it would have meant turning away his many Filipino friends. 4

Although the report suffered, it was not entirely neglected as long hours of work finally resulted in a summary for Washington. "As we have to disappoint those Filipinos who wanted and expected immediate independence it is well to have a strong new hand at the helm when the announcement of our findings is given out," Forbes explained in reference to Wood's acceptance of the Governor Generalship. "This in case of any demonstration or destruction. So we worked frantically and finally cabled a summary of our report just before we left." 5

"We are trying very hard to put in the essentials of the situation, with as little offensive material as possible," Wood briefly explained

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3 Manila Times, September 9, 10, 11, 1921; Forbes, Journals, II, 170-71.
4 Ibid., pp. 164-70.
5 Ibid., p. 165.
concerning their difficult task, "and at the same time tell the whole truth." But Forbes commented much more freely on this cabled summary, and his words constitute an invaluable insight into the Mission's entire work:

It is unnecessarily long; it is just not logical in arrangement, nor exactly coherent but it is a powerful document. It tells the story in slashing direct phrases. I put the sting and kick into it myself and General Wood adopted it word for word as I wrote it. There is no ambiguity about the meaning. We have been more than fair to the Filipinos. We have let them down easy. We have failed to tell a lot of home truths that would have stung terribly. We have seen a picture of graft, corruption and decadence that is simply ghastly and yet we've only hinted at it in the report. We have done this for the reasons, first: because we have instances of the same sort of graft and incompetence in our own government at home, not so much national but in cities and towns; and secondly: we want to save their faces and keep their good will and there is no need of rubbing it in too hard. We have given full credit to all the pleasant things we've seen and not emphasized too many of their failures.

Another thing, the failure is by no means wholly theirs; it is Wilson's and Harrison's. Wilson who made an execrable selection and then stood by him in spite of unspeakable performances of which he had full knowledge. Harrison for being just what he was, a degenerate, and renegade. I have come away with a very poor opinion of him, much worse than I'd any idea I should have.

A series of entertainments and honors were accorded the Mission in their tour of China, Korea, and Japan, principally by the Chinese and Japanese governments. From Kobe, Wood and his party sailed for Manila aboard the cruiser New Orleans with one day spent at Formosa en route. Forbes and Bryant sailed for America on October 10 aboard the Golden State."

"... a tinge of sadness was over all of us," Forbes recorded, "as this is the break up of the Mission, a really wonderful group of men, who have had a really wonderful experience together." But he seemed particularly

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6 Wood, Diary, September 8, 1921.
7 Forbes, Journals, II, 171-72.
8 Manila Times, September 13, 27, 29, October 2, 3, 7, 11, 13, 1921; Forbes, Journals, II, 180-97, passim; Wood, Diary, passim.
pleased that Wood had become "really much more cordial than at first," even asking him "again and again to write him 'as though I was his brother', anything that I felt ought to be done in the Islands. He seemed to really want me with him, and several times begged me to try and get away this winter and come back and advise. He said he will pay all expenses there and back if I'd only arrange to come." Although "there wasn't a ghost of a chance," Forbes found "it was pleasant to have him feel that way about it." 9

"I was sincerely sorry to say good-by to Forbes," Wood wrote. "We have worked in the most thorough harmony and our association has been altogether a pleasant and delightful one." 10 And to Forbes's mother he sent a most gracious letter of appreciation for her son's "invaluable . . . [contributions] to the successful conduct of the Mission," which had made their work "much more comprehensive in scope and also much easier than it otherwise would have been." 11

"Johnston, McCoy and Peter [Bowditch] were almost sentimental about our breaking up and all of them were tenderly friendly and solicitous about

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9 Forbes, Journals, II, 199. Near the conclusion of their work a crisis in the relationship between the Commissioners had developed when Wood finally accepted the Governorship. "The General had just taken it for granted I didn't want it," Forbes rather petulantly recorded, "and went right on with his plans to assume the responsibilities and accept as though I were non-existent." This appears all the more strangely petty because of his statements immediately preceding and following: "I had wondered a little if the desire to stay and take up the work wouldn't come to me when I got here and saw it all. Fortunately, it didn't. . . . I told him [Wood] very frankly when he consulted me about his taking over that I had no desire and also explained Dr. Locke's and Dr. Strong's beliefs that I couldn't have stood it and accepted that as final. Which was all right." Ibid., p. 170.

10 Wood, Diary, October 8, 1921.

11 Carbon copy of a letter to Mrs. Wm. H. Forbes, Milton, Massachusetts, dated "Enroute. September 28, 1921." Wood Papers, Box 156. Many other examples of Wood's urbane graciousness can be seen in copies of letters retained in his papers which he wrote as the Mission's work concluded, expressing appreciation for the assistance extended to them.
my feelings and welfare and health," Forbes noted. "In all we had a most harmonious group and made or cemented lasting friendships."  

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Meanwhile in Washington the bureaucratic machinery had moved to provide for Wood's resignation from the Army, for his nomination by Harding as Governor General, and for his confirmation by the Senate. Secretary of War Weeks explained that the Mission's recommendations had been quite "sufficient" to warrant Wood's appointment, and that this should provide assurance that the United States would not "abandon" the Islands. 

"No man in our country has more capacity to plan vital, constructive policies or to direct the execution of them fruitfully," editorially declared a leading American newspaper concerning Wood, while a prominent British periodical affirmed that "his record in Cuba gives promise that he will effectively promote the general welfare of the islands..." But perhaps most generous was a short editorial from the Emporia, Kansas, Gazette which declared that "If ever an unselfish and high-minded man ever lived in this country, that man is he," that he would "make a wise and kindly governor," that America would "be represented by her best mind and heart and soul," and that "He is in the one place where he can serve his country best." "Here is

12 Forbes, Journals, II, 199-200.

13 The documentary materials for these complex maneuvers may be seen in BIA, Wood File "P". For newspaper accounts see Associated Press dispatches, Manila Times, September 24, October 6, 1921; and the New York Times, September 22, 23, 25, October 5, 6, 1921.

14 Ibid., September 21, 1921. Essentially the same item was also printed as an Associated Press dispatch by the Los Angeles Times on the same date and by the Manila Times, September 22, 1921.

a little Kansas prairie rose to cheer you on your lonely way for a day," William Allen White had added. "Luck to you." But the Manila Daily Bulletin was most succinct: "He came; he saw; he accepted."

The San Francisco Chronicle had already fully and freely expressed their opinion. "If General Wood would accept . . . it would be the best thing that could happen to the people of that country and," they gratuitously continued, "what amounts to the same thing, the worst thing that could happen to its politicians." Two days later they added that if the Filipinos were determined to have independence, America should make them a present of Leonard Wood as king so he could be the needed "enlightened, benevolent and powerful autocrat."

Not until Wood had been inaugurated did Quezon comment by extending his "warmest congratulations" and by pledging his "cordial and cheerful cooperation." But as early as June 4, he had privately expressed himself to Wood as being "very anxious" that he accept the Governor Generalship. Yet the two-facedness of this Machiavellian politico was exhibited when he declared in a letter to his compadre Harrison "that the best thing about this appointment is that it was to be for one year only," and when he labeled Wood "the worst selection that could have been made for your successor."

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16 An undated clipping and note in the Wood Papers, Box 158.

17 Editorial, "Speaking For America In The Orient," September 3, 1921.

18 Editorials, "WOOD FOR GOVERNOR-GENERAL: If He Would Accept the Place It Would Be a Great Appointment," July 6, and "VIVA EL REY LEONARDO!: If the Filipinos Would Take Wood as King They Might Make It Alone," July 8, 1921. Quezon's mouthpiece, the Philippines Herald, reprinted this on August 11, in the most prominent spot on page one but without comment. But on August 12 the American-owned and -edited Manila Daily Bulletin could not resist a short untitled editorial rejoinder: "A Frisco paper suggests that General Wood come to the Philippines as king. Why not? We've had a joker for governor general and everybody has played the deuce."

19 Letter, Quezon to Wood, Manila, October 15, 1921, in Wood Papers,
Almost immediately upon his return to Manila, Wood was sworn in as Governor General. His inaugural address explained what he proposed to do for the Filipinos and their country; obviously the elements in this program had grown out of his recently concluded investigative work.

"As you already know," Wood wrote to Dr. J. Norman Henry, president of the General Alumni Society of the University of Pennsylvania, "our investigation developed a situation here of such gravity that I feel I must do what I can to straighten matters out. The situation is one which involves the interests of 10,500,000 people and our own reputation in the islands. It is a call for service which I am sure you will appreciate cannot be disregarded." This meant that the University would be without Wood as provost and explained why he had been willing to retire from active duty as a high ranking Army officer.

Actually, this decision had been months in the making. "There is a tremendously strong pressure being put on here to have me stay and straighten out things," he had written to his wife on July 5. "It comes from all sides, radical Filipinos as well as the conservative, and the Americans as a unit. The situation involves the welfare of ten and one-half million people here and our own reputation."

Box 157; Wood, Diary, June 4, 1921; letter, Quezon to Harrison, Vancouver, British Columbia, no date (but probably early in September, 1921), in the Harrison Papers, Box 44.

For details of the welcome and inaugural ceremonies see the Manila Times, October 16, 1921.

For the text of this speech see the New York Times and the Manila Times, October 16, 1921.

New York Times, October 11, 1921. See also an Associated Press dispatch, Manila Times, October 13, 1921.

To "Dearest Lou," Manila, July 5, 1921. Wood Papers, Box 192.
A few weeks later he returned to this theme, telling her that it was "a tremendous call for Duty [sic]." "I am perfectly conscious of all the disadvantages," he admitted, "but the question is whether one can refuse what is practically a unanimous call, endorsed by all factions." One fundamental obstacle was his promise to the University of Pennsylvania; but he had told them "that in case of war or any emergency - and this seems to be such an emergency - that I should feel entirely free to respond to any call of the President. It is difficult to see just how I can refuse to do so, in view of the condition of demoralization which exists here."

"The situation here is so bad that I cannot go into details," he asserted in a note added in his own hand and obviously as a special effort to convince a possibly reluctant wife. "It is one in which the demand for service is so strong that I cannot I fear resist it and ever again preach unselfish service for country and humanity." And still he was not certain that he had been altogether convincing: "If you knew the details I'm sure you would feel as I do. It means the sacrifice of interest advantages and inclinations for the university to a rather stern sense of duty."

When Wood reached his old command area at Zamboanga, the decision was apparently clinched in his own mind. "The situation is so bad that it is difficult to disregard the appeal," he wrote in his Diary. "In fact, it can't be done."

After their final provincial tour, Wood talked of the problem to Forbes.

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24 Letter, "Len" to "Dearest Louise," Manila, July 29, 1921. Wood Papers, Box 192. Similar comments can be seen in copies of his letters to a number of persons, such as those to Colonel Wm. Cooper Procter, July 4, 1921 (Box 157); to Mrs. Theodore Roosevelt, Manila, July 28, 1921 (Box 157); and to Dr. Lawrence Abbott, aboard the General Alava, off Puerto Princesa, August 26, 1921 (Box 155).

25 Wood, Diary, August 15, 1921.
and others and told them of his decision to accept. To Forbes it came as no
surprise: "It was evident to me from early in our visit that the lure of the
Philippines was working more and more and that the life there appealed to him
greatly. So I wasn't surprised at his finally deciding to do it." 26

And in his letters, it is easily seen that soon after arriving Wood
began to consider the possibility of accepting the Governorship, even though
his references were impersonal. As early as June 9, he had written to Bishop
Brent that "It is going to require the best and strongest kind of leadership
here to put affairs back on the road of Progress and Decency"; that "a vig-
orous and active Governor-General" was needed; that the situation was "one
of very great gravity"; and that he did not know "anything which is more
vitally important just now than the straightening out of this situation." 27

While Wood was thus assuming these responsibilities in the Philippines,
Forbes was crossing the Pacific to deliver their report to Harding in person.
It was largely during the weeks spent in visiting China and Japan that Wood
and Forbes had written this report. "The final form was arranged between the
two members of the mission by radio," Forbes has explained, "as their two
ships, heading in different ways, carried one member to his arduous post in
Manila at the gateway of the Orient, and the other eastward toward the na-
tional capital of the United States in the Occident." 28

26 Forbes, Journals, II, 164.

27 Carbon copy of a letter (copied as underlined), Wood to Bishop C.
H. Brent, Manila, June 9, 1921. Wood Papers, Box 155. Other letters, of
which Wood retained copies, could also be cited: to Mrs. Whitelaw Reid,
June 11, 1921 (Box 157); to William Howard Taft, June 11, 1921 (Box 158);
and to Secretary of War Weeks, June 13, 1921 (Box 158). All at Manila.

28 Forbes, Philippine Islands, II, 297.
Although some time was found for work at various stops en route, the most lengthy and profitable sessions were held aboard ship, with the document being finished at Kyoto on October 3 just before the Mission disbanded. "Our two days in Kyoto were spent ... mostly on the report, morning, noon and night," Forbes has explained, "and finally the last night I worked most of the night on it and brought it down pretty much hashed over." Wood was very pleasant about it all," and finally accepted all the suggestions. "Unfortunately," Forbes added, "a thing like that needed to be gone over, not hurriedly but a dozen times and must of it the General hadn't brought in before, so that I found a lot more to be done after we'd left." Thus his voyage across the Pacific was to be no pleasure cruise.

Because of the final pace, Forbes boarded ship at Kobe "pretty well used up, knowing nobody aboard," so deciding "to work six hours a day on our report and exhibits, and did it for the next sixteen days," with the assistance of Redmayne, his personal secretary. "I wrote up journals but most of the time it was read, read, read, studying and sorting our exhibits, classifying them again and dictating notes," Forbes has explained. Several radiograms were exchanged with Wood as they worked out final details, and Forbes supplied Wood with more than a dozen letters concerning their work.

"As you know," Forbes explained in a later letter to Wood, "I worked all across the ocean on this business, studied the exhibits through, and should have liked to have had two [or?] three weeks of time with you to have gone over them, because I was not entirely satisfied with the material which we had adduced nor the form in which it was placed." Forbes also explained

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29 Wood, Diary, September 13, 14, 16, October 7, 8, 1921; Forbes, Journals, II, 177, 183, 191, 199.
30 Ibid., pp. 201-08.
that at the Secretary of War's request he had spent a week in Washington, preparing cross references in the form of a key from statements in the Report to the supporting trunkful of exhibits. "Of course there is a great deal of material going to support our position and our report to which no cross references are made in my notes," he explained. "... It would have taken me a year to have read them all and completed the cross references. But I think I have given enough references to give abundant sanction for all our more important statements."31

At home in Boston, Forbes talked freely to reporters from two local newspapers. Although he revealed nothing new or startling, he did make one specific claim for their work: "when we wound up, we had covered the islands more thoroughly than ever had been done before."32

In Washington on November 14, Forbes laid the final draft of the Wood-Forbes Report before Secretary of War Weeks, who discussed it with Forbes before they went together to submit it to Harding. Here they spent an hour with the President going over it before other engagements forced a postponement of further consideration.33 On the following day the Report was discussed at a Cabinet meeting, after which Harding expressed gratification with its comprehensiveness. Although details of the Report were not divulged, reporters gained the impression at the White House and at the War Department that it did not recommend immediate independence.34


32 Boston Transcript, November 3, 1921. Essentially the same statement was printed by the Boston Herald, November 6, 1921. Both are clippings in BIA, W-F Mission File.


34 New York Times, November 16, 1921.
In addition to the Mission's formal report, Forbes submitted a lengthy letter to Weeks containing his personal observations and conclusions. It is not entirely clear why he should have felt that this was necessary as none of his statements disagrees with any major statement in the Report. Probably it was an attempt to reinforce various sections in the Report with some personal elaborations presented in a medium through which he could speak more freely.

"Our investigation . . . revealed the fact that the desire for independence is very general," Forbes declared in the opening sentence, "has been systematically fomented and encouraged by the Philippine leaders and by American teachers and officials . . . [and] is so strong that I believe any effort to repress it is likely to result in explosion." He counseled that withdrawing promises of ultimate independence would be "inexpedient," "immoral," and "madness, even though we may be convinced at the present time that they can never maintain a stable government by themselves." He was convinced that it would be "a great many years before they would be able to maintain a stable government if left to their own devices," and that there was "a very fair chance they would never be able to do so."

As racial pride was fundamental to the Filipinos' desire for independence and as typical Orientals they were more interested "in the form than in the substance," Forbes was convinced that they would gladly "accept a thing that would be a little different from what they have now which they could call independence, but it could be hedged around with so many conditions lodged in the hands of representatives of the United States that their actual powers could be limited rather than augmented in the change." If they were given the external trappings of nationality (a flag, their own president, etc.),
the United States could continue to exercise de facto sovereignty while the
politicos "would go out with tremendous acclaim, tell the people that the day
of independence had come, have tremendous celebrations, and stop for a while
agitating for further powers."

A major weakness of the situation, Forbes felt, was the explicit na-
ture of both the independence promise in the Jones Bill and in the statements
by Wilson and Harrison that the Filipinos had complied with its requirements.
But one fact had not been considered by the Filipinos: "... that neither
Wilson nor Harrison acted in good faith. . . ."

Forbes quickly explained, however, that there was "a very sober sen-
timent . . . of conservative people, certainly a minority, which doesn't
want independence and is willing to oppose it, for the most part clandes-
tinely, because independence is the popular cry." Not only could no can-
didate for public office hope for election unless he openly expoused in-
dependencia, but also those who had publicly opposed it before the Mission
"were subjected to violence after we had gone," and some who sought private
interviews "were intimidated on the chance that they had spoken against in-
dependence."

In the fact that more than seventy-seven percent of the petitions
received from municipal governments were in Spanish Forbes found "the
strongest argument . . . we have against independence, and the most convinc-
ing proof of their unfitness . . . ." This clearly indicated to him that the
Filipinos who actually governed at the grass roots level were "those trained
up in Spanish ideas, which were full of graft, corruption, and maladministra-
tion, and in no sense brought up to the modern ideas which must prevail if
the Islands are to progress."

Second only to this as an argument against independence, in Forbes's
personal opinion, was the fact that nearly half of the resolutions received
had not originated spontaneously but had been ordered from above. "The fact that a provincial governor undertakes to order the municipality to perform some function the initiative for which properly rests with the municipality, is proof enough that democratic ideas have not made much headway as between those two units of government," he explained. "The fact that the municipality obeys the order instead of telling the governor to mind his business, shows how far the Spanish despotic idea still prevails."

In Forbes's own mind there was "a grave question" whether the Filipinos were going to be satisfied with the Mission's Report.

The great danger of the situation [he explained] lies in the fact that with a show of justice . . . the Filipino agitator can step forward and demand immediate independence and say he is going to fight if we don't give it. . . . [and] it is perfectly possible that a conflagration might be started by a lot of young hotheads, which would bring it to pass that the United States had a second insurrection on our hands, and that we had to send out troops and kill these young people for insisting upon the "rights" which our own Congress promised them and our own president and official representative in the Islands have told them are theirs.

Neither he nor Wood thought this likely, although it was "perfectly possible . . . [and] might happen whatever is done," and was "much more likely to happen if a tactless or inexperienced governor general were sent out to make experiments." When he delineated in detail the characteristics such a man should possess they were, not surprisingly, almost perfectly matched by Wood.

In conclusion, Forbes recapitulated his recommendations under eight headings, of which the second pointedly advised Harding on the words he should publicly use about the Mission:

That for the present the only statement given out by the President shall be to the effect that no change will be considered until the government shall be creditable to the United States and the people of the Islands, the abuses found by our mission . . . shall be rectified, the judiciary reorganized, finances restored to their proper condition, and efficiency and economy made the watchword of the Islands.
And his final recommendation looked forward to a solution of the vexatious issue of *independencia*:

That consideration be given to the possibility of later satisfying the Philippine desire for what they now consider to be independence [sic!] by creating a supervised republic, with power of intervention before the act in case of certain governmental activities, such as expenditure of the public money, etc., and the power of intervention at any time to remedy existing defects.  

35

Before the Wood-Forbes Report was officially made public by the President, a series of cablegrams was exchanged with Wood to ensure correct timing for its release in both capitals. 36 Wood was also concerned with obtaining some statement by Harding definitely approving the Report prior to its release, which would be both "valuable" and "opportune." 37 Harding, however, saw no necessity for this ("President regards your appointment as general approval of report," McIntyre explained, "and will take up with Congress as soon as practicable your recommendations." 38)

After presenting the Report to the Secretary of War and the President,

35 Letter, Forbes to Weeks, Boston, November 12, 1921, on J. M. Forbes & Co. stationery. BIA, W-F Mission File. With this was filed a memorandum dated February 2, 1922, and initialed by McIntyre, Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, which commented, both favorably and adversely, on Forbes's recommendations. It was apparently only filed. BIA, W-F Mission File.

36 See these cables from Wood: No. 910, October 29, 1921; No. 929, November 18, 1921; and these from the Bureau of Insular Affairs to Wood: No. 836, November 2, 1921; No. 837, November 3, 1921; No. 851, November 19, 1921; No. 854, November 23, 1921; and a memorandum, Weeks to McIntyre, Washington, November 1, 1921. BIA, W-F Mission File.

37 See cable No. 940, Wood to Weeks, Manila, November 28, 1921; a memorandum, McIntyre to Weeks, Washington, November 28, 1921. BIA, W-F Mission File.

Forbes cabled Wood concerning their reactions ("Both well pleased with substance and form of report. Offer no criticisms."). and offered a practical suggestion for forestalling radical Filipino criticism:

Suggest you show report Sergio Osmeña and Manuel Quezon and suggest to them the advisability of their instructing their representatives here, resident commissioners and press bureau, not undertake to contest our statements in order to avoid necessity our publishing exhibits which more damaging to Filipino administration than anything contained in the report which we made purposely moderate and conciliatory. This course suggested by action Jaime C. De Veyra and Gabaldon [the two Resident Commissioners] publishing denial of true and careful statement I made in the speech in regard to condition of courts.39

When Wood allowed Osmeña to read this cable--Quezon was then seriously ill--he noted that Osmeña "seemed to think the suggestion good."40

Soon Wood also decided to allow the leading políticos to read a copy of the Report, "so that they can be familiar with what is coming." Although they were warned to consider it "strictly confidential," this had little significance as on November 19 Wood gave local papers copies "so that they could have their comments and editorials ready the moment we released it."41 And actually the bureaucratic right hand in Washington had not informed the left hand in Manila of its actions, as the Resident Commissioners had been allowed to read the preliminary report, but not to copy from it, as early as October 10. "Assuming that you do not know its contents," they cabled Osmeña, "we have tried to reconstruct it from memory and the following is a brief summary: . . ."42

40 Wood, Diary, November 16, 1921.
41 Ibid., November 19, 1921.
42 Copy of a cablegram, De Veyra and Gabaldon to Osmeña, Washington, D.C., October 10, 1921, enclosed by W. Morgan Shuster in a letter to Harrison,
After the Report was released, according to Forbes, it "received a great deal of attention and much publicity." The New York Times considered it "an honest piece of work," while the Tribune labeled it "sane and practical," because it took into account both "our obligations and commitments in the Philippines as well as the obvious disqualifications of the Filipinos for political independence." "Our share of the 'White Man's Burden' of the Far East must be carried for a while longer," resignedly commented the

New York, November 19, 1921. Harrison Papers, Box 45. Shuster was president of the Century Company which was to publish Harrison's forthcoming book on the Philippines.

Forbes, Philippine Islands, II, 305. In spite of the extensive efforts to coordinate release of the Report in Manila and Washington, misunderstandings developed to nullify these plans and it was released in Manila on November 30 and in Washington on December 2. Extract from BIA cable No. 854, November 23, 1921, in BIA, W-F Mission File; New York Times, November 30, December 3, 1921; Manila Times, November 25, 30, 1921. The complete Report was printed in a special edition of the Manila Times, November 30, 1921; in a special supplement to the Manila Daily Bulletin, November 30, 1921; and in Spanish in La Vanguardia, November 29, 1921.

A typed copy of the Report--marked "original" on the hand lettered cover (REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MISSION TO THE PHILIPPINES) but not signed by either Wood or Forbes--is in the Wood Papers, Box 218. A similar typed copy but signed by both men is in file 22639-A-57 of the National Archives' holdings from the Bureau of Insular Affairs. It is dated only "MANILA, P.I. 1921"; presumably Wood signed this sheet before Forbes sailed from Japan with the rough drafts (Wood has carefully written "Chairman" beneath his typed name with the same pen and ink used to sign his signature). A notation indicates that it was received from the Secretary of War's files in May of 1927. Another typed copy of the Report in the same file box was elaborately tabulated for the Secretary of War with some hundreds of tabs attached to the pages on which notations in India ink have been made and with indications in the margins of the text to confirmatory materials in the exhibits (these documents are referred to by code letters and a page number; a separate sheet gives the code designations for each of the documents in the exhibits). It was stamped as having been received at the Secretary of War's office on November 12, 1921, and labeled REPORT OF THE WOOD-FORBES MISSION TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR. Another typed copy, unsigned but dated October 8, 1921, is in file 22639-A-40. As it is unbound, has been roughly folded and stuffed into a large envelope and is covered with printer's and proofreader's marks, it is assumed that it was the government printer's copy. The most impressive copy came from the Bureau of Printing in Manila and was obviously intended for presentation to Wood. It was printed on heavy, fine quality paper, bound in beautiful red leather, and imprinted in gold on the cover (including Wood's signature). Extra pages were added for use as a picture scrapbook; many pictures of the Mission and their activities were mounted here but, unfortunately, without captions. See Wood Papers, Box 219.
Philadelphia Public Ledger. "The Islands' are too far away and our responsibility too great for us to make any mistake about Filipino fitness." 44

Independence then "would be ruinous," thought the Kansas City Star, while the Cincinnati Enquirer declared that "although we had "lifted a people from the jungle, and delivered them from despotism and graft," each yet needed the other until the Filipinos were ready for independence. "It is ... our duty to keep our flag on the Islands, where it means protection and prosperity, at least until world conditions become more settled," averred the Providence Journal.

Because the United States was the guardian of the Philippines, the Washington Post was firmly convinced that "the question of independence must be settled in Washington, not in Manila." But that America should set a date for granting independence seemed "wholly reasonable" to the New York Evening Post.

Among those papers sympathetic with the Filipinos, the New York World asked if their admittedly sorry financial showing was any worse than New York City's. And a California paper asserted that the United States was "hanging on to the Philippines for our own benefit, and not for the welfare of the inhabitants." 45

English readers in Shanghai were told that the Report was "delightfully refreshing in its cool, clear, common sense." "It is curious," this editor observed, "that the conspicuous absurdity of attempting ... to graft democratic government upon Oriental peoples accustomed for thousands


45 All quotations from "Philippine Independence Put Off," The Literary Digest, LXXI (December 10, 1921), 7-8.
of years only to autocracy . . . still continues to delude unstable minds.”

In the opinion of Sir Michael O'Dwyer, Governor General of India, "every sentence" bore "the stamp of the practical administrator," and demonstrated that the Mission had done its work both "thoroughly and well." "It is high time that an equally sane and convincing announcement of policy . . . was made in regard to British India," he flatteringly concluded, "where a slavish adherence to crude political theories has created a situation even more critical than that of the Philippines." 

Unfortunately, the reaction to the Report of Francis Burton Harrison—the single person most responsible for its unfavorable elements—is not known. Although he delayed finishing the manuscript of his book on the Philippines until he could read the Report, and even though he had received advanced confidential information on it as early as November 10 so that he could counter as he chose, the results were disappointing. His nearest

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46 Editorial, "Wood-Forbes Report," The North-China Herald, CXLI (December 3, 1921), 625-26. At the Mission's stop in Sandakan, Governor Pearson had declared "that the British Colony in North Borneo and, he believed, all British Colonies in the East, are most anxious that we should remain in the Philippines; that America's course in the Philippines was being watched most anxiously by the Eastern colonies of European nations, and, he believed, by their home governments as well. . . . He was very suspicious of the Japanese and their policy. . . ." Wood, Diary, August 24, 1921.


48 See a letter from W. Morgan Shuster, New York, July 18, 1921, in Harrison Papers, Box 43. "I have, I think, a very good idea of what their report will be," Shuster commented. "Between you and me I think they would like to recommend a 'return to military government' but will hardly dare go that far."

49 See another letter from Shuster to Harrison, New York, November 10, 1921, which included a summary of the Mission's preliminary report made by the Resident Commissioners after having been allowed to read it, but not to
answer to Wood and Forbes was in the Preface which merely repeated his prior assertion of complete Philippine readiness for independence. 50

Even though he wrote his comments in Caithnesshire, Scotland, on September 10, 1921, the book was not published until the next year which was plainly too late to have any effect upon the Report. It would seem a certainty, however, that regardless of when they might have been read by Wood and Forbes, these words could have had no effect upon either of them save that of revulsion. A copy of the printed Report was sent to Harrison; but, unfortunately, he made not a single comment, mark, notation, or annotation on it (in fact, from its appearance it would not be possible to prove that he ever even read his copy). 51

"The Filipino people will receive the report with mingled emotion," declared the American-owned Manila Daily Bulletin, ranging from disappointment at its frankness by those most responsible for the "defective system," to "a sigh of relief" by those who opposed independence, and to the presenting of a "list of refutations and denunciations" by "those irreconcilables who see in independence oratory their only hope for maintaining political prestige..." But they hoped "that the Filipino people, appreciating the

make notes (copy of a cablegram, De Veyra and Gabaldon to Osmena, Washington, D.C., October 10, 1921). Harrison Papers, Box 45.


51 Harrison's copy of the Report is filed with his papers in Box 45. He had requested a copy in concluding an almost formal letter to Wood on July 8, 1921, from Scotland. Wood Papers, Box 156. This was in reply to Wood's letter of April 1, written at Fort Sheridan, Illinois, which had rather formally notified Harrison of the Mission and expressed his regret that Harrison would not be in the Islands, thus denying him "an opportunity for a conference with you after your eight years' service as Governor of the Islands... If there is anything to which you desire to specially invite my attention, I shall be delighted to receive it at Manila..." To this offer Harrison made no response. Harrison Papers, Box 43.
spirit in which it is submitted and the caliber of the men responsible for it, will now turn their hands to the task of rehabilitation."52

"We have had hard times in the Philippines, but so has the United States and every other country. Mistakes we have made, but who has not made them?" asked the director of the Philippine Press Bureau in Washington. Regardless of what the Mission had found, he boldly asserted that "conditions in the Islands to-day are better than conditions in any of the independent countries of the world."53

Later the Press Bureau adopted a harder line, claiming that the Report was "utterly discredited, has been repudiated by the people of the Philippines, and can be shot to pieces on any reference to existing facts."54 And two indignant patriots approached Forbes in Washington and threatened to attack him in the press for his part in the Report, and particularly for the section on the judiciary. "Go ahead," Forbes responded, "don't mind me. But go with me and let me show you what we've really got on the courts." The attack never materialized, Dean C. Worcester explained in telling the Manila Rotary Club of the incident.55

Not only did the Report display much ability but "apparently ... the desire to avoid wounding Filipino susceptibilities," Resident Commissioner

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53 "Philippine Independence Put Off," The Literary Digest, LXXI (December 10, 1921), 7-8.

54 An undated press release (but clipped to other materials dated in May, 1922) in Harrison Papers, Box 45.

55 Manila Times, May 25, 1922. "Every statement in the Report is backed up with more than superabundant evidence," Worcester added, "and ... [Wood and Forbes] are perfectly capable of turning an avalanche loose on those who attempt to controvert any statements made in the Report. That is a very good situation, I think."
De Veyra wrote to Harrison. He saw in it "very flattering affirmations," but essentially "a distaste against the Filipino administration and the noble ambitions of my country." 56

"The great majority of the Filipino people have accepted the report with a sigh of relief," Wood himself declared to Major General James G. Harbord, Assistant Chief of Staff in the War Department. "Most of the leaders who are making a great deal of noise now for political purposes have again and again assured the Mission that nothing could be more unfortunate than the withdrawal of American control." 57

To Weeks, Wood reported that although publication of the Report had "aroused intense interest," the Americans and foreigners "and nearly all Filipinos" in private agreed that it was fair and just. The absence of "threats or demonstrations of objectionable character even by those publicly most dissatisfied" he attributed "to sympathetic treatment in the report." 58

Forbes, however, stated that the Report "was not well received by most of the Filipino leaders, although it abounded with pleasing allusions to their good qualities." But they had not "minced words nor hesitated to point out weaknesses or bad points ... where it saw them." He explained that each statement was deliberately made "a careful understatement of fact,"

56 Letter, Jaime C. de Veyra to Harrison, December 17, 1921 (in Spanish). Harrison Papers, Box 45.

57 Carbon copy of a letter, Wood to Harbord, in the Wood Papers, Box 156.

58 Copy of a letter, McIntyre to Forbes, Washington, December 7, 1921, quoting a cablegram from Wood to Weeks of the same date which was decoded and sent to Forbes at Wood's request. BIA, W-F Mission File. An American writer in the employ of the Philippine Press Bureau did not agree with Wood's description of how the Filipinos had received the Report. "When the report was made public the native leaders had much ado to prevent outbreaks of violence. Unfortunately, news of these events did not reach the United States [nor even papers in Manila], which is still largely unaware of the native reactions ... . Resentment became outspoken ... . An émeute in the streets was
with supporting evidence filed in Washington as exhibits being "so much more vigorous and critical of the Filipino than the words in which the statement was couched in the report that the Filipinos were wise not to have assailed the document to an extent that would have brought about the publication of the accompanying exhibits." 

Shortly after the Report's release, Wood "Had a long talk with Mr. Quezon and Mr. Osmena, who both admit that the report of the Mission is fair." Wood then gratuitously suggested that "the best thing to do, feeling the report to be fair, would be to come out with a very simple declaration that the people of the Islands would correct any defects and not to quibble over small points; that a declaration of determination to correct defects would do more to win American support than years of talk and argument." 

Soon after copies of the Wood-Forbes Report were distributed to the Legislature on November 30, a **Nacionalista** caucus in Osmena's office decided to ask Harding to withhold any action on its recommendations until authorized Filipino representatives had been given a hearing. Several **políticos** labeled the Report as unjust while Osmena characterized it as "a severe criticism of Philippine affairs expressed in courteous language." Surprisingly, Quezon had no comments. 

In Washington on that same day the Resident Commissioners conceded prevented by the quick action of the leaders. . . ." Charles Edward Russell, "The Future of The Philippines," **Contemporary Review**, CXXII (December, 1922), 752-54.

59 Forbes, **Philippine Islands**, II, 305.

60 Wood, **Diary**, December 1, 1921.

61 Manila **Times**, San Francisco **Chronicle** (quote from here), December 1, 1921.
that the Report displayed "a lofty interest and a profound sympathy for our people," but refused to accept its conclusions as they were "contrary to the ideals and aspirations of the Filipino people." Particularly objectionable was the recommendation to restrict the Senate's power in case of disagreements with the Governor General over confirmation of appointments. "To a subject people like us," they explained, "[this power]... is a bulwark against possible tyranny on the part of the Governor General. Under the circumstances, therefore, we cannot surrender it." 62

On December 1 the Legislature in joint session adopted a resolution specifically asking Harding not to take any action on the Report until he had heard from the Filipino people. 63 Soon they were encouraged by a message from the Resident Commissioners stating that Harding was willing to comply. 64

Yet there was far from unanimity among the Filipinos on this issue. In La Nacion, its official organ, the Democatas made this gratuitous editorial declaration:

... it is a fact that no Filipino delegation can deny the truths printed in the report of the Mission. Should the Delegates air the Filipino case in the halls of the American Congress, it would be still worse for the Philippine Islands, because then the whole history of the scandals and calamities which characterized the administration of Harrison in the islands will be unfolded before the bar of American public opinion.

What is more important for us to do at the present time is to accept the bitter truth, and to rectify the errors of the past. ... 65

62 Associated Press dispatch, Los Angeles Times, December 1, 1921.
63 Manila Times, December 2, 1921.
64 New York Times, December 7, 1921; Manila Times, December 8, 1921. In a letter dated December 15, 1921, at the White House, Harding informed Wood that "The Philippine leaders have been very insistent about our holding up any legislative program designed to carry out the recommendations in your report, until they can have a delegation heard by me. I have told them that we will never be deaf to a petition for a hearing. Accordingly any recommendations are awaiting the arrival of the Philippine delegation so that its petition may be heard." Wood Papers, Box 156.
65 As quoted in D. R. Williams, The United States and the Philippines.
Yet perhaps the most telling opposition came from a convention of the Philippine Federation of Women's Clubs in Manila on December 12 at which a resolution by Mrs. Clarence Wrentmore, mother-in-law of former Governor General Harrison, urged that part of the Independence Fund be diverted to improve deplorable conditions among lepers and the indigent poor as a concrete argument in favor of independence. Enthusiastic support came from the floor and arguments urged that politicos devote more time to improving insular conditions instead of advocating removal of American influence which had brought the blessings of civilization. Complete withdrawal of the United States was opposed because "a vast majority" of Filipinos "were unfitted for self-government as yet and complete independence would mean ... [their] exploitation ... [by] Tagalogs and other educated ... [Filipinos]." 66

And what was Quezon's solution for the dilemma faced by his people? "We do not want nor need American protection," he told a Nacionalista convention in Manila on December 12. "It is unworthy of people clamoring for independence to ask for help, protection or compassion. Only those ready to maintain independence deserve freedom. If the Filipinos wish not to live under a master they must assume entire responsibility for their existence." 67

Later Quezon melodramatically declared that he would willingly go to

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(New York, 1924), p. 198.

66 Cable by Roy C. Bennett, Los Angeles Times, December 15, 1921.

67 "Philippine Independents," The North-China Herald, CXLI (December 17, 1921), 753; New York Times, December 14, 1921 (quote from here); direct cable by Roy C. Bennett, Los Angeles Times, December 14, 1921. These sources indicate that Quezon, as chairman of the Platform Committee, presented the draft of a platform calling for immediate independence, woman suffrage, adoption of English as the official language, the conservation and exploitation of natural resources for and by Filipinos, the establishment of a complete plan for national defense, freedom of the judiciary from political influence, promotion of public schools, and the creation of a new department of health and sanitation.
Washington to fight for *independencia* even though it might mean his death. Explaining that his physicians had advised against this (he had suffered from tuberculosis for years), he nevertheless declared that "If such is the desire of my people, I will not hesitate to go, despite the fact that I know such action might bring about my death. But I am ready to serve my people and will go wherever they command me to go." 68

With the signing of the Four-Power Pacific Treaty in Washington on December 13, 1921, the *politicos* took courage, trusting that the bogey of the Japanese threat to the Philippines had finally been interred. "With a single stroke the Administration has killed what . . . has been a powerful factor, if not the most powerful factor, in public opinion in the United States against . . . independence," declared the Press Bureau. 69

While awaiting organized action from Manila, the Resident Commissioners in Washington were active--certainly upon instructions from the chief *politicos*--in "answering" the Report. On December 13, 1921, they addressed a letter to Harding which feebly attempted this task. Rehashing the standard arguments for independence, referring to "hasty criticisms" in the Report, and countering some of its charges by citing short-comings in the United States, they urged the United States to follow England's example in freeing Ireland. Challenging Harding, "as the leader of high national ideals," to emulate this "spirit of justice and good will," they expressed their "implicit confidence" in him and the American Government and their belief "that an early

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68 *Manila Times*, December 17, 1921.

performance of pledges repeatedly made ... will be kept." 70 "In this letter they carefully culled from the context [of the Report] such words of praise as the members of the mission felt justified to make," Forbes wryly observed, "and held these up to the President as proof of the stability of their government and of their readiness for the independence which the letter requested." 71

Together with two other documents, this letter was introduced into the Congressional Record as an extension of Resident Commissioner Jaime C. de Veyra's remarks ("The Filipinos' Answer to the Wood-Forbes Report"). The second document—a speech by Osmeña to the delegates at the Nacionalista convention in Manila on December 3, 1921—was a perfunctory reiteration of Philippine progress, governmental stability, and entire readiness for independence, with no direct references to the Mission or its Report.

The third, and by far the most significant, document was an analysis of the Report by Professor Maximo M. Kalaw, Dean of the College of Liberal Arts, University of the Philippines. Kalaw frankly admitted that "possibly its greatest merit" was that the Report pointed out "in a graphic form some of the grave mistakes that have been committed during the last eight years," thus presenting "the possibilities of the improvements that can be made." Although feeling that Justice had been done "to some very salient and notable characteristics of the Filipino people," he noted that "its compliments are always followed by 'but's' which go far deeper to prove the present incapacity of the Filipino people to support by themselves any decent constitutional government."

Specifically, he enumerated some of their "shortcomings and defi-

70 Congressional Record, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 13263-64.
71 Forbes, Philippine Islands, II, 306.
ciencies":

The lack of sufficient press which will insure a sound public opinion; the mistakes that have been made in the finances; the delay in the administration of justice; the need of good teachers both in the schools and in the higher institutions of learning; the inadequate treatment and care of dependent peoples; the defects of the election law—all these are more or less recognized by the majority of the people, and measures are already afoot for their correction.

And in the area of sound finances, "we must confess that the Filipino people have made the greatest blunders," he added, but with the face-saving comment that their situation was "not as bad as that of other countries where moratoriums have had to be declared."^72

"The recommendations made by the mission are unsatisfactory to my people," Resident Commissioner Isauro Gabaldon declared in a lengthy speech on the floor of the House on January 20, 1922. "We can neither agree to them or [sic] accept them. We can reach no other conclusion than that the object of the investigations was to find excuses for delaying independence instead of to fulfill the promise of independence upon the establishment of a stable government contained in the Jones Law of 1916."

"My answer to the Wood-Forbes report," Gabaldon stated, "is to demand anew, and with more emphasis than ever before, the immediate granting of independence ... I insist that this is the only logical and righteous answer ... to this report, because it does not contain a single justifiable reason

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^72 For De Veyra's entire extension of remarks, see Congressional Record, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 13263-68. Kalaw's document was an extensive and detailed analysis of the Report and also a lengthy reiteration of Philippine independence desires; it went into the background for the sending of the Wood-Forbes Mission, their instructions, etc.; but it did not attempt to answer most of the charges in the Report, although it labeled the recommendations "a backward policy." De Veyra proudly sent a copy of this "Reply" to Harrison and suggested he add it to the Report. Harrison Papers, Box 45. With this Harrison filed a pamphlet version of De Veyra's "Reply" as printed at the Government Printing Office in 1922.
for America to longer postpone the keeping of its solemn pledge to us." Because no "condition or attainment or virtue" was demanded except governmental stability, Gabaldon contended "that the Wood-Forbes report could have justified the further delaying of independence only by proving that we have not yet established the specified stable government." Because it "absolutely failed to disprove this fact," and the Mission "could not successfully meet the real issue involved, it proceeded to ignore it." If such "a clever but unworthy attempt to change the issue from that of stable government to a multitude of other conditions not required by Congress" were accepted, "then independence can be denied to Filipinos forever."

As to the Report's four specific recommendations, Gabaldon labeled them "autocratic, militaristic, and reactionary, not compatible with American history, American institutions, or the teachings of America's great men of the past." Because these constituted a "backward policy," he felt confident that Harding would not approve them and thus break his recent promise. And their enactment would constitute a denial of the principle that "governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed," and would countenance "taxation without representation," thus "reducing the immortal Declaration of Independence to a mere scrap of paper."

In conclusion, Gabaldon invoked the Filipinos as "inheritors of centuries of struggle for liberty" before proclaiming his "most solemn protest against the report . . . With all earnestness, in all sobriety of thought and purpose, with all the respect and honor due from us to the great American Nation, our benefactor," he forcefully declared, "I protest against that report, because it is inaccurate, unfair, misleading, unrighteous, uninformed and unenlightened."

73 Congressional Record, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 1483-86.
From the February 18 meeting of the Independence Commission, at which it was definitely decided that a mission should be sent to Washington to answer the Wood-Forbes Report, until this group finally sailed on April 30, 1922, a series of complicated disputes harassed its progress. Privately to the politicos, Wood expressed his firm opposition to the mission. Quezon, with whom he "had a very frank talk," declared "that he thought it would be a great mistake to attempt to criticise the Report and pull it to pieces."

He then went on to say [Wood carefully recorded], General, the Report is an honest report and the facts are as stated and the less we say about the report the better. I then said to him that if they did not care to discuss the Report all they would need to say was that whatever defects exist in the government they were going to correct them. I told him if they made this statement they would certainly make a favorable impression in the beginning, whereas any attempt to discredit the Report would certainly lead to controversy in which they would come out second best.

According to their instructions from the Independence Commission, the Second Philippine Independence Mission was being sent to the United States "to obtain . . . the immediate recognition of the absolute and complete independence of our country." They would not have "to dwell upon the progress realized by our country under the administration of Filipinos . . . [because] this progress has been recognized in great part by the [Wood-Forbes] report

Extensive excerpts were printed by the Manila Times, March 20, 1922, after printed copies were received in Manila. Gabaldon proudly enclosed a copy in his letter to Harrison, dated at Washington, D.C., January 21, 1922. Gabaldon stated to Harrison that this speech constituted the greatest satisfaction that he had ever experienced as a Resident Commissioner. Filed together with these documents was a copy of this speech prepared as a pamphlet by the Government Printing Office.

74 Manila Times, February 19 to April 30, 1921, passim. See also the New York Times, April 22, 28, May 1, 1922.

75 Wood, Diary, April 25, 28 (quotes from here), 1921.
..." But there were "motives" for questioning "certain parts of the report ... especially those which refer to the stability of the actual Filipino government." It was to be "the special care of the mission, in the event that public opinion in America has been unfavorably impressed" by the Wood-Forbes Report, "to give out truthful and actual facts and describe actual conditions ... as well as the satisfactory results obtained under the present government together with the enviable prospects which the future holds for the establishment of a government completely and absolutely independent."76

"No special interest in the sailing of the Mission yesterday," Wood noted on May 1. "All enthusiasm seems to be rather artificial."77

Accompanied by Secretary of War Weeks, the Philippine Parliamentary Mission was received at the White House by President Harding on June 17, 1922. The entire group remained standing for more than half an hour while Quezon read their seventeen page memorial.

After explaining that they were "charged to resume the negotiations for the independence of the Philippines begun by the first Philippine Mission sent in 1919," this lengthy document reviewed the history of American-Philippine relations since 1898. Extensive attention was devoted to proving that the "stable government" demanded by the Jones Law as a prerequisite to independence had been fully met. "Even the report of the Wood-Forbes Mission, which is generally considered severe and critical," it declared in what was surely considered a telling point, "does not deny this assertion."

76 Manila Times, April 20, 1922. Herein was printed the entire text of these lengthy instructions, a portion of which were printed in the New York Times, May 21, 1922.

77 Wood, Diary, May 1, 1922.
Many pages were devoted to explaining in detail conditions in the Islands which, it was claimed, qualified the Filipinos for an independent international existence. Each assertion was buttressed with carefully selected and edited excerpts from the Wood-Forbes Report. Their concluding plea ("from the only Christian people in the Orient") was for "complete emancipation" at a time "when the American nation swells with pride over her wise statesmanship in world affairs, and when all the nations of the earth are watching and scrutinizing every deed, every word, and every purpose of the foremost leader of modern civilization—the United States." 

Pleading that it would not be just to them nor fair to himself if he were to reply then, Harding asked the mission to return later for a statement on the Philippine policy of his administration. But he was careful to explain that Congress had final authority in such matters.

"I heard with deep interest and have read with full deliberation, the petition which you delivered to me," Harding began when the mission was received at the White House again on June 22. "I can only commend the Philippine aspirations to independence and complete self-sovereignty," he continued. "None in America would wish you to be without national aspirations. You would be unfitted for the solemn duties of self-government without them." Thus the time for independence was the only major point of difference. "You crave it now," he declared, "and I do not believe the time has

78 The Manila Times noted that they had "found it convenient . . . in some instances to quote only parts of sentences . . . and to ignore the general context." Editorial, "The Second Independence Mission's Memorial," June 19, 1922.

79 From a special cabled dispatch to La Vanguardia as printed in the Manila Times, June 18, 1922. The entire document was also printed in the Congressional Record, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 9110-12.

80 Manila Times, June 19, 25, 1921.
arrived for the final decision."

"We have extended you control in government," Harding stated, "until little remains but the executive authority without which we could not assume our responsibility." He explained that it "would be less than candid and fair if I did not tell you that we assume no responsibility without that authority."

"Frankly, then, with everything considered, with fullest appreciations of your aspirations, with shared pride in your achievements, with gratitude for your loyalty, with reiterated assurance that we mean to hold no people under the flag who do not rejoice in that relationship," Harding affirmed after specifically referring to the work of the Wood-Forbes Mission, "I must say to you that the time is not ripe for your independence." And when this might be, he cautioned, "is not for me to say whether the day is distant or near."

"Meanwhile," he concluded, "I can only renew the proven assurance of our good intentions, our desire to be helpful without exacting from your private or public purse or restricting the freedom under which men and people aspire and achieve. No backward step is contemplated, no diminution of your domestic control is to be sought. Our relation to your domestic affairs is that of an unselfish devotion which is born of our feat in opening to you the way of liberty."..."^81

Upon leaving the White House the mission declined to comment to the press on Harding's reply; even Quezon was silent. It was left to Resident Commissioner De Veyra to complete their work. On June 30 he was granted permission by the House to extend his remarks by having printed "a statement

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^81 Ibid., July 5, 1922.

^82 Associated Press dispatch, Ibid., June 25, 1922.
of the actual [sic!] conditions of the Philippines by the parliamentary mission..." The result was a tremendously detailed historical sketch and analysis which was obviously intended to portray a progressive, well-organized, and effectively functioning stable government ready to sever all ties with the United States. But no attempt was made to answer the Report specifically point by point.  

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Quite in contrast to his usual performance, Quezon declined to make a public statement upon his return to Manila; but later that day, after the traditionally enthusiastic welcoming ceremonies, he returned to his normal effusive self. After warning that the independence campaign would be costly, he urged that more missions be sent although frankly admitting that he had no hope for achieving independence under Harding.  

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Certainly inaction was unthinkable for the politicos if they were to retain the support of the Filipino masses; Juan de la Cruz had been so thoroughly saturated with independence propaganda that he would surely equate silence and inaction with treason. What could be done in a practical and realistic way? Would there develop a determination to meet the charges in the Wood-Forbes Report by concerted efforts to raise the level of their political and economic conduct, or would there be a continuation of the tried ways of propaganda and manipulation?

Taking advantage of the national disappointment for personal gain,

83 Congressional Record, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 9821-44. An Appendix (p. 9844) contains the "Instructions of the Commission of Independence to the Philippine Parliamentary Mission."

84 Manila Times, August 20, 1922.
Quezon obtained a decisive political victory over his arch rival, Osmena. Indignantly withdrawing from the *Nacionalista* Party on the pretext that it was being run in a dictatorial manner by Osmena, that he was personally responsible for the shortcomings revealed in the Wood-Forbes Report, and that the party under his leadership had failed to conduct the independence campaign properly, Quezon and his followers formed the *Colectivista* Party. In the 1922 elections, the new party won control of the Legislature, making Quezon the indisputable chief among the *políticos*. Demonstrating that they were the true party of genuine patriotism, the *Colectivistas* adopted an official platform demanding immediate and complete independence, which Quezon maintained "was the best reply to the Wood-Forbes mission report."  

Yet regardless of the search for scapegoats in Manila, the accuracy of the facts in the Wood-Forbes Report was never directly and officially attacked. Maintained in reserve to counter any such move were the voluminous exhibits which Forbes had personally brought to Washington in a trunk. "In case of any formal inquiry these will be main evidence in support," Wood had cabled the War Department, "and should be held confidential until that time." Forbes concurred, commenting that he readily understood why the new Governor General "should not want to have the brick in the hat exposed."  

Shortly before the Wood-Forbes Report was made public, the Manila Spanish language newspaper *Integridad* had declared that the Report would "weigh in the balance the Filipino pro-independence Heart and say whether

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86 Extract from cable No. 45, Governor General of the Philippine Islands to the Bureau of Insular Affairs, February 17, 1922; letter, Forbes to McIntyre, Boston, February 23, 1922. BIA, W-F Mission File.
or not the judgment shall be Mene mene tekel upharsin.\textsuperscript{87} The writing on
the wall of Malacanan Palace had indeed been carefully read and interpreted
by two modern prophets during what Forbes had described, with obvious pride,
as the most thorough and careful investigation of any country in the annals
of history ("I venture to say," he had written to the Secretary of War even
before their work was finished, "that there has never before been such a
careful scrutiny of this country, or any other country, as we have made."\textsuperscript{88}).
And for Quezon, Osmena, and their fellow politicos, the interpretation of
the writing on the wall was the same as it had been for Belshazzar and
Babylon: "Thou art weighed in the balances, and art found wanting." But in
this instance, one of the prophets would remain to supervise the work of
reconstruction, serving in this capacity until his death in 1927.

And for this task he had been admirably prepared by his recently
completed assignment. "I have been so thoroughly through the Islands that
I know what is needed and what I want to do," Wood confided to his Diary as
he worked on his first message to the Legislature.\textsuperscript{89} To the Secretary of
War he later reported that the vast quantity of data collected by the Mission
had proved to be "invaluable in correcting abuses and formulating our
policy."\textsuperscript{90}

And their conclusions had definitely been conservative, Wood soon
realized. "The job is bigger and bigger as we look into it," he wrote
Kinsley. "Pretty much every lid that is lifted uncovers conditions which

\textsuperscript{87} Quoted in the Manila Times, October 15, 1921.
\textsuperscript{88} Letter, Forbes to Weeks, August 6, 1921. BIA, W-F Mission File.
\textsuperscript{89} Wood, Diary, October 16, 1921.
\textsuperscript{90} Carbon copy of a letter, Wood to Weeks, Manila, November 1, 1921.
Wood Papers, Box 158.
indicate the need of radical measures of reform... We certainly were very conservative in the statements made in the Report."\textsuperscript{91} And to Theodore Roosevelt's widow he wrote that there was "a vast amount of work to be done to untangle one of the worst conceivable muddles and straighten out administrative confusion."\textsuperscript{92}

\textsuperscript{91} Copy of a letter, Wood to Philip Kinsley (in care of the Chicago Tribune), Manila, November 25, 1921. Wood Papers, Box 156.

\textsuperscript{92} Copy of a letter, Wood to Mrs. Theodore Roosevelt, December 10, 1921. Wood Papers, Box 157.
CHAPTER XXI

EPILOGUE

As a direct result of Harding's decision to send an investigating mission to the Philippines, Leonard Wood personally became thoroughly aware of the critical nature of Philippine conditions and convinced that duty called him to the Governorship. And in this key position he forced the Filipinos and their politicos to clean their national house and institute urgently needed reforms. With little sympathy for the demagogic pattern of political leadership which had flourished under Harrison, Wood directed the politicos during an extended period of apprenticeship. Optimistically he anticipated that such practical schooling would progressively alienate the Filipinos from their Spanish heritage (and the equally pernicious and more recent influence of a Governor General steeped in the corrupt heritage of Tammany Hall) that politics was primarily a means for exploiting one's fellow citizens for personal gain and to satisfy a lust for power. Hopefully he desired their conversion to the American ideal of political office as principally an honored avenue for service without personal profit, and in this Wood himself set an enviable and visible example.

Although Wood's firm hand at the helm was not pleasing to the politicos, the postponement of independencia while their desperately needed apprenticeship in the school of responsible democratic political leadership continued would seem to have been a critical element in providing the Islands with the minimal requisite stability to keep their ship of state afloat when the United States eventually withdrew her restraining hand and declared her independence from the Philippines.
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